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ABSTRACT 
Since the days of Ranade, Naoroji and Dutt and other 'moderate 
nationalist' economic thinkers, a positive state intervention in economic 
activities was considered as essential for the development of the Indian 
economy. It was this notion which was eventually to develop into the idea 
of planning during the two decades prior to Independence. But however 
nationalist, this idea, far from being the product of any autonomous Indian 
thinking on the question, was formed not merely in response to British 
bureaucratic efforts at planning but acquired much of its content from the 
latter. 
The official effort for socio-econ~mic p:anning in India started in 1930 
when George Schuster and some other British administrators took the initiative 
to Ferm an Economic Advisory Council. Although that effort was to end in 
failure, the idea of planning became popular amongst a section of the Indian 
elites. By the late nineteen-thirties it became central to nationalist 
economic thought. 
Bureaucratic effort at planning was revived with the advent of the 
Second World War. The Indian elites, including lhe leading capitalists, 
produced their own plans during the war-period. Both the nationalists and the 
colonialists found a common ground in the idea of planning as a method of 
industrialising the economy. Althouqh Gandhiar1s and some 'leftists' produced 
a number of alternative idPas of planning For socio-economic development, 
'industrialism' remained the dominant ideology both among the colonial 
rulers and the majorjty of lhe Indian elites. However, the reality of 
agrarian poverty and discontent forced them to consider the qtJestion of UlP 
development of agriculture as one of primary importance, and boU1 souqht ib> 
solution in a technological improvement of agricultural productivity and r1ol 
in the restructuring of the social and political relations of landPd 
property. 
After the Transfer of Power, the ne1v Government formed by Lile Irnlim1 
National Congress follo1'led in th~ footsteps of i tG colonial prl'clccr>suor. 
Faced with the socio-economic crisis created by the Partition and aggravated 
by lo\'/ productivity and profiteering in the private sPc!or of thC' ecor1omy, 
the new Government delayed its programmes for lwsic reforms. 1r'ihrn Jmmharlal 
Nehru ultimatPly launched the First Five-Year Plnn. it ;·;;is Coumi to contain 
little more than what had already been envisaged in thP turPalH'rat ic plans 
formulated during the last few yenrs of British rule. In t>ffPd, the> 
Nehruvian project thus amounted to a programme of stale-participation in a 
politico-economic process which increased the economic nnd polilicnl p~nver 
of the Indian elites. 
It is the aim of this thesis to make a survey of the idea of plrnminCJ 
from its very inception, in the convergence of administrative efforts at 
regulating the colonial economy and early nationalist efforts to bend that 
economy in favour of private Indian enterpriseJuntil such time,when that idea 
matures in independent 1ndian attempts at formulating plan programmes on the 
eve of Lhe Transfer of Power and lo realise those efforts in the policies of 
the post-colonial Government of India in the First 1-ive-Year Plan. 
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CHAPTER I 
IN fRDDUCT ION 
:·ifil·'i Jm·:cihnrk: Nehru launched the First Fivr-YPar Plan in }9r,,. the 
""Per1ment qcrwratt>d 3 lot of PnthtmiRsm at home rmd abroad. 1hP procr>ss \'JBS 
\ i1•\·1HJ tiy mnny ns yet another aspt>ct of thP uniqueness of India Llmong the 
Third ;forld cmmtrie~;. The supportrrs of Nc>hruvicin plmminq found elt>ments 
of 1;;:mdhian or de>mocral ic sociali~;m in it. The critic~;, depPndirnJ on llwir 
pol1lici1l vie1vs, sm; in it Uw de\PlopmPnt of an 'indcpcndi:>nt capitalist, 
\·/clf:l!'l' Sl~1lP 1 , a 'biq-bourqcoi'.; hiq-Lmdlnrd StrilP' nr the perpetuation of 
cnnt ined larrw 1 v to cinri h<> inq t erhriic:il reasons for Uw failure ur t>tJCTP<;s 
ur the' Pl<ms. 1\lthouqh LhP idea of 'rni\Pd-Pconorn1c pl;inn1nq 1 • NiU1 <l lartje 
nu1.r·l nr1r>, arnl Imlia !J:lVP h';1dC'rchip to o!hrr Third \'lorld courilriPf> in this 
rPriard. t.hcrc i:; h<irdl~ ;my hi;;tor1cal on<ilv~;is or LhP P\nlut illfl of this idea 
rn lnd1a. :Jurne authm·:; hH\l' includr>d a hriPf rPsurn:· of tlw plan proqrcimrnes 
of lhP pPriod prior to l':i.'f7 io provide n quaui-hinorir·al backqround lo Uwir 
vmr k. R11l PVt'n in such C<Jf3P~J thC' di iJcuss inti i" l n•at Pd H:i no mDrP than u 
'prr>-his1ory' of ;1 prorr:s,3 supposed lo hm(' ciH11mpr1cPd only HftPr LhP lrnnsfor 
of Powrr. 1 
In f]PnPrnl, the' wrHlen history nf plmmirnJ in Indio storts \·Jilh 
ImJf'pl~r1dPricn. In most of thP PXi!lling litPrature, plnnning is seen as an 
outonomous procPu:; introduced by the nnt imm li s Li; 1 r:d by Nehru, i t.s 'nrchit Pct; 
mid is trE'ntrd primari Iy BB mi Pccmornic phPnorn0nor1 distinct from politics. 
It h> rioteworthy thnt nlmosL thP r>nt ire discussion on the subject grew up out 
of 1·wrkn hy Pconorni:c;ls. Tht' sPparntion of the politicnl trom the economic 
Pmnnates from the developrnPnL of 'economics' RS a tool for the study of market 
phenomenn in all their intricacies. Gut. thiH separation makes it difficult 
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to underst mid t hP nature nf 'plcmning' which necessarily involves slale 
policies, :md !'f'Pn'~;f'r1L:.> thereby the inl:ermeshing of 'politics' and 'economics'. 
Tt1is qeneral trend of treatinq planning primarily as a post-independence 
Prnrmmic prm'Pss. has it:; excertions in the 1vorks of E.M.S. Namboodiripad2 
3 
and r .H. Frm1kel. \imnboodiripad has situated the idea of planning within the 
t rr1mPwork of Indfon Pcormmic and politicnl thouqht. I rankel has tried to 
c-..;pl 1c:itP the 'pnrndox' of Nehruvion socialism based on the Gandhian concepts 
of :;ucinJ rPform. But thr.re has as yPt been no at.tempt made to write n com-
pn•hens ive his Lory of planning in India, as i l Pvol vPd through the strugglP 
for independence. A study of the history of Lhe idea of planning will, it is 
hopPd, help to mnkr> up for this l<Jcunn to some extent and contribute lo an 
uridPrstandinq of the poli t.ical implicntions of ideus and meusures rolnLed to 
economic plnr111in~1 both in nationalbl and colonir,Jist tho•JCJht and practice 
in India, lwfor•p and immediately after Indcrwndencr~. 
Hm \'/Ord 'plunninq' hnr; m1 Hurci of progress at tach~d to it. L ven Lo 
people critical of the Indian pl;ins, lhf' C'OllCf'pt nr pl;mninq relatPS to i1 
proqrr:sstvr plwnom<>non. Plrnminq is reqGrdPd bv tilf'm variously BS socialism, 4 
a part of socialism,'.> an pffurl lo build independent capitalism, 6 ci \vPBpon 
-, 
of anti-imperialitit struqqh' of Indim1mdionalit>t.s, 1 onrl so on. lndPed, in 
LhP ox is! ing hJStoriogrRrhy, plnnnimJ hu~' us~airnPd UH' dwracter of un ind0-
pendent and autor1omm11-; t~ffort by Indian nolionuliGLs, 1·1ith no notice taken 
of the significancP of the dose link and resemhlancl' bctl-1Pen tho Lirsl five-
yr;ar rlan and the prccedinq British plHns of Llw ninetE'en-forties. 
In the works of those outhors who look upor1 plmininc:i aG a progrcssivl' 
phenomf~rrnn, the chronoloqicfll sequE'nce stnrt.s almost invariably with H. 
Visvesvnraya's book of' 1934, B and then goes throuqh the Naliomil Planning 
Committee formPcJ by the Indian National Congress in 1938 lo the Bombay Plan 
of the Indian capitalists of 1944. The People's Plan and the Gandhian Plan 
arP. mentioned en passant and an acknm/ledgemcmt. is made of the efforts made 
I 
I 
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by Dalal. an Indian businessman who hPaded the Planning and Development 
Department v1hich prciduced the plans of the Government of India in the mid-
for! iPs. ln all lhir;, thP fact which is gr>nerally missed out is that already 
in tlw t>ar1\ nir10Leen-thirties the Britiuh officials in India had tried to 
sPt un a plan machinery and that in at least one province, the U.P., a 
;>l:~mninq commit lr'e had alrPady been formed in 1934. 
fhP exp1wml ion of l his omission lic:>s in the idPology of all these 
historians, both of thP 'Right' arnl Uw 'Lr'fL' VBriPty. 'Planning' to them 
is a pArt ot a nationalist offensive, developed during the struggle far 
independPr1ce within the overall strategy to brinq about a bourqeois-democratic 
re\olution - if nn! snci<ilisrn - in Imlia. flence thP senrch for Indinn 
planning 'pionoerf,'. l\en v1iU1 \iamboodiripad, a M'll-knmm Marxist, the 
criticism ot Visvesvaroya's Plan is meant not to 'detract from ils importance 
a;; lhP firsl srTirnm att<~mpl cit tncklin~1 lnd1L1 1 s Lwsic problems'. He reqards 
this book as 'Lhl' prP('Ursor of UH~ <:;uhsequPnt d f orb> made by the bourgeoisie 
to reorganise and rnoderniSl' Indifm uconorny alorHJ capitalist linP', and cites 
it <JS P\'idPflC'P in support Of his OMl fjPrlP!'rili~;HliOll that Uw~:;p lmurCJPCliSie, 
once e11trPnchPd in prn·1P1', l'uuld 'um• lht> Stuh' mrich111ery as instruments of 
q 
struggle against irr:;:::erialism . tk t lum crmcPdP[:; the claim made by the 
stratPgy for oripos.inq the inipPrial i~;l. pn•sPr1cn in India. In addition, he 
sePrns lo HtJr_j(JPE>t thnt 'plann1nq', evPn of the Visvt'r>varaya kir1d, 1•1aH t.he 
only me!=lns of Uwklinu Iridta'E> basic problems. llr>n' he is on common grm.nd 
with bourgeois idPnlmJuPn HlH'h cis ~Pliru, and it is worth dwelling a little 
longer on thP nrqurnenU; they put fonmrd. 
It is wirlelv acknnwledqcd that the success of Lhe first plan in Soviel 
Russia during 1928-33, in ut1arp contrast Lo the crisis of the Great Depression 
uf that period in the capitalist wnrld, made the entire world 'plan-conscious'. 
Thal. success led many of the non-social isl rrnt. ions to take up planning as a 
serious measure to develop their economies and to attempt to solve their 
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economic problems lhrnu9h planned state intervention. In the USSR the idea 
of planning served as a political concept to mobilise the entire people to 
transform the society. Since the Soviet State had nationalised all the major 
branrhPs nf the economy, it was incumbent upon the stat.e to direct and 
control and thus plan 311 economic activities. But planning within that system 
was more than just an alternative to a market-based economy. It was a central 
asper·! of the socialist ideology of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Rapid industrialisation of the society was a part of that ideology, hut 
industrialisation as such was not its goal. But the nspect of Soviet 
plannir1g which attracted the non-socialist nations was not its function as a 
n~ans to achieve a comprehensive social transformation, but its mechanics, 
that is, plmining as an economic rnPthod divorced from politics and intended 
mPre 1 y lo bolster rapitalism t hrou~Jh slat.e int ervPnLior1. 
lhe early - and later - Indian planners were no exception. It was not 
l hi• communists whc1 v1erP the first to advocate pl;:mninq in India. From 
\:i:;vpsv::irHya, thP first lndim1 plannPr, to NPhru, its principal architect, 
:ill ttw 'pionPPrs' dPalt \'1ith µl~mniriq as a rnPndy ecmirnnic exPrcisP. It 
wa~. for them, an effective method lo induslrialiGc lhe lr1dian economy. 
Mr1dPrnisation throuqb industrialisation h~d renmined the central point 
around ~·1hfrh the dnminnnt stnmd nf Indian Pcormmic t.hotHJht dPveloped since 
rPpresented the characteristic demand of the Indian capitalists as they grew 
in nurnher <1nd strenr:ith sincP the sPcond half of thP J ast crmtury. The 
entjr>rnn~;s shn\'ln by alrnnnt all thP rintirmalists in !hr> njrndeer1-lhirties, 
'>.. 
excupling Gm1dhi mid a fAv1 nf his close~ rollmiers, to adopt planning as the 
only way to ':econstruct' and develop the economy, can be best understood if 
wr~ study the history of this iden ns an aspect of Indian nationalism. The 
immediatP impflt.w3 to 'plan' rniC]ht hovr come from lhP uuccrss of Soviet 
planninq; hut the C)PnesiG Of thP idPn lay in the etatisme l'lhich was integral 
to 'economic nationalism' as il evolved through Telang, Ranade, Naoroji, Dutt 
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and their followers. A study of the development of this strand throws light 
not only on the ideological basis of planning within Indian nationalist 
thougt1t, but also fhe resistance it encountered, even at its incipient stage, 
from Gundhism. A detai lt>d study of the development of, what may be called, 
Indi3n eco,omic thought, would be beyond the scope of the present work. But 
WP rnay sketch here G. brief outline of the central problem that concerned the 
Inilian socio-economic thinkers since the middle of the nineteenth century up 
to 1930 when the idea of planninq was first mooted out officially by the 
British officials in India. 
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed some major political 
and economic changes in India. After 1857 the British Crown took over the 
adrniriistration of the Indian colony from the Last India Company. Indi8 
became a direct responsibility of the British Parliament. The avowed 
economic dictum nf lhe period in Britain vms the laissez-faire. 10 In thP 
mime of that policy Indian indigenous manufacturing - pnrticularly lhl' hand-
loom industry - continued to bP destroyed through the fiscal policies adopted 
by Uw Government of India. 8ut the coLlon mill inchmtry in India began 
developinq durirnJ the> same period. The nurnbt•r of cotton mil h; in India 
increased from ju~~t. onP in 1WJ4 to tNelve in 1861 and vii.thin another eighteen 
yPars, in 187'1, Indio had fifty-four coUon mills viorkinq v1ith 1,550,000 
. 'l 11 spum PS. This developmPr1t" of the Indinri cuttcm mill industry occurred 
despilP U1<> efforts by the Lancashire text.ill> imlLmLry tu rP.tain its hold 
ovc>r thE> Indian rnarkPL In effect the rise of the Indian cotton mills did 
not encroach upon the in tere~c;ts of t1arw11f's lPr i.n India. The mills were 
calerinq to the residual demand v1ithin the country and 1·mre engaged in 
exporliri9 Indian cotton cloths to countriC's or Asia and f'\frica. 12 But this 
dr>velopment of inriigenoun cotton tPxUle industry \"las restricted mainly to 
thP Bombay area. The other region of India which witnessPd industrial grol'lth 
was Bengal. Here, jute, a major industry, was characterised by its over-
6 
whelming domination by European, more narrowly, British businessmen. This 
period also marked the rise of nationalist thinking in India. Poona, in 
Bombay Presidency, and Calcutta in the Eastern region became two major centres 
of the development of nationalist ideas. The urban middle class elite and 
some of the forerunners of indigenous factory systems in these cities began 
Lo vnice their anxiety about the adverse effect of the 'laissez-faire policy' 
on the Indian economy. The Swadeshi movement which took place during the 
fipst decade of the present century can be traced back to 1849, when 
Gopalrao Deshmukh of Poona advocated, in the columns of Prabhakar, the use of 
Indian products in place of the imported ones. 13 In Bengal, Nabogopal Mitra 
orqanised the Hindu Mela (or· National Gathering as they called it in English) 
in 1867 which regularly met once a year for nearly fourteen years. 14 One of 
the major functions of the Mela was the promotion of the use of indigenous 
manufactures by organising exhibitions of the products of Indian arts and 
crafts. 
Sumit Sarkar has identified fou1 different political trends within the 
Swadeshi movement as it developed through the second half of the nineteenth 
centur~': 'moderates; the trend lmmrds self-devt:>lopment without inviting an 
immediate political clRsh ["constructive Svmdeshi"]; political extremism 
using extended boycott or passive resistance in addition to selfhelp efforts; 
and terrorism' . 15 In terms of economic tl1inking there were various shades 
of differences between these strands. But, in the main, these may be said 
to constitute two ma1·or tendencies. The first, expounded at great length by 
~ ' 
th1• 'modPrates', looked forward to an industrialised modern India, while the 
second fell tl8ck upcn the traditional handicrafts and artisan mode of 
production as the source of prosperity. The latter emphasised the glorious 
pHst of Indian village community. The revivalism inherent in this tendency 
found expression in the rejuvenated interest in Hindu religion. Dayananda 
in Northern India, VivekanandR and Gankim Chandra in Bengal and Tilak and his 
followers in Western India became the new proponents of Hindu society· 
7 
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Rabindranath Tauore also wrote for a time in a Hindu nationalist vein up-
holding the'·:"deal of rural society in Ancient India. In economic terms the 
emphasis in this thinking was on self-reliance and boycott of all foreign 
commodities ( 1vith the implied re,iection of the 1vestern mode of life). 16 It 
opposed British rule because the latter intervened and disrupted the stability 
of the traditiona~ Indian society through the destruction of its indigenous 
f• t 17 manu·ac ures. Indeed it denied the state any role at all in the economic 
activities of the society. In a way Gandhi's Hind Swaraj is one example of 
this variety of socio-economic thought worked out in its fullest logical 
18 
extent. 
' 
However, it was the 'moderate' school of thought which actually dominated 
the thinking of the early 'nationalists'. (For convenience, we shall use 
here the term 'Swadeshi' only in relation to the other three groups identified 
by Sarkar.) People like Telang, Naoroji, Ranade, G.V. Joshi and R.C. Dutt 
belonged to this school. Protectionism was the key word to them for the 
remedy of the economic distress of the country. To both the 'moderate' and 
the 'swadeshi schools, the reasons for the abysmal poverty in India was to be 
found in the policies adopted by the British Government which resulted in an 
economic 'drain' of the country. Agriculture was ruined by the new system 
of land revenue introduced under the Raj. 19 The indigenous industries were 
destroyed. Extravagant expenditure by the Government on civilian and military 
personnel brought from England bled the country financially. All this added 
up to an 'UnBritish rule' . 20 The remedy according to the 'moderates', lay 
in the industrialisation of the country. The view of this .school is cogently 
summarised by Justice Ranade in his inaugural speech to the first Industrial 
21 Conference in Poona in 1890. He pointed out the phenomenal poverty of the 
existing society and its growing dependence 'upon the single and precarious 
resources of agriculture'. He particularly emphasised the disproportion that 
was there between the engrossing production of raw agrir~ltural produce and 
the backwardness in the production and distributi~n of 'manufactured p~oduce'. 
8 
He observed that 'no hand-made industry [could] hope to thrive in competition 
with industry moved by cheap natural agents. The free use of natural agents 
... [made] large investments of capital a necessity, and this handicapped all 
individual efforts beyond rivalry'. Therefore 'the organisation for industry 
and capital on the joint-stock principle for collective and large undertakings' 
was vitally necessary. Thus the lack of large-scale industrialisation was 
recognised as the major cause of Tndian poverty. This was an important 
distinction from the other trends in Swadeshi movement which considered the 
development of indigenous traditional handcrafts through individual and 
community efforts as the panacea of the economic ill. 
Once large-scale industrialisation was accepted as the means to develop 
the Indian economy, the role of the state became vital in such a programme. 
The country with its 'scanty capital resources' could not hope to develop its 
industries in the face of stiff foreign competition particularly when the 
state itself was encouraging foreign (British) interests in the name of its 
'laissez-faire policy'. The protest against the latter and the demand for 
protection was a distinguishing feature of this strand of 'moderate' economic 
thinking. 
One of the earliest pleas for Indian protectionism was made by K.T. 
Telang, in 1877, in his long essay on 'Free Trade and Protection from an 
Indian Point of View'. Free trade might have benefited England, but for 
India, he argued, it had been the cause of industrial decline. Protectionism 
alone could save the country under the prevailing circumstances. It would 
h 1 . b 'l. . . dl 22 e p in mo i is1ng i e resources. G.V. Joshi went further and clearly 
advocated state-participation in industrial development. Thus: 
First of all, we must have the Government thoroughly 
with us, heart and soul. Without its help in our economic 
weakness and unpreparedness, we could hope to accomplish 
Dut little in the direction of national progress, in the 
face of such fierce competition as we are exposed to -
Government must recognise the true wants of the nation and 
cordially identify itself with the cause of national 
industries.23 
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Ranade elaborated on this argument when he pointed out that in 
Euro~ean countries there was a decided reaction against laissez-faire policy. 
Even in England, he observed, 'the recent factory legislation, the qualified 
reorganisation of the law of trade unionism, the Poor Law system, and the 
Irish Land Settlement are all instances which indicate the same change of 
?4 
mind'.- He then went on to make a case for positive state intervention in 
economic activities, emulating England and other developed countries where 
'the State [was] ... more and mere recognised as the national organ for taking 
care of national needs in all matters in which individual and corporate 
efforts [were] not likely to be so effective and economical as national 
effort. This [was] the correct view to take of the true functions of the 
State' . 25 
The early criticism of the British laissez-faire policy in India thus 
gradually developed into an idea of positive state participation in economic 
activities of the nation. R.C. Dutt actually tried to put this idea into 
practice when he became the Revenue Minister of the State of Baroda in 1904. 
He attempted to organise state-help to private enterprise to make Baroda, 'a 
model state in India ... in the prosperity of the agricultural people, the 
briskness of trade and enterprise, the starting of new mills and industries•. 26 
The role of the state in the vision of these thinkers was not confined 
only to protecting the nascent Indian industries from foreign competition but 
often included the responsibility of bringing about agricultural and social 
27 
reforms. It is from this understanding of the role of the state that 
Gokhale observed, in 1903, 'what the situation really demands is that a large 
and comprehensive scheme for the moral and m8terial well-being of the people 
should be chalked out with particular care and pre-sight and then it should 
be firmly and steadily adhered to and the progress made examined from year to 
28 year'. Although in 1903 the idea of planning had not yet emerged in Indian 
economic thought, Gokhale's demand was almost an harbinger of what was later 
to take the form of a conscious effort in that direction. 
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The plea for state participation went unabated throughout the period 
up to the First World War. The colonial authority, however, continued to 
adhere to the doctrine of laissez-faire up to 1916. Lord Curzon, who claimed 
to be a staunch champion of industrial effort, admonished the proponents of 
state intervention for imagining 'that by any stroke of an e11ch1mter' s wand, 
the present Government, or any Government of India can effect a revolution in 
the economic, social or industrial conditions of this vast continent•. 29 The 
official v ie1v at the time considered the Government 'ill-quali fie·d' to promote 
industrial development by direct action and wanted all such matters to be left 
t . t t . 30 ·o pr1va·e en erpr1se. Against this sort of argument the Indian elite 
cited the examples of the cases of the railways, cinchona, tea and coffee 
plantations and coal mining where the Government of India either subsidised 
and underwrote private investment or even directly participated for a long 
time. It amounted to saying that the Government was not really averse to the 
principle of state-aid, but refused it in the case of indigenous efforts. 
But the laissez-faire policy broke dmvn with the Government of India's 
entry into the First World War. Orders had to be placed with the Indian firms 
to meet the war needs. For the Indian industrialist a welcome change in the 
attitude of the Government was discernible in regard to excise duty on cotton, 
when the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, said before the Legislative Assembly in 1916, 
I need hardly say that the Govt. of India have no desire 
to create controversies here, in England or elsewhere at 
the present time by the discussion of the question 
affecting Indian interests; but they are glad to have 
had that the import duty on cotton fabrics should be 
raised and the excise duty should for the present, remain 
at its actual figure and an assurance given that it will 31 be abolished as soon as financial conditions will permit. 
The plea put forward by the moderate Indian nationalists for so many years 
now started showing some result, and they rendered wholehearted support to the 
British war effort. 
Industrial development in India during the war was hindered by several 
factors. The most important of these was the lack of supply of plant and 
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machinery for expandinq the capacity of the industries. There was no machine-
mak{ng industry in India, not evPn for producing nails and screws. 32 But all 
through the war, Indian industries were automatically protected from foreign 
competition. Britain's war needs also rendered help in this direction. Many 
new industries were started to meet urgent civil and military requirements. 
Some of the most important among them were those concerned with the manu-
33 facture of glass, hardware, cutlery and Portland cement. The pre-war 
industries were also encouraged to expand their productive capacity. Tata 
Iron and Steel Company, for example, registered a steep rise in its productive 
activity under the stimulus of enlarged demand, high prices and almost mono-
polistic position in the Indian market. Output of rolled steel rose from 
48,872 tons in 1913-14 to 1,230,800 tons in 1917-18. 34 The cotton mills too 
experienced an unparalleled prosperity. Though very few new mills could be 
set up owing to the difficulties in obtaining plant and machinery from abroad, 
the existing ones kept working at maximum capacity and were able to earn large 
f •t 35 pro i s. The Government of India also rendered some help to the Indian 
industrialists in forming the Indian Nunitio~ Board in February 1917 and 
placed orders for Government stores and railways with Indian firms. 36 
In 1916 the Government of India appointed an Industrial Commission to 
examine and report on the possibilities of furthering industrial development 
and to suggest the ways in which the Government could give encouragement to 
industrial enterprises. (But even now the change in outlook was only hesitant. 
Tariff policy was deliberately excluded from the terms of reference of this 
Commission. The Government ostensibly did not think it desirable to raise 
controversial issues while the war was still in progress.) The Commission 
presented its report in October 1918 and recommended t1~0 principles in order 
to make India more self-reliant in the field of industrial development: (1) 
in future the Government must play a more active part in the industrial 
development of the country, and (2) in order that it was able to discharge 
this responsibility effectively, it would be necessary to set up adequate 
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administrGtive mGchinery based on rcliablP technical advice. The Government 
accepted the suggestion of the Commission in principle but pleaded its inability 
to implement the recommendations immediately due to the war situation. 37 
However, it could not overlook the growing Indian popular demand for 
changes. Close on the heal of the Industrial Commission in 1918 the f~oyal 
Commission on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Montagu-Chelmsford) was set up. 
The Report of this Commission strongly emphasised the need for accelerating 
industrial development and recommended the replacement of laissez-faire by a 
policy of active encouragement. The authors pointed out the widespread 
prevalence of protectionist sentiment among the educated elite of India and 
the resentment against the formulation of Indian fiscal policy in England and 
observed that 
So long as the people who refuse India [the demand for 
protection] are interested in manufactures with which 
India might compete, Indian opinion cannot bring itself 
to believe that the refusal is disinterested or dictated 
by ca:e for the best interest of India.38 
The Bill of 1919, by the Joint Select Committee on the Government of 
India also recognised the need for giving autonomy to India. It suggested 
setting up a convention of non-interference by the Secretary of State for India 
in the fiscal policy of the GovernMent of India, unless explicitly required 
for safeguarding the international obligations to the Empire. 39 On the basis 
of this suggestion a Fiscal Commission was set up on 7 October 1921 with Ibrahim 
Rahimtoolah as the President and with ten members, six of whom were Indians. 
The Report endorsed the conclusion of the Indian Industrial Commission of 
1916-18 that industrial development of the country was uneven and in most cases 
inadequately developed. It also endorsed the view expressed in the Montagu-
Chelmsford Report that the economy of a country like India which depended to 
a large extent on agriculture was bound to be unstable. 40 It is interesting 
to note that the Commission drew heavily upon the theories of J.S. Mill and 
Fredrich List. It proved (l) that in spite of various natural advantages, 
new industries could not be established in an industrially backward country 
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when those industries h3d to compete with powerful rivals, and (2) that tariff 
profection was necessary to neutralise the benefits of early start, and (3) 
that protection was, on the whole, the most suitable policy in India. 
Ry 1923 the Government of India finally abandoned its earlier tariff 
policy in favour of discriminating protection. Meanwhifo the demand for 
protection also underwent changes. It was increasingly felt that the fiscal 
dependence of India was the greatest hurdle in the way of any policy of 
protectior1. The demand for fiscal autonomy was not a new post-war phenomenon. 
41 It was as old as the Indian National Congress and perhaps older. But the 
Indian National Congress took up the demand for state aid towards industrial-
isation ir1 1902 when it recommended that 'practical steps in the shape of State 
encouragement be taken for the revival and development of indigenous art and 
manufactures and for the introduction of new industries•. 42 
In 1916 Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola, while moving a resolution in the Imperial 
Legislative Council on the growth and development of Indian industries, had 
also stressPd the need For a grant of full fiscal autonomy to the GovernmenL 
of India. He had observed: 
If the Government of India were free to adopt measures 
solely in the interests of the people of this country, 
without any restrictions or limitations in fiscal matters, 
our industrial development would be in a fair way of 
successful accomplishment. India wants fiscal re-
organisation, and if Indian public opinion is to have any 
weight in the determination of this question, we ought 
to get it at once.43 
Although it took five years after the end of the First World War for 
the Government of India to come to terms with the reality and accept the 
hollowness of the policy of laissez-Faire, the awareness of the economic 
thinkers became more acute with the passing of the war. By now the study of 
economics as a discipline was well organised. Economics as a specialised 
course in the universities started with Calcutta University. An honours 
course in economics was introduced in 1909 and an M.A. course in the same 
44 
subject a year later. But by the end of the war a new group of economists 
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emerged from the universities in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The Indian 
Economic Association was established in 1916. The first number of the Indian 
45 Journal of Economics came out during the sRme year. A host of textbooks 
and other writings on Indian economic problems were published after the end 
of the war. ti6 
With the end of the war, the respite from foreign competition to the 
Indian industries was over. Industries were again subjected to severe foreign 
competition. The demand for protection, therefore, became widespread again. 
A new generation of economists now took up the cause. V.C. Kale, Benoy Sarkar, 
P.N. Bose, K.T. Shah, C.N. Vakil, R.K. Mukerjee, D.R. Gadgil and others who 
had succeeded the early nationalist thinkers, were all staunch supporters of 
state protection and encouragement of industrialisation. But now the arguments 
and visions were more complex than before. New ideas were being incorporated 
in the national movement. M.K. Gandhi with his revivalist ideology was 
emerging as the undisputed leader of the Indian National Congress. The 
Swadeshi movement of the early decades had lost its vigour but its ideas 
became an effective weapon in the hands of Gandhi. At the same time the ideas 
of communism and socialism also begun to have an impact on socio-economic 
thinking, especially because of the success of Bolshevik revolution in Russia. 
The conflicting ideas of the time can be discerned in the writings of 
the economists of the time. People like Pillai were re-reading their economic 
history: 'India was never a great manufacturing country in any adequate sense 
of the term. The only industry she had developed on any extensive scale was 
h d • • d ' I 47 an -sp1nn1ng an weaving And, 
It is indisputable that tariff policy has contributed its 
own share to checking the development of this textile 
industry; but this share has generally been overestimated 
The reason that tariff policy has loomed so large in 
the eyes of Indian writers is that it was persisted in by 
the Government in flagrant defiance of popular wishes, 
and that its supporters have invariably employed language 
of a most provocative character.48 
Another interesting writer of the early 1920s was I<. T. Shah, a professor 
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of Economics in the University of Bombay, whose books are examples of the 
ne1v economic thinking. In his Trade, Tariffs and Transport in India, published 
in Bombay in 192~Shah was concerned not only about the protection of Indian 
industries but also about the idea of distributive justice. His support for 
protection to private enterprise was also a qualified one: 
The real danger ... of an active State aid for the building 
up of industry lies in [the problem that] ... should 
industry develop by such means under the aegis of private 
enterprise, a much more serious problem in distributive 
justice would have been created, of which doctrinaire 
free trader usually takes no cognizance ... The concen-
tration of riches, in ever increasing proportion, in a 
steadily diminishing number of hands, b£ought about 
demonstrably by such active assistance granted by the 
community collectively, intensifies the class cleavage 
that is universally regretted as the most undesirable 
feature of modern industry. The only solution ~hat I 
can think of for avoiding the otherwise certain 
disaster would be frankly to accept the socialist 
principle of collective enterprise, at least in new
49 industries where no vested interests are concerned. 
But knowing full well that socialism was a far cry in the then Indian 
situation he prescribed the alternative that 'the authority responsible for 
the supervision and guidance of the economic system' should treat the problem 
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'as a comprehensive whole instead of breaking it up into parts'. 
The idea of treating the problem as a comprehensive whole could be the 
starting point of planning. This idea is however not new in K.T. Shah. We 
have already found Gokhale prescribing it as early as 1903. This was re-
iterated by others also. The most prominent among them was M. Visvesvaraya. 
He was neither a politiciEn nor an economist. By training an engineer, he 
earned his fame as a Dewan of the State of Mysore. It was during his role 
as the administrator that Mysore advanced in modernising its administration 
and economy. He also served the British administration in India in different 
capacities and travelled throughout the world to 'gain experiences' from the 
workings of the economies of Japan, the U.S.A., Canada and other European 
t . 51 coun ries. Although he was not a professional economist, he had a very 
clear idea about the nation's needs. He published his book, Reconstructing 
16 
Indi& in 1920 with a view to discussing the ways and means in which 
the.new Government of India Act (1919) could work for the development of the 
52 
country. Starting with a survey of the prevailing economic conditions 
of India he pointed oul the causes of its underdevelopment. In this, hib 
views \\lere no different to that of his predecessors like Ranade, Naoroji or 
R.C. Dutt. The problems of Indian poverty were, according lo him, the (i) 
low standard of living caused by the negligence of the rules over a long 
period; (ii) low level of education - general and technical; (iii) dependence 
on agriculture - primitive and over-burdened; (iv) lack of industrialisation 
and destruction of indigenous industries due to British tariff and fiscal 
policies, etc. On the other hand the potentialities were immense. Although 
literacy was as low as less than 7 per cent, the absolute number of literates 
in India far exceeded that in the United Kingdom. India had also abundant 
natural resources. What was lacking was the effort from the authority to 
harness the natural and human resources. 
To prove his point he went into a brief survey of the developed countries 
like the U.S.A., the U.K., Canada and Japan and showed that all these 
countries developed only under the protective umbrella of state aid policies. 
And 'the first lesson to be drawn from this survey by the Government and the 
people of India is that industries and trade do not grow of themselves, but 
have to be willed, planned and systematically developed. In India the 
Government has shown some enterprise in developing railways and irrigation; 
but the expansion of trade and industry hes been a matter of British 
domination and has left the people of the country disinterested, with no share 
. th t l f l" • t t 0 I 53 1n e con ro o po icy or 1 s opera 1on . 
In this respect too Visvesvaraya echoed the demands of Ranade, Naoroji, 
Joshi, Dutt and other 'moderates'. The 'statism' of early Indian economic 
thinking has been noticed by many scholars. One of them, P.K. G6palakrishnan 
has attributed to these nineteenth-century thinkers a notion of actually 
planning 'mixed-economy' within the framework o,· parliamentary democracy: 
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1 What they probably had in mind was a state armed with more effective legal 
pow~rs and with the more monopolistic economic units - owned by the stale and 
directed to the public inLerest•.~4 
This may be stretching the point too far. For there was no basis either 
in the material or the intellectual conditions of nineteenth-century India 
to foster any indigenous idea of planning or mixed ·conomy. The perception 
of abject poverty and economic backwardness and an exposure to the western 
capitalist world had led the thinkers of that epoch to the conviction that 
the path towards development lay in industrialising the economy. But in so 
far as this tendency within nationalist thought stood apart from the trad-
itional Swadeshi ideology with its opposition to any kind of Etate inter-
Ference, in so far as it argued for a positive intervention - it was not 
merely n plea for 'protection' from foreign trade but actual participation 
by the slate - it may be said to have anticipated some of the fundamental 
presuppositions which were to characterise the discussion on planning during 
the two decades prior to Independence. The planners of pre-Independent India 
were in a direct line of descent from 'moderates' like Ranade and Naoroji in 
their outlook. It was not total state control that they wanted. Rather the 
idea was to seek aid for the indigenous bourgeoisie to stand on their own and 
the state was asked to participate in those sectors where priv~te enterprise 
was absent. In his discussion of the Report of the Indian Industrial 
Commission (1916-18) Visvesvaraya observed: 
The Commission's most important recommendation is that the 
Government should start imperial and provincial departments 
of industries which should be staffed with experts, at the 
commencement brought from outside India. The Report provides 
for imperial and provincial scientific and technical 
services and a permanent controlling staff. 
The entire scheme, it is to be feared, is conceived on 
wrong lines. The people require help and backing not 
control and direction. In the expansion of industries, 
there are numerous ways in which Government can help or 
hinder, and not until an atmosphere of sympathy, a spirit of 
helpfulness and Indian control are established, will 
industri8s make any real headway.~5 
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It was words such as these which expressed the fear of dominance by an alien 
st8fe power even as they gnvt~ voice to an aspiration for 'Indian control', 
an euphemism for control by the Indian bourgeoisie. The ideologues of this 
aspiration - from Ranade to Visvesvaraya - theorised and prepared these 
aspiratio11s through their writings. Visvesvaraya's book, Reconstructing 
India~ is unique in the sense that more than any other publication 
of that period it specified and rationalised all the demands of the Indian 
bourgeoisie. He enumerated the ways in which the Government of India could 
render direct help thus: 
Protection of any newly started industry for a term of six years, 
or till the industry is firmly established, by imposing tariff 
on imported goods. 
Inducing Indian, BritiRh and foreign firms by levying tariffs on 
imports as was done in Japan. 
Pioneering large scale and difficult industries, including the 
manufacture of railway materials and ship-building and also 
pioneering key industries. 
Granting premiums, subsidies and subventions or guaranteeing 
dividends to individuals and indigenous companies who show 
enterprise in new industries. 
Providing the services of experts free or at special low rates. 
Affording special railway facilities. 
Taking an industrial census periodically, as required and 
publishing statistics. 
'The provincial governments', Visvesvaraya wrote, 'may make a start by 
pioneering some of the larger industries like ship-building, machinery, 
engines, motor transport, chemicals, paper, etc. and also some of the many 
key industries needed, with the object of making them a success and subse-
quently transferring them to the people. There are few technical secrets 
that are not readily available or that cannot be secured by the expenditure 
56 of money'. 
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It was not the aspiration of an individual but of a whole class which was 
thus· represented - the aspiration indeed of the Indian capitalist class. 
But Visvesvaraya' s own ahility to think ahead of his time shows through 
when he speaks directly of planning in his book. After discussing the 
different economic activities, e.g~ industr~ trade and cownerce, agriculture, 
77 etc.~ he comes lo the task of nation-building and writes: 
As it is, the absence of common ideals has led in local 
areas to inaction and stagnation and much misdirected and 
unproductive effort. To avoid this waste in future, a 
definite move should be made towards building up an 
Indian nation by outlining national plans and prograrrmes 
in the political, economic and social spheres. An 
attempt has been made in previous pages to indicate the 
character of the national plans necessary to deal with 
India's reconstruction p~oblems.58 
Beginning with K.T. Telang's demand for protection in 1877 the Indian 
bourgeoisie and t~~ir ideologues took more than forty years to spell out 
their economic aims and goals clearly. Politically the demand for self-rule 
or independence had been mooted much earlier by the proponents of traditional 
Swadeshi. But that particular kind of nationalism did not speak fully for 
the Ir1dian bourgeoisie whose leading organisation, the Indian National 
Congress, paid only lip service to the Swadeshi movement associated with the 
'extremists', and often even denounced it. When M.K. Gandhi championed 
Swadeshi it was of a different variety - poltically speaking - from the earlier 
movement. Even then, the Mahatma's Swadeshi idea did not strike a deep root 
within the Congress. 
The Gandhian vision of 'Hind Swaraj' attempted to evolve an alternative 
not only to British rule in India but also to the social structure based on 
the concept of western capitalism. This was the first attempt, however 
utopian it might have been, to transform the entire society by decentralising 
political power and situating it at the basic level of social organisation -
the village community. But this vision did not agree with the 'modernising' 
ideas of the ideologues of Indian bourgeoisie. As a result although Gandhi 
was the universally acknowledged leader of the national 1novement in his mass-
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mobilising role, and latter day planners and politicians tried to uphold the 
Indian five-year plans of the 'fifties as efforts towards Gandhian socialism, 59 
his blueprint for a sovereign India was never really accepted by the dominant 
leadership of his own party. This was so, because the latter had chosen 
economic modernisation rather than social transformation as their principal 
objective. With them, as with Visvesvaraya, Nehru and most other Indian 
planners, modernisation came to be synonymous with industrialisation and 
planning with 'industrialism'. 
However, Indians were neither the first nor the only ones to want planned 
economic development for the subcontinent. By the time Visvesvaraya published 
his book on Planned Economy for India, the idea had already gained a wide 
currency and a substantial degree of acceptance within the colonial bureau-
cracy. Although the first British effort, in 1930, to set up a plan machinery 
failed, it merits discussion because of the light it throws on the nationalist 
claim to have pioneered the idea of planning in India. When the colonial 
bureaucracy tried to set up a plan machinery in 1930, it drew inspiration 
from the Economic Advisory Council in the U.K. set up to advise the Govern-
ment in its efforts to come out of the crisis of the Great Depression. In 
India, however, planning was designed by the colonial regime as an economic 
solution for the political crisis created by the gro1ving tide of the national-
ist movement during the late nineteen-twenties. The direction and details 
of these official initiatives are discussed in Chapter II of this thesis. 
It is not only that the nationalist efforts for planning originated in 
the wake of, rather than before, the moves made by the colonial administration 
in this sphere; the Indian planners were fairly close to the British bureau-
cr~ts in their emphasis on planning as a matter of technical expertise, 
related exclusively to 'economics' and segregated from 'politics'. Conse-
quently, the first Indian advocates of planning, such as Visvesvaraya or S.C. 
Mitter, or even G.D. Birla, who was so closely associated with Gandhi and the 
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Indian National Congress, found it quite ir order to insist that a planned 
economic development should be the responsibility of the Raj. It was as if 
planning, regarded as a strictly economic question, had nothing to do with the 
political demand for national self-determination. This separation of the 
political from the economic is evident in the attitude of the Congress as well. 
Although the National Planning Committee was formed on the basis of reso-
lutions adopted by the All India Congress Committee, planning was treated by 
both the Congress and the N.P.C. as essentially an economic process. Indeed, 
the latter was constituted of 'experts' in industries, and scientists and 
economists. Planning to the dominant leadership of the Congress was an issue 
to be formulated by 'experts'. Nehru, as the chairman of the Committee, 
was proud of its 'quiet' and 'expert' work, and advised that the 'political' 
element should be kept outside the Committee. Planning, to him, was an 
economic process, the result only of the quiet and expert work of scientists, 
economists and industrialists. 
The convergence of ideas betl'leen the British officials and the Indian 
planners in this respect can hardly be overstated. Pl2nning to the British 
meant expert work based on scientific statistics. As a result, the efforts 
of the colonial ~fficials in the 'thirties ended in inviting experts from the 
West and in setting up new statistical organisations in the Centre. The plan 
effort of the N. P. C. , in its mm turn, would wait for its mm experts to 
formulate their recommendations scientifically, while Congress ministries in 
the provinces would come and go. 
The convergence between the British and the Indian nationalist ideas of 
planning is particularly evident since the eerly 'forties. But the ideo-
logical position from which such convergence derived, was already accepted 
by both parties early in the 'thirties. Both the colonialist and the 
colonised worked for a capitalist development. Buf the nature of capitalist 
development envisaged by both the sides was different frcm a bourgeois 
democratic transformation of the society. The colonialist wanted to avoid any 
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disruption of the existing structure of Indian society. Hence the separation 
of the political from the economic in their ideas of planning. But the 
Indian planners, whether they talked of capitalist development or socialism, 
did not work from any fundamentally different concept either. The national-
ists also did not advocate any fundamental structural change in the society, 
and therefore offered no role for the people to play in the process of 
planning. It was natural for the colonialist to depend on their own bureau-
cracy and collaborative Indicns and experts. The Indian planners too worked 
on the basic premise that planning was best handled by the experts and the 
administrators alone. No wonder then that although the Congress leadership 
instituted the National Planning Committee in 1938, planning.was never 
considered as an agendum in the political forum of the Congres9 before the 
Party came into power in 1947. And when it came to power, Nehru, the 
principal 'architect' of planning, was pleased to leave the task of imple-
mo.nting the plan programmes entirely to the bureaucracy inherited from the 
British. 
In this thesis, the year 1951 has been chosen as the terminal point of 
our discussion. The place of planning in the nationalist effort to shape 
India's destiny emerges most clearly during this period, covering the ~ime when 
the idea of planning was first mooted at the official level to when the first 
five-year plan was launched. The subsequent pl~ns do not contain ideas funda-
mentally different to what emerged during this period. The scheme of the 
present work is as follows. 
The second chapter traces the development of the idea of planning 
during the period 1930-34. The advent of the Great Depression and the 
simultaneous success of Soviet planning made both the colonial state and 
Indian social thinkers plan-conscious. This chapter focuses on the early 
bureaucratic efforts in planning, and relates these to the ideas of planning 
of the Indian 'pioneers'. 
23 
The ideas of planning entered the political domain of Indian nationalism 
towards the end of the nineteen-thirties, when the Indian National Congress 
took up the task of planning. The contradiction within the Congress between 
the Gandhian utopia, of a society based on the village-community, and the 
vision of a modern industrialised India, as propagated by Nehru and his 
followers, was resolved in the 'thirties in favour of the latter. The third 
chapter is on the Congress's view of planning, and the nature of the work 
done by the National Planning Committee which was set up by the Congress. 
The British renewed the effort in bureaucratic planning with the 
beginning of the Second World War. The early 'forties witnessed a plethora 
of plans produced by different sections of the Indian elites as a response 
to the bureaucratic effort. The convergence of ideas between the British 
rulers and the Indian capitalists about the nature of planning needed for 
India, and on the role of the state in it, is particularly evident in these 
plans. The fourth chapter is devoted to a study of all these programmes. 
The creation of a separate Planning and Development Department of the 
Government of India, in 1945, is evidence of the seriousness with which the 
British took up the task of planning in the nineteen-forties. It also marked 
the speeding up of the process of the 'Indianisation' of official planning 
that had been initiated by the British soon after the end of the war. In 
the fifth chapter of this work we discuss this process and its outcome. We 
start with Ardeshir Dalal's efforts as the head of the newly formed depart-
ment, and end it with a survey of the developments during the period of the 
first Interim Government, formed by the Congress in 1946. 
The last chapter considers the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan 
in India. The period 1946-51 informs us about the nature of the Indian 
political economy as it evolved in the hands of Nehru and his colleagues. 
A few words on source materials. The second chapter is based almost 
entirely on official proceedings of the Commerce, Finance and Horne Political 
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Departments of the Government of India. For the later period of British rule, 
the files of the Executive Council's Office and the recently open~d files of 
the Planning Branch of the Finance Department in the National Archives of 
India (NAI) are the single major source of official unpublished documents 
on the subject of plannin9. 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML) in New Delhi is another very 
important repository of unpublished sources for the research of this kind. 
ExtP.nsive, though not exhaustive, use has been made of private papers of 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Purushottamdas Thakurdas, Walchand Hirachand and J.C. 
Ku. 1rappa available in NMML. The Library has a near-complete collection of 
reports and proceedings of the All India Congress Committee and other 
organisations of the Indian National Congress. Given the limited time 
available for 'field \vork' in India, it was difficult to sort out the 
relevant materials from that collection. However, the volumes of The 
Encyclopaedia of Indian National Congress, published in recent years in 
India (edited by A.M. Zaidi and S.G. Zaidi) and available in the libraries 
of the Australian National University, filled up much of the gap. These 
volumes provided all the reports and resolutions of the Congress Working 
Committees, All ·India Congress Committees and the sessions of the Indian 
National Congress. 
Although I have made as much use as was possible of sources in the 
National Archives of India, I am aware of gaps that remain. Many of these 
could have been filled ih by research at the India Office Library in England. 
A trip to England would have also made available to me some other unpublished 
sources, including private papers of the British officials employed in India 
or at the India Office of the Government of the U.K. The papers of Schuster, 
Amery and others would surely throw some more light on British efforts in 
planning in India. Unlike the papers of some other British administrators, 
however, no copies of these papers were available at the National Archives in 
Delhi, and unfortunately funds were not available for a trip to England. 
25 
To compensate for this lacuna, I have made extensive use of the volumes of 
India, The Transfer of Power, 1942-1947 (edited by N. Mensergh) as one of 
the primary sources of this work. 
No attempt is made here to describe in detail the sources used. Notes 
and references given in the chapters and the bibliography should serve that 
purpose. 
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CHAPTER II 
EARLY EFFORT: OFFICIAL INITIATIVES AND FIRST INDIAN RESPONSES 
SECTION l: Schuster's 'Notes on Economic Policy' 
In almost all the literature on Indian planning Sir M. Visvesvaraya's 
Planned Economy for India, published in 1934, is generally accepted as 
the pioneering effort in formulating an economic and social plan. This 
claim has been put forward by writers both of a nationalist and a 'left' 
orientation. However, the evidence contradicts this myth, and shows that 
Visvesvaraya was only one among a number of Indians who utarted thinking 
and talking of planning during the period immediately after the Great 
Depression. As a matter of fact, all these individuals' contributions to 
the discussion on planning had been preceded by a bureaucratic initiative 
towards planning through proposals formulated by Sir George Schuster and 
other British officials in the Government of India. Indian thinking on 
this subject must be regarded primarily as a response to the official moves 
in the direction of planning during the early 'thirties. The purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss the initial efforts at economic planning in 
India in the period 1930-34. 
In 1930 Sir George Schuster, the then Finance Member in the Viceroy's 
Executive Council, circulated a paper, 'Notes on Economic Policy 1 , 1 within 
the different departments of the Government of India. The idea of planning 
was mooted for the first time in the official circles in India. That paper 
was more than an individual's brain-child, as witness the introductory 
lines of the 'Notes': 
In the following paragraphs [writes Schuster] I set out 
certain general ideas which have been the subject of 
conversations between myself and several of my colleagues 
- principally the Hon'ble Member for Commerce and the 
former Hon'ble Members for Education, Health and Lands, 
and Industries and Labour. These conversations led to 
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the preliminary discussion of a proposal for 
constituting in India something on the lines of the 
Economic Advisory Council which has been created by 
the British Government.2 
The idea of an 'Economic Advisory Council' for India arose out of the 
one recently formed in Britain. The British Economic Advisory Council 
was formed in January 1930 by the second Labour Government in Britain 
soon after Ramsay MacDonald and his party had been elected to office in 
1929. 3 England was facing acute unemployment problems. The Council was 
intended to advise the Government on all matters of economic policy and to 
'make continuous study of developments in trade and industry and in the 
use of national, imperial and international economy with a bearing on the 
4 prosperity of the country'. The Council in England was shortlived -
1930-32, but it 'served as an essential stepping-stone towards the more 
ambitious advisory system devised during the early stages of the Second 
World War, when it was transformed first into Stamp's Survey of War Plans 
and then, via the Central Economic Information Service, into the Economic 
Section of the Cabinet Office' . 5 
The inspiration and rationale for forming the Economic Advisory 
Council in England derived from the Liberal 'Yellow Book' on Britain's 
Industrial Future which had been produced in 1928 by a distinguished group 
of experts under the chairmanship of Walter Layton. This group included 
J.M. Keynes and Henderson. It was widely recognised that Britain faced 
special problems of a structural character resulting from the long-term 
decline in competitive power of the basic export industries, notablf coal, 
iron and steel, cotton and shipbuilding. 'Rationalisation' was the all-
embracing solution offered to the problems of these industries and entailed 
the elimination of excess capacity and reduction of costs through re-
organisation into larger production and marketing units. The role of the 
state in sponsoring rationalisation and in arresting the process of decline 
by means of various expedients ranging from export promotion, and tariff 
truces to a full-blooded system of protection, had become a major area 
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of policy debates in the 1920s. These debates led to the formation of the 
Council in 1930. 6 
The much avowed laissez-faire philosophy was already on its way out 
and was being replaced by new ideas of the role of the state in Britain itself. 
The Great Depression and the international liquidity crisis had sounded 
its death-k~ell. 7 Although the concepts of managed economy and Welfare 
State were to gain a firm foothold in English political philosophy only 
after J.M. l<eynes published his The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money in 1936, Roosevelt, in U.S.A. had already anticipated a number 
of so-called Keynesian ideas in his New Deal much earlier. Even in 
England in the late 1 twenties Keynes was not alone in his economic 
thinking. Keynes and Henderson were the liberals who argued for the cause 
8 
of managed-economy. Within the Labour Party itself there ·~re people 
like G.D.H. Cole, R.H. Tawney, Ernest Bevin and Oswald Mosley who preached 
their peculiar mixture of Keynesian liberalism, Hobsonian socialism a11d 
Italian fascism, while within the Conservative ranks were those, such as 
L.S. Amery, Oliver Stanley, Robert Boothby and Harold Macmillan, who 
believed in 1 positive 1 economic policies. 9 Indeed, such an attitude cut 
across all three of the major British political parties, though it was yet 
to gain acceptance as the dominant view of any of them. 
In India too, economic thinking and political perspective were shaping 
up for a change. The growing tide of agrarian and urban unrest had 
worried Delhi and London since 1928. The rulers in India were well aware 
of what they saw as the economic causes of these unrests. Linlithgow, in 
his capacity as chairman of the Royal Commission of Agriculture, had 
written to Baldwin in 1927, 1 0ur troubles in India are due at root far 
more to economic causes than many of the clever ones suppose. Unless by 
good administration we secure to the cultivator, 11 a fair share of the good 
things of life'' ... , we shall lose our jobs and we shall deserve to' . 10 
Regarding the labour situation the Viceroy, i11 1928, wrote to the Secretary 
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of State, 1 ••• the most effective way to remove industrial unrest is 
improvement of labour conditions. The nettle has to be grasped some time 
and what better time is there likely to be than now when ... it is 
important to show that the measures for maintenance of order do not mean 
want of sympathy with labour 1 • 11 
The political agitations had a direct bearing on constitutional 
reform. But the appointment of the all-white Statutory Commission in 
1928 helped to stimulate political actions rather than lull them to 
sleep. The Government was alarmed at the unity of Indian opinion against 
the Simon Commission. Anticipating a boycott of the Statutory Commission's 
recommendations, Irwin made his famous declaration about Dominion Status 
as the goal of British policy in India. 
The Government's initiative to rally the 'moderates' by these 
declarations was however nullified by the Congress response. On 2 November 
1929, the Congress had issued its 'Delhi Manifesto' and in December 1929 
the Lahore Congress, with the 'left-wing' in control, passed resolutions 
to the effect that the ultimate objective of the Congress was severance 
of the British connection. 
To the rulers of India the increasing popular struggles for freedom 
in the subcontinent made no sense except in terms of economic grievances. During 
the 1920s most sections of Indian businessmen also had reacted sharply 
against the government's economic policies. Great battles were fought 
on the rupee-sterling ratio question. There were other issue~ such as 
those relating to protection of the cotton textile industry, which engaged 
the business classes in bitter conflict with the Government. They 
gravitated towards the Congress, since the movement led by that Party 
looked as if it might prove a useful platform for voicing their economic 
demands. In other words, they were eager to mobilise 'nationalist' support 
in order to impress on the British authority the need For concessions in 
favour of indigenous enterprise. However, 1·1hen the Congress Conference 
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at Lahore in December 1929 rejected the Delhi Manifesto as too mild and 
called for the repudiation of Indian debt and a movement for complete 
independence, and Gandhi prepared to launch Civil Disobedience, some 
businessmen felt extremely perturbed. One of them, P. Thakurdas, urged 
liberal and moderate leaders like Sapru and Malaviya to unite the rest 
of political India 'to make up for this lapse by the Congress' . 12 At 
the same time he wanted to press it home on the Government that the best 
way of strengthening the hands of the liberals and the moderates would be 
to grant generous concessions to India. 13 But Britain, caught in the 
throes of a general economic crisis, could not afford such concessions. 
Far from yielding to the pressures of Indian business interests, the 
Government of India, therefore, responded by foisting on the country a 
stringent monetary policy which, taken together with the negative aspects 
of the depression, merely helped to stiffen the attitude of many business-
men. 'Unless there is a general improvement in the economic condition of 
the people and the cultivators have a stake in the country', wrote Ambalal 
Sarabhai to Thakurdas, 'Bolshevik propanganda will find fertile soil in 
India 1 • 14 Matters were made worse when, in March 1930, the Government 
hustled through the Cotton Protection Act, with a preferential treatment 
for Lancashire. A large group of opposition members led by Malaviya 
resigned from the Legislative Assembly. 15 Many spokesmen of business 
interests urged support for the Civil Disobedience movement as a means of 
strengthening Gandhi's hand in negotiating with the Government. 16 
Gandhi launched the Civil Disobedience movement in April 1930. By 
the middle of the year his business allies had moved closer to the 
attitude adopted by their 'moderate' colleagues. To keep the agitation 
alive, Nehru and others .urged a more active campaign. But 'uncontrolled' 
unrest grew in the countryside. The no-tax campaigns showed strong 
tendencies to turn into no-rent movements. Economic distress, police 
brutality and hopes of 'Ram-Raj' aroused by Gandhi combined to create a 
..... ,..~ ....... ~\~· 
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difficult situation for the British authorities in India. 17 
On the economic front Indian industrialists and business groups 
continued to clamour for a change in fiscal policy and full-tariff 
protection for indigenous products. 18 Birla, in his ~residential speech 
in the Annual General Meeting of the Federation of India Chambers of 
Commerce and Industries (FICCI) in February l93o, 19 pointed to the 
economic plight of Indian people as the most important cause of the 
prevailing 'discontent in the country'. The industries, in his opinion, 
were anaemic because of the extremely low level of purchasing power of 
the people. India being mainly an agricultural country and partly an 
industrial one, 'production should be increased in both fronts 1 • 20 He 
warned that things could not remain as they were: 'the placid contentment 
of the masses is already disturbed. Even the worm at a certain stage 
begins to turn, and the dissatisfaction of the dumb millions, unless its 
causes are removed, is bound to make itself felt one day' . 21 He, there-
fore, appealed to all concerned, urging them to 'adopt in time a far-
sighted policy'. He particularly called on the Government to promote 'a 
t . l l' h"h "htb d "Id" f" t dind1alast 11 •. 22 na 1ona po icy, w ic mig e summe up as n ia ·1rs an 
Birla's Presidential speech would have reflected the opinion of the 
majority of Indian industrialists and merchants. And it was addressed 
directly to Schuster who chaired this meeting as the Viceroy's 
representative. 
The 'Notes on Economic Policy' was 1-1ritten in the context of changing 
economic thought and political developments narrated in brief above. The 
Government was called upon to take certain steps to ameliorate the poverty-
stricken condition of India. The problem however was not one of poverty 
alone. The indigenous capitalist class had already established itself 
firmly in the political arena and their plea for concessions was made and 
heard as a distinctly nationalist demand. Politically the situation was 
volatile. To make matters worse, the boycott movement had begun to affect 
' 
f 
•' 
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British business interests in India. 23 
It is in the light of this looming politico-economic crisis that the 
'Notes on Economic Policy' by Sir George Schuster has to be reviewed. 
As already noticed, the idea of forming a body similar to the Economic 
Advisory Council in Britain was first put forward by Schuster among his 
collei ~ues in the Viceroy's Executive Council during the winter of 
1929-30. 24 It was understood by Schuster and his colleagues that there 
was a 'growing appreciation among the Indian public of the importance of 
economic questions, and a growing demand, first, that the Government 
should frame and pursue a constructive economic policy, and secondly, 
that unofficials should have a share in framing it 1 • 25 The political 
importance of such a demand could hardly be doubted: ~t was indeed to a 
great extent no more than a natural symptom of the growing demand in 
26 India for representative and responsible government'. This was by no 
means a uniquely Indian phenomenon. On the contrary, it was, according 
to Schuster, the expression of a very general and world-wide 'tendency'. 
For the First \mrld War had 'upset the ordinary process of economic life, 
and created forces and oscillations of an artificial and unprecedented 
kind which have forced Governments to intervene and give a lead to the 
t d t 1 ff t • d t •th th d • t • I 
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cancer e na ona e or ... require ·o cope w1 ese con 1·1ons . 
Schuster drew his examples of such state intervention from countries 
like l\ustralia, Germany, Japan, the U.S.A. and, naturally, Russia. 28 The 
Russian case attracted his special attention not only because of the 
success of planning in Russia - and he quoted from Naurice Dobb's review 
on Russian planning to emphasise this point - but also, because, 'there 
[was] said nov1 to be a tendency for the "advanced" youth of India to look 
more and more to Russia as an example and a guide 1 • 29 Thus the political 
consideration 1~as already there. Although laissez-faire was still the 
avowed policy of the rulers in India - and Keynesiantsm was still a far-
cry even i~ Britain - yet what we find here is that the state was seized 
·---------·-----~ 
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with a political problem for which it was trying to find an 1 economic 1 
solution. George Schuster 1 s effort at 1 planning 1 was not simply an 
individual 1 s benevolent or far-sighted attempt for the amelioration of 
poverty. It was the state which was speaking through him and groping 
f 1 t . 30 ·or a so u ion. 
The year 1930 marked a critical juncture in the career of the 
colohial state. Never before had it felt itself more alienated from its 
subjects. For that year saw the culmination of a decade of the most 
momentous political developments in the subcontinent. The Congress had 
emerged in that period as a massive nationalist force, equipped with a 
vigorous, if small, left-wing which, under the leadership of the young 
Jawaharlal Nehru - indoctrinated.in socialism from his sojourn in 
Europe - was vocal about its anti-imperialist and socialist views. 31 A 
Communist Party, too, had already been formed. The organisation of the 
workers in a trade union movement and of peasants in Kisen Sabhss was 
understood Ly the authorities as the symptoms of a growing radical 
challenge. (The Kanpur Conspiracy Case was their first awkward response 
to what they feared as the advent of Bolshevism). 32 Altogether there was 
a pervasive mood of impatience and restiveness which was difficult for the 
Government to ignore: even the habitually obsequious class of Indian 
businessmen and industrisalists had gone so far as to unite themselves 
under the aegis of the FICCI as a petulant gesture of defiance against the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce (ACC), formed as the exclusive club of 
European capitalist interests in India. Never before had the Raj felt so 
alienated from its subje~ts. And if all these signs of alienation added 
up to veritable crisis of authority for the colonial regime, it was 
compounded further by the crisis of world capitalism caught up in the 
throes of the Great Depression. 
Altogether the situation called for an intervention by the state in 
the life of the colony in a manner more direct and positive than ever before. 
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One of the consequences of such intervention was to demonstrate, with 
unprecedented clarity, the political character of its economic measures. 
This is made explicit in Schuster's 1 Note 1 in so far as it acknowledges 
that 'all economic discussion in India is conducted, not with scientific 
accuracy on the basis of reliable statistics and impartial evidence, but 
±n an atmosphere of political bias' , 33 and assigns to the proposed 
Economic Advisory Council the role of an instrument 1 for co-operating 
with unofficial opinion so that Government may not only get the advantage 
of advice and ideas from those who are actually engaged in economic 
activities, but also carry public opinion to some extent with it in its 
actions' . 34 That the 1 Note 1 was not merely designed by its author with 
political consideration in mind, but was indeed read as a political 
document by others, is illustrated further by the response it evoked in 
official circles. 1 What is wanted', wrote J.A. Whitehead, the Trade 
Commissioner, in his comments on the document, 1 is not so much the 
provision of more economic statistics as the presentation of the statistics 
already compiled, the deductions to be drawn from those statistics and an 
explanation of what Government does in various directions in a 
readily readable form in current newspapers' .35 It is comments like 
these which help clearly to identify Schuster's 'Notes' as a political 
document born of the crisis of Britain's Indian empire and recognise the 
primarily political character of the planning processes and institutions 
envisaged in it. 
SECTION 2: Responses to Schuster's Proposals 
To go back to the history of planning, Schuster and his colleagues' 
proposal for the formation of an advisory council was initially confined 
to the members of the Viceroy's Council. It was a closely guarded secret, 
and although Schuster wanted to make a statement in his budget speech of 
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1930 1 to the effect that the Government were considering action on these 
lines and would be glad to receive suggestions from the unofficial 
benches 1 , 36 the Council decided against it on the grounds that 'it would 
be dangerous even to throw out this general idea until we had considered 
more carefully how far we were prepared to go 1 • 37 
But, by this time, the idea of an Economic Advisory Council had 
attracted the ~ttention of a part of the Indian elites as well. This 
was evident during the budget discussion, when Mr R.K. Sanmukham Chetty 
declared from the opposition benches: 
... the Honourable the Finance Member should concern 
himself, not merely with the task of balancing the Budget, 
but of improving the general economic situation of the 
country, improving the agricultural and industrial 
situation in the country and in that task, may I give him 
a suggestion? He must appoint an Economic Advisory Council, 
on the lines of the Council recently announced by the Labour 
Government, so that such a Council might, from time to 
time, advise the Central Government as to the measures 
that are to be taken for developing the vast natural 
resources of the country, and thereby increasing the 
national wealth of the country and place at the disposal 
of Provincial Governments funds for nation-building 
services.38 
Once the issue was raised by the 1 unofficial 1 side in this manner, 
Schuster had his way cleared. It was settled after a further discussion 
in Council that he should give a sympathetic response to Mr Chetty 1 s 
proposals in winding up the general debate on the budget, and invite the 
unofficial leaders to confer with the members of the Council informally 
•t 39 upon 1 . 
Accordingly, a meeting was held on 16 March 1930 at which were 
present the Members for Industries and Labour, Commerce, Finance, and 
Education, Health and Land representing the official side. The 1 unofficial 1 
representatives were M.A. Jinnah, P. Thakurdas, G.D. Birla, H. Cocke and 
S. Chetty. But the time chosen was not conducive to any agreement between 
the official and unoficial points of view regarding the formation of such 
a Council. The budget of 1930 itself led to a revival of political 
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movements. The Cotton Protection Act which the Government introduced 
in a hurry to protect Lancashire through a preferential treatment, made 
matters worse. Although Gandhi's movement was not due to start until 
April 1930, the meeting held on 16 March already foreshadowed the coming 
alignment of different political views. While M.A. Jinnah, whose 
differences with the Congress Party were pronounced, supported the idea 
put forward by Schuster and his colleagues, Birla was definitely against 
it. He 'feared that such a Council would be bound to consider questions 
of policy on matters which properly fell in the sphere of provincial 
governments and that constitutional difficulties would arise' .40 Thakurdas 
also was not keen to accept the idea. He was of the view that no 
constructive economic programme in India could be effective unless it 
included a full-blooded protectionist policy. 41 
Thus the political import of an Economic Advisory Council was not 
missed by the leaders of Indian business at all. Schuster grasped this 
very clearly indeed, and summed up the difficulties as follows: first, he 
feared that 'the political parties would seek to control policy through 
such a council and might not take much interest in it if this were not 
possible', and secondly, there would be 'constitutional difficulties 
between the Central Government and the Provinces' .42 Eventually, the only 
recommendation on which all parties attending the meeting could agree, 
was that it 1would be valuable to constitute a Council on the lines 
suggested, recognising that its sphere for the moment might be limited to 
43 
one of research'. 
Although the meeting did not yield any concrete proposal for the 
formation of an Economic Advisory Council, Schuster and his colleagues in 
the Viceroy's Council did not let the matter end there. They wanted to go 
forward and organise an economic conference of the representatives of the 
provincial governments in May or June of that year at Simla. However, as 
a first step it was suggested that, prior to any official communication 
40 
with the provinces, the Viceroy might write personal letters to the 
Go~ernors inviting their opinions on the general idea. 44 This was done. 
The responses of the Governors were mixed. While the Governor of Bengal 
heartily welcomed the proposal, Montague Butler of the Central Provinces 
was quite sceptical about the efficacy of such councils. For the central 
issue was very clear to him: 'Economics in India tend to be treated 
politically' . 45 The Governor of Punjab thought that the local Board of 
Economic Enquiry in Punjab was already working in the same direction at 
the provincial level and could be emulated for the formation of the 
Central Economic Advisory Council. 46 In spite of all reservations, however, 
the idea of the Council was accepted by all the provincial governments, 
and they started making preparations for the forthcoming Economic 
Conference proposed by the Viceroy. 
Schuster also wrote to Sir Arthur Salter, Secretary of the Economic 
and Finance Sections of the League of Nations, for information about the 
steps taken in other countries in the direction of planned economic 
development. Salter, who had made a detailed study regarding the role of 
the state for economic development in many countries, supplied Schuster 
with the relevant documents. 47 These show that the idea of an Economic 
Advisory Council ~1as not a novel one. Russia of course had constructed 
its own planning machinery soon after the October Revolution. Germany had 
set up its Economic Advisory Council as early as 1920. Some of the other 
European countries like France, Italy, Poland and Greece too, had already 
developed such councils to look after their own economic problems, whil0 
in Australia an informal committee, headed by its Prime Minister, S.M. 
Bruce, had been functioning since the spring of 1927 in order to assess, 
from time to time, the efficacy of the methods used to enforce its policy 
of protection. 48 So the notion of harnessing a degree of economic 
expertise into the affairs of the state with a view to monitoring its 
activities and steering it towards some determinate objectives, was by no 
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means an Indian or British innovation. If anything, India and Britain 
were relatively latecomers in the field of managed economics. 
Schuster had not given up his hope of establishing a degree of 
rapport with the 'unofficial advisers' in India. However, the political 
situation soon became so volatile that he could not make much headway in 
that direction. 'IF political conditions had been normal', he wrote in 
some frustration, 'I should have felt the arguments to be very strongly in 
favour of continuing and expanding the informal discussions started in 
Delhi. Even though I recognise the dangers of discussing such matters 
without having carefully worked out our own plans, I should have been 
prepared to take this risk for the sake of the political value of 
impressing on public opinion both that we are "getting a move on" and that 
we are prepared to take account of unofficial views and wishes, even in 
the early stages of formulating a plan 1 • 49 In the prevailing political 
climate, he had no option other than to concentrate on the official side 
and make his 'Notes on Economic Policy' the basis of a discussion of 
economic perspectives at a conference between the Commerce and Railways, 
Education, Health and Lands, Industries and Labour, and Finance Depart-
ments. According to him, the aim of such a conference would be to improve 
the machinery of Government for planning a constructive and co-ordinated 
economic policy, to develop contacts between the representatives of 
official and non-official opinion, and to encourage the creation of an 
intelligent public opinion on economic questions, and as a means to this 
t d . t t' . t t' t' so end, the provision of accura e an ins rue ive economic s·a is·1cs. 
To achieve these he proposed, among other measures, that the Provincial 
Banking Enquiry Committees should be kept alive to utilise them as the 
nucleus for a continuous study of possibilities and developments in the 
economic field, and that the Commercial Intelligence Department should be 
incorporated in, or at least associated with the permanent ~~tablishment 
of the Economic Sub-Committee of the proposed Council. He also wanted to 
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have Sir Arthur Salter invited to India the following year in order to 
make an economic survey, and in terms of general policy, he recommended 
that the Punjab model should be followed by the Provincial Governments. 51 
The 'Notes on Economic Policy' generated an interesting variety of 
responses among the heads of the departments and other British officials 
in India. The Trade Commissioner J.A. Whitehead conceded that something 
had to be done along the lines indicated in that paper, but was against 
the inclusion of non-officials in a Council. 'It would be unwise to give 
non-officials a direct share, in association with the Members of Government, 
in the planning and framing of economic policy 1 ~ 2 For he feared that Indian 
non-official, particular commercial, opinion would try and make use of the 
Council in order to force a change in the policy of the Government of 
I d ' 53 n ia. His other objections were related to the problems of a clash of 
interest and authority between the Centre and the provinces. Whitehead 
submitted that instead of an Economic Advisory Council, a Central Board of 
Economic Enquiry should be formed. The function of such a board would be 
to conduct enquiries, but not to formulate policies. This, he thought, 
would help to prevent the devolution of unwarranted power in the hands of 
the Indian members which was a distinct possibility if Schuster's advice 
were to be favoured. 
Sir George Rainy, the Commerce and Railway Member, suggested that a 
Civil Research Council, following British precedent, sho~ld be formed 
initially. Such a Council could complement the work of the Agricultural 
Research Council, which was already there, in dealing with non-agricultural 
matters. 54 He also apprehended constitutional difficulties with regard to 
Centre-State relationship, etc., arising from an Economic Advisory Council. 
He inclined, like Whitehead, in fnvour of setting up an Advisory Council 
devoid of any decision making power. 'The rule should be that the Council 
should consider and investigate only those subjects which are referred to 
it by Government, but should be free to suggest subjects which it thinks 
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ought to be discussed. I would not go further than this, for if we 
surrender control at the initial stage, the Council may lead us a pretty 
55 dance 1 • Another problem which worried Rainy was that of the forthcoming 
Simon Commission Report. He felt that the Simon Commission Report was 
certain to have much to say on the question of the future direction of the 
Government of India's economic policy and that in any case the issue of 
the Economic Advisory Council was bound to be sidetracked once the 
Commission 1 s recommendations were published, pressing more urgent issues 
on the administration for at least the next twelve months. 56 These 
opinions were shared also by the Railway Board, which saw in the function 
of the proposed Council a threat to its own right to make decisions about 
railway freights and tariffs. 57 
A very interesting comment on the role of State in economic develop-
ment came from Sir Frank Noyce, Secretary to the G. 0. I., Department of 
Education, Health and Lands. After enumerating the problems of Indian 
industries, Noyce observed that it 1vas 1 axiomtic 1 that private enterprise 
could not undertake the task of solving them. 1 It does not, at least in 
India, command the requisite resources either in men or money. The State 
must, therefore, step in. In a country of the size and political 
tendencies of India, it is also evident that the organ of the State that 
can most efficiently play the role of co-ordinating agency and of guide is 
the central government; otherwise there will be neither a national outlook 
nor a national policy. Provincial particularism and, possibly provincial 
inequalities of resources, wp1 lead if not to actual inefficiency at least 
to a failure to achieve efficiency in the fullest measure possible 1 • 58 
This could have been the view expressed by any 1 nationalist 1 of the time. 59 
With all such reservations, however, most of the members of the policy 
making body of the Government of India accepted the idea of an Economic 
Advisory Council. They differed with Schuster, when they did so at all, 
in the details about the modus operandi of such a Council, which, if not 
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properly thought through, might, they feared, tempt the non-official 
members to use the Council in furthering the cause of the Indian economic 
and political nationalism. and create constitutional difficulties between 
the Central and the provincial governments. In other words, there seems 
to have emerged, at this point, a consensus in the highest official 
circles about the need for a direct political initiative on the part of the 
State itself to evolve a machinery for economic planning in India. 
SECTION 3: Salter's Visit to India 
It was Schuster's idea (as noticed above) 60 that Sir Arthur Salter, 
who was the Secretary of the Economic and Finance Sections of the League 
of Nations at the time, 61 should be invited to India to advise the 
Government of India on the proposed Economic Advisory Council. Accord-
ingly, Salter arrived in India in January 1931 at the invitation of the 
Government of India 'to give them the benefit of his special knowledge 
and experience of organisation existing abroad for the study of economic 
questions including both the continuous interpretation of current develop-
ments and the consideration of plans designed to achieve particular purpose 
and to advise them on organisation matters in relation to the associated 
. t. . I d. I 62 posi ion in n ia By now the Government of India was convinced about 
the efficacy of having an Advisory Economic Council. Salter's visit to 
India was viewed by the Government of India as a positive step in that 
d . t. 63 irec ion. The tour which included Bombay, Calcutta, Cawnpore, Lucknow, 
Lahore and Madras in its itinerary was preceded by a meeting between 
Salter and the heads of the Departments of the Government of India in 
Delhi at George Sc~uster's house on 18 January to discuss different aspects 
f th d C . · 1 64 o· e propose ounci . That discussion, held under six headings - (i) 
Composition etc. of the Council, (ii) Subjects for discussion by the Council, 
(iii) Question of publicity, (iv) Financing of the Committees etc,. (v) 
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Balance of competencies and (vi) Basis for organisations, - was important 
enough to merit a review. To start with the 'composition of the proposed 
Council', it was envisaged that a two-tier system had to be evolved. 
Together with a Central Council there had to be provincial councils, as 
many of the economic programmes were to be taken up only by the provincial 
governments. But since a new constitution based on the Simon Commission 
was in the offing nothing could be done at that stage to give any permanent 
shape to the proposed Council. Its composition too, could not be deter-
mined. It was thought that the Council and the provincial committees would 
be wanting in a sense of responsibility if these were made up of too many 
'non-officials'. If non-officials were inducted to such committees then 
the danger was that the opinions or advices of such committees would be 
unacceptable to the government concerned. On the other hand, if the 
committees were composed of only the official members of the Central or 
the provincial governments, then they could lose their representative 
character and would not be acceptable to the people. Caught in this 
dilemma, the meeting failed to reach any firm conclusion regarding the 
composition of the Council or of its associated Committees. It was under-
stood, however, that 'non official experts would have to be included in 
1 65 the committees with sufficient safeguards for the governments concerned. 
On the 'subjects for discussion' for the Council, however, the meeting 
was more specific. Schuster conceived of the Economic Council 'not as a 
body treating detailed day-to-day problems of immediate and practical 
import, but rather as examining large questions and in general exploring 
66 the economy of the country'. As such, examples of the subjects he wanted 
for discussion at the Council would be the establishment of tobacco monopoly 
and jute control by the state, financial questions such as co-operative 
marketing, land mortgage banks and the establishment of warehouse certifi-
cates to link up indigenous trade with the money market, production of 
salt, extension of hydro-electric power and so on. 
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But even the issue of the 'subjects for discussion' involved 
politics: How could the Council be stopped from launching out on 'undesirable 
questions'? Salter suggested some alternatives: Anything not specifically 
referred by Government would be out of order; the Committee would have 
initiative but subject to a veto by Government, or the internal safeguard 
that the decision to embark on a new subject should require a substantial 
majority of the full Committee, i.e., two-thirds or three-fourths. 67 But 
it was understood that none of these alternatives could ensure popularity 
of the Council. On the other hand, some safeguards were in any case 
necessary so that the future government under the new proposed constitution 
should not have its freedom of action and policy undermined before it 
came into existence. As a result it was proposed that only the research 
side of the Committee's future activities would be undertaken at that point 
of time, 'in order that the. materials might be got together at once upon 
which a future government might base its policy' . 68 
The question of 'balance of competencies' was another issue which 
bothered the members in the meeting. It was decided that this should be 
considered under two heads, different principles being adopted in each 
case. The first question was how to get the expert elements, and the second, 
how to get the representative elements, both being required on this body. 
Salter asked if it would be safe to ask the universities and other 
organisations to nominate economists. The members were against it and 
Schuster said that 'Chambers of Commerce should certainly not nominate 
Economists 1 • 69 
Although no reason was given for the exclusion of the 'Economists', 
it was perhaps not unrelated to the fear, expressed in another context by 
Sir Fajl-i-Hussain, about 'the danger of politics dominating such a body', 
for, according to him, 'The Inter-Universities Board, for instance, had 
manifested a strong leaning towards the political handling of academic 
bodies'. 70 So the economists would have to be excluded from being 
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nominated by public bodies to avoid politicisation of economic policies 
and researches. 
The meeting thus could not decide upon the structure of the proposed 
committee and its mode of operation in any concrete forn1. It was 
decided, however, that if the political situation permitted - a Round 
Table Conference was soon to be held and the reaction of the Indian 
leaders on a number of important political developments was being closely 
monitored71 - a conference of representatives of the provincial govern-
ments, and experts nominated by them, would be organised in Simla using 
S lt ' t b . f . t d. . 72 a er s repor as a asls or i s iscussion. 
Failing in his effort at eliciting any conclusive guidance from his 
meeting with the Government of India's departmental heads, Salter decided 
to delimit the scope of his enquiry to two sets of issues. One of these 
related to questions concerning the constitution of the central body, the 
role of expert and representative elements, Central and Provincial elements, 
staff, sub-committees, power and procedure, and the relation of the whole 
of the proposed organisation to existing and contemplated Central and 
Provincial bodies and institutions, e.g., the Imperial Council of Agri-
cultural Research, the Tariff Board, the Railway Rates Advisory Committee, 
the Indian Central Cotton Committee, the Central Jute Committee (when 
formed) and the Reserve Bank (when formed). 
The other set of issues which figured in Salter's enquiry and 
presumably in his report concerned more general isues about the purpose 
of the organisations contemplated and their operations for gathering, 
processing and producing information about Indian economic performance. 
As such, the co-ordination of economic policy, inter-departmentally as well 
as between the Central and Provincial Governments, was one of his main 
concerns. Equally so were matters relating to the improvement of the 
statistical and commercial intelligence, research into economic questions 
by experts, and the provision of machinery to inform public opinion. 73 
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The response evoked by Salter's enquiry in the top echelons of the 
bureaucracy correspond in many respects to that evoked earlier by 
Schuster's 'Notes' among the officials. One of the latter, Dr D.B. Meek, 
the then Director General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, had 
already met Salter in Calcutta and sent him a detailed note on the subject 
of the proposed Council. 74 
In its intelligence as well as in its disapproval of the idea of an 
Economic Council, this note was representative of much of official thinking 
at the highest levels. Meek had no difficulty in grasping the overall 
developmental 9im of the proposal as that of 'increasing the national 
income, the supply of food and the standard of living 1 , 75 and in identifying 
its 'two immediate reasons' in the need for specialised knowledge and the 
support of unofficial opinion in framing economic policies. 76 But his 
opposition to the notion of a Council derived from attitudes characteristic 
of high officialdom. In the first place, Meek, like many of his colleagues, 
feared the changes, bound to be brought about by such a Council, in terms 
of a reduction of the virtual autonomy of all departments of Government. 
The Simon Commission Report, with its recommendations for constitutional 
reform, had already made a degree of change inevitable in the near future. 
To rock the boat further by creating 'a hard and fast comprehensive 
organisation during a period of transition' , 77 could only make matters 
worse. So, although he understood the importance of 'expert investigation 
and advice', he would like it to be harnessed by me3ns of the existing 
h . f d . . t t. 78 mac inery o a minis ra ion. Secondly, his resistance to the idea 
derived to no mean extent from political considerations - from the fear of 
opposition likely to be voiced within constitutional bodies designed to 
be set up soon in the wake of the Simon Commission Report. 'At present the 
criticism is criticism of a Government not responsible to the legislature', 
he wrote. 'Under the new constitution the criticism will be criticism of 
the responsible Government. What the present Government and the future 
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Government require is expert investigation and advice as to what is 
considered the best policy. If they follow this expert advice they will 
at the same time have the materials with which to meet the opposition 1 • 79 
His advice, in sum, was to be on guard against the risk of exposing the 
process of economic policy-making to politicians and through them, to the 
public, but to keep it firmly in the hands of specialists and technocrats 
functioning under the aegis of the existing bureaucratic apparatus. 
Salter's enquiry and recommendations could not break new grounds for 
Schuster and other enthusiasts for planning within the official circles. 
But, this enquiry reiterated the need for 'expert investigation' and 
1 slatistics'. The importance of statistics was never missed by the 
authority. But when it was emphasised by the Indian Enquiry Committee in 
1924, 80 the Government did not pay any heed to it. 81 Now, when the 
question of planning cropped up, the Government took special interest in 
augmenting its statistical organisations. It was very well understood by 
Meek that sooner or later it must be the duty of the Government 'to examine 
continuously the factual positions relating to economic conditions and 
changes in India and for the information of the Government to·try to point 
to the.determining factors of these conditions•. 82 Now that the Government 
was thinking in terms of 'development' of Indian economy through pl_anning, 
the importance of 'statistics' was doubly felt. In Meek's own words, 'No 
constructive economic policy is possible .without continuous scientific 
study of the conditions prevailing in India ... as deduced from 
statistical data•. 83 And as Meek wrote in his note on Salter's enquiry, 
statistics would also supply the Government with materials to face the 
opposition. In 1930 itself when Schuster was trying to convince others in 
the Government about the necessity of having the Economic Advisory Council, 
Meek was sent to the U.S.A. by the Government of India to study the 
statistical organisations and methods adopted there. 84 After his return 
Meek suggested some measures including publication of monthly statistics 
·\ 
t) 
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regarding production, etc. and 'long-term surveys of economic conditions', 
in view of the proposed machinery for economic planning. 85 All these 
figured in Salter's report and later in the Bowley-Robertson Report also. 
• 86 But the officialdom took its own time to organise these. 
SECTION 4: The Sequel to Schuster's Initiative 
By 1931, Schuster's and his colleagues' effort had reached a bottle-
neck. Political exigencies took priority over the efforts towards planned 
economic development. Although the Congress suspended its Civil 
Disobedience movement, launched in 1930, by early 1931 for a proposed 
talk between Gandhi and Irwin, the Gandhi-Irwin pact of March 1931 failed 
to solve the problems for the rulers. The Congress went back to organise 
a second Civil Disobedience movement in 1932 which went on until 1934 with 
varying intensity. The other important political development concerned 
the Ottawa Conference in 1932~ By then Irwin was replaced by Willingdon 
as the new Viceroy. Although Hoare, the Secretary of State, was keen on 
including representatives of the FICCI in the Indian delegation to the 
Conference and both Birla and Thakurdas assured Hoare of their support, 87 
Willingdon was not ready to trust Birla or Thakurdas. 88 The Indian 
capitalists in the FICCI also were not interested to join the Conference 
89 
without Gandhi's support. Ultimately when the Ottawa Agreement was 
signed in August 1932 the vast majority of the leading Indian capitalists 
90 
were not ready to accept the Pact. 
The situation of confrontation between the Indians and the British 
rulers on these politico-economic fields did not help Schuster to proceed 
with his efforts. However, the proposal for a Council 1vas not given up. 
Schuster and his friends continued to pursue the matter with the new Viceroy 
and Willingdon asked Schuster to prepare a fresh note on the subject. In 
this note, dated 8 June 1932, the idea of direct stat~ intervention in 
iJ 'i 
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favour of economic planning was reiterat~d more vigorously than ever 
before, as Schuster wrote: 
No Government in present economic conditions can a11ord 
to carry on with the old laissez-faire policy. The need 
for some kind of national planning is being forced on all 
governments ... any nation that does npt make any such 
attempt to look after itself may find great difficulties 
in surviving at all. 
1 should like to see the Gbvt. of India attempting to 
design something in the nature of a five-year economic plan. 91 
As a practical measure he suggested that the question of an Economic 
Advisory Council should be taken up for discussion in November. This, 
92 however, was not done 'owing to the pressure of Ottawa and other work', 
although it was agreed in principle, by the end of the year, that a Central 
Bureau of Commercial Intelligence equipped with a Central Research 
Statistical Bureau should be set up at the Government of India head-
93 quarters. 
This particular decision followed directly from a recommendation 
made in Schuster's note to involve Dr Meek, Director of Commercial· 
Intelligence and Statistics (whom we have met before), in the planning 
94 process. For the latter had, meanwhile, changed his mind about planning 
and moved more than half-way to meet the idea. While, in 1931, he was 
sceptical about the proposal for a Council, by December 1932 he was 
convinced of the need for 'continuous study with a view to the orderly 
95 development of the economic life of the country'. He was clearly 
influenced in his thinking on this subject by the Soviet Russian experience 
and its emulation elsewhere. The 'question of economic planning has been 
brought to the front by the "five-year plan" in Soviet Russia', he observed, 
and 'other countries now have begun talking about five-year or ten-year 
t . d . d t . 1 . t' ' 
96 plans in order to overhaul heir economic an in us ria organisa ion . 
The extent of his departure from his own conservative stance on this 
matter not so long ago is illustrated in a letter he wrote to a colleague 
at about this time. Thus: 
i. 
\l 
j 
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I fully realise that to many the idea of regulated effort 
is entirely obnoxious; but the fact remains that under 
the present system, economic depressions have been growing 
in intensity at each recurrence, until a point has been 
reached now when the system of unregulated production, 
distribution and consumption is on the verge of breaking 
down. Without going nearly so far as to establish 
machinery to control production and consumption there is 
still a large field for the exercise of conscious planning 
of the orderly development of the natural resource of the 
country, while the successful determination of economic 
policy implies some such plenning, which looks ahead, even 
if a time programme is not rigidly adhered to.97 
In order to convert thi~ general idea into administrative measures 
Meek also drew up a comprehensive prospectus of tasks for collecting 
information on the most important aspects of the Indian economy and for 
maintaining a record of the Government's economic decisions and perform-
98 
ance. This advice, taken together with Schuster's recommendations, led 
the Government eventually to confirm the decision to set up a Central 
Bureau of Statistics and to form a Standing Economic Sub-Committee of the 
Viceroy's CounGil with the task, among other things, of reviewing the 
economic situation from time to time and formulating economic policy. 99 
One of the immediate results of Schuster's and Meek's initiative 
was the visit, in 1933, of two British experts, Dr A.L. Bowley and Mr D.H. 
Robertson, at the request of the Government of India100 and their report, 
submitted the following year, on the existing organisation of statistical 
and other information and the problems of utilisation of the country's 
economic resources. The Bowley-Robertson report reiterated the importance 
of a separate central statistical department, a statistical survey for the 
purpose of measurement of national income and wealth, a quinquennial census 
on production and above all, of a small, but permanent, staff of economists 
working directly under the Viceroy's Executive Council in order to advise 
th G t . l" . 101 e overnmen on economic po icies. These recommendations were accepted 
by the Government in principle, although not all of these could be fully 
realised at the time for want of funds and because of the uncertainties 
involved in the constitutional changes soon to be introduced in the light 
j.: .. , ., 
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of the Simon Commission's Report. Interest in these recommendations, 
however, continued at the departmental levels of the administration until 
as late as 1936-37. 102 Meanwhile, one of the by-products of Schuster's 
initiative - the idea of an economic conference of representatives of the 
Provincial Governments - was revived in 1933. 
SECTION 5: The Bureaucracy Retracts 
It will be recalled that in 1930 Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, had written 
to the provincial Governors on the subject of an economic conference in 
order to consider, among other matters, the proposal to set up an Economic 
Advisory Council. Nothing came of that idea for some time until it was 
brought back to life under the impact of Great Depression. Industrial 
activities in India were not severely impaired by the Depression due to 
various reasons. But agriculture, particularly the cash-crops, suffered 
from a sharp fall in exports. 103 The economic discontent of the peasantry, 
aggravated further by their increasing politicisation since 1928-29 and 
the spread of the movements launched by the Congress and other parties in 
rural India, made the authorities acutely aware of the need to ameliorate 
the conditions of the peasantry. 
Early in the summer of 1933, the Viceroy wrote to the Governors of 
the provinces asking for their views on 'economic conditions particularly 
among the agriculturists' in their province. 104 In January next year he 
wrote again to the Governors with the object of fixing a date for the 
inter-provincial conference that had been envisaged four years ago. 105 
Written in the wake of the Civil Disobedience movement, this letter puts 
the economic issues facing the Raj squarely in a political context. 
Reviewing the political scene and asserting that the calm was only 
temporary, the Viceroy wrote: 
54 
Political issues in India have always tended to dominate 
the scene, but in other countries at present it is the 
economic issue which dominates politics and although India's 
special conditions may tend to make us at times forget 
this, nevertheless our position is essentially the same as 
that of the rest of the world and it is the economic issue 
which really matters. Therefore it is on this that we need 
a policy and we may be quite sure that unless we can 
convince the public that we are doing something to tackle 
the problem, we shall give the political agitators exactly 
the forces and occasions which they need in order to 
recreate an atmosphere of political disturbance. 106(italics mine) 
The economic problems that the Viceroy wanted to discuss concerned 
the agriculturists in India. However, it is important to remember that 
his definition of 'agriculturists' did not include the agricultural 
producers; for, according to him, 'in India the greater part of the strain 
has hitherto been taken up not so much by the agricultural producers as 
by ~hose to whom the fixed money payments are due, namely, Governments, 
landlords and money-lenders, and chiefly by the last two•. 107 
The provincial Conference was held in April 1934. The Provincial 
Governors all agreed that if any eco~omic development in India was to be 
envisaged, something was urgently required to be done about Indian 
agriculture, especially about problems relating to rural indebtedness. 
marketing, industrial research and capital programme. 108 A number of 
practical decisions were taken about all of these, as well as about setting 
up a Central Intelligence Bureau to co-ordinate research and advise 
Government on economic policy. What, however, was not achieved, and 
appears indeed to have been deliberately avoided, was any decision about 
planning. This was made clear by none other than Schuster himself, who 
presided over this Conference, and observed: 
I want to produce some practical results from this 
conference. The problems are so complex, the amount 
involved in any general action are so huge, the possible 
reactions of any particular line are so difficult to 
foresee and may be so dangerous that it seems to me there 
is not the slightest chance of launching any general 
plan. What I should like to see is each province under-
taking an intensive large scale experiment in a selected 
district ••. I believe that it is only by these means that 
we shall achieve any practical advance. 109 
Jc . 
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So when it came to making the decision, Schuster and his colleagues -
. 
all of them attended the Conference in official capacity - backed out, and 
the vision of a planned economy was buried in a plethora of practical 
administrative measures of immediate concern. 
The mountain thus produced a molehill. The long-awaited Provincial 
Economic Conference was held but did not lead to any concrete step towards 
the Economic Advisory Council. The India Legislature, however, had 
interpreted this conference as a direct effort at planning and resented 
being left out. 110 Many of its members had been seriously airing their 
ideas for some time in anticipation of a planning machinery they thought 
would be set up by the Conference. It is difficult to say whether the 
interest shown by the Indian elites in planning was what made Schuster and 
his colleagues in the Council see the red light. He is certainly on record 
as having tried to discourage the enthusiasts for planning in the 
Legislature by warning them of possibility of greater government control 
involved in planning111 - a strange thing to do for one who had been 
advocating it for so long. The history of this retraction on the part of 
the bureaucracy sheds some light on its fears about the political 
implications of economic planning under conditions of colonial rule. 
During the General Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly in 
March 1934, F.E. James, the representative of the European communities in 
India, brought in a 'cut motion' to discuss the question of a 'planned 
economy' in India and the immediate constitution of an Economic Advisory 
C ·1 112 ounc1 . This was supported by all the non-official members - from 
N.M. Joshi the labour leader to H.P. Mody, the leader of the Bombay 
Millowners Association. They all wanted, in fact pressed, the State to 
intervene even more directly in the economic life of the country. H.P. 
Mody put it very cogently: 'It is very natural that a people who have been 
l~ving under some sort of domination or another throughout almost the whole 
j. 
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of their history should come to depend on a large measure, not on self-help, 
but upon the help which a ma bap Government can administer in every sphere 
Of natl.onal act1'vi'ty 1 • 113 Y t th b · d d h e ano er mem er remin e t e Government of 
its 'duty ... to safeguard and ameliorate the economic welfare of the 
people under it 1 • 114 Schuster, speaking for the Government, appears to 
have agreed with some of these arguments as he acknowledged the futility 
of the old non-interventionist attitude: 'Every day new needs are coming 
upon us for taking an active part in directing policies which were 
formerly left to develop on their own account under what was then a 
generally accepted policy of 1aissez-faire 1 • 115 But this recognition on 
the need for 'an active part in directing policies' was not strong enough 
to overcome his anxiety about the loss of authority likely to result from 
the formation of an Economic Advisory Council. He opposed the idea on 
purely political grounds as witness the following extract from his reply 
to the cut motion: 
If the Government have an Advisory Council and that Council 
probably, as a matter of fact will be very divided in its 
opinion - and that Council puts up opinions which are 
inconsistent with the policy of the Government, ... then the 
Government must reject such advice, and no Council of that 
kind can maintain its authority in the country or really 
perform useful functions unless its advice is always taken 
or practically always taken. Therefore, for a Government to 
set up an Advisory Council of this kind tends either to be 
a matter of mere eyewash or to involve the relinquishment by 
the Government of their own responsibilities, in perhaps th116 
most important part of the field of those responsibilities. 
(italics mine). 
One can hardly improve upon this as a confession of official fear and 
anxiety about the proposed Economic Advisory Council. This is further 
jllustrated by Schuster's retort to James when the latter suggested a body 
of fifteen members to constitute the Council. 1Will he [James] ask 
himself', he said, 'how many of these men are not already committed 
publicly to opinions either on politics or economics which are inconsistent 
with the definite policy of Government? 1117 
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Such fear on the part of the colonial government could only arise 
from a realisation of the want of its own legitimacy in the eye of its 
subjects. Since 1930 the bureaucracy had been talking of a planned 
economy not only as an instrument of improvement of material conditions 
of the people, but also - one feels - primarily, as the means to reinforce 
itself politically. Yet, after years of fiddling with the idea, when it 
actually came to taking s decision, it could not make up its mind. An 
Economic Advisory Council composed of Indian 'economic experts' and other 
representatives could not be trusted. The Government recognised the need 
for a well-chalked out programme to alleviate the economic plight of the 
people~ but fell that this could be achieved by such prudent measures as 
it finally settled for in 1934 - that is, an Economic Sub-Committee of 
the Viceroy's Council, proposals for extensive economic enquiries, and the 
formation of a Central Intelligence Bureau of Statistics. 
By 1934 two of Schuster's supporters had already left India. Irwin, 
the Viceroy, was replaced by Willingdon. George Rainy, who was the 
Commerce Member in 1930 was replaced by James Bhore in 1933. Schuster 
himself left in 1934. But the question of planning was not buried with 
their departure. Many of the provinces took their cue from the effort of 
the Central Government. As a matter of fact, the Government of the United 
Provinces actually set up its own Committee on Economic Planning in 1934. 
The initiatives came from Mr C.Y. Chintamoni who was the Leader of the 
Opposition in the U.P. Legislative Council. In December 1933 he moved a 
resolution recommending to the Government 'to set up a committee to draw 
up a five year's plan of economic development' for the United Provinces. 
This resolution was adopted by the Council, and the Government readily 
agreed to implement the proposal. In July 1934, a Committee of four was 
set up under the U.P. Board of Economic Enquiry, with Dr Radhakamal 
Mukherjee, a noted economist from Lucknow University as one of the members, 
to formulate a five-year plan for economic development of the region.118 
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As far as t~e Central effort was concerned we shall find the idea of 
planning taken up again by the bureaucracy with the advent of the Second 
World War. Meanwhile, the Indian nationalists themselves had to have a 
say on the subject, broadening thereby the scope of political inter-
vention in the economic life of the country, no longer in terms of 
bureaucratic ideas and initiatives, but in those of the aspiration for 
power on the part of the Indian capitalists and their allies within and 
outside the Indian National Congress. 
SECTION 6: The 'Pioneers' 
When the Government of India was busy organising the Provincial 
Economic Conference in 1934, the first book on planning in India was 
published by M. Visvesvaraya. 119 This work reflected the interest that 
the Indian elite had begun to take in this subject at that time. It was 
also a response to the governmental effort in that direction. To respond 
intellectually to an official initiative was characteristic of the author. 
His first book, Reconstructing India, 120 published in 1920, was inspired 
by the recently introduced Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. In much the same 
way, in 1934, he chalked out a plan programme when the colonial Government 
was considering the feasibility of setting up a plan machinery in India. 
As Visvesvaraya himself said in his introduction to his book: 
Yet 
year, by 
addressed 
justified 
Since the Government of India appear to be thinking 
actively in the same direction for some time now, though 
they have not been able to reach any practical decision 
yet, it is hoped prompt action will be taken to set the 
Government machinery in motion and put in hand the first 
year's work of the Ten-year Plan.121 
another Indian statement on planning was published in the 
S.C. Mitter. It was a large book of nearly seven hundred 
same 
pages 
to the question of planning for the province of Bengal. 122 He 
the choice of a narrower scope for his argument on the ground 
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that India was so vast and the provinces were so different in character-
istics that, 'there cannot be any one plan for the whole of India•. 123 
To both Mitter and Visvesvaraya planning was the only way to rejuvenate 
India's economy. 
These two authors had one thing in common - both were closely linked 
with developmental activities of the Governments. Visvesvaraya was for a 
long time the Dewan of Mysore, a state famous for the positive interest 
shown by its bureaucracy in modern industries. As early as 1881, the 
Dewan of Mysore proclaimed that, 'the development of various industries on 
which the prosperity of the country is dependent demands the consideration 
of His Highness. Government will also always be prepared to give every 
attention to any suggestion which may be made on these subjects•. 124 
Visvesvaraya was also connected with Government of India in various 
capacities. In 1928 he headed the Indian Economic Enquiry Committee 
formed by the Government of India. The setting up of this committee, in 
a way, was the precursor of the later efforts towards planning by the 
Government. S.C. Mitter was an engineer by profession and served the 
Government of Bengal in the Department of Industries. 125 He was also a 
member of the Legislative Council and was a member of the Indian National 
126 Congress up to 1934. Mitter, like Visvesvaraya, derived his inspiration 
from the a0tivity at the governmental level. 
The Depression of 1929-30 affected the Bengal economy with a 
devastating impact. The major industry of Bengal - jute - was essentially 
an export-oriented industry. Employment in the jute industry which had 
been continually increasing since the turn of the century, dropped 
drastically from 343,868 in 1928-29 to 257,175 in 1933-34. 127 The total 
industrial employment in Bengal elso decreased by almost 400,000 during 
the decade 1922-1931. This decrease was largely due to the impact of the 
G t D . 128 rea epression. Raw jute being a major cash crop of Bengal, the 
peasantry also was hard hit. The average harvest price of raw jute which 
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was Rs.9.7a. in the 1920s, fell to Rs.5.la. in the next decade. 129 In 
the face of this economic crisis, the Bengal Provincial Government formed 
its own Board of Economic Enquiry in 1933 and followed it up with the 
appointment of a Development Commissioner to monitor the economic 
situation of the Province. 130 It was these official measures which 
d u. tt t . t h. b k l . 131 encourage 1·1i er o wri e is oo on p anning. 
The works of both Visvesvaraya and Mitter deriving as they did from 
their cue of governmental initiative for planning, agree with the spirit 
of the early phase of 'nationalist economic thought' (discussed in 
Chapter I above) and its reliance on state help for the development of 
Indian economy. However, by 1934, with the development of the Indian 
capitalist class, the idea of an alternative seat of power was already in 
the making, however vaguely as then. Congress had by then emerged as a 
major political force aspiring to take over the state for the Indian 
elites. This emergence of a distinctly Indian polity is reflected 
particularly in the works of Visvesvaraya. To him, industrialisation and 
nationalism were closely related. He observed that in the developed 
countries, 'industries and manufactures supply the elements needed to 
make a people self-sufficient and self-reliant and develop their organic 
life as a nation ... Industrial life connotes production, wealth, power 
d d •t ' 132 an mo erni y . He therefore came to tile conclusion that 'no nation 
which desires to be economically and politically self-sufficient can ignoTe 
"industrialism"' 133 while this cry for modernisation-qua-industrialisation 
echoed that of his predecessors such as Ranade, Naoroji or R.C. Dutt, 
Visvesvaraya was also aware that, 'industrialisation thrives under a 
Government which encourage both corporate and individual enterprise and 
134 this usually happens only where there is a national government'. The 
demand for a 'national' government was thus a logical step forward from 
the earlier nationalist demand for state intervention for economic 
development. 
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This shows that by 1934 people like Visvesvaraya had started 
speculating about the semblance of alternative administration that might 
be expected to make an effort towards economic planhing. The idea of 
influencing government policies presupposes two things - that the 
government would be amenable to influences and the 'leaders and the 
representatives of the people' would be in a position to influence the 
government. This approach is different from just appealing to the 
Government to come to the rescue of the Indian people. It speaks of a 
confidence in the possibility of a sort of 'national' governmeht. 'The 
safest course for Great Britain, in her own interest', wrote Visvesvaraya, 
'is to grant India without further loss of time and without equivocation, 
a satisfactory form of Federal Dominion Government which will give it full 
t 1 . t f. . 1 d f. 1 l" • I 
135 con ro over i s inancia an isca po icies . But he does not stop 
at that. Regarding the Government's role he said: 
It is hoped Government will cooperate with the people 
and between them both, provide all the cash and credit 
and manpower and machine power needed for reconstruction 
and recovery. If however, they show no inclination to 
make a start, it is up to the leaders and representatives 
of the people to concentrate attention on such of the 
measures recommended as may be immediately practicable, 
take vigorous action to influence Government policies on136 
the one side and stimulate private efforts on the other. 
S.C. Mitter's economic argument was less directly nationalistic than 
Visvesvaraya's. Taking his cue from the efforts made by the Government, 
Mitter mentioned Sir Arthur Salter's visit to India in 1931, and observed 
that latter's report 'has influenced the economic policy of the Govern-
ment of India which has secured the support of public opinion' 137 He 
also eulogised Sir John Anderson, the then Governor of Bengal, saying that, 
'we, in Bengal, are deeply indebted for his noble desire, great deter-
mination, perhaps unparalleled in India so far as administrators are 
concerned, for making a real and sincere effort in developing the economic 
138 resources of the country'. Anderson's objective was purely political. 
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Economic betterment of Bengal was part of his grand strategy for containing 
terrorism. Mitter's idea was to steer the terrorists 'from the perilous 
path of murder and revolution on to a healthy and peaceful tract of 
economic reconstruction' suggested in his book. 139 The difference between 
Visvesvaraya and Mitter is in their attitude towards the national question. 
While Visvesvaraya was arguing in favour of a modified form of 'national' 
government, by the way of dominion status for India, as a sine-qua-non for 
the success of planning, Mitter was silent on the issue of power, though 
it should be noted that nationalists like Rabindransth Tagore and Acharya 
140 P.C. Ray acclaimed his book for its constructive proposals. 
A few things come out quite clearly from these two books. First, 
the idea of planning was gaining a certain degree of acceptance among the 
Indian elites - the publication of the books on the subject point to a 
growing audience. Secondly, the dissemination of the idea among the 
Indian elites coincided with initiatives issuing from the colonial state 
in India itself. Government action itself might have encouraged 
nationalist thought on planning. In the early 'thirties, when the Govern-
ment of India ~as trying to set up the Economic Advisory Council, the 
provinces formulated their own measures to 'recover' from the effer.ts of 
the Depression and guide the economic development of the economy. In 
Bengal, as we have already mentioned, the Board of Economic Enquiry was 
constituted in 1933. The Government of Punjab had set up a provincial 
t ·1 . . l' 141 economic developmen counci even ear ier. In the United Provinces, 
the provincial government set up an Industrial Reorganisation Committee 
in late 1932 and the Planning Committee in 1934. 142 All these go to show 
that by the time that Visvesvaraya and Mitter came out with their own 
plans, the colonial administration at the Centre and some of its provincial 
counterparts had already recognised the necessity of a controlled and 
managed economy in the sub-continent. Indian econo~ists had been advocating 
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industrialisation since at least the second half of the last century. 
It was also understood by them that any rapid progress towards that goal 
would be possible only with the backing of the State. 
In 1934 Visvesvaray8 and Mitter were not the only Indians to talk 
about planning. It may be recalled that the Indian rerresentatives in 
the Legislative Assembly were seriously trying to persuade the Government 
of India to adopt 'planning' for the economic development of the country. 
In 1930 itself Sanmukham Chetty had already proposed a plan machinery. 
By 1934, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries 
(FICCI) also took positive interest in planning. Two of its very prominent 
members, G.D. Birla and N.R. Sarkar (President of the Annual General 
Meeting of FICCI in 1934) actually sketched their own plans. Birla, in a 
long speech delivered in the Annual General Meeting of the FICCI in 1934, 
(22 printed pages) surveyed the economic condition of India and gave the 
143 
outline of a plan for the development of the country. N.R. Sarkar also 
dwelled at length on the idea of economic planning in an even lengthier 
h (53 ) th . 144 speec pages on e same occasion. 
By 1934 the idea of planning had thus become qvite popular among 
both the Government of India and the leading Indian 'nationalists'.· This 
does not mean that all these people were thinking on the subject in the 
same way. The Government of India, it may be recalled, started in 1930 
with the proposal for an Economic Advisory Council m~inly to go into .the 
question of industrialisation through planning. By 1934, however, the 
amelioration of the condition of the 'peasantry' - a euphemism for land-
lords and rural money-lenders ~ became the major theme. Both Birla and 
N.R. Sarkar also emphasised the importance of the role of the state in the 
process of agricultural recovery. The former thought that 'in the 
industrial sphere there may not be any need of direct encouragement. 
Protection_, tariffs and the increased purchasing power of the masses will 
take care of the job; but in the case of agricultural produce .•. some big 
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concentrated effort will have to be made to improve the situation and 
nothing short of some sort of subsidy will be sufficient to induce the 
145 producer to produce more'. To Sarkar, 'In any scheme of planned 
economy for India, our foremost attention should be directed towards 
agriculture - the biggest indu~try of the country. Whatever degree of 
inter-dependence with other parts of the world may be permissible or 
economically justifiable in other matters, India should aim to complete 
self-sufficiency in food'. Otherwise, he thought, the country could not 
stand on her own. 146 
Such emphasis on agriculture was no doubt influenced by the impact 
of the Great Depressjon. The impact of depression was, by all accounts, 
much more serious on Indian agriculture than on the industries, as the 
Government of India itself came to acknowledge it. 147 It can also be 
discerned from the following table. 
Year 
l 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
TABLE 1148 
Indices of Manufacturing Production and the Wholesale 
Prices of Agricultural Producers 
Manufacturing Wholesale Prices in Calcutta 
Production 
(1913 = 100) Cereals Oilseeds Raw Jute 
2 3 4 
157.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
144.7 80.0 91.3 66.3 
155.3 62.4 52.9 51.5 
155.3 54.4 49.0 47.3 
167.7 52.8 47.7 43.2 
190.2 55.2 59.3 41.0 
205.4 60.0 59.0 52.6 
216.6 63.3 65.2 52.6 
234.9 61.6 74.2 59.0 
239.7 57.6 68.3 51.5 
(1929 = 100) 
Raw Cotton 
100.0 
62.3 
56.8 
63.0 
54.8 
50.0 
53.4 
61.0 
61.0 
..... 
45.9 
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As the figures given in Table l clearly shows the impact of the 
depression of 1930 was not very severe in the case of Indian manufacturers~ 
and by 1933 the industries recovered their lost ground in production. In 
the case of agriculture, however, the impact was so devastating that even 
though the price of agricultural products started increasing slowly from 
1933 it was still far below the level of 1929 even in 1937-38. Naturally 
the Government as well as the industrialists would be alarmed by such a 
situation. Where nearly ninety per cent of the population lived on 
agriculture, a drastic fall in agricultural prices would directly affect 
both government as well as industries - Government by a loss of revenue 
and industries by a fall in the purchasing power of the mass of the 
population. 
As Birla pointed out, 'the agriculturist suffered on three points: 
he has been hit, firstly by the precipitous fall in the prices of the 
commodities which he sells, secondly, by the rigidity of some of the items 
on the expenditure side of the budget, and thirdly, by the incident that 
the prices of commodities which he consumes have not fallen to the same 
149 
extent as the prices of the commodities which he produces'. An: 
industrialist, he was conscious of the importance of the home market to 
Indian capitalists. He represented the point of view of his class as he 
observed: 'We do not aspire to build industries artificially on the strength 
of our export trade. Whatever industrial development there will be will 
have to depend entirely on the home market •.• [And] we should not forget 
that the success of a plan which contemplates increased production depends 
entirely on a parallel increase in the purchasing power of the masses. 150 
Hence his emphasis on the role of the stbte in redressing and developing 
the condition of agriculture. 
The emphasis on agriculture is also evident in S.C. Mitter's plan. 
He quotes Sir John Anderson, the then Governor of Bengal, to vindicate his 
stand: 'Agriculture is and must always be our mainstay .•• and we need a 
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Recovery Plan here as surely as any country or state in the world. It 
is on agriculture - our staple industry - that we must concentrate•. 151 
This does not mean that he was oblivious of the importance of industrial-
isation. In relation to the need for planning he wrote: 'The first 
requirement of the Province and of the country is the augmentation of 
wealth. We must not restrict ourselves to agriculture only. The 
insecurity of agricultural production is too apparent. The problem of 
industrialisation should be studied simultaneously 1 • 152 And when he said 
industrialisation he did not mean modern industries only: 'The case of 
153 
cottage industries should not be left out in the background'. 
While Birla, Sarkar and Mitter emphasised the development of 
agriculture, in Visvesvaraya we find a different approach. Visvesvaraya 
envisaged a highly industrialised India through planning. Agriculture 
could not be ignored. But when he talked of agriculture he had full.-
fledged mechanised capitalist farming in mind. He cited the case of 
U.S.A., Canada and Russia to demonstrate that by the introduction of 
machinery, power and scientific methods in agriculture, 'commodities could 
b f t d · dl th t · before' . 154 A d ft · e manu.ac ure more rap1 y an any ime n a er summing 
up the outstanding defects of rural life in India, e.g. excessive pressure 
of population on land, small size of holdings, the primitive methods of 
cultivation, lack of finance for farm work, etc., he observes that, 'given 
a suitable organisation, efficient tools and instruction in up-to-date 
methods of farming, the Indian cultivator may be expected to rise to the 
same level of activity and enterprise as any of his ~11terprising brethreh 
under similar circumstances in foreign lands 1 • 155 The remedy for Indian 
poverty, according to him, was industrialisation. It was only through 
modern industrialisation that the process of 'reconstruction' and 'recovery' 
could be carried on. More, it was not industrialisation but 'industrialism' 
which was the solution. 156 
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This radical emphasis on industrialism is absent in Birla, Sarkar, 
. 
Mitter or even Government of India. Mitter wanted industries, but to him 
an 'equilibrium between agriculture and industries' was more important. 157 
Birla, as we have already seen, thought that the industries were in a 
position to look after themselves, provided the minimum conditions of 
state help were ensured. Agriculture on the other hand needed special 
efforts from the state for its rejuvenation. N.R. Sarkar wanted a 
balanced development of all sectors because there was 'a pronounced lack 
of equilibrium between agriculture, industry and other channels of 
economl·c act1·v1·t1"es 1 • 158 It ·11 b 11 d 1 th t · 1934 G t wi e reca e a so a in overnmen 
of India was more anxious about the condition of Indian agriculture than 
that of the industries. 
However, this difference between Visvesvaraya and others must not be 
exaggerated. For as we have noticed above, when Schuster and his colleagues 
had started thinking of economic planning, they did think in terms of 
industrialisation. It was the particularly precarious condition of Indian 
agriculture that forced them to give importance to the agratian question 
in 1934. Birla might have been motivated by the same consideration when 
he emphasised the importance of state help to agriculture. We should also 
remember that in 1934 the relation between Indian industrialists, 
represented by FICCI, and the Government of India was not particularly 
. 1 159 congenia . This also might have clouded the vision of Birla when he 
said that state help was not directly required to industrialise the 
economy. That the Indian industrialists such as Birla and others in FICCI 
did want state participation in industries would be evident within a decade 
when they were to produce their own 'Bombay Plan'. But then, by 1944, 
they would be in a surer position to envisage an independent India in the 
near future. 
Visvesvaraya, unlike Government of India or Birla, did ~ot have any 
-
direct stake in the policies to be adopted by the state. He was an 
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ideologue of capitalism in India. Hence when he talked about industrialism 
he could also foresee that, 'left to private enterprise, industries will 
not make satisfactory progress. Government should take the lead as every 
progressive Government is doing now•. 160 We have a direct echo here of 
Frank Noyce's opinion on Schuster's 'Economic Policy'. According to 
~oyce, it was axiomatic that private enterprise alone could not make 
satisfactory progress towards industrialisation in India. 161 In a sense 
the idea of planning itself evolved from the understanding that private 
enterprise, developed under the colonial aegis, was unable to carry 
forward on its own the task of industrialisation. 
This was the most important issue to the ideologues of Indian 
capitalism. Starting from Telang through Ranade, Naoroji and R.C. Dutt 
the idea of industrialisation for eradication of poverty revolved around 
the question of the role of the state in India. Industrialisation was 
the talisman. The first opposition to state policies to be signalled from 
these quarters came in the form of protest against the so-called laissez-faire 
policies pursued by the colonial regime. The nasc11nt Indian industries 
needed protection by the state. But from this simple demand for protection 
emerged the idea of state participation in the process of industrialisation. 
By early 1930s the idea of state aid to industries developed into the idea 
of planning. Since industrialisation was the only way to prosper, and 
since Indian capitalism was not mature enough to expand its base all on 
its own, the role of the state appeared as vital to these thinkers and 
writers. Left to itself the private sector could not make such progr~ss. 
This was true not only because of the unhelpful policies of the state, 
but also because of the lack of a capital base and the limitation of the 
home market. Birla stated the problem quite clearly: 
There is a limit beyond which the standard of living 
cannot be raised without adopting unjust means. And 
as being a subject nation, we realise this truth more 
keenly than any one else, we do not aspire to any unduly 
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high or luxurious standard of living which can be 
attained only through exploitation, in one form or 
another, of the labour of others. India is a subject 
nation and she has no desire to subjugate others. 
She cannot, therefore, afford to have an unduly high 
standard of living. Those who think that India, without 
any colony to feed or slave for her, can attain the 
standard of western countries, are labouring under a 
gross illusion. 162 
But since ultimately the increase in the standard of living, meaning 
the purchasing power, is a precondition for industrialisation of the 
economy, planning becomes the most desired goal: 'If there is no wherewithal 
to buy, then increased production will be simply decorating the warehouse 
of the producers 1 • 163 So 'we should not forget that the success of a Plan 
which contemplates increased production depends directly on a parallel 
164 increase in the purchasing power of the masses'. 
This was then how the mind of the capitalists worked in India. 
Planning was necessary for the development of capitalism in India. The 
growth of the latter was dependent on the role of the state because 
without state participation large scale and rapid industrialisation was 
not possible. The growth also required some distribution of income to 
raise the purchasing power of the masses without which the capitalism 
could not expand. The idea of state aid thus merged into the idea of 
planning. It was only through a planned effort that the question of 
production and distribution could be solved in the interest of a proper 
capitalist development. Even the colonial state could not ignore this 
fact in the post-depression era. But what was understood as imperative, 
by both the Government officials and the Indian capitalists and their 
ideologues, could not be implemented by the colonial government in the 
'thirties. 
The spokesmen of Indian capitalism also shared a common fear of 
Communism. They wanted a plar·ed economy but not a 'communistic' one. 
Visvesvaraya was of the view that 'the Indian plan should avoid communistic 
tendencies, its basic policy should be to encourage collective effort 
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without interfering with individual initiative•. 165 The Russian 
. . 
experience was valuable for planning but, according to Visvesvaraya, 'the 
doctrines of communism should be discouraged as unsuited to India 1 • 166 
Mitter observed that 'a plan to be successful should proceed along the 
line not only of least resistance but also of maximum social satisfaction. 
Government control is necessary but not necessarily aggressive .•. India 
does not aspire after socialism nor does she value the ideal of the West. 
If I d • • t h t d th h h t d • t • I 16 7 n ia is o progress s e mus o so roug er own ra i ions . 
Birla praised the New Deal of President Roosevelt of the U.S.A. because 
'they knew that it was in their interest, for there is no surer method 
of inviting Bolshevism, Communism or anarchism than to create an unhealthy 
disparity between the higher and the lower strata of society'. l68 Hence 
his emphasis on distribution of wealth through planning to raise 
purchasing power of the people. Sarkar declared that 'the extreme type 
of State Socialisms and economic regimentation that have been enforced in 
Russia was hardly acceptable or applicable to India. The basic principles 
of the Russian experiment were contradictory to the tradition, outlook 
and philosophy of the Indian people'. However, he was careful to argue, 
'while we reject the communistic basis of economic planning as adopted 
by Russia, we would _be exceedingly unwise to offer opposition to planning 
itself'. 169 The 'nationalist' advocates of planning were thus all in full 
agreement with the Government in its effort to differentiate planning from 
communism in India. 
The idea of economic planning was thus beginning to take a firm root 
in India by 1934. It was not only the Government of India who were trying 
to evolve a plan machinery to recover from the impact of the Great 
Depression, the Indian bourgeoisie also wanted planning. The Great 
Depression forced all the capitalist countries of the world to acknowledge 
the importance of state control over economic activities. In India also 
the rulers understood the importance of state participation in giving the 
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economy an orientation towards greater production and better distribution 
of income. The shattering impact of the Depression was withstood by the 
Indian economy only through the sale of her gold. 170 The economic 
predicament of the country and the concurrent political agitation in both 
urban and rural areas forced the rulers to acknowledge the importance of 
developmental activities of the state in their effort to give a semblance 
of legitimisation to their rule in India. On their part, the Indian elites 
who had been clamouring for state aid to economic activities for a long 
time, now called upon the state to plan the economic development of the 
country to suit their own needs. However, no basic structural change of 
the economy was envisaged in any of the proposals formulated by either 
side. The content of the plans or their outlines remained more or less 
the same: industrialisation of the economy and amelioration of poverty 
through increased agricultural production. The problem of rural indebted-
ness, and low productivity of agriculture, etc. were to be solved by 
state help and the introduction of technology in agriculture. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THE IDEA OF PLANNING AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 
SECTION 1: The Emergence of the Idea 
The need for positive state intervention in the economic and social 
life of the country was something that the Congress had recognised quite 
early in its political career. But it was not until 1931 that the Party 
openly declared its view on the subject. The All India Congress Committee 
in its Karachi session passed a resolution on Fundamental Rights and the 
Economic Programme which declared that 'the State shall own or control key 
industries and services, mineral rect•, .. J.rces, railways, shipping and other 
1 means of public transport'. The Congress, we shall see, like most other 
planners in India viewed industrialisation as the only method of economic 
development. The above item of 1931 resolution was a crucial one in this 
regard. All subsequent policies and programmes of the Congress regarding 
economic development had this resolution as the point of reference. It 
shows the importance attached by the Congress leadership to the role of 
the state in the p~ocess of industrialisation of the Indian economy. The 
etatisme that was implicit in the demands for protection now became a. 
matter of public policy. Almost all the political and economic opinions 
in India converged on this point. The socialists and the communists would 
naturally demand state control or ownership of industries. But this view 
had also the approval of Vallabhbhai Patel who presided over the Karachi 
session and was anything but a socialist. 2 The colonial bureaucracy too, 
on its part, wes convinced that private enterprise, left to itself, would 
not be able to cope with the task of industrialisation. 3 To all these 
otherwise diverse interests, industrialisation was the only way to develop 
.,-
·! 
'' 
\· 
.. 
' > 
., 
~:. 
:s 
.-,~ 
'i 
I 
i 
' ! 
l ' 
, I 
f ' 
,, ' ! -=------------------------~ 
83 
the Indian economy. Gandhi was alone among politicians not to subscribe 
-
to this line of thinking. But his views on industrialisation, though 
respected, were seldom followed. 
The 1931 resolution thus reflected the strong influence that sections 
of the Indian bourgeoisie wielded on the Congress. It did not visualise 
any abolition of private property as a socialist programme might have 
done. On the contrary, state participation in developing the 'key' 
industries and 'means of communication' were very much the demands of the 
Indian bourgeoisie themselves. This would be evident by 1944, when the 
leading capitalists of India were to bring out their own economic plan. 
It may be argued that the emergence of socialists within the India.n 
National Congress in 1930 influenced the resolution. But one should 
remember that Congress Socialists were a small minority in 1930-31 and the 
Congress Socialist Party was not formed until 1934. 
The 1931 resolution was, in a sense, the best economic and political 
manifesto ever produced on behalf of the colonial bourgeoisie in colonial 
India. In 1929 the Congress under Jawaharlal Nehru, in its meeting at 
Bombay adopted a resolution ackno~}edging that 'the great poverty and 
misery of the Indian people are due, not only to foreign exploitation in 
India but also to the economic structure of the society, which the alien 
rulers support so that their exploitation may continue'. It was further 
resolved that 'in order therefore to remove this poverty and misery and to 
ameliorate the condition of the Indian masses it is essential to make a 
revolutionary change in the present economic and social structure of the 
t d t th . l't' I 
4 Th c th socie y an o remove e gross inequa l ies . e ongress, us: 
expressed an awareness of the necessity to bring about fundamental changes 
to the social structure. Later on in 1931, the Karachi Congress declared 
that 'in order to end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom 
must include real economic freedom of the starving millions'.
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again the importance of 'real' economic freedom was reiterated. 
Ironically, however, this resolution also proved the hollowness of the 
1929 proclamation about the need for a 'revolutionary' structural change. 
For with regard to agriculture, the mode of livelihood for more than 
eighty per cent of the India masses, the resolution of 1931 could only 
propose 'relief of agricultural indebtedness and control of usury - direct 
and indirect 1 • 6 What was vitally missing from this policy statement was 
any concern for land reform. This absence was all the more conspicuous 
because the time was particularly bad for the peasants due to the effects 
of the Depression on Indian agriculture. Many local committees of the 
Congress were forced by popular demand to consider non-payment of rent~ 
and taxes. 7 But the central leadership was not ready even to talk about 
any anti-feudal programme. With all their dreams of an industrially 
developed economy the bourgeoisie were content to leave out of consider-
ation the issue of land reform in a country where the overwhelming 
majority of the population were toiling under feudal bondage. Not only 
.that; soon after the Karachi Congress, on 1 January 1932, the Congress 
Working Committee declared, in the face of growing agrarian movements, a 
reassurance to the Zamindars. Thus: 
In as much as some misapprehension has been created 
in the minds of the Zamindars of U.P. in particular 
and others in general, that in discussing proposals for 
non-payment of rent or taxes under given circumstances, 
the Congress was contemplating class war, the Working 
Committee assures the Zamindar~ concerned that the 
no-rent proposals referred to were in no way aimed at 
them but that they represent an economic necessity 
for the peasantry which is known to be half-starved 
and at pres8nt suffering from unprecedented economic 
distress. The Working Committee has no design upon 
any interest legitimately acquired and not in 
conflict with the national well-being. The Working 
Committee therefore, appeals to all landed or monied 
classes t~ help the Congress to the best of their 8 
ability in its fight for the freedom of the Country. 
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This declaration reveals the ideological stand of the Congress 
leadership at that time. 1t was a desire to reach a 'nationhood' bypassing 
all class conflict. Here the Congress leaders were at one with the Indian 
bourgeoisie as a class. They were afraid to lead the masses towards any 
'real' economic freedom. The intent to 'remove poverty and misery' proved 
to be hollow when the masses started pressing their demand for such a 
change. The popular movements of the late 'twenties and the early 'thirties 
occasionally showed a tendency to turn into a class struggle. The ideas 
of socialism and communism began to acquire some popularity. The 
socialists united themselves through these movements to form a socialist 
organisation within the Congress. In 1934 the Congress Socialist Party 
9 
was formed. Although this socialist group in Congress remained a 
minority, the fear it evoked among the Indian capitalists and their allies 
among the feudal landed gentry, forced the leadership to reassure the 
latter of the real aim of the Congress. The Congress Working Committee 
declared on 18 June 1934 that: 
Whilst the Working Committee welcomes the formation 
of groups representing different schools of thought, 
it is necessary, in view of loose talk about 
confiscation of private property and necessity of 
class war, to remind Congressmen that the Karachi 
resolution as finally settled by the A.I.C.C. at 
Bombay in August 1931, which lays down certain 
principles neither contem~lates confiscation of 
private property without just cause or compensation, 
nor advocacy of class war. The Working Committee 
is further of the opinion that confiscation and 
class war are contrary to the Congress creed of 
non-violence. At the same time the Working Committee 
is of the opinion that the Congress does contemplate 
wiser and juster use of private property so as to 
prevent the exploitation of the landless poor, and 
also contemplates a healthier relationship between 
capital and labour. 10 . 
The dominant ideology within the Congress during the early 'thirties 
thus remained favourable to bourgeois and landlord interests. Even in 
1936 when socialist ideas had gained a significant degree of influence in 
the Congress and Nehru scared the Bombay capitalists and merchants with 
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his strong leftist rhetoric, the agrarian programme of the Lucknow 
Congress did not contain any direct reference to the issue of anti-
Zamindar land reform. 11 It was only in the 5Dth Session of the Congress 
at Faizpur later that year, again presided over by Nehru, that the Party 
a~opted its agrarian programme as an acknowledgement of the force of 
agrarian movements precipitated by the Depression and the influence of 
12 
socialist ideas within the Congress. Back in 1931, however, the emphasis, 
as we have noticed, was still on industrialisation and the role of the 
state in bringing that about. This ran directly against the Gandhian 
notion of power. 
The Mathatma's principle of non-violence fitted well with the ideology 
of class-collaboration of the Congress. But his utopia of 
decentralised authority as elaborated in Hind Swaraj. 13 Against that 
utopia was pitted the alternative vision of a 'modernised' industrial 
nation in the image of the Western world. These two utopias - Swadeshi 
and Modernism, in different forms, had been influencing Indian nationalism 
since late nineteenth century. The two streams of thought, represented 
by the 'extremists' on the one hand and the 'moderates' on the other, may 
appear to have merged into one in Gandhian leadership of the Congress 
during the early 'twenties. But then neither of these had a clearly well-
developed ideology behird it. Congress was still going through a period 
of ideological flux. What held many different groups of people within its 
ranks was the urge for national freedom. But freedom meant different 
things to different people. Anything _western was alien to Gandhi's ideal 
of Hind Swaraj. But the very concept of nationalism was connected with 
the development of the bqurgeois notion of 'nationhood', market, nation-
state, etc. The dominant leadership of the Congre~s was trying to 
reconcile the notion of the state with the Ghandhian point of view, but 
the very concept of a nation-state would be an anathema to Gandhi's 
thematic of Ram Rajya. 
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The battle between the two tendencies - Gandhian and 'modernist' came 
t~·a head with the 1931 resolution. While the Congress, which aspired to 
represent the entire nation, could not afford to adopt the essentially 
anti-capitalist Gandhian economic philosophy as its own, it could not 
afford to lose Gandhi, the unquestionable leader of the masses, either. 
As a result a compromise had to be forged. In 1934, the Congress Working 
Committee at its meeting in Benares, publicly recognised the existence of 
doubts about its policy in regard to Swadeshi, and considered it 'necessary 
to reaffirm the Congress position on it in unequivocal terms'. According-
ly it declared that 'Congressmen are expected to use and encourage the 
use of only hand-spun and hand-woven khadi to the exclusion of any other 
cloth 1 • 14 Regarding articles other than cloth, they formulated a guiding 
principle for all Congress organisations laid down to the effect that 
..• the activities of Congress organisations relating 
to Swadeshi shall be restricted to useful articles 
manufactured in India through cottage and other small 
industries which are in need of popular education 
for their support and which will accept the guidance 
of the Congress organisations in regulating prices 
and in the matter of the wages and welfare of labour 
under their control.15 
Even this assertion of the importance of Swadeshi to the Congress was 
not thought to be sufficient to allay the fears of Ghandhians, and the 
Working Committee had to add that, 'the formula is a recognition of the 
fact that the large and organised industries which can or do command 
state aid are in no need of the services of Congress organisations, or any 
Congress effort on their behalf 1 • 16 It was thus that two virtually 
contradjctory views - one Modernist and oriented towards large scale heavy 
industry under state patronage, and the other Gandhian and oriented 
towards small scale cottage industry based on private enterprise - came 
to be accommodated within the bosom of thn Congress between 1931 and 1934. 
Soon after the Benares resolution of July 1934, the same year, the 
India National Congress resolved to authorise J.C. Kumarappa to form, under 
' ··, 
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the advice and guidance of Gandhi, an association called the All India 
Village Industries Association as part of the Congress. 17 This Association 
had to be formed because 'much confusion [had] arisen in the public mind 
as to the true nature of Swadeshi' and the 'aim of the Congress [had] 
been from its inception progressive identification with the masses' and 
'village re-organisation [was] one of the items in the constructive 
programme of the Congress' and 'such reconstruction necessarily [implied] 
survival and encouragement of dead and dying village industries'.· The 
Association would 'work for the survival and encouragement of the said 
industries and for the moral and physical advancement of the village 1 • 18 
The format~on of the All India Village Industries Association was an 
effort by the Ghandian to emphasise their economic ideals. This, however, 
19 did not stop Gandhi to retire formally from the Congress soon afterward~. 
He had been exasperated by the attitude of the Congressmen towards his 
ideal of truth, non-violence and Swadeshi. He realised that his philosophy 
was untenable for the Congress and that the leadership was paying lip 
. t h. . d 1 1 t f 1 t h. 20 service o is i ea s on y ou o persona reverence o im. 
But the abdication of formal leadership did not mean the end of 
Gandhi's influence. 21 Even the initiatives that evolved in the Congress 
in the course of the next two decades had strong overtones of the Gandhian 
emphasis on village community, etc. Follm-1ers of the Mahatma in the 
Congress also tried to adjust themselves to the prospect of a state 
capitalism. Hence the five-year plans in independent India could be 
proclaimed by them tp be in line with Gandhian philosophy. 22 
Although the question of economic freedom of the masses and the 
necessity of a structural change of Indian society was envisaged by the 
Congress leadership in 1929, the idea of planning did not emerge as a 
strategic concept in the Congress during the early 'thirties. The 
Economic and Social programmes of 1931 and the later Congress resolutions 
I c 
of 1934 and 1936 on agrarian programme~-Jid pronounce the aims of Congress I 
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in the economic field. Yet the concept of planning was still absent 
. 
from these programmes. 
The programmatic adoption of the idea of planning dates from 
Jawaharlal Nehru's Presidential Address at the Faizpur Congress in 1936. 23 
He asserted the need for planning in the course of his speech dealing 
with rural indebtedness. He reiterated the need for a structural change 
of the land system, and pointed out that 'the reform of the land system 
[was] tied up with the development of industry, both large-scale and 
cottage, in order to give wor~to scores of millions of unemployed and 
raise the pitiful standard of the people'. And this in his opinion was 
connected with 'education, housing, road3 and transport, sanitation, 
medical relief, social services, etc.'. So the problem of land system 
itself needed a comprehensive solution of a far bigger problem: The 
problem of upliftment of the whole society. 'Only a great planned system 
for the whole land and dealing with all these various national activities, 
co-ordinating them, making each serve the larger whole and the interests 
of the mass of our people, only such a planned system with vision and 
courage to break it, can find a solution•. 24 However, Nehru had no doubt 
in his mind that 'planning' presupposed assumption of state powers by the 
planners. 'Freedom', he recognised, was its most important condition. 25 
He, therefore, concluded his speech on the necessity of planning by 
saying: 
These are distant goals for us today though the rapid 
march of events may bring us face to face with them 
sooner than we imagine. The immediate goal26 independence - is nearer and more definite. 
As we shall notice in the next section, the 'march of ~vents' was soon to 
lead the Congress to think concretely in terms of planning even under the 
colonial aegis when, after the elections of 1937, it undertook to form 
ministries in a number of provinces. 
,_;I 
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SECTION 2: National Planning Committee - Coming into Being 
In the 1937 election, held under the Government.of India Act of 1935 
, which followed from the Simon Commission Report, the Indian Nation:;il 
Congress won directly.in five of the eleven provinces and emerged in two 
other~ as the singl~ majority Party. The election showed that the 
Congress, whether it repres@nted the poor masses of the Indian people or 
not, certainly had the support of the propertied classes in both rLiiral 
and urban areas~ 27 The industrialists and merchants backed it morally es 
11 f . . 11 28 we as inancia y. 
After. the election,. the Congress did not hesitate long to accept 
I 
'office' of the provincial ministries. The weak protests voiced, among 
others by Nehru as. well as by the Congress Socialists led by Jayprakash 
Narayan, were brushed aside by the Congress leadership. 29 Congress 
ministries were formed in U.P., Bihar, Orissa, C.P., Bombay and Madras 
initially. Within a year the Congress formed ministries also in N.W.F.P. 
and Assam. Although the 'rightists' in Congress led by Vallabhbhai Patel 
were in.a dominant position in the Party, the 'leftists' like Nehru and 
· Subhas Bose too soon joined whole-heartedly in the process of ministry 
f t . 30 orma ions. 
With ministries came power and responsibility. The Congress Working 
Committee ~dopted an important resolution on the question of planning at 
its Wardah meeting held in August 1937: 
The Working Committee recommends to the Congress 
Ministries the appointment of a Committee of Experts 
to consider urgent and vital problems the solution 
'of which is necessary to any scheme of national 
reconstruction and social planning. Such solutions 
will require extensive survey and the collection of 31 data, as well as a clearly defined social objective. 
This was the first time that the concept of planning was mentioned in an 
official document of the Congress. Among the immediate tasks for the 
~· 
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proposed committee, the meeting listed comprehensive river-valley 
projects, sugar industries and the question of det,>l moratorium. 
later on, this proposed Committee was to be mentioned in Congress 
documents as a Committee to explore the possibilities of an All India 
Industrial Plan. 32 The word 'industrial' shows how 'planning' was 
conceptualised by the Congress at that time. The emphasis on 
industrialisation was evident in the pr.esidential speech of Subhas Chandra 
Bose in the Haripura Congress in February 1938: 
However much we may dislike mode.ri:i industrialism and 
condemn the evils which follow in its train, we cannot 
go back to the pre-industrial era, even if we desire 
to do so. It is well therefore, that we should 
servaile ourselves to industrializ~tion and devise 
means to minimize its evils ,,,33 · · 
Bose represented the standpoint of the left elements in the Congress 
and their critique of the Gandhian view of economic development. His 
plan sketched out in the Address mentionetj ~bove could be accepted only 
by the hard-core socialists in the Congress. For land reform he wanted 
i) the abolition of landlordism, ii) liquidation of agricultural indebt~ 
edness, and iii) co-operative and scientific farming. He insisted that 
agricultural improvement alone would not be enough and, ia comprehensive 
scheme of industrial development under state-ownership and state control 
will be indispensable' . 34 It was his opinion that 'the State on the advice 
of a Planning Commission', would have to adopt •a comprehensive scheme 
for gradually socializing our entire agricultural and industrial system 
in the spheres of both production and appropriatinr 
The rising tide of peasant movements during th& period and the 
increasing influence of socialists and communists among the rural and 
urban poor had been forcing the Congress to accept the importance of land 
\ 
reforms a~d progressive labour laws in the p~ovlnces under its 
administration. 36 But certain elements within the Congress leadership 
were not quite reconciled to the idea of s9ch reforms. Within its ranks 
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thP socjnlists and other 'leftists' were fiqhtinq a losinq battle. ThP 
Haripura session where Subhas Bose spoke for the rause of sociulism, abo 
called upon the provincial Congress Committees not to lolernte nGy Kisan 
37 
organisations outside their own fold. Bose's sprech in 1938 was in a 
wriy the swan song for the cause of socialism in the Conqrcs'>. l'lilhin a 
year, soon after Tripuri Congress eleclion, a decisive buttlP was to LL' 
fought by the icfoo1oguf's of the Indian bourqeoisie in the Congress agnirn;t 
the 'leftists'. However, in 1938, planning was still viewed as a distinct 
method to develop Indian economy on socialist ljnes, although Bose bent 
backwards to avoid a confrontation with the Gandhian ideology as he pointed 
out. that 'In n country like India, there will be plenty of room for cotLHJC 
ind11stries, especially in thP cnse of industries including hand-spinniny 
nnd hnnd-weaving allied to agriculture•. 38 
This 1·ms a standard srgument put fonmrd by all uubsequent pl<mnPrs 
of India. \·lhile G;mdhi's emphasis on village community life was uccornmo-
dntPd by his ideological opponents, the Mahatma himself modified his views 
in some respects. In the face of ttw grm1ing influence of 'inrlustri<llism' 
he started to defend his anti-capi tnl ist ideas2 first formtilated in Hind 
. t" l"t 39 Swaraj, in terms of bourgeois economic ra iona i y. This might have 
m;idc it easier for the Congress leadership to incorporatP some elementr; of 
Gandhian utopianism into its own utopio of a welfarr· !Jt<1tc. When Gondhi 
forrnulc1ted his objection as one thnt is addressed lo lhP crnze for machinery 
h 4(] ti i' t t nnd not to rnacl1j11ery w; sue, ien wrnme essier for Subhns Bose to 
. l' t' 'l 41 2ombat j t by diaracterisinq industria 1sil ion ilS H necessnry evi , or 
for ~ehr~J to refute 'any argument as to the relative merits of small-
scale and lorge-scale industry' as 'strangely irrelevanl' in a world clearly 
42 dominated by tt.e latter. 
The Congress Working Committee's resolution of August 1937 relating 
to the formation of an Expert Committee was rather vague in the sense 
that it did not provide any guideline for the provinces regarding how they 
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might go about it. As ~ r It th· 
c esu · no inq 1·ms done ;:ibniit i l unt i l It;, 
meeting in July 1938 when it authorbed the Part> Prr>~iidPnt 'to Cllfl\ l'fH' 
a conference of the Ministers of Industries at. ;m ear 1 y d<Jt t' <Hid r<i l l f nr 
a report of the existing industries npcrnt inq in di ffrrPnt prrJ\ 1rwP~; ;;o1d 
th 45 f' needs and possibilities of nP1~ ones'. · Arcordinqlv <1 cor1tPn•nr't' of 
Industries Ministers of the Congress Province~; 1·ms held in !k.it11 in 
October that year. Four Congress Go\ernrnents - Madrus, fl11mbm, Llih<ir 
nnd Orissa 1·1ere rerresented therP. Among those 1·1ho attcmJf'd tlw rrH•et inq 
on special invitalion were: M. Visve~3verava, t1c h d '" t (' [) 13 · J 
, · .q ria ,1a ia, ,, • 11' a, 
44 Lala Shri Ram and Lala Shankarlal. 
The list of special invitees is of some interest to us. fhr 
Congress Party, and Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, were fond of mentioning 
'planning' as an effort tm1ards socialism in India. 1\s ~ehru wrote in 
n1e Discovery of India: 'Big business was definitely npprehcnsivP and 
critical [of the National Plnnning Committee], and probably joined up 
because it felt that it could look after its interests better from inside 
4) 
thnn outside'. However, as at least three names in that list - all 
stalwarts of Indian industry - indicates, the connection of bi~ business 
in India to the planning pror.ess was established riqht from its inception 
- rind lhnt by invitation from lhe Congres itself. The only olhf'r two 
. j l d . l . 46 special invitees were lmlivic un s intereste 1n p ann1nq. Subllas Bose, 
who chnired this conference, diluted his ideals of socialism with state 
r:rmtrol and mvnenihip of industries and private property, as dPfinPd at. 
the Haripurn Congrf'ss. Now one year later, in 1938, 'the National Planning 
envisaged by the President ir1rluded 1) national autonomy in the field of 
[India's] special needs and requirements, 2) growth and development of the 
mother industries, 3) technical education and technical research, 4) 
economic survey of the country with a view to collecting the necessary 
d t ' 47 a a • 
The Conference of October 1938 gave birth to the National Planning 
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Committee. Its idea of planninq 1vas essentially concerned 1-1i th the 
question of industrialisinr.1 the economy. fhus: 
This Conference of the Ministeni of Industrief> is of 
the opinion that sinrt> ttw proll!Prn of pmPJ t y and urH'mploy-
menl, of National Defence and of the ccor1ornir 
regenerntion ;.n qeneral cannot be solved without 
industrialisation, a comprehPnsive scheme of m~lionnl 
pl<inninq should lie formulatc>d. This scheme should 
provide for the development of heavy key industriP~>. 
medium '.>eale industries and rottmie induslriP:i, kPPpinq 
in view our nat.iomd requirement;,, the resourre:i of the 
country, as also t e peruliar cirrumslances prevailing 
in the country. 48 
The journey that had begun 1·1ith the 'rise of econorr.ic nationalism' 
in the second half of thP last century was now draw;ng to a close. Telang, 
H<mnde, Naoroji and Dutt hCJd nll stnrted with t.he question of poverty, 
anrl prescribed industrialisation for an answer. This ideal of industri:d-
i'.;at ion \v<Js enthusianticnlly subscribed lo by the riGinrJ bourqeoisie of 
Indi<1. Ttwy and the ideoloques had been for loncJ pointinq their CJCcusirHJ 
finqPrs to t.hc ~;tate for not allowing them to prosper. Nm1 lhHt the 
clwi~; W<W rPpre'.ierttPcl nt the politic<il lPveJ, it. cn]Jpd upon the state o 
fulfil its demand. It is noteworthy that t.he questions of industrialisa-
tion nnd planning were not mixed up by the Congress 1·1ith questions of 
socialism. Gandhi, nnd later the socialists, trh~d to influence the course 
of Indian nationalism. But lhe ideology dominant in the Congress hnd 
always remained that of n bourgeois development. Nationnlism in Indi<:1 
might h<:1ve started with the question of poverty. But inherent in thal 
concept 1·ms the idea of bourrwois hegemony. Industriulisution 11as the 
only means to establish the power of the bouryeoisie. Hence t.he concept 
of planning itself was that of industrial planning to start with. 
The other resolutions on planning adopted at that Conference also 
contained some ideas of a provisional kind. 'Penuing the submission Hnd 
consideration of a comprehensive industrial plan for the whole of India', 
the Conference recommended to the provinces and Indian states to make 
efforts to start the following: 
a) t1anufacturc of mHchirn•ry ;md plm1t and tools of :ill kind;; 
b) ~1'mufocturc of nutomoliilP.s, rnotor boats, dr. mid then 
accP.~.>sor.ies and other indu'.>trie~; connect Pd 1·1i th Lr:in:;port and 
communiccition 
c) Manufacture of P1cctricnl plant and uccPs:~orir,~; 
d) Manufacture of heavy chemical!; and fert iJ j si'r~; 
e' Metal production 
f ·;· 49 Industries connected ~1ith pm1er qenPrulion mid pol'1er ~;uprily. 
lt 1·ms also decided lo aproint a Planninq Commiltee 1 o do some prc•pCJratory 
work and recorrrnend steris to form a \ationul PlannirHJ Crnnmission al a fultJrP 
d<1te. The President of the Conqress 1va~> pmpmvPred tu select the mc:mtwrs 
uf the Committee, and v.V. Giri, MinistP.r of Industries of the CmPrnrnt>nt 
of t•1ndr::E;, 1·1<is qiven UH~ lw>k nf ~>Pttinq up <m f\11 lndi;i i'l:irir1i11q l:ornmi:;:;ion. 
Subhas Bose, 1-;ho formed the ~<ilional Planninq CornmiltcP, 1va!>, :m1or1q 
the Congres~; leaders, probably the most 'mlhusiastic about plrnH1inq. 
Most Indizm histori;:ms overlook his role nnd describP i\ehru ;i~; U11· chief 
. ')[) 
architect of Indian planning. It is true that ttw Jaltr•r h;1cJ tulkcd 
<ibrnit soc1nlism and industri<Jlisnlion in his Lucknm1 speech ir1 l'J)l> ;ind 
pointed to the success of socialism in Ru~>sia. In taizpiir, l<it ··r that 
ye·1r, he had strc'ssed once more that only a planned r>yr;lr'm coLJld find a 
rmlulion to the problemr; or poverty <Jnd other r;ocio-r•conornic 11 lr; of lhl' 
country. But, tn him, thiu could only comr C:Jft.er ir1drperid('rtcc•, ar> plarmirirJ 
required Lhe 
,, I 
'<iir ;md soil of political CJnd social freedom', 
Rora~ who sd. up lt1P National Planning Commit tee in 1938, and it 1·mn on hir; 
(>2 
insistdcnce that ~ehru accepted the chairmCJnship of the N.P.C. 
The followers and supporters of Subhas Ruse in Rnd out of the Conqrcss 
attached so much importance to his connection with the efforts of planning 
that they wanted him to remain the President of the Congress in 1939 as 
well. Rabindranath Tagore thought that Nehru and Bose were 'the only two 
genuine modernists in the High Command' of the Conqress capable of looking 
l 
,-; 
~ 
96 
after the planned efforts and was 'very eager to see SubhasbHbu again 
elected the President' .s3 Pattabhi Sitaramayyci's History of the Congress 
also relates Bose's candidature for the re-election lo the Congress 
Presidentship with his efforts in the field, and writes that 'ho hRd 
inaugerated large undertakings - not~bly national planninq, although of 
his own accord he had offered the Chairmanship of the Committee to 
S4 Jawahar lal'. 
Soon after the Conference of the Ministers of Industries held in 
Delhi on the 2-3 October 1938, Subhas Bose nominated tl1e following members 
of the National Planning Committee: Jawaharlal Nehru, Sir M. Visvesvaraya, 
Sir Purushottamdas Thakurdas, Dr Mcqhnad Saha, A.O. Shroff, K.T. Shah, 
A.K. Saha, Dr Nazir Ahmed, Dr V.S. Dubey, Ambalal Sarabhai and Dr J.C. 
Ghosh. Subsequently J.C. Kumarappa, representing the All Ir1dia Village 
Industries Association, N.M. Joshi, representing Labour organisations, 
Prof. Radha Kamal Mukerjee, at the instanre of U.P. Government, and 
Walchand Hirachand, a leading industrialist.were co-opted to the Committee.SS 
Out of these fifteen members, four clearly represented Indian big business. 
Thakurdas, Shroff, Sarabhai and Hirachand were all leading merchants and 
industrialists belonging to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce 
and Industries. Five others, viz. Dr Meghnad Saha, Prof. A.K. Saha, 
Dr Nazir Ahmed, Dr V.S. Dubey and Dr J.C. Ghosh 11ere scientists. Prof. K.T. 
Shah and . . t 56 Radha Kamal MukerJee were econom1s·s. Apart from Nehru 
only K.l. Shah and Meghnad Saha were known for their socialist lcnnings. 
The National Planning Committee, as formed in 1938, was thus made up 
of industrialists, scientists, economists and political leaders. Excepting 
Kumarappa not a single member represented rural India and even he did not 
stay in the Committee for long. By that time, the concept of planning had, 
among the Congress leaders, boiled down to industrial planning only. In 
.. ut including the agrarian problem into consideration within its plannin~ 
perspective the Congress leadership was only being true to the tradition 
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of Indfan nationalism. Sinre the days of Telang Ran;.de, Naorji, Dull 
and their followers, the economic nationalists hRd avoided the ]and 
question. R.C. Dutt's apology for the Permanent Settlement is only one 
instance of this general attitude. The nationalists were only interested 
. . 1 t. 57 in a passive revo u ion where peasantry were to be politically appropriated 
but never given a chance to unshackle the bonds of the pre-capitalist land 
system wh.ch characterised their socio-economic condition. Even in its 
Karachi Resolution, the Congress had fought shy of the land question and 
represented it as a matter of 'Taxation and Expenditure'. The resolution 
adopted ran as follows: 
The system of land tenure and revenue and rent shall 
be reformed and an equitable adjustment made of the 
burden on agricultural land, immediately qivinq 
relief to the smaller peasantry, by a substantial 
reduction of agricultural rent and revenue now paid 
by them, and in case of uneconomic holdings, exempting 
them from rent, so long as necessary, with such relief 
as may be just and necessary to holders of small 
estates affected by such exemption or to reduction in 
rent, and to the same end, i1posing a graded tax PR 
net incomes from land above <i reasonable minimum.) 
The resolution thus mentioned land tenure only in terms of revenue 
and rent problems and did not envisage any change ir1 the property relation 
in agriculture. During 1936 the mujor economic resolutions of the Conqress 
)9 had tried to incorporate the land question into its ovnrall programme. 
Again in 1937 the Congress stressed the importance of this issue. In a 
letter writlPn that year Nehru described the land quPstion ns 'the most 
importunt one' and thouqht that the Congress '!>hould fay stress on land 
60 being the property of the State'. However, when the Party ussumed power 
in the major provinces, the election pledges made in its ~anifesto of 1936 
were quietly forgotten. Even the minor reforms in tenancy and rent systems 
attempted by the provincial Congress governments remained merely half-
61 hearted efforts and did not lead to any major change in the land system. 
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SErTTON 3: Working of the Committee 
The first session of the National Planning Committee was held in 
Bombay on 17 December 1938. Apart from the members of the Committee, 
representatives from the Congress provincial governments and the feudatory 
states of Hyderabad, Mysore and Baroda attended the meeting. 62 Subhas 
Bose inaugurated the proceedings. Bose's speech indicated that the birth 
of this Committee had not been hailed by the Gandhians: 
During the last few weeks [said Bose] I have noticed 
an apprehension in certain quarters as to the possible 
effects of our efforts at Industrial Planning on the 
movement that has been going on since 1921 for the 
production of Khadi and the promotion of cottage 
industries .•• 63 
He then reiterated his stand on the relation between large-scale and 
cottage industries as propounded in his speech at the Delhi Conference 
of the Ministers. He tried to allay the fears of Gandhianc by saying 
that 'there was no inherent conflict between cottage industries and large-
l · d t · I 64 sea e in us r1es . Bose also proposed that a representative of the All 
India Village Industries Association formed in 1934 at the behest of 
Gandhi- be co-opted to become a member of the National Planning Committee. 
At the same meeting Nehru also felt a need to assure the Gandhians that 
'there was no inherent conflict between them [large-scale and cottage 
industries] and they would not clash, unless they were developed independ-
l h th . tt t d • t. I 65 ent y of eac o er w1.1ou any co-or ina ior. Consequently, J.C. 
Kumarappa was co-opted to the Committee. Nehru also recommended the 
66 inclusion of 'a representative of organised labour in the country', as 
'they [the labour] should not be allowed to think that the industry of 
the country belonged to somebody else while they themselves were merely 
chattels. They must feel that they were being consulted not merely on 
labour conditions, but on all matters proclaiming to industry. After all, 
there could be no industry without labour•. 67 The labour leader who was 
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co-opted following this suggestion was the trade unionist N.M. Joshi. 
tle was a nominated member of the Legislative Assembly during the earlv 
'thirties and was known for his anti-socialist anti-communist views. 68 
In its first session~the National Planning Committee sat daily from 17 
December to 21 December 1938. The major task completed by the Committee 
in that session was to prepare a detailed questionnaire for circulation 
to the Provincial Governments, Governments of Indian States, Departments 
of the Central Government and 'others interested in the subject matter 
f th t . . I 69 o e ques ionna1re • It was a lengthy and comprehensive question-
naire made up of 237 questions, which, arranged under 27 headings, touched 
70 on almost all aspects of the socio-economic life of the country. 
In the course of its work on this questionnaire the meeting debated 
three major questions. Visvesvaraya wanted the Committee immediately to 
direct the Provincial Governments to instal a few major industries - at 
least one in each province. He was of the opinion that if the Provincial 
Governments took such a step, the country would be launched on the path 
of rapid industrialisation. His sense of urgency might have some 
connection with his having written a book on planning four years earlier. 
However, the majority of the members decided that the Committee could not 
impose any decision or recommendation upon the Provincial Governments. 
This, they thought, would be encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the 
provinces - industries were made a provincial matter under the Government 
of India Act of 1935. 71 Apart from the legal and formal problems connected 
with such suggestions, Nehru was of the view that the Committee was meant 
not for making any specific recommendations regarding particular industries 
to be built up in the country but to try and evolve a general plan for 
72 
economic development. 
The second major debate was on the vital issue of the relation 
between the cottage and large-scale industries. J.C. Kumarappa, a staunch 
Gandhian, actually questioned the authority of the Committee to discuss 
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lorge-scale industrialisation. His opposition, in this respect, relied 
on the Congress view on Swadeshi and large industries. This reopened 
the whole question of industrialisation on which both Subhas Bose and 
Jawaharlal Nehru deliberated at length during the inaugural session of 
the meeting. Nehru came out again with the view that there was no 
necessary conflict between small and large industries. 'The Congress 
Ministers', he observed, 'were interested at the moment in big industries. 
The Planning Committee was of the opinion that all these industries 
should be pushed subject to the condition that they should not come into 
conflict with the cottage industries•. 73 Kumarappa's objection to the 
proceedings of the Committee amounted to raising a point of order and 
brought the meeting to an impasse. As its chairman Nehru submitted a 
note on the resolutions adopted by the Congress on this question since 
1920, he concluded that although the Congress had always emphasised the 
need to develop cottage industries, 'it did not decide in any way against 
large-scale industry'. Moreover, 'Now that the Congress [was], to some 
extent, identifying itself with State it [could] not ignore the questio 1 
of establishing and encouraging large-scale industries. There can be no 
planning if such planning does not include big industries ••• [and] it was 
not only within the scope of the Committee to consider large-scale 
industries, but it was incumbent upon it to consider them 1 • 74 Kumarappa 
opposed this view saying that 'as the key industries were more or less 
under State control, the background was bound to be capitalistic. What 
the Congress had in mind was a socialistic [sic], and this Committee in 
considering the key industries would be deviating from the policy l~.id 
75 down by the Congress'. The majority of the members in the Committee 
disagreed with Kumarappa's view and proceeded with the drafting of the 
questionnaire. It was agreed that the questions regarding large-scale 
industries should be included in the questionnaire. 
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The debate between Kumarappa and the rest of the members of the 
Committee was really an irrelevant one. The very notion of industrial 
planning - the basis on which the N.P.C. was formed - presaged such 
debates. The debate only made it clear to all that the Gandhian notion 
of village economy was finally disregarded by the Congress leadership. 
In a sense, Ram Rajya had its appeal only to the 1nasses in India. This 
is not to deny the influence that the Gandhian emphasis on village community 
had on the Congress leadership. All economic planning in independent 
India was to accommodate this concept. But the goal which the bourgeoisie 
had come to set for itself by 1931 was clearly one of industrial power. 
A third important point was raised by Ambalal Sarabhai, the well-
known industrialist who sympathised with the Gandhians. He wanted to know 
what stand, if any, was to be taken by the Committee regarding the land 
question. In reply, it was suggested by the others in the meeting that, 
since the Committee was set up on the basis of resolutions adopted by the 
Industries Ministers' Conference, the question regarding land was beyond 
the purview of the Committee. 76 But further discussions on the nature and 
object of planning made it clear that agrarian issues could not be left 
out of the questionnaire. As a result, questions relevant to land systems 
were incorporated in the questionnaire. 77 
These debates in the first session of the N.P.C. a1e fairly 
representative of ideological positions within the Congress at the time. 
The Congress, in 1938, had1 by Nehru's own confession, identified itself 
with the state. And the role of the state, as envisaged by the Congress 
leadership, was to industrialise the economy. The 'key' industries to be 
built up with the full participation of the state, were those 1which [were] 
the starting point or the basis for the equipment of other industries, e.g. 
making of machines, tools and plants needed in industrial development'. 
It should be noted here that machines, tools and plants were almost all 
being imported in India around that time. 78 State control over these 
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industries would not affect the private sector in any adverse manner. 
On the contrary, their development was meant to ensure easy availability 
of the 'means of production' to the Indian capitalists. These key 
industries were by ~ature capital-intensive and required a relatively 
long period to be fully effective. Private enterprise by itself could 
not cope with the task of building these up. On the other hand, it had 
everything to gain if the state did not encroach upon other industries but 
concentrated on the key industries alone. The 1931 resolution of the 
Congress thus deserved the full support from the Indian capitalists. 
Regarding the opposition to Visvesvaraya's proposal about launching 
big industries immediately, one could perhaps see in this the tentative-
ness in the approach of the leadership to this issue. On the one hand 
the Committee was set up to go immediately into the question of building 
up new industries in a manner best suited to the needs of the Indian 
bourgeoisie, but on the other, the N.P.C., with all its determination to 
evolve a comprehensive plan for the whole of India, was not ready yet to 
take any immediate steps in that direction. In fairness, however, it 
should be said that Congress resignations from the ministries in 1939 
foreclosed the Committee's option in this regard. 
The N.P.C. ended its first session on 21 December 1938 after preparing 
the questionnaire. Nehru was not very satisfied by the work done in the 
first session. 79 But the meeting generated some enthusiasm among the 
educated of India. 80 The British capitalists were apprehensive about it. 81 
Even before the commencement of the first session the newspapers started 
f l . . I d. 82 publishing articles on the need or p ann1ng in n ia. At the organi-
sational level, the Congress Governments in the provinces continued to 
make certain efforts towards provincial planning. In U.P. the report of the 
Industrial Reorganisation Committee of 1934 formed the basis of governmental 
efforts in planning. 83 G.B. Pent, Prime Minister of U.P. Government, was 
en enthusiastic supporter of Nehru in his efforts towards planning. In 
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Bihar, Syed Mahmud, Minister of Education and a close friend of Nehru, 
was another enthusiast. Both Mahmud and Pant had started their efforts 
in accordance with the Wardha Resolution of August 1937 soon after the 
84 assumption of office by the Congress. The proposal rif a national 
planning also enthused young Indian scholars abroad. Some of them were 
ready to join in the plan efforts of the Congress Provincial Governments 
85 
or the N.P.C. The Indian Science Congress and the Indian Economic 
Conference praised the N.P.C.'s efforts in their annual meetings in early 
1939. 86 The Congress Provincial Governments, and particularly the U.P. 
and Bihar Governments tried through Nehru to recruit some emigre Jewish 
experts from Germany to help in their efforts for industrialisation. 87 
During his visit to Europe in late 1938 Nehru had sought to persuade some 
Jewish experts to migrate to India and associate themselves with the 
planning efforts in the country. He had also tried to get the ILD and the 
League of Nations to take an active interest in N.P.C.'s work by way of 
securing a certain amount of international expertise in favour of its 
. t 88 ;:iroJec s. Though these attempts came to nothing, they go to show the 
seriousness with which planning was taken up by the Congress in this 
period. The Government of India also took note of this effort. Lord 
Linlithgow, the Viceroy, used his speech at the annual meeting of the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce to stress the necessary connection between 
the national planning and the federal system proposed by the Government 
of India Act of 1935. 89 (It may be recalled that at that time the 
Congress was opposed to the federation clause of the constitution which 
in their opinion had been imposed on the Indians.) 
In spite of all that initial enthusiasm, it was six months before the 
N.P.C. convened for its second session. Meanwhile the questionnaire 
prepared during the first session was circulated among the Provincial 
Governments, Indian States, Departments of the Government of India and 
others. The memorandum attached to the questionnaire explained the 
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objectives of national planning as 'an improvement of the well being of 
the country, principally by intensifying the economic development of the 
country on an all round basis, in an ordered and systematic manner so as 
to observe a due proportion between various forms of wealth 1 • 90 The 
questionnaire sought information on such matters as an adequate standard 
of living, principal sources of production in the provinces and the Indian 
States, availability of raw materials, requirements of industrial develop-
ment, agricultural organisation, and industries subsidiary to agriculture, 
marketing and commerce, transport facilities, conditions of field 
employments, technical education, resources of power and energy and 
economic relations between the various provinces. 91 Although the range 
of questions asked was fairly comprehensive, the replies were neither 
prompt nor adequately informed. Even U.P. and Bihar Governments did not 
send their reply in time. The provincial bureaucracies defeated the 
purpose of the questionnaire. In U.P. many of the governmental departments 
even claimed that they had not received the questionnaire. 92 
The second session of the N.P.C., held in Bombay, sat for two weeks 
from 4 June to 17 June 1939. 93 Jawaharlal Nehru, its Chairman, submitted 
a note explaining, among other things, his view that although the Congress 
resolutions over the years since 1929 had laid a great stress on the 
encourageu1ent of cottage industries in India, this did 'not necessarily 
mean a conflict between cottage industries and large-scale industries•. 94 
He pointed out that the 'very resolution appointing the planning committee' 
called upon them 'to provide for the development of heavy key industries, 
• d tt • d t • I 95 medium scale industries an co age in us r1es • Yet another important 
observation made by Nehru was about the connection between planning and 
political independence. Nehru wrote: 
It is clear that the drawing up of a comprehensive national 
plan becomes merely an academic exercise, with no relation 
to reality, unless the planning authority, or those to whom 
it is responsible, are in a position to give effect to 
that plan ••• An essential prerequisite for planning is 
1
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thus complete frerdom and indopendence for the country 
and the removal of outside control. 96 
The question of 'economic planning' thus had a political side to it. 
National planninQ was in essence an exercise in the anticipation of power. 
As Nehru said that: 
Our plan for national development must, therefore, Le 
drawn up for a free and independent India, This does 
not mean that we must wait for independence before 
doing anything towards the development of planned 
economy. Even under existing conditions we must make 
every effort to adopt all measures and policies which 
develop the resources of the country and raise the 
standard of our people. All such efforts, however, must 
be directed towards the realisation of the plan we have 
drawn up for a free India. They should neutrai1se, 
as far as possible, the force of the existing 
restrictions on our constitutional powers, and should 
not create new vested interests, or further erroneous 
policies, which might form new obstacles in the 
achievements of one goal and realisation of our full 
plan,97 
Taken together with his earlier observation that the Congress, after 
assuming the provincial governmental offices was identified with the 
state, we have here a fairly clear representation of Nehru's idea of what 
the post-colonial state should be. It was the state which was to plan for 
the society in all its aspects. The state would bring about ecoru~nic 
development without transgressing much upon the interests already vested 
in the economy but it would try and control new encroachments: 
It may not be impracticable to insist on state management 
of the existing industries in which vested interests have 
already taken root. But whenever even an established 
industry under private control, receives aid or protection 
from the state and tends to develop into a monopoly or comes 
into conflict with the general policy of the state in 
regard to workers or consumers, the state should take 
necessary steps to assure conformity in all such ventures 
with its basic policy and with the objective laid down 
in the plan. 98 
Later on, in May 1939, he was to elaborate on this idea in a letter to K.T. 
Shah: 'Planning, as most of us conceive it, is inevitabJ. connected with a 
socialist society', he wrote. 'Obviously, constituted as we are, and 
constituted as the planning committee is, we can hardly begin tackling the 
question on a socialist basis ••• If we start with the dictum that only 
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under socialism there can be planning, we frighten people and irritate 
the ignorant. If on the other hand, we think in terms of planning apart 
from socialism and thus inevitably arrive at some form of socialism, 
that is a logical process which will convert many who are weary of words 
and slogans. I imagine that our approach should be s0mething on these 
lines without challenging the existing structure ••• Could we then 
concentrate on a few major items of policy which should guide us in our 
planning and which are not obviously in conflict with the basic structure 
today, though they change it considerably 1 • 99 
Socialism was thus his motto still in 1939. But it was a socialism 
to be admitted through the back door. Nothing of the existing social 
structure was to be disturbed. Planning would, by itself, convert the 
natio~ to socialism, but it had to be brought about by the adoption of 
correct economic policies at the level of government. This socialism did 
not depend on the will end effort of the people. The state with its 
omnipotent power would do it for them. The task of a planning committee 
was therefore simply to formulate correct policies for industrialisation 
which would bring about the miracle. This had happened in Europe, so it 
should happen in India too. 
But whose state was it to be? let us read a few more lines from 
his letter: 
I feel that in India today any attempt to push out the 
middle class is likely to end in failure. The middle 
class is too strong to be pushed out and there is a 
tremendous lack of human material in any other class 
to take its place effectively, or to run a planned 
society ••• a premature conflict on class lines would 
lead to a break-up and possibly to prolonged inability 
to build anything. 100 
So if one wanted to find out the class basis of this kind of socialism, I 
one could possibly situate it within the domain of the urban petit J, 
bourgeois ideology in India, This waa a atate which acknowledged ita I 
middle-claas origin. But at the SaMe time_t_h _e--v-is_i_on_a_r-ypu-t--hi_Rl&_e_l_f_ab_o_v_e_J 
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the people. The middle-classes were the human material on which the 
'planners' would work in order to realise their aim. The planners were 
thus above the people - the 'experts', who knew the right policies that 
had to be adopted. As Nehru wrote on another occasion around the same 
time, he wanted the Committee to 'function' more as a body of experts or 
as a board of dire~tors in as businesslike way as possible. 101 The 
socialist character of this state wee to be based on class-collaboration. 
For class-struggle would undermine the structure of the society and delay 
its development. In a way this idea of socialism, devoid of class-
struggle, enabled Nehru and his colleagues to accept the Gandhian doctrine .:: 
of non-violence. It also enabled them to portray Gandhi as a socialist. 
The term socialism was denuded of its political content er that it could 
be made acceptable to all and sundry. 
The atten.,t to de-politicise the work of the N.P.C. and make it seem 
like a techno-economic exercise alone - an atten.,t typical of liberal 
political stance - is illustrated by the case of H.V. Kamath, an Indian 
Civil Service officer who resigned from the Service in 1938 to join the 
N.P.C. as one of its secretaries. Closely associated with Subhas Bose at 
that time, he wee suspected of be].ng a 'leftist'. Nehru wrote to Bose 
complaining about Kamath's involvement in 'controversial politics 
publicly 1 , 102 and the latter had to resign from the N.P.C. as a result of 
opposition from its members. In accepting his resignation Nehru wrote: 
'It is evident that you ere far keener on active political work than on 
d . th 1 . . tt I 103 A tl the quiet type of wor~ require ln e p ann1ng comm1 ee • pparen y, 
it was the 'quiet' work of the experts which alone could make planning 
effective. To that end K.T. Shah, an economist of Bombay University, was 
made the Honorary General Secretary of the N.P.C., with the task of helping, 
among other things, in the collection of statistics and setting up of 
targets to achieve. It was this econ011ic acienti•, and not the political 
, I 
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upect of plonning, thot al..,. - 1-r~t to-Neh"_r_u_. ________ J 
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Nehru was not alone in submitting a note to the second session of 
the N.P.C. Ambalal Sarabhai also submitted a confidential note which 
suggested, among other things, the appointment of sub-committees to go 
into some of the speci fie problems of the economy, such as t~1ose 
concerning a) industries which would compete with cottage industries, b) 
those which would have to be built up on an all-India basis, and c) those 
which could be started by the provinces. He was of the opinion that 'no 
large scale industry should be encouraged or permitted to be started, 
which compete with cottage industries•. 104 
Regarding agriculture in which he had already shown a keen interest 
at the first session, Sarabhai wanted the Government to 'run or arrange 
through an approved agency for storing, grading and marketing'. 
Organisations of the governments, he said, should take over or arrange 
for purc:·u1ses and sale of all primary necessities of life. Artificial 
prices should be fixed and the Government Board created for the purpose 
should take over or arrange for sale at the prices so fixed. He also 
suggested measures to introduce licencing for all kinds of production. 
Letting out of land for cultivation should be made illegal 'excepling 
through government agencies' 105 
lhe second session of the N.P.C. which started on 4 June 1939 was 
attended by representatives from most of the provinces and the Indian 
states. Among the non-Congress governments, Punjab showed interest in 
planning and agreed to co-operate. It was only Bengal which maintained 
total silence regarding the activities of the Committee and did not 
associate itself ith it. 106 The principal task accomplished by the 
second session of the N.P.C. was to form twenty-seven sub-committees to 
consider different aspects of planning. The sub-committees were to 
analyse the replies received to a questionnaire that had been sent to 
different bodies, each dealing with its own specific issues, and submit 
their reports within three 111011tha.107 
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The second session of the N.P.C. witnessed debates similar to those 
during its first session six months earlier. Visvesvaraya again harped 
on the necessity of immediate action towards industrialisation. 
Thekurdes echoed him in saying that 'the scope of the work they were 
undertaking [formation of twenty-seven sub-committees, etc.] was so vest 
that he was filled with apprehension. They were aiming at achieving too 
much end the result might well be disappointment and a measure of failure. 
They were tackling too many subjects and a proper enquiry in each or them 
might take months or even years'. He wanted the N.P.C. to limit its scope 
108 
of work. Nehru sunvned up this debate acknowledging that the question 
raised by Thakurdas 'was a fundamental one and went to the root of the 
problems they were facing. It affected the whole conception of planning•. 109 
But to him 'it was clear that no real-planned scheme could be evolved 
with the meagre data available to them and in a hurry'. He was convinced 
that the work they proposed to do 'was an essential preliminary to the 
evolution of a planned scheme' and 'would be the beginning of planning 
through surveys and otherwise, and the co-ordination of all these in a 
reel planned scheme•. 110 Obviously the visionary was facing trouble from 
pragmatists like Visvesveraya, Thekurdas end others in the Committee. 
He actually threatened to have a vote on the issue end carried the meeting 
with him by suggesting that he would 'rather have general consensus of 
. . 'f t • 't I 111 op1n1on l no unen1m1 y • 
The other important argument was that between the Gandhian end 
Nehruvian points of view. Kumereppa again questioned the validity of the 
emphasis on industrialisation. But he shifted partially from his previous 
position of total opposition to large-scale industries. In this meeting 
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he accepted that 'the key industries, public utilities end the exploitation 
of natural resources demanded the application of the methods of large-scale 
production'. But he pointed out that the Congress had 'definitely decided 
to have these under State ownership or control', and since the Government 
110 
was 'not under popular control' et the time, it would serve no useful 
purpose taking them up et that stage. He was of the opinion that 'the 
Congress was not in favour of developing production under private 
enterprise on a large-scale basis in such industries as compete with 
cottage end village industries. Under the circumstances he suggested 
that the Committee would do well to concentrate on the functional planning 
of cottage end village industries for the time being'. The minutes of 
the proceedings of the meeting of the day concerned mentionerl t~,t Prof. 
R.K. Mukherji, Sir Purushottamdes Thakurdes, Prof. Dubey, Prof. M.N. Saha 
end Dr Nazir Ahmed es those who took part in it. Together they formed 
a group of economists, industrialists and scientists - the high priests 
of 'modernity' - who were all perhaps in favour of large-scale industria-
lisetion. Kumerappa was fighting a lone battle in the Committee. 
Kumarappe's opposition to large-scale industries was connected with 
the Gandhian conception of society. Nehru, in summing up the debate, 
conceded this but argued that 'the immediate issue was clear'. For the 
members had to bear in mind that while the general policy of the Congress 
was to encourage village industries, the development of big industry in 
India was en urgent need in order to increase the wealth of the country 
es well es to make it truly dependent. 'The two had to be co-ordinated 
together end this was the business of planning'. Regarding the problem 
of distribution of wealth, Nehru agreed that the problem was real and 
asserted that 'it was very necessary to lay the greatest stress on 
distribution in our scheme of planning•. 112 Planning, for him, was the 
answer to the problems of poverty, meldistribution of wealth, and social 
injustice,end this panacea was to be evolved by experts working away in 
the quiet of their offices without changing the existing social structure. 
Kurnarappa, on his part, was fighting his battle on behalf of 
GandhiBll. To him, as to other Gandhians, violence was inherent in machines 
and large-scale industries. As non-violence was the accepted creed of 
111 
the Congress, he could not see how it could indulge in abetting violence 
by taking up the cause of large-scale industrialisation. But to connect 
large-scale industry with violence seemed unjustified to Nehru, who 
argued: 
Violence and coercion there undoubtedly were in large-
scale industry today but that violence was the outcome 
of the social and economic structure and was certainly 
not inherent in large-scale industry. There was 
probably far more sweating in the small industries 
than in the big industries. Even in the cottage 
industries the whole background was one of violence 
It was the economic system which was founded on 
violence and encouraged it. Those who desired to 
eradicate this violence must do away with the economic 
system. 113 
Planning could thus solve the problem of violence also. What was 
then the importance of cottage industries? Apart from the employment 
aspects of cottage industries, 'The Congress', said Nehru, 'had very 
rightly always laid stress on village industries because it wanted us to 
think in terms of the villager. We had got into the habit of ignoring 
him and his needs. He was the forgotten man in India although it was he 
who constituted India. That emphasis ~~q essential and in all our work we 
must remember him. But the emphasis did not mean _ turning away from big 
. d t 114 in us ry. 
Gandhism was thus interpreted as a principle which underscored the 
importance of the 'forgotten man' of village India. But it was the role 
of Nehru and his like - the educated elites and the experts - to put that 
principle into practice. The Congress, said Nehru, 'thought that big 
industry was powerful enough to look after itself and to go ahead. It was 
the village that wanted help and protection and the Congress gave him 
thes~'. 115 The Congress was thus assigned the role of the protector of 
the poor and powerless villager, and that protection could be provided, 
according to Nehru, only by the power of big industry. 
Kumarappa lost his battle. His relation with the other members of 
the C011111ittee turned sour after this meeting, and he tried to move the 
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Congress Party in his favour. He wrote to Rajendra Prasad, President of 
the Congress, who had inaugurated the second session of the N.P.C., 
requesting him to intervene. Rajendra Prasad evaded the issue by 
replying that so far as cloth was concerned all competition with Khadi, 
whether from foreign or indigenous sources,, was to be discouraged. So tar 
as any particular cottage industry was concerned the same principle would 
apply as soon as it was possible for the Congress to declare that it 
advanced so far as to be independent of mechanised industry of the class. 116 
This response shows that 'planning' had the support of both the 'Right' 
and the 'Left' in the Congress. 
The relation between Kumarappa and the rest of the members 
deteriorated to such an extent that he refused to co-operate with the work 
of the Committee. Gandhi himself obviously did not have a great opinion 
about Nehru's activity regarding planning. When the latter invited Amrit !' 
Kaur to join the Women's Sub-committee and she wrote to Gandhi for his 
advice, Gandhi quipped that 'In my opinion the whole of his [Nehru's] 
planning is a waste of effort. But he can't be satisfied with anything 
that is not big•. 117 Two months later he wrote explicitly to Nehru about 
his attitude to the N.P.C.: 
I have never been able to understand or appreciate the 
labours of the committee. I do not know that it is 
working within the four corners of the resolution creating 
the Committee. I do not know that the Working Committee 
[of the Congress] is being kept informed of its doings. 
I have not understood the purpose of the numerous sub-
committees. It has appeared to me that much money and 
labour are being wasted on an effort which will bring 
forth little or no fruit. l18 
Gandhi was obviously irked by Nehru's efforts in planning. The idea 
of planning had no place in the Gandhian outlook. The village community 
of the Gandhian utopia depended entirely on the moral and spiritual uplift-
ment of the people to be achieved by the leaders through dedicated work to 
that end. Planning had no place in such a programme. His ambivalent 
attitude towards the concept of state power and his pronounced opposition 
t; 
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to the idea of 'modern' industries mLJde planning altogether unacceptable 
t h. . 119 o im. 
Apart from the formation of the sub-committees two other major 
resolutions were adopted by the Committee. Many of lhe foreign companies 
in India, in the face of the campaign against foreign goods tried to 
confuse the public by 'lndianising' their concerns. Gandhi himself wrote 
in Harijan against this phenomenon of 'India limited•. 120 A resolution 
was adopted by the N.P.C. condemning this 'menace' and asking for safe-
guards against uncontrolled industrialisation. It called upon the 
Provincial Governments to stop the establishment of new factories and 
t f f t l . t. f t . . th t . . . 121 rans er o con ro over ex1s ing ac or1es w1 ou prior perm1ss1on. 
We had earlier mentioned the importance attached by the planners to 
statistics. To that end the N.P.C. adopted a resolution to form a sub-
committee ' to draft letters addressed to the Government of India and 
Provincial Governments and States suggesting to them the desirability of 
utilising the forthcoming census operations [1941 census] to collect 
additional information of various kinds which would help in drawing up 
a Plan'. 122 
The sub-committee was also to prepare a Note 0n census and statistics 
and consult 'Prof. P.C. Mahalanabis of the Institute of Statistics, 
Presidency College, Calcutta and Dr John Matthai [an economist attached to 
Tata and Sons], and suggest in tubular form what data and further 
information should be collected in future by the Government of India, the 
123 Provincial Government and the Stah•s' • 
SECTION 4: The futile Effort 
The N.P.C. concluded its second session on 17 June 1939. The Conmittee 
selected most of the members of the twenty-seven sub-conmittees formed 
during the session and authorised Nehru to select the others. Initially 
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he included some officials, but since the Central Government would not 
allow that, substitutes had to be found for them. 124 The list of members 
of the sub-committees makes interesting reading. Excepting Birla, almost 
all other big industrialists, bankers and big businessmen were included 
in them: A.O. Shroff, Ambalal Sarabhai, Walchand Hirachand and Purushottomdas 
Thakurdas were already in the N.P.C. Among the other names from big 
business were those of Lala Shri Ram, J.R.D. Tata, B.N. Mukherji of 
Martin & Co., Kasturbhai Lalbhai, S.L. Kirloskar, Padamphat Singhania, 
D.P. Khaitan, M.A. Master, G.D. Naidu, Rani Laxamibai Rajwade of Giwalior and 
S.C. Majumdar of Hindusten Insurance. 125 
The third meeting of the N.P.C. had been scheduled for October 1939. 
But the changing circumstances during the second half of that year forced 
Nehru continually to postpone the meeting until May 1940. 126 Meanwhile 
the St·cond World War had broken out in September 1939. Linlithgow, the 
Viceroy, unilaterally associated India with Britain's war against Germany, 
wi~hout bothering to consult the provincial ministers or any Indian leader. 
The Cong1·ess in particular was keen on declaring its support for the 
Allies. Uut it demanded that the British should accept India as an equal 
partner in the war effort by promising to give India its independence after 
the war, and by providing a genuinely responsible government in the Centre. 
127 But since Britain would not concede any of these demands, the Congress 
resigned in protest from the Provincial Governments in October 1939. 128 
Thus, by the time Nehru convened the third session of the N.P.C. the 
Congress was no more 'identified with the State'. The short stint of 
provincial offices was over. Within the N.P.C. also there occurred some 
changes. Both the dissidents, Visvesvaraya and Kumarappa resigned their 
memberships from the Cornmitee. 129 The former wanted his draft on planning 
to be accepted by the N.P.C., which Nehru refused to do, 130 while Kumarappa 
131 
seemed silently to have dropred out. 
11 s 
During the eleven months that lapsed between the second and the 
third sessions of the N.P.C., most of the sub-committees continued 
their work. Many of these found themselves unable to decioe on the issue 
of state control of industries, etc. 132 I ·t f th N P C ' l n spi e c e • • • s genera 
directives on the subject of state ownership and cont~o1 of 'key' 
indLstries it was found that 'unless some clear instructions were given, 
difforent sub-committees might work on different lines and with different 
objectives•. 133 So Nehru called a meeting of the chairmen and secretaries 
of all the sub-committees on 11 February 1940. 134 
This meeting reconsidered the principles and policies regarding 
different industries and the role of the state as envisaqed by the Karachi 
Resolution of the Congress. It was decided that the Defence Industrir ~ 
must be owned and controlled by the state. On the queotion of 'key' 
industries, the majority were of the opinion that they should also be 
state owned, though a substantial minority considered that state control 
would be sufficient. It was made clear, however, that control over such 
industries must be rigid. Public utilities, it was also decided, should 
be owned by some organs of the state, such as the Central Government, 
Provincial Government or a Local Board. 
In regard to the other important and vital industries, which were 
not key industries, or defence industries, or public utilities, no special 
rule was laid down. But it was made clear that the very nature of planning 
required control in some measure. What this measure should be might vary 
h th . d t . t. 135 wit e in us ry in ques ion. The definitions of Defence and Key 
Industries and the Public Utilities were given in the Red Book published 
by K.T. Shah on behalf of the Committee. 136 
The controversy regarding the role of the state vis-a-vis industries 
did not end with the meeting mentioned above. At least one of the 
industrialist members of the Committee voiced his difference quite sharply. 
' 
" 
A.O. Shroff, in his Minute of Dissent to the Interim Report of the 
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Finance Sub-conwnittee thus expressed his view: 
It appears that the underlying tasks [of the Report 
of the Sub-Committee] is the adoption by the State 
of a policy of nationalisation of industries in the 
country. I have consistently felt that the adoption 
of such a policy, except in the limited sphere of what 
may be described as Defence Industries, would be most 
detrimental to the main objective of the National 
Planning Conwnittee, namely, to work out a well-thoughl 
of plan for a rapid industrialisation of India with 
a view to raise the standard of living of the scores 
of men and women living in the country. I am afraid 
the recommendation of a policy of nationalisation will 
only result in severely discountenancing men of 
enterprise and means to undertake ~ny further industrial 
ventures. This, in my opinion, would be particularly 
deplorable as, whilst in actual practice the ultimate 
effective implementation of this policy might not 
fructify for many long years to come, even the hope of 
a gradual promotion of new industries and expansion of 
the existing units is more likely than not to be 
seriously checkmated by a very natural fear that the 
State might in time intervene and deprive those who 
show initial enterprise and risk their capital of the 
benefits which should naturally accrue to them.137 
Shroff's fear was rather unfounded. It was already made clear by the 
meeting of the chairmen and the secretaries of the sub-committees that the 
N.P.C. was not thinking in terms of nationalising all industries. However, 
the particular sub-committee whose report Shroff was dissenting from was 
chaired by K.T. Shah. Shah was known for his radical inclinations and he 
was keen to introduce policies of nationalisation, etc., in the N.P.C. 
This effort always met with strong opposition even from ~ehru himself. 138 
The Public Finance Sub-committee Report was prepared by K.T. Shah, Dr. D.R. 
Gadgil, Prof, C.N. Vakil, Prof. Gyan Chand and Dr J.P. Neogy - all 
economists. Three other members did not attend the meetings. So Shroff 
was the only one dissenting. Later discussion on the report of the sub-
committee revealed that its authors had assumed that all the 'key' 
industries would be nationalised rather than 'controlled' by the state as 
proposed by the February meeting of the heads of the sub-committees. This 
assumption was unacceptable to the members of the N.P.C. and the Report 
d d d . 1 139 was ammen e accor ing y. 
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The third session of the N.P.C. was held in May 1940. And two more 
sessions were held soon after in quick succession during the months of 
June and August the same year. 140 Now that the major voices of opposition 
within the N.P.C. were removed, the approach of the meetings was more 
businesslike. Out of the twenty-seven sub-committees, nineteen submitted 
their reports - final or interim - before the fifth session was over in 
September 1940. 141 
The tone of these sessions was set by Nehru in his Note to the 
Members of the Committee during the third session. Referring to the 
calamity of the war he expressed his fear that the future that they had 
envisaged for lndiu had seemed to recede further away and 'even the 
heritage of the past [stood] in danger of being lost'. In a scathing 
comment on British policy in India, he said that 'India which was emerging 
gradually into a semi-colonial stage [was] again being treated as a full 
colony and its resources used for antinational purpose'. Regarding the 
future of the N.P.C. he reminded the members that most of the Provincial 
Governments, which had 'fathered' the N.P.C. and had co-operated with its 
work 'were no more', and the political changes in India had added in many 
• 
ways to these difficulties. But 'in any event', Nehru suggested, 'the 
sub~committees should carry on their labours and finish them, in any event 
[they] must collect all [their] materials and arrange it and give it 
shape', as 'thinking and planning for the future [was] essential if that 
future [was] not to end in misdirected energy and chaos. It [was] foolish 
to imagine that when the present crisis would at long last end, a new or 
better arrangement of world affairs would automatically emerge out of 
. t' 142 l • 
Planning was now part of India's preparation for independence. The 
work must be carried on because the colonial regime in India would have to 
go soon and then the state would be in their hands to execute their own 
plans. Nehru's vision of this new state is worth noting here: 
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We are aiming at a free and democratic state, which 
has full political and economic freedom. In this state 
the fundamental rights of the individual and the group-
political, economic, social and cultural - will be 
progressive and will utilise all scientific and other 
knowledge for the advancement of the people as a whole, 
and for the promotion of their happiness and material 
as well as cultural and spiritual wellbeing. The 
state will not permit the exploitation of the connunity 
by individuals or groups to the disadvantage of the 
forms and to the injury of the nation as a whole. To 
realise the social objectives, the state has to Plan 
through its representatives for the nation, and to 
co-ordinate the various activities of the nation so as 
to avoid waste and conflict and attain the maximum 
results. This Planning will deal with production, 
distribution consumption, investment, trade, income, 
social services, and many other forms of social activity 
which act and react on each other.143 
This was Nehru's vision of the future state of India, a state which 
would work for the advancement of the people as a whole. Planning was 
the major apparatus of this state to avoid waste and conflict end bring 
about the maximum result. 
The policies and principles of planning for this new state were 
already determined by the earlier sessions of the N.P.C. Its aim was to 
increase national wealth 'between two and three times within the next ten 
years', and this was to be so planned as to raise the general standard at 
least in a like measure. 144 Now the emphasis was on research work to be 
done by the sub-committees. The gathering of information was now considered 
to be the most vital task. And this information was to be scientifically 
collated and analysed. As Nehru put it: 'It is clear that adequate data 
and information is of the essence of planning and therefore the very first 
step that a planning authority must take is to organise the proper and 
scientific collection of statistics•. 145 He had already established 
contact with Prof. P.C. Mahalanabis who was in chRrge of the Indian 
Statistical Institute and the Statistical Laboratory of Calcutta. 
Mahalanabia suggested that the reports of all the sub-c011111ittees should 
be ex•ined from a 'purely statistical point of view1146 and Nehru saw to 
it that copies of these reports were sent to him even before being 
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considered by the Committee. 147 
The N.P.C., during its three sessions in 1940, considered the reports 
of nineteen sub-committees submitted to it. It would not serve any 
purpose to go into the detailed discussion of all these here. The 
reports of all the twenty-seven sub-committees were later published by 
K.T. Shah in the late 'forties. However we may discuss here briefly the 
issues that came up during the discussion on some of these reports, which 
had a bearing on the future planning of India. The Engineering and 
Transport Industries Sub-Committee suggested that the Heavy Engineering 
Industry, concerned with making machines, etc. for the manufacturing 
industries, should be established at a place in the Bihar-Bengal region 
which offered some geophysical advantages. All the basic inputs like 
coal, iron and 0V•e1· m1.nerals, and water were easily available there. 
A similar argument of locational advantage was put forward for the 
proposed Automobile lndustry. 148 The N.P.C. was 'finally of opinion that 
the establishment of a heavy engineering industry for the manufacture of 
heavy machinery of all kinds, heavy forgings, boilers, machine tools, 
locomotives, railway carriages and wagons, heavy engines, etc. was 
essential for the advancement of India, the development of her industries 
and for the organisation of defence. Such a key industry is the 
foundAtion of all planning'. However, it postponed the decision about its 
location as well as that of the Automobile Industry until later. 149 
Although the meeting of the chairmen and the secretaries of the sub-
committees in February 1940 had decided that rll key industries need not 
be nationalised, the Engineering and Transport sub-committee again brought 
up the question of state ownership in their report. The N.P.C. reiterated 1 
its stand that 'the words to be used should be "owned or controlled" in 
regard to key induetries ••• Thia question of ownership and control might 
be considered more fully in its general aspects as well as its particular 
------ ----~------------
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application, when questions of policy were discussed. 150 It was further 
decided that the state should encourage private capital to start plants 
under key industries 'in the transitional period' by guaranteeing interest 
for a period of years and imposing he~vy duties ~n foreign articles. To 
maintain state control over these industries a system of licensing was 
to be introduced. 151 
The question of state control cropped up in the discussion about 
monopolies also, and it was resolved, 'on principle we are opposed to 
monopolies in private hands and therefore all monopolies which are 
injurious to public interest or whose acquisitions is beneficial to public 
interest should be acquired by the State•. 152 
Reqarding foreign firms the N.P.C.'s stand was that 'control of 
foreign companies and foreign vested interests by the State was essential 
for Planning and tor the success of these enterprises•. 153 And the 
discussion on the Report of Manufacturing Sub-committee led to the 
resolution that 'when any foreign country has established quota arrange-
ments, or other restrictions, in their dealings with India, similar 
restrictior.s may be established from the Indian point of view, wherever 
it is necessary•. 154 
The colonial state had never bothered to organise the commodity 
economy on a national basis. The planners were worried not only about 
the lack of 'statistics' but also regarding the heterogeneity of the 
markets in India. There was no uniform units of weights and measures 
in the country. The British had superimposed their own units on the pre-
capitalist market operations in India. As a result together with 'f.p.s.' 
units of the British, the Indian traditional units were prevalent in the 
markets. The N.P.C. decided that, if other conditions permitted, the 
Metric System should be encoouraged and adopted throughout the country and 
a Bureau of Standards should be established at the Centre to standardise 
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weights and measures on an all-India basis. 155 The importance of a uniform 
system of measurement was felt not only for industrial goods but also for 
agricultural produce: 'The grading of all agricultural produce in order 
to ensure proper grades and uniform quality should be completed at an 
early date, and measures such as the Indian Agricultural Produce Act, 
Indian Fruita and Drugs Act, etc. should be passed and applied . ,enever 
necessary•. 156 
After Industry came Labour. The major resolution adopted by the 
N.P.C. on Labour Sub-cOlllftittee Report was as follows: 
Regulations as regards living and working conditions 
of the employAes, including hours of work [to be 
limited to 48 hours per week], employment of children 
[the minimum age should be raised to 15), provisions 
for safety and sanitation, social insurance and such 
other matters should apply ••• In the event of an 
industry not being able to comply with these conditions, 
the State may protect, subsidise or take it out if it 
is in the interest of the COllDUnity to do so.157 
The other important rec011Dendation was regarding statistics. The 
N.P.C. resolved that 'Legislation should be passed to enable full 
collection of all necessary labour and .other statistics'. It also resolved 
that there should be uniformity and co-ordination in labour legislation 
all over India. 158 
All these deliberations at the N.P.C. meetings of 1940 indicate the 
nature of the new Indian state as envisaged by the early plans. The 
demand was obviously to establish a bourgeois state in the image of Western 
industrial democracies. The British formed a colonial state in India 
which worked on a piece-meal basis to change the pre-capitalist economy 
of India to the extent that it suited them. The Indian elites were trying 
to replace that state by one of their own which would have a comprehensive 
role to play in changing the Indian society. To this end all the aspects 
of this state had to be planned. Although the beah: concept of planning was 
borrowed frm eocialist Ruaaia, the plan of the N.P.C. waa far fra11 a 
.i 
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socialist one. People like Nehru and his associates such as K.T. Shah 
and Meghnad Saha believed that any successful planning would automatically 
lead to socialism. 
Even the bourgeois demo:ratic prescriptions of the N.P.C. sub-
committees were utopian. This was most evident in the discussion on the 
Report of the sub-committee on Land Policy. The N.P.C. passed three 
resolutions on it in the course of its discussion of the Report. K.T. 
Shah, who was the chairman of this sub-committee emphasised the need for 
coll ~tivisation of all agricultural land. The meeting, after a long 
deliberation, resolved that: 
l. Ownership of all forms of natural wealth including agricultural 
land, mines, quarries, rivers and forests must vest absolutely 
in the people of India collectively. 
2. The co-operative principle should be applied to the exploitation 
of land by developing collective and co-operative farms in order 
that agriculture may be conducted more scientifically and 
efficiently, waste avoided, and production increased, and at the 
same time the habit of mutual co-operation for the benefit of the 
community developed in place of the individual perfit motive. 
Collective or co-operative farms should be developed to begin with 
on 'cultivable waste' land which should be acquired, when necessary 
by the State i11111ediately. 
J. No intermediaries of the type of taluqdors, zamindars, etc. should 
be recognised in any of these forms of natural wealth after the 
transition period is over. The rights and title possessed by these 
classes should be progressively bought out by granting such 
compensation as may be considered necessary and desirable. 
The practice of aub-infeudation and sub-letting of land should 
not be peniittect. 159 
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We mentioned earlier in this chapter how the land question was long 
avoided by the Congress and the N.P.C. When the N.P.C. was forced to 
consider the land question it came out with quite a radical prescription. 
But the radicalism was modified end diluted in the gradualistic approach 
of the planners. The concept of 'transition period' recurred again and 
again whenever discussions regarding property ownership were involved. 
Recall here the discussion on the ownership of 'key' industries. The 
objective reel~~Y of the Indian agriculture demanded the reccgnition of 
the evils of the existing land system. The utopia of socialism suggested 
collectivisation and nationalisation of all lend property. But the 
'middle-class' planners160 would not dare to unsettle the worshippers of 
Mammon who provided the class basis of the Congress and the N.P.C. 
Hence the notion of just compensation and transitional period had to be 
introduced in these resolutions. Again, this gradualist approach to 
social change could very well fit in with the Gandhian concept of non-
violence. This is where Gandhi and Nehru converged despite the differences 
in their visions about the future of India. 
SECTION 5: End of the Beginning 
The fifth session of the N.P.C. in August-September 194~ was the last 
regular meeting of the Corrmittee to be held for many years. In a way it 
marked the beginning of the end of Congress efforts at planning in 
colonial India. 
Ever since the beginning of the Second World War the British had 
been toughening their attitude towards the nationalist movement in India. 
By May 1940 when Winston Churchill became the Prime Minister of a national 
coalition government in Britain, the relation between the Government of 
161 India and the Congress had deteriorated. Even when the fifth session 
of the N.P.C. wea held, Nehru waa well aware of the possibility that he 
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might not be out of prison for long. In his Note addressed to its 
. 
members he wrote on JO August 1940, 'It is possible that circumstances 
over which I have no control may prevent my active association with the 
work of the N.P.C. for a while•. 162 
Soon after the fifth session, Nehru was put under arrest for making 
anti-war speeches. This was the start of Gandhi's new civil disobedience 
movement. 163 With Nehru behind bars, the N.P.C. found itself in a quandary. 
It had been decided that arrangements would be made by K.T. Shah, its 
General Secretary, to publish the sub-committee reports once these were 
finalised. 164 Not all the sub-committees had submitted their reports. 
A Drafting Committee consisting of Nehru, M.N. Saha, S. Quereshi and K.T. 
Shah was appointed 'to consider and report upon the integration and co-
ordination of the administrative and other machinery needed and 
recommended to carry out the Plan when prepared and approved; and to 
correlate the decisions hitherto taken by the N.P.C. on the reports of 
the various sub-committees and otherwise, and to develop out of those a 
picture of Planned Economy for the country as a whole•. 165 But this 
Committee failed to function in the absence of the chairman. Moreover, 
members like Thakurdas, Shroff and others started losing interest in the 
work of the N.P.C. For some weeks after Nehru's arrest on 17 October 
1940, the jail authorities allowed him to correspond with K.T. Shah and 
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others about the N.P.C.'s work. But by Marc~ 1941 the U.P. Government 
decided not to permit him to see any papers or reports of the N.P.c. 167 
Meanwhile even the funds of the Committee were shrinking. Many contri-
butors like Thakurdas and Shroff stopped their subscription eltogether. 168 
They were of the opinion that the N.P.C. had ceased to serve any purpose, 
and discouraged Shah from asking the various sub-committees to proceed 
with their work. 169 
K.T. Shah tried in vain to organise a meeting of N.P.C. lllllllbers to 
decide 80llle of the organiaational issues. 170 Nehru, on hia part,waa 
.. ~ 
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insistent that the work of the N.P.C. should be carried on in his 
- 171 
absence. But both Shroff end Thekurdas were against the continuation 
of the N.P.C.'s work. 172 The Committee was financially dependent, since 
the resignation of the Congress Provincial Governments in 1939, on the 
contributions of its industrialist members. But of the latter, it was 
only Sarabhai who continued to support Shah in his effort to carry on the 
unfinished work of th~ N.P.C. during the time. 173 The others might have 
been prejudiced against Shah because of his 'leftist' inclinations. 
railing to convene any meeting even during the Easter holidays of April 
1941 because of the lack of interest among the Committee's more important 
members, 174 Shah tried to execute the decision of the N.P.C. regarding 
publication of the sub-committee reports - an initiative endorsed by 
Nehru from Dehra Oun Jail in April 1941. 175 But both Shroff anc1 
Thakurdas were opposed to such publication. 176 Thakurdas thought that it 
would not be in the interest of the Congress and the country to put out 
any incomplete sub-committee reports. 177 He suggested that Gandhi should 
be consulted on the issue before Shah proceeded with the task in 
conforming to Nehru's advice. 178 When Shah sought his advice, Gandhi 
wrote in reply that 'the publication of the sub-committees' Report would 
only result in harm. What could be the value of anything on which the 
imprimatur of the main Committee was not available' 179 That was enough 
to dampen Shah's enthusiasm. Nehru was released from prison by the end 
of 1941. Both he and Shah now renewed their effort to reactivate the 
N.P.c. 180 Nehru of course did not like the steps Thakurdas and others 
had taken to stop the publication of the sub-committee reports. 181 Soon 
after his release, Nehru met some of the members of the Committee in 
Bombay182 and tried to organise a meeting of the N.P.C., first in January 
1942, 183 and failing that again in April 1942. 184 But this was an exercise 
in futility. No new report was submitted by any of the sub-committees 
and even the Drafting Committee failed in its appointed task. Nehru 
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himself now recognised the folly of his efforts to organise meetings 
. 
and advised Shah to take steps to publish material regarding the N.P.C. 
Quite a few of the members like Dubey, Saha and Sarabhai supported him 
in his view. The idea was that the publication of the reports would 
inform the public of the work done by the N.P.C. and would be useful in 
future when the time came to give shape to the idea of planning. 185 By 
August 1942 Nehru was back in prison. The N.P.C. went into a state of 
suspended animation for a long time to come. Only Ambalal Sarabhai 
continued to be faithful in his support for Shah who was still struggling 
alone to keep the N.P.C. alive. So little work was done in 1942 that a 
donation of Rs.500/- from Sarabhai was deemed sufficient by Shah to 
f 
maintain a skeletal office running for one year. In view of the opposition 
from Thakurdas and others as well as from Gandhi,Shah sidetracked the 
issue of the publication by deciding to put out in print his own view on 
planning. He was backed by Dr Nazir Ahmed and Sarabhai in this venture 
and the latter was eager to bear the expenses. 186 However Shah decided 
to do it all by himself so as to keep the publications free from any 
connection with the N.P.c. 187 In March 1943 his 'Little Book' on planning 
called Principle of Planning was published. 188 This brought some 
satisfaction to Nehru. 189 
The N.P.C. was to be revived again in 1945 after the war was over. 
But so far as the story of the early planning efforts is concerned, we may 
conclude our discussion here. The idea of planning was, for the Congress, 
essentially connected with the notion of power. The N.P.C. was formed 
after the Congress had assumed office in the Provincial Governments. The 
'identification with the State' stimulated its leaders to think in terms of 
a planned economy. But since the Congress was out of office, the wind was 
taken out of the N.P.C.'s sail. It was the enthusiasm of its members and 
the vigorous leadership of Nehru which had sustained it for some time after 
1939. By 1941 the Governnent of India revived its own effort in planning 
.. 
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in the form of 'post-war reconstruction' and Indian industrialists also 
began to take an interest in that effort. That development will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
1. Quoted in National Planning Carm1.ttee, a booklet (hereafter NCPB) 
' published by K.T. Shah, Hon. General Secretary of the National 
Planning Convnittee, from Bombay in 1939 (undated), p.l. This 
booklet was later known as the Red Book in N.P.C. parlance. 
2. Patel was always viewed by the Indian capitalists as their own 
representative in the Congress. In 1934, G.D. Birla, while arguing 
against the attempt by Dorabji Tata and some other Indian industrial-
ists and merchants to form a United Capitalist Party to have their 
own repreAentation in the legislature, mentianed people like Patel 
and Rajendra Prasad whose hands, he thought, should be strengthened 
by the Indian capitalists in their fight against 'socialism and 
communism'. (Letter from G.D. Birla to Purushottamdas Thakurdas 
dated 3 August 1934 in PTP, file No. 42, part VII.) 
3. See Chapter II, Section 2 above, where this point has been argued 
in detail. 
4. See Jawaharlal Nc:hru Papers (hereafter JNP), II, file No.135, Part 1, 
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DWTER IV 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND SOME NEW INITIATIVES 
SECTION 1: Revival of Official Efforts 
The first initiative of the Government of India for economic planning, 
as has been shown in Chapter 2 of this work, came in the year 1930 and 
was prompted by the Great Depression. We have already aeen how the 
bureaucracy ultimately retracted its steps in 1934. With the departure 
of Schuster and his friends from the Indian scene, the idea of 'planning' 
appeared to have been dropped from the progrannes of the Government of 
India. P.J. Grigg, who succeeded Schuster in 1934 as the Finance Member, 
was orthodox in·his views on the role of the state in economic develop-
ment and tried to uphold the already moribund doctrine of la1ssez-fa1re. 
He viewed the idea of planning as a 'Bolshevik' ruse in lndia. 1 
But the situation was such that even Grigg could not totally reject 
the idea of positive state intervention and programmatic thinking in the 
management of the economy. While commenting on the Bowley-Robertson 
Report in 1935 he had to concede that, 'the question of a permanent 
Economic Adviser to the Viceroy's Council was too important to be ignored 1 • 2 
The importance r.f overhauling the statistical organisation of the 
Government of India and of the provincial governments, as proposed by 
Bowley and Robertson, was also acknowledged by him. 3 He was also anxioous 
to relieve the 'higher Secretariat officers ••• from the routine manage-
ment of their departments so that they could devote more time to essential 
economic problema'. 4 In a sense Grigg's apparent allegiance to la1ssez-
fa1re doctrine was a convenient bluff to dissuade the opposition in the 
Legislative Aaaetlbly frOll continuing to harp on the subject of planning. 
for. while he uw 'red' in the dellanda for planning by the opposition, a 
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colleague of his, f azl-i-Hussain, the Member of the Council for Education, 
Health and lands, declared in reply to a motion, moved by Mehrhotra in 
the Council of State urging a five-year plan of economic development for 
India, that the resolution had already been anticipated by the steps 
taken by the Government towards planning. 5 So eloquent indeed was the 
assurance from the official bench about the Government's concern for 
economic planning that Mehrhotra was persuaded eventually to withdraw 
his motion. 6 
Hussain's declaration was again an eye-wash. Nothing really had .been done 
regarding planning since the Provincial Economic Conference in 1934. 
The initiative for planning definitely lost its vigour with the departure 
of its prime movers in 1934. But in spite of this waning of enthusiasm 
the idea of planning still attracted some attention within the official 
circles. The last major outcome of Schuster's effort, that is, the 
Bowley-Robertson Report, continued to be a subject of bureaucratic 
discussion, even up to 1938. 7 Although the major reconnendations of this 
Report, such as census of productions, etc. were never executed, it 
produced at least one positive decision in the form of Dr Theodore 
Greggory's appointment as tMe Economic Adviser to the Viceroy. 8 
The next break-through in the official initiative for planning came 
in the form of the Post-War Reconstruction Committee set up by the 
Government of India in 1941.9 In 1930, when Schuster, Rainy and others 
proposed to form the Economic Advisory Council, the idea had partly 
originated from the formation of the EAC in Britain. In 1941 also the 
Government of India followed the formation of Post-War Reconstruction 
Committees in Britain. Soon after the outbreak of the War in late 1939, 
committees had been formed in Britain to evolve 'reconstruction' programmes 
to face post-war probl.-. 10 The Government of India followed suit. In 
19JO it waa the crisis of the Great Depression which forced the capitalists 
to acknowledge the illlportance of econollic plaming. In 1941 it was again 
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a crisis - that of the Second World War - which revived interest in 
planning within the capitalist world. As Paul Sweizy has noted, 'after 
the First World War economic planning was no more then en untried idea', 
whereas 'from the early 1930s both the methods and the tremendous 
potentialities of economic planning were widely known•. 11 Even then it 
required the impact of the Second World War finally to drive home the 
importance of planning to the capitalist world. All the big powers 
engaged in the struggle for supremacy set up their own plans for a new 
world economic order. During the early 'forties, Germany, Japan, Britain 
and the U.S.A. were ell busy formulating post-war plans not only for their 
respective economies, but for the whole world. 12 
When Beveridge was formulating his strategies of war against the five 
giants of 'Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness' in Englend, 13 
a high-level Reconstruction Committee was formed by the Government of India 
in 1941 under the chairmanship of the Commerce Member of the Viceroy's 
Council. As early es March that year the Commerce Member announced, in 
the legislative Assembly, his intention to set up en inter-departmental 
committee for the investigation of reconstruction problems connected 
with the question of the transition from war to peace in industry. 14 
Eventually in June 1941 a Committee was set up to 'prepare developmental 
plans for India•. 15 In addition to the Chairman, the Member for Commerce 
himself, it consisted of the Economic Adviser to the Government and 
representatives of the Railway Board end the Finance, Commerce, Defence, 
Education, Health and lands, and Supply Departmercs. At its first meeting 
held on 23 June 1941, the Committee set up four sub-committees to deal 
with labour and demobilisation, disposal of stocks and contracts, Public 
Works and Government purchase policies, and trade, international trade 
policy and agricultural clevelopment. 16 It was decided to associate with 
each cOINllittee representatives of c0111111ercial and industrial interests and 
labour, 17 and to set up a consultative committee of economists, drawn from 
I 
142 
the different universities in the country and presided over by the 
E - i Ad . 18 conom c v1ser. 
The four sub-committees set up by the Reconstruction Committee were 
to go into the problems of the economy likely to arise at the end of the 
war and suggest policies and progranwnes to the Government for action. 
The Reconstruction Committee on Labour and Demobilisation was to collate 
proper statistics on labour, organise re-training programmes for the 
labour force for post-war employment, generally supervise and control the 
process of demobilisation of the Army recruits after the war, and 
organise labour 'in a planned manner to tackle the possible increase in 
unemployment after the cessation of hostilities•. 19 The second committee 
(on disposals and war contracts) was to prevent post-war recession by 
making arrangements for.a planned termination of war production and 
release of stocks. The third one was to supervise public expenditure to 
prevent unemployment due to the possible decline in public works expendi-
ture on war. Alternative public works, such as housing, etc., were to be 
arranged to maintain end increase employment in this sector. Regarding 
the fourth committee, it was acknowledged that 'the formulation of long-
term trade and industrial policies was properly a matter for Government as 
a whole', but that the committee could help the Government by formulating 
policies to tackle these problems for the post-war economic development. 20 
The formation of the r~st-War Reconstruction Committee and its sub-
committees, heralded a new era in the colonial administration of India. 
Since India did not serve directly as a battle-field it was more a question 
of construction and economic development there than of reconstruction. 
The emphasis on the role of the state in stimulating economic growth and 
organising economic development ln a planned manner following the Keynesian 
prescription of economic management by the state at a time when Keynes was 
at the height of his influence in England as an adviser to the Treasury. 21 
The decision to set up the Reconstruction Committee was the definitive 
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recognition by the British, at home and in India, of the futility of 
laissez-faire as an economic philosophy and acknowledgement of the role 
of the state in economic and social activities of the nations. 
Unlike in 1930-34, when the Government of India first proposed and 
then retracted measures for the formation of an Economic Advisory Council, 
in 1941 the Reconstruction Committee were set up to stay and work. Yet 
during the first two years of the existence of these Committees, the 
bureaucracy really did not take up any concrete programme. 22 Meanwhile, 
the Government faced new problems on the political front. Even the 
moderate Indian collaborators like Jayakar and Sapru now demanded that 
the Viceroy's Executive Council should be reconstituted as an all-party 
national government to organise defence23 and that Dominion Status should 
be declared for India. 24 Internationally, Chiang-Kai-Shek's visit and the 
consequent public declaration of his sympathy for 'India's aspirations for 
freedom', 25 and Roosevelt's pressure on Churchill regarding the question 
of Indian political reform26 put the Government of India on the del,:'!nsive. 
The Cripps Mission to India, although it helped to pacify American criti-
cism about Britain's role in India, 27 did not help the Government of India 
at all to solve the internal problems. On the contrary, the failure of 
the Cripps Mission soon led to a total confrontation in the form of the 
Quit India movement. 28 
Stafford Cripps, however, did not give up his efforts to find a 
solution for India. Failing to provide a political solution to the 
problem faced by the colonial administration as a sequel to the resignations 
of the Congress-led provincial governments in 1940, Cripps suggested 
'economic and social solutions'. In August 1942, the War Cabinet 
recommended that 'urgent attention should be given to the development of 
a more progressive social and industrial policy in India', for, according 
to it, under the existing conditions, 'discontent with social and 
industrial conditions was being exploited for political purposes; and this 
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type of exploitation could best be countered by a positive policy for 
• . • th . d • t • I 29 improving eir con i ions • The matter came up again, in the War 
Cabinet meeting of 31 August. 30 Within a few days Cripps prepared a 
'Note' based on the suggestion given by the War Cabinet, of which he ~:as 
a member, regarding social and industrial policy for India. 31 The major 
points in this Note which attracted the attention of Churchill end other 
British Ministers were as follows. Cripps suggested that any attem~t to 
rally all sections of Indian opinion to the Allied war efforts upon a 
convnunal basis would lead to very great difficulties, and would only 
antagonise Indians. The alternative was 'to concentrate upon an immediate 
policy of putting right some of the most deep-seated wrongs which affect 
the mass of the people'. He blamed the 'appallingly bad' conditions of 
the workers and the 'Ryots' on 'the Indian millowners, landlords and 
money-lenders', and suggested that 'if the British Government could enlist 
the sympathy of the workers and peasants by immediate action on their 
behalf, the struggle in India would no longer be between Indian and 
British upon the nationalist basis, but between the classes in India upon 
an economic basis. There would thus be a good opportunity to rally the 
mass of Indian opinion to [British] side 1 • 32 
Cripps' 'economic' solution to the political problem in India was 
ridiculed by officials of the India Office. 33 But Churchill took up the 
issue and considered it 'most important that a movement should be made 
in the sense of [Cripps's ideas] and that those points should not br • 
excluded from any statements that may have to be made on Indian polic~ 
He suggested to h .. · Amery, the Secretary of State for India, that a 
preliminary survey be made with regard to the issues by Cripps, Amery, 
Bevin (Labour Minister) and John Anderson (Chancellor of the Exchequer). 34 
Although Churchill's primary interest in Cripps's 'social and industrial 
policy' was political because of its propaganda value, particularly in the 
United States of America, his advice was taken up in all seriousness by 
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Cripps, and subsequently, by Bevin. The sub-committee of the War Cabinet 
formed by Churchill to discuss Cripps's 'Note' discussed the issue with 
some of the advisers of the Secretary of State, including Atul Chatterjee 
end A.R. Mudaliar, by the end of September 1942. 35 The Indian advisers 
strongly opposed the idea of intervention, in any form, by Britain in the 
affairs of the administration of the Government of India and pointed out 
that under the 1935 Act the social and economic programmes were in the 
main provincial subjects in India. Any implementation of Cripps's 
prescription would require changes in legislation which could not be 
rushed through particularly at a time when most of the provinces were 
operating under Governor's rule according to Section 93 of the 1935 Act. 36 
Mr Amery also pointed out to Cripps the futility of a 'publicly 
announced policy of social reform in India as a counterblast to the 
political situation'. This, he thought, 'would have no effect in weaning 
the peasants from Congress and would be regarded by the whole of India as 
contrary to ell our [British] professions ••• of encouraging India to 
37 govern herself'. The alternative he suggested was that the Viceroy 
should be advised 'privately to encourage in his turn his own Executive 
end the Section 93 Provincial Governors to be active in good works•. 38 
But Bevin end Cripps were eager to continue their efforts for a 
'social end industrial policy' to win over workers end pe~aents of India 
from the influence of Indian nationalists. Cripps was interested to 
recover some of the prestige he lost by the failure of his mission to 
India, and Bevin as a Labour Party leader was interested in it for 
ideological reasons. A detailed note was prepared on their behalf by 
Mr A.D.K. Owen, of the Office of the lord Privy Seal, heeded by Cripps. 39 
Its major prescriptions were i) more education (and a reduction in the 
birlh rate); ii) higher productivity in agriculture (and associated 
industries); and iii) a rapid increase in non-agricultural employment. 40 
The important points to note for our purpose in this proposal are the 
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emphasis on economic planning through the development of 'Public 
. 
Corporations', and the importance attached to the reconstruction 
committees set up by the Government of India. 41 
The Cripps-Bevin proposal · ·<>s opposed, among others, by linlithgow 
himself. He 'wished' that 'Cripps and his young man [Bevin?] would 
devote themselves to something a little more prectical 1 • 42 However he 
conceded that any proposnl sent out to him by either the Secretary of 
State or Churchill himself would have to be considered. 43 But meanwhile 
the Viceroy took steps to reorganise his own defences. He decided that 
'reconstruction' being an 'urgent matter' should be taken up at the highest 
level by the Government as a whole. Accordingly, the Interdepartmental 
Reconstruction Committee, set up in June 1941, was replaced in March 1943 
by a Committee of the Viceroy's Council, with the Viceroy as the Chairman 
and consisting of the Members for Civil Defence, Defence, Labour. Supply, 
Commerce, War Transport and Finance, and it was given the power to deal 
with all matters of policy, exercise initiative, and co-ordinate and 
sanction plans. 44 A separate secretariat was provided for the new 
Committee, and a number of Policy Committees, made up of representatives 
of the provincial governments and Indian states, and prominent 'non-
officials', were set up to deal with various aspects of the economy. 45 A 
General Policy Committee of Government officials and representatives of 
provincial governments and Indian states and a large 11umber (twenty-three 
in all) of non-officials was set up in order to advise the Government on 
major matters of policy, including those which did not fall within the 
purview of one or the other of the various policy Committees. Various 
other official committees were also formed to deal with technical prepare-
tory work and for co-ordinating the activities of different departments in 
respect of 'plan' works. 
The reconstitution of the Reconstruction Committees was thus directly 
influenced ly the impact that the Cripps-Bevin proposals made on Churchill's 
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War Cabinet. Linlithgow, in spite of his early ridicules, 46 had to take 
. 
this proposal seriously. It was to help him later on to argue that the 
issues raised by the Cripps-Bevin proposals had already been taken in hand 
by his Reconstruction Committee. 47 
The inclusion of 'non-official' advisers on such a generous scale in 
the new policy committees was a new development We may recall that in 
the early 1930s, when Schuster was trying to set up the Economic Advisory 
Council, the idea of including non-official experts was not supported by 
the majority of the bureaucracy. The 'non-officials', too, were not eager 
lo join the Council proposed by Schuster end his colleagues. In 1943 the 
situation was different. 
The idea of including 'non-official' advisers started with the 
administration of 'Section 93 Provinces'. These were the pr0vinces which 
were put under Governor's rule (under Section 93 of the Government of 
India Act of 1935) after the resignation of Congress Ministries in 1940. 
In view of the opposition from the Congress to the war effort and the 
unpopular character of Governor's rule in the 'Section 93 Provinces', 
Linlithgow mooted the idea of incorporating 'non-official advisers' in the 
administration of these provinces. 48 The idea was supported with 
enthusiasm by Amery, the Secretary of State for India, but he pointed out 
that 'no special political advantage would be achieved unless the non-
officials were representative politicians•. 49 Linlithgow was also faced 
with mixed responses from his Governors on this question. 50 Particularly 
after the Q~it India movement of 1942, many of the Governors did not think 
it possible to induct any non-official advisers who .-10Lii·1 have popular 
support while working as a part of the British Administration. 51 As a 
result the idea was dropped by Linlithgow. But it was revived, in a 
modified form, when it came to the reorga11isation of the Reconstruction 
CORRittee in 1943, for the non-official advisers were accommodated only in 
the Policy Coanittees while the highest body - the ~econstruction Committee 
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of Council - conaiated of Government officials only. 
The Policy Committees were formed on the same basis as thoae of the 
National Planning Committee which by 1943 was virtually defunct. like 
the sub-committees of the N.P.C. the Policy Committees were elao con-
stituted of industrialists, businessmen and professional experta. 52 But 
it is interesting to note that the only group of people who found places 
in both the N.P.C. sub-committees and the Policy Committees were the 
industrialists and the big businessmen. Almost the entire industrial and 
commercial interest of the country, both Indian (largely rICCI llelllbera) 
and Europeans (of Associated Challt\ers of Commerce) was represented in the 
Policy Committees. The only con&picuous absence was that of Ambalel 
Sarabhai. 53 Also absent were moat of the 'experts' who had participated 
actively in the aff$irs of the N.P.C. Out of the fifty-aix Chairmen and 
Secretaries of the N.P.C. Sub-committees, only seven were included in the 
Policy Committees, end of these seven only two - Professor J.N. Mukherjee 
end Dr D.R. Gadgil were 'experts'. Of the rest, Sri Ram, Shroff, C.V. 
Mehta and Rahimutulle Chenoy were all industrialists or big businessmen. 
T. Vijayraghavacharya represented one of the Indian States. Even among 
the ordinary members of the N.P.C. Sub-committees (nearly two hundred of 
them), the only names to occur in the list of the Policy Committees were 
those of Begam Shah Nawaz, Professor N. Sanyal and Dr. S. Higginbotham. 54 
The absence of almost the entire gamut of N.P.C. expertise from the 
Policy Committees is in glaring contrast to the participation of the 
industrial and the commercial tycoons. People like Thakurdas and others 
who were so hesitant in 1930, from political considerations, to join 
Schuster and his colleagues in their effort to aet up the Economic 
Advisory Council, happily took their aeata in the sub-committees of the 
Reconstruction Comittee of the Council in 1943-44. It does not appear 
to have worried thell that they wre excluded frm the deciaion Mking body 
- the Reconstruction CoMittee .. -* up only of gover.went officials. 
----------------------------- -- --
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That the N.P.C. llellbers should be left out of these connittees is not 
. 
at all surprising. The relation between the Congress and the ~-vernment 
of India was never congenial since 1930. Particularly in 1943, within a 
year of the Quit India movement, it would be unim~inable to the British 
to seek co-operation from the Congress or trust it's followers with any 
official programme. Even earlier, in June 1939, when Nehru, on behalf of 
the N.P.C. had sought the Government's co-operation regarding surveys 
and some such 11attera, the Executive Council decided that the N.P.C. 'had 
been started aa a form of "parallel Government" and was therefore ab 1n1t1o 
hardly deserving of encouraget1ent•, 55 and aa a result no government official 
was allowed to participate in its activitiea. 56 It was perhaps political 
considerations of the same kind which 11ade the Government of India keep 
out N.P.C. experts from its Policy Committees at a time when its relation 
with the Congress was even more unfriendly. It is hard to explain other-
wise how leading scientists like Meghnad Saha, A.K. Saha, J.C. Ghoah and 
economists like C.S. Vakil, Radhakamal ~herjee and statisticians and 
other experts like P.C. Mahalanabia and Viaveavaraya were ignored. The 
N.P.C. had definitely chosen its members on the basis of their commitments 
to the nationalist cause. The Government's selection had to follow a 
directly contrary principle. 
However, Indian industrialists and big business could not be kept out 
or Governmental committees altogether. The good relations established 
between the 'non-official advisers' and the Government during the lndo-
British Trade negotiation which replaced the Ottawa Pact and the supple-
mentary Lee-Mody Psct, 57 was sufficient to make the 'nationalist' 
capitalists acceptable to the colonialists. Again this ie also a reflection 
on the 'nationali•' of the Indian capitalists. Despite their emotional 
and praCJ19tic attachllent to the f reedall .avwnt led by the Congreaa, 
people like Birl•, Thatcurdaa, Shroff, Sri R• and 111111y other big buaineaa-
11en did not .,rrer mny qual .. .twn it c ... to Joining hands with·the 
- - --------~----~--------
1SO 
colonialists in the sharing of profits of the war. Only the Sarabhais 
-
remained an exception. 
Viewed from another angle, participation by big business in official 
planning efforts llBY seem quite in order. Since the birth of Indian 
capitalism, indigenous industrialists and commercial interests had been 
clamouring for help from the state in their effort to develop as a class. 
In 1930 when the Governnent first indicated its eagerness to help by 
offering accommodation on the EAC, the hostile Political atmosphere and 
the impending nationalist movements created difficulties. In 1943 the 
situation was different. The Quit India movement had been brutally crushed. 
The Congress was in a cn1nplete disarray with all its leaders behind bars. 
On the other hand, the war had boosted the economy through war demands. 
International competit:i.on in the Indian market had almost ceased to exist 
because of the war ane the stoppage of imports. Even the preasure of 
British expart intere·3ta on the Government of India had eased to some 
extent. At the same time a huge sterling balance was piling up with the 
~ 
Indian Treasury in the form of surplus of war materials to the allied 
Army. 58 The events - both economic and poliJ:ical - now called for a close 
collaboration betwoen Indian private enterprise and the state. 
The particip6tion of the indigenous big business in the Policy 
con111ittees therefore was quite in keeping with the logic of these develop-
ments. Bureaucratic efforts in the area of planning were strengthened by 
certain administrative reorganisation in 1943. Soon after the formation 
of the Reconstruction Con111ittee of Council, the Government of India set up 
a new department exclusively for Planning and Development. It was headed 
by an Indian businessman - Sir Ardeshir Dalal - who was closely connected 
with the f'ICCI. The same year saw the publication of two Reports of the 
Reconstruction Camittee, which wu to fora the baaia of the nt.1 depart-
llent'a work cklring the next few yeara.59 
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SECTION 2: Big Buaineas Plana 
Before we go into the details of the reports mentioned above, and the 
consequent activities of the Department of Planning and Development, it 
will be worthwhile to discuss another development - that of the publication 
of the well-known 'BOlllbay Plan' which preceded tl',c publication of the 
Government Reports by a few montha.60 The publication of the Bombay Plan 
ushered in a plethora of plan programmes by various groups in India during 
the late 1940s. But the reason why we diacuaa the history of this Plan 
at this point is the close link between the Government reports and this 
particular document produced by the Indian capitalists. Not only theta 
all the people who authored the 'Bombay Plan' were in the Policy Committees 
of the Government. Ardeshir Dalal, the Member of the Council for the 
newly formed Department of Planning and ~velopment, himself was one of 
the authors. Also we will find a close resemblance between what the 
capitalists aspired in their Plan and the Governmental programmes chalked 
out in the reports. 
The correspondence between Government policies and the responses of 
the Indian elites followed a pattern. After the First World War the 
Government instituted Montagu-Chelmeford reforms, and Visvesvaraya came 
out with his Reconstructlng Indla. In 1934 when the Government 
was organising the Provincial Economic Conference with a view to aetting 
I 
up the Economic Advisory Council, Visvesvaraya, Mitter, Birla and Sarkar 
produced their own plans. In the 1940s when the Government started 
organising the Reconstruction Committees, it was now the turn of Tata to 
take a similar initiative on behalf of big buaineaa. 
In November 1942, J.R.D. Tata wrote to Thakurdas informing him that 
the 'first meting of the infor•l Poat-War Econo11ic Develop11ent Ca.ittee' 
. 61 
could be held J.n hia 'Board Rocm' in Bollbay the following month. Although 
no ~ta reprding earlier correapandence oen be found, it my be 
1S2 
safely aaaUlled frOll the content of thia letter that talks about the 
'informal C01111ittee' had been going on for quite 80ll8 time among some of 
the leading capitalists. That the 11ajor initiative for the setting up 
of thia coa11ittee cat11e from the Tata family is evident from another 
l~tter, written by John Matthai, then in the employment of Tata Sona Ltd, 
to Thakurdaa on 8 December 1942. Matthai enclosed with this letter 'papers 
relating to the Proposal Connittee of Poat-War Economic Development, 
General Note, List of Subjects, Agenda, etc.•.62 Later, when the C011111ittee 
started functioning, all ita clerical and research tasks were performed by 
the Statistical Department of Tata Sona Ltd who alao provided it with 
some additional staff. The Tataa bore half the coat of investigation 
for the COlnlllittee while the other niembera of the C011111ittee financed the 
rest. 63 
The first meeting of the COlllllittee was held at the Bombay house of 
the Tataa on 11 December 1942. Those who attended the meeting were P. 
Thakurdas, Shri Ram, G.D. Birla, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, J.R.O. Tata, A.O. 
ahroff and J. Matthai. The only other person who authored the 'Bombay 
Plan' - Ardeahir Dalal - was possibly not in the know of this Committee 
at that time. 64 The meeting was held in secret and its time was scheduled 
ingeneoualy to coincide with the arrival of Birla, ~hri Ram and Kaaturbhai 
in Bombay for a 'Standard Cloth Conference•.65 
That the Committee w-a set up in secret and was kept so for quite 
aome time is evident from yet another document. It appears that post-war 
planning was the concern not only of the people who organised the Connittee, 
but also of many other buaineastnen. S C. Majumdar, who headed the 
Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd of Bombay at that time wrote 
to Thakurdaa. in March 1943 suggesting to hi• that he should form a 'Post-
war Anociation of India'. He felt that it was 'high ti• that buaineaa-
..,. in India llhauld do ... thing in thia reQerd' Md if pereona of 
lhakurdu'• stat. took •u.· 1..., in thi• •tter•, they could 'do a CJOOcl 
15) 
deal of work in this direction'. Majumdar also infor11ed Thakurdaa that 
he had 'had SOM talks in this regard with Sir Ardeshir Dalal and •.• 
[was] also thinking of discussing this matter with Seth G.D. Birla•.66 
He also suggested a list of personnel to be included in his proposed 
committee and this included, among others, all the members of tho 
Committee that Thakurdas and others formed in December 1942. Thakurdas 
hastened to reply to Majumdar within a day of receiving his letter: 
I an already connected with one Committee of the sort 
indicated in the enclosure to your letter and I do 
not think that I can agi-ee to Join any other C011111ittee 
which undertakes similar works. However, the Committee 
with which I an connected is doing work very quietly 
and I pass thls on to you so that you may not count 
Lf>On any acUve cooperaUon or help fran me, or J.ndeed, 
fran those whose mnes I have seen you have put down 
ln your conm.tttee. (italics mine) 
A letter from Matthai to Majumdar also testifies to the secrecy. 
Matthai, while appreciating Majumdar's effort, gave his opinion that it 
would not succeed without the help of the Government or 'some recognised 
business bodies'. He suggested that 'flCCI should take the matter up', 
but m-ntioned nothing to Majumder about the committee which was already 
working in the same direction.68 
Such silence and aecr&cy are not difficult to explain. Thakurdas, 
Shroff and the others had dissociated themselves from the N P C. in .1941, 
which closed down due to the lack of moral and financial support from them. 69 
They were, therefore, eager to keep quiet about their own efforts started 
so soon afterwards. Secondly, they were perhaps not keen to let the 
Government know about their independent efforts at that time. Indian 
big business was worried about the way the British were trying to handle 
the sterling balance of India accumulated through the war efforts. They 
feared that British industrialists both in India and in Britain would try, 
with the connivmice of the Gover..-nt of India and the India Office, to 
place their orders for capital goode with the British firMll in Britain for 
delivery after the we&"ft·thul bleek the.way for Indian rtrMll to uee, for 
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their own benefit, the 'reconstruction fund' created by the Government of 
India to utilise some of the sterling balancea. 70 
The fear was not entirely without a basis. Indeed some British 
fil'llB, e.g., Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI~were already moving in 
that direction. 71 The Indian induatrialiata were also worried about the 
advice that the Federation of British Industries had circulated to all the 
British Chambers of C011111Brce in India to the effect that the latter should 
make their plans of starting and capturing Indian industries with rupee 
capital ao that in the post-war period they would be in a position to 
compete with Indian industries. 72 The Coverrwient of India's decision, in 
1942, to increase the import of consumer goods from U.K, also created a 
serious breach in the war-time co-operation between Government and Indian 
industrialists. FICCI condemned the decision to increase the import of 
bicycles, drugs and other consumer goods, charged that 'under the guise of 
making available large supplies of conaU111er goods, the G.O.I. were assisting 
British industries at the cost of nascent Indian industries', and 
suggested that rather than importing finished goods a better plan would 
be to help Indian industries to import capital goods such as plants, 
machinery, materials and stores necessary for increased output.73 
This decision by the Government to increase the import of consumer 
goods was particularly unpalatable for the Indian industrialists because 
it coincided with Government actions to control import of capital goods 
in India. Between 1940 and 194' the Government of India imposed strict 
restrictions on the import of all kinds of goods necessary for industrial 
investment in the country. A wide range of Uf'MIBnufactured and se11i-
manufactured steel was brought under the jurisdiction of import trade 
control in Decellber 1940. In the course of 1941 the illlpOrt of Mny 
varieties of tlllChine tools, llllChinery and lli.llwork required for industrial 
purpoeea wu brought wmr i11pOrt trade control Md a central authority waa 
iMtituted for thia putp0ee. It all culllinated in 1943 with the Control 
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of Imported Engineering Stores Order, imposing a general restriction on 
the' import of capital goods, 74 
These developments, taken together with the fact that the Post-War 
Reconstruction Committee set up in 1941 under the Conmerce Member of 
Council consisted only of officials, with no more than a minimal alllount of 
non-official representation limited strictly to its sub-committees, made 
these industrialists rather secretive about their own efforts at planning. 
later on, in 194.3-44, when the Government sought the co-operation of these 
industrialists for the Reconstruction Committees, the situation was to 
turn in their favour and the 'plan' chalked out by them was to receive 
serious consideration from official quarters. 
The first meeting of the Committee formed by Thakurdas, Tata and 
others on 11 December 1942 formulated a general attitude on the question 
of economic planning on the basis of political assumption a) that if a 
national Government came into existence after the war, it would 'embrace 
the whole of India'; b) that it would be on a 'federal basis with residual 
powers vested in the local governments'; and c) that it would be 'complete-
ly free in respect of economic matters•. 75 
It was decided that, 'the aim of the committee should not be to 
vindicate capitalism as an institution but impartially to analyse 
capitalism', with a view to determining what modifications were necessary 
. 
'to enable it to render the beat possible service to the country'. In 
this regard the role of the state was vital; enquiries were to be initiated 
on the subject of state control with a study of the 'defects of capitalism, 
particularly in respect of planning distribution'. According to the 
Committee the system of war control could be a proper subject to determine 
the merits and demerits of state control. In general it was agreed that 
the state should lay down a general plan for the development of industries, 
and ita control ehould carry with it an obligation to aaaiat industries 
lillhere euch miatanee wa Maded. lta control wu to be exercieed through 
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machinery composed of representatives of employers, labour and the state, 
. 
and care was to be taken to maintain individual freedom and initiative 
and to avoid over-centralisation. licensing of industries was considered 
to be a suitable means of enforcing state control in respect of the 
regional distribution of industries and also of the social and economic 
conditions within each industry. 
In selecting subjects for investigation, the Committee decided, among 
other things, that 'problems relating to agriculture should be examined 
not merely in relation to their bearing on industrial development but on 
its own merits as the most vital economic activity of the country', and 
that consideration should be given (clearly under the influence of 
Keynesian economics) to the question of providing Public Works on a long 
term basis and building of houses in industrial areas and in villages as 
a means of remedying cyclical fluctoations. At the same time it was felt 
that Public Works as a means of providing employment should, as far as 
possible, relat~ to directly productive works 1 • 76 The Committee worked 
very efficiently because of the help rendered by the Statistical Depart-
ment of the Tata Sons Ltd. The initial 'Note' on planning prepared by 
Matthai in June 1943 was considered by the Committee in its meeting held 
in August. 77 By December that year an 'outline' was drafted by Matthai78 
with the help of , amongst others, P s. Lokanathan - a noted economist of 
the time. 79 It had envisaged an increase of 55 per cent in industrial 
production as against 60 per cent in agriculture. But both Thakurdas and 
Birla criticised this on the ground that this would expose the Committee 
•to the charge of industrial bias' and suggested, instead, a 100 per cent 
increase in agricultural production over fifteen years of planning. 
Accordingly, the 'outline' was revised within a few days, incorporating 
these auggestiona.80 
The Plan, A BrJef tenor..un ,OutlWng a Plan of Otwtlapmnt of lnclJ.a, 
• 
ae it wu called, was preeented at a Pre•• Conference held at Tata'• 
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Bombay house on 19 January 1944. 81 Initially, the idea was to publish 
it by the end of January after arranging some g•1od publicity. But the 
Committee decided to bring forward the date to take advantage of the 
meeting of the General Policy Committee of the Reconstruction Committee 
of Council, which was scheduled to be held on 17-18 January. 82 Since 
A.O. Shroff, P. Thakurdas and G.D. Birla were members of this Committee, 
they wanted to use this occasion to make an impact on the Government of 
India with the production of their own plan, Although this resulted in 
insufficient publicity, the authors were successful in drawing the 
attention of the policy makers of the state to their efforts. 83 
Tate's personal initiative in planning in this period was evident 
here as well. Sir frederick James - who, we may recall, had made a plea 
for planning as the representative of the European communities in the 
Legislative Assembly in 193484 - was now in the employment of Tata in his 
Delhi office. 85 The latter made use of James as a liaison with the 
Government of lndia. 86 Birla also used his influence with James Bhore, 
the erstwhile Commerce Member, to lobby with the Government in favour of 
87 what came to be known as the 'Bombay Plan'. Theodore Gregory, Economic 
Adviser to the Viceroy, met James unofficially and appeared to be 
enthusiastic about the plan. His criticism was that the cost of planning 
as estimAted by the authors - Rs.10,000 crores over fifteen years - could 
prove to be too low, and that the plan targets had not been worked out in 
detail in their technological aspects. Gregory, however, 'advised the 
Government of India to treat these proposals as being of great importance 
and to make their criticisms constructive•. 88 Publicity for the Plan was 
not conf ir.ed to Government circles. Efforts were made to mobilise popular 
support as well. Tata and Birla again took leading parts in this matter. 
In february 1944 the former explained the Plan in a talk delivered to 
the Bollbay Rotary Club. ln March Birla took the opportunity of the Annual 
General Meeting of the flCCl to give hie views on the Plan.89 But since 
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the authors wanted to get their Plan executed without delay, they 
. 
naturally looked up to the Government of India for support and made an 
all-out effort to convince the Government about the efficacy and 
feasibility of the Plan chalked out by them. 
The Bombay Plan caused quite a stir in the official circles.90 
Gregory's advice was readily accepted and arrangements were made to 
analyse the different aspects of this Plan by the relevant departments of 
the Government of lndia. 91 Consequently, the War Transport Department, 
the Supply Department, the Finance Department, the Commerce Department 
and Theodore Gregory, the Economic Adviser to the Viceroy, all prepared 
detailed analyses. The departments of the Government of India were all 
in agreement with the general objective of the Plan. Departmental 
criticism was primarily concerned with the financial aspect of the Plan. 92 
Gregory in his note pointed out the difficulty in carrying out such an 
elaborate plan for economic development under the prevalent constitution 
based on provincial autonomy. He was of the opinion that 'plaming on a 
national scale [had] hitherto been attempted in a thorough-going way only 
in Russia, Germany and (to a smaller degree) in Italy', and that all these 
countries were under totalitarian forms of governments. 93 This observation, 
however, did not stop the Government from considering the Plan. The 
Research Department of the Reserve Bank of India was given the task of 
analysing the financial aspect of the Plan. 94 
Accordingly, J.V. Joshi, Senior Economist of the RB.I. prepared a 
detailed Note on the Plan, in which he expressed some concern on the 
question of sterling balance expenditure envisaged in the Plan. The 
Bombay Plan estimated a sterling balance of Ra.1,000 crores at the end of 
the war, and suggested spending this amount in importing capital goods 
for planning at the very begiming of the Plan period.95 The expert 
critic!• of the R.8.1. wae that the United Kingdaln, tilhich owd this Maney 
to India, would not be in a poaition to release thia reaerve itllllediately 
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after the war and thus the balance could not be used to India's benefit 
at that time. Joshi used arguments about depleted currency reserve, 
inflationary impact of the use of this balance, deflationary impact of 
'withdrawing certain purchasing power from the public' through the use 
of this balance, etc. in order to warn the planners against relying too 
much on this balance. 
The Government of India at that time was 'working on a statement of 
the broad policy to be followed as regards post-war development•. 96 This 
was ne~esaitated by the pressure created by Bevin and Cripps in the War 
Cabinet, and Churchill's support for them, on the question of 'social and 
economic policy' in India. As a result the Government decided to consult 
the authors of the Bombay Plan for clarification of the points raised in 
criticism of the Plan by different government officials. J.P. Srivastava, 
the Member of Council for food and Deputy President of the Reconstruction 
Committee of the Council (RCC~was entrusted with the task. 97 He wrote 
to Thakurdas that in view of the proposed statement of policy by the 
Government, on which his Committee was working on at the time, he 'wished 
to take up into consideration the various suggestions and proposals 
made in "A Plan of Economic Development for India"' [Bombay Plan] and before 
doing so he felt that it would be 'moat useful to have the Bombay Plan 
98 
explained' to the Government by the authors. He suggested a meeting 
between the authors and Government officials at his place. The meeting 
held in April 1944, was represented on the Government side by, apart from 
Srivastava, the finance Member, the Supply Member, Secretaries of RCC, 
Industries Department, finance Department, Education, Health and Land 
Department, and Commerce Department, the Economic Adviser to the Viceroy 
and a few other government officials. Amongst the authors Thakurdas, 
Tata, Dalal, Shri Ral, Shroff and Matthai were present at the meeting.
99 
Srivastava opened the ... ung by congratulating the authors 'on the 
public eervice they had rendered in preeenting their plan' and hoped that 
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the discussion 'would bring the Govern111ent and the authors closer 
together in their efforts and assist the Government in formulating a 
comprehensive policy and plan for post-war development' .100 The 
Government side then put forward some points for clarification to the 
authors of the Bombay Plan. 
The first point, raised by Srivastava, was 'whether the Plan 
contemplated the '~Ontinuance of provincial autonomy [under the 1935 Act] 
or a revision of the Constitution in regard to the respective functions of 
the Centre and Province•. 101 This was obviously an effort to side-track 
the issue of National Government &A the prerequisite to planning. The 
authors of the Bombay Plan reiterated their stand on the necessity of a 
National Government and observed that such a government would have to be 
invested with 'adequate power of control and direction as regards economic 
matters both in the Provinces and in the States'. We may recall here 
that in 1935 the major opposition of the Congress and other political 
parties in India against the 1935 Act was related to the power that it 
102 devolved to the Princely Indian states in the proposed federal system, 
The authors of the Bombay Plan in a way echoed the 'unitarianism' of the 
Congress in their demand for a strong central authority in economic 
matters. The Government side conceded this point in principle. 103 
However, it was agreed by both the sides that the existing 'Government 
must initiate planning on the basis of the [prevalentj Constitution and 
with regard to its constitutional relations with Provinces and States•.104 
The authors stressed that the existing Government should immediately 
'declare their intentions and policy regarding post-war development over 
the whole field and in particular, the industrialisation of the country', 
initiate action for and modify the conditions and restrictions which stood 
in the way of 'developing key industries, arrange illlpOrts of machinery 
and plant, etc., mid the priorities required'. This, they thought, would 
be in conf orllity with the policy of • National Goverment which ehould be 
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instituted without delay. They aleo emphasised the importance of 'giving 
preference to Indian nationals in the matter of prospecting and mining 
licences and avoiding the intervention of foreign vested interests'. All 
these demands, by the leaders o' the Indian bourgeoisie, were obviously 
a part of their efforts to pre-empt the efforts that British and other 
foreign economic interests would make ira using India's sterling balance 
during the post-war period. By publishing the Bombay Plan they were 
trying to force the Government to make it commit itself regarding the 
direction of its post-war policies. The importance that was attached to 
this publication by various groups of people - Indian and otherwise-is 
evident in the fact that within three months since its publication, the 
Bombay Plan had two editions end two reprints. 105 
The meeting of April 1944 also revealed the attitude of the Indian 
bourgeoisie regarding the role of the state in the economy. The authors of 
the Bombay Plan stated that they contemplated three kinds of Government 
intervention in industry, viz~ Government control, Government ownership 
and Government management: 'The relation between the National Government 
and Industry should be in the direction of a large mt.Jsure of Government 
control, considerable Government ownership, in view of the large expendi-
ture of Government finances that would be involved, and a minimum of 
Government management•. 106 The authors did not want state awnership or 
Government management in those cases where 'private capital was forthcoming 
for an enterprise'. They thought that apart from the armament industry 
only public utilities and 'some units of baE\c industries might be 
Government-owned' 107 
In this view they were following the same argument as they had put 
forward in the N.P.C. deliberations on Government control of 'key' 
industries. It may be recalled that in the N.P.C. the initial idea was to 
have all 'key' industries nationalised. Shroff, Thakurdas and Walchanu 
Hirachand opposed this idea and aucceeded in whittling down the resolutions 
162 
108 regardiNJ this i.-... The leedera of the Indian bourgeoisie knew 
. . 
very clearly lillhat they wanted frm the state. The atate waa to exerciae 
control over inc:luatriea via-a-via distribution of induatriea - to Minimise 
regional disparity, undertake or aubaidiae non-1'ellM'terative enterprises 
ana build up public utilities and basic industries which, though eaaential 
for the general growth of industries, were characteristically non-
remunerative. Private enterprise waa to be given a free hand to chooae 
their own fields of operation. Hence not only the entire consumer goods 
industry but even 80lllt of the basic induatriea, in which private enterpriae 
might find it profitable to invest, waa to be kept free from state inter-
vention. 1t ia inter~ating to observe that people like Nehru and hie 
followers, in their effort to develop 'aocialiam' through econamic plnning, 
could agree to these typically capitalistic propoaala aa early aa 1938-39. 109 
In their effort to 11aintain freedom of private enterprise the authors 
of the Bombay Plan convinced the official aide in the meeting that 'it 
would not be possible or desirable to aet out in advance the industries 
or enterprises which should be owned by the Government•. 110 It was also 
agreed by both the aides that the question of the policy regarding state 
controls should be decided through the Reconstruction Policy Connittees, 
in association with the non-official experts, so that the Indian capital-
ists could exercise some control on Indian experts by influencing their 
selection. 
A decision on economic planning could not leave out agricultural 
issues from its purview. We found that in N.P.C. discussions.the question 
of agriculture had figured only as an afterthought when Sarabhai pointed 
out its omiaaion frOll the progr-.111 By contrast the Bonlbay Plan did 
discuss the prabl.,.. of Indian agriculture and auggeated.aa a way of 
BUg11enting of aoricultural productivity, incr ... ing the size of average . 
land holding and rndjuatment of the area under cultivation of different 
cropa. ·The c .... in aericulture, the Mtthor• ~. cauld be achieved 
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through co-operative raraing introduced, if necessary, even with 'some 
•aeure or C011pUlaion 1 • 112 The vagueness or this prescription wee pointed 
out by the Goverr.ent aide. Characteristically their criticism related 
to the technical aepecte or the problem of increasing agricultural 
productivity, They pointed out that to increase agricultural production 
by 130 per cent over fifteen years would require 'advanced agricultural 
reaearch and technique', The authors agreed that 'the question required 
further ex .. ination' and the 'prl.lblema of co-operative farming and 
consolidation or holdings would need further study and consideration' 113 
The inllbility of the leaders or industry to conceptualise or prescribe 
any concrete structural change of the land syat• is evident here. They 
talked about size of land-holding, rural indebtedness, low agricultural 
productivity, etc., but could not come to a firm decision even with regard 
to co-operative fal'tling that they prescribed ae a solution. Thia failure 
followed frOll the evolutionary approach to economic development adopted 
not only by the Indian bourgeoisie but by al11ast the entire nationalist 
leadership including Nehru. Whenever they talked of 'planr1ing', they 
thought only of industrialising the econOlly. As a reeult, the question 
of agriculture was dealt with in a perfunctory manner, sometimes as an 
afterthought, SOll8timea only as a 111atter of technology. (Aa far ao the 
Congress was concerned, even the most daring measure on its part - the 
U.P. Tenancy Act of 1938 - was not aimed at any basic change in the land 
ayatem.)! 14 The inability of the bourgeoisie to prescribe any radical 
change in the land system led th811 to suggest 'co-operative farming' ae 
a solution to the problems of agriculture. But since it wae obvious to 
thelt also that the prevalent land syst• wae itself the largest hurdle in 
illpleMnting even co-operative fal'tling, they v11CJU9ly suggested 'sme 
MUUre of CGllPUl•ian' without epelling out the •....,re'. 
Ttw ottwr •Jor point of diecwaion in the .. ung between the •thore 
of ttw a..IMay Pl• .,.. tM Glwer••nl official• wa the relatian bet....an 
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the state and the plaming authority. The Plan envieaged a National 
. 
Planning Ca.ittee under the central government in W.ich 'the various 
interests concerned' would be represented and to which the responsibility 
for drawing up plans would be dt!legated. The actual execution of the 
plane would be the function of a 'aupreme economic council working along-
side the national planning C0111111ittee under the authority of the central 
115 government'. The Goverrwent aide asked them Mhether the legislature 
was to be bound by the proposals of the Planning C01111ittee and alternatively, 
wt was to be the position of the Planning C011111ittee if the Cn1111ittee'a 
or the Council's advice was rejected. The officials thought this problem 
as peculiar to a parlia..ntary form of government. In a totalitarian 
state with a cnnatitution baaed on the principle of the aupremacy of a 
single party, the problem would not arise. 116 The authors did not 
consider the issue aa problematic. They explained that,· 'as the National 
Government would have the confidence of the people and be reaponaible to 
them and as the two bodies would be representative, there would be little 
room for divergence of opinion or a clash of viewa•. 117 As an aside it 
may be added here that -.en the Congress Government fo1'1118d its National 
Planning COllllliaaion a problem did arise on the question of its relation 
with the Government, and ironically it was John Matthai, the architect of 
the Bombay Plan, Mho accused the Planning Commission of acting aa a 
'parallel Cabinet' and made it one of the isauea for hia reaignat.ion from 
118 the poet of f'inance Minister in Nehru's Cabinet. 
The moat crucial debate in the meeting, however, concerned finance. 
The Government negotiators were of the opinion that the Plan involved 
heavy taxation mid depended too much on 'a heavy overdraft on the future'. 
Moreover, since the budget for the Plan waa eati•ted on the pre-war 
(1931-19) price level, the act .. 1 finance, they a~, would be .x:h .,re 
than the eetiMtad ficJm'e of ta.10,000 crone. tt.y auggaated thet •1n 
view of thia the 98Cia1 ldl11H of .-.Uonal and putalic hnlth -.1ap-
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mnt should be held back 'until the national income had been stepped up by 
. 
the expanaior,·of industry and other re111Unerative echellea'. The authors 
agreed that the Plan involved a heavy taxation, but hoped that it would 
not be difficult for a National Government which enjoyed popular support 
to raiae the necP-asary finance. They alao acknowledged that the taxation 
involved distribution problems and promised to state their views on the 
distribution aspect in a separate publication. By the end of the year 
they brought out a aecond book called Memorandl.m Outllnlng a Plan of 
Eeonard.c Dltvelopnent for Indla, Part II. 119 But by then there had been 
a number of publication& on planning in India from different quarters of 
the Indian society - !ncluding plan documents of the Government of India. 
The Bombay Plan had a 111Brked impact on the policy of planning of the 
Government of India during the perit1d. Moat of the literature about the 
Indian economic plans acknowledge a close correspondence between the 
Bombay Plan and the plan documents produced by the Government of India 
during the period 1944-47. 120 It will be our endeavour to show that while 
the Bombay Plan did influence the plan policies declared by the Government 
of India during 1944, there were some important differences in the 
attitudes of the two sides. Before we go into that aspect of the matter, 
it may be worthwhile to summarise the major aspects of the Bombay Plan. 
The Plan envisaged a National Government with a National Planning 
Coanittee and a Supreme Econo111ic Council as its planning organisationa. 
The objective was to bring about a hundred per cent increase of the 
existing per capita income over a period of fifteen years, by trebling 
the current aggregate national income to allow for the increase in 
population during the period. The planners estimated a five hundred per 
cent increase in it1duatrial output together with a one hundred and thirty 
per cent tncreue 1n agricultural production and a two hundred per cent 
increMe in U. eervice eector to brinQ about the deeired increue in per 
aepit• 1.-. ."'9· lnduatrtea ..,. divldld into tw principal categorin: 
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basic industries end coneumption goods induetrin. The 8111phaaie waa laid 
.. 
on the ilmllediete develOp119nt of basic industries and particularly of power 
and cepitel goods. And ae we diecueaed above, the question of the role of 
the state in bringing about the industrial developnent was on the minds 
of the planners, although they did not spell it out in any definitive 
lllBnner. 
Regarding agriculture the authors suggested co-operative farming as 
a solution to the probleta of fragmentation of land-holdings and other 
connected iaeuea. They however did not specify the measure of control 
that •ight be necenary for the state to exercise in order to increase 
agricultural production. 
Regarding finance the Plan envisaged the use of the acclA.llated 
sterling-balance of India together with hoarded wealth and savings in the 
country as the major initial rnourcee. It also contemplated the intro-
duction of a high dose of 'created money' to cloee the gap between the 
available financial resources and the estimated total expenditure of 
Rs.10,000 crores over the fifteen years of the proposed plan. 
SECTION la Some Other Plana 
The formation of Poat-War Reconstruction C011111111ittse of Council in 
1943 opened the floodgate of plan literature in India. Apart from the 
Bombay Plan a number of other major works on planning were published in 
1944 itself. At the 88fl8 time there appeared a number of books criticising 
and evaluating the different plan documents published during that year and 
after. 121 The Engineering Association of India, affiliated to the Indian 
Chamber of Comerce, eubllittlHf their representation to the Governnent of 
Indi• in a publication celled Post.- IncilstrJal Oew.lopmnt. 122 The 
following year Via¥e8¥811tY•• Mho ... the President of the All·lnd.i• 
Manufecturttn;• Awelatian, dnw '4> • pl1n for poet-war ncanetruction~2l 
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Theae two atatemnta added nothing new to what waa envisaged in the 
Bombay Pl., or the aubaequant Government plans. But the two major works 
which attracted the attention of the critiques 11aat were the People's Plan124 
and the Gandhimi Plan. 125 Both of theee represented ideological positions 
different frm those of the Congress, the Indian big buaine88 or the 
Governnent bureaucracy. 
The People's Plan waa the work of the Poat-War Reconstruction 
Committee set up in 1943 by the Indian federation of Labour (Ifl). 126 
lfl waa formd by a breakaway group frm the All India Trade Union 
Congress (AITUC) in 1941 under the leadership of M.N. Roy. Roy, an ex-
communiat, had formed hie own Radical f:iuRtaniat Party in 1941 with a number 
of hie followers in and outside the Indian National Congreaa. 127 The 
immediate iaaue, on which both the party and the lfl were formed, waa the 
attitude of the Congress and the communists towards the war. The Congress 
had decided to support the Government in ita war effort only on condition 
that India would be granted independence. The Communist Party of India 
was opposed to the war in 1941 and termed it aa an 'imperialist war'. 
By contrast, the Radical Humaniata and lfl under their leadership were for 
~ 128 
an all-out, unconditional support to the Government in its war effort. 
Although the Ifl was to merge itself with Hind Mazdoor Sabha in 1948, it 
had a large membership during the war and waa recognised by the Government 
aa a representative Trade Union body. 129 It had a close link with the 
Government in carrying out propaganda for war efforts and received an 
official aubaidy of Rs.13,000 per month. This earned it a bad name among 
the nationalists and the communists and resulted in its loaa of support 
within the trade union movement after the war. 130 
The People'• Plen fo1111.1lated by the lfl atllllll8d from a request frm 
the Goverraant of India to M.r •• Roy in 19'\:S 'to prepare a paper on labour 
and poet-war reoonetruction' •ich ... to be aulmitt.d to the Pacific 
a.1.u ... Confe1•-• 1l1 After Roy wrote thia paper, the lfl aet up • 
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ec..J.ttee in Oecellber 1943 to draw up a plan of economic development for 
. 
India. Thie plan, called the People's Plan, waa published in April 
132 1,... It differed eubetantially fra11 all the preceding literature on 
Indian planning in its ideological f'rallleWOrk. While 'planning' up to 
that period had been aynonyMOUB with rapid industrialisation under state 
auepices - consider any work starting f'rOlll Visveavaraya's down to the 
BOlllbay Plan - the Major elllphasie of the People's Plan lay on the develop-
•nt of agricultu:-e and coneumption goods induatriea. The plan envisaged, 
for British India, an increase in agricultural production by 400 per cent, 
with 600 per cent growth in industries, and aimed at the 'standard of 
living of the manes' by 300 per cent, 'exclusive of the services such as 
health, education and housing which would be provided for them' by the 
atate. 133 The total period of planning was set aa ten years with an 
estimated expenditure of Ra.lS,000 crores. The Plan left out the area 
under the Indian States frOIR ita purview due to lack of statistical 
information relating to it. 124 
Regarding agriculture the authors were of the view that the 'abolition 
of the antiquated land tenure system in the country aa well as the 
liquidation of usury [were] the essential preconditions for increasing 
the productivity of agriculture in a marvier calculated to benefit the 
cultivator', 1.35 They did not think it 'at all necessary that the feudal 
rights should be confiacated•. 136 But they thought it essential that 'the 
state should acquire theta tthe feudal rights] on the basis of payment of 
such compensation' aa would not involve 'any undue hardship to the parties 
concerned•. 137 They fixed the rate of C0111penaation at seven ti111es the 
net income of the 19ld under such right and suggested, as the fol'lll of pay-
ment of such CCllllpefW8tion, self-liquidating bands to be iaaued by the state 
138 for a period or 40 years at a three per cent rate of interest. 
The Proor- of land refont prncribed by the .,thDra borrwed 
heavily fraa .the Floud ea.i•ion Report of 1938 on BenQal.139 The 
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authors themselves acknowledged thie debt and suggested acceptance of 
. 
the recOIM9tldation of this report on an all-India basis.· Although the 
Floud CDlllftiaeion Report had been published in 1938 and was the first 
official acknowledge•nt of the need for abolition of the zamindari 
system to alleviate the condition of Indian agriculture and that of the 
cultivators, neither the N.P.C. nor the Bombay Plan, Part 1, seemed to 
have considered its recommendations in their discussion Of'l agricultural 
planning. The People's Plan also suggested a gradual collectivisation of 
land holdings in the form of state farms and co-operatives as a meausre 
to check fragmentation of landholdings and introduce modern technology in 
agriculture in order thereby to enhance production and distribute income 
equitably among the cultivators, 140 
Regarding industries, the Plan emphasised mainly the development of 
consumption goods industries. The heavy industries required for the 
development of the consumption goods industries were to be under state 
ownership. The capital goods necessary for the development of industries 
in general could be imported on the basis of the export of surplus 
agricultural production and by the use initially of the accumulated 
sterling balancea. 144 Private enterprise would be allowed to exist, but 
prices were to be fixed by the state and the rate of profit would be held 
at three per cent on investment by private capital. The state would 
however aubsidise such enterprises as might find it difficult to achieve 
a J per cent rate of profit. This, in the opinion of the authors, would 
142 be sufficient to induce private enterprise to run their business. The 
planners were against putting etllphasis on basic industries per se, as 
witneBB their view on the prevalent attitude towards the question: 
A variety of factors have produced such a great enthusiasm 
for induatrialisation that the distinction between planning 
for 111tre induatrialiaetion and pl&IV\ing for industrialisation 
for popular welfare ia forgotten. While the for9r can lay 
a diaproportionate 8'1phni• in the develapmnt of the buic 
J.nG'8trin, the latter -t ...,....eiae the prcd.lction of 
con•••..-. 
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The nphaais on conau111er goods industries thus emanated in this plan 
. 
fra11 its concern for popular welfare. It took the view that a combination 
of the develop111ent of agriculture and that of consumer goods industries, 
would not only increase the well-being of the people, but also create a 
self-sustaining economy. The Plan envisaged a state expenditure of only 
Rs.1,600 crores out of their total budget of Rs.15,000 crorea over the 
first three years. Thia, it was thought, would generate sufficient 
income in the economy to produce a surplus to carry out the rest of the 
Plan progr8111118, 144 
The ifllPOrtance of this plan was not in its highly ambitious targets 
and objectives. Its value derived from its critici• of the Bombay Plan 
and of the prevalent attitude of the Indian nationalists towards planning. 
The authors of the plan were of the view that the demand for s National 
Government by itself would not solve the problem of the poor in India 
'To talk of State control in the absence of control over the State' was 
meaningless. If state control was to be 'properly and effectively exercised 
with the object of attaining the aima outlined', the state would have to 
be a 'genuine democratic state•,145 Hence the plan conta\ned an 18-point 
list of Fundamental Principles on which the constitution of the new state 
was to be founded.146 This list reflected M.N. Roy's own 'programme' for 
the Congress in 1922, 147 but echoed at the same time the 1931 Karachi 
Resolution of the Congress. It differed from the latter in its emphasis 
on federaliBll and state ownership of all land. It also deviated from 
Roy's own programme of 1922 in that the concept of abolition of Standing 
Army and •arming the entire people to defend National Freedom' was left 
out of the 'Fundamental Principles' of 1944. 
The Bombay Plan and the nationalists in general were also criticised 
for their ellphuie on inc:luatrialiaation aa the panacea for the economic 
8nd 110Cial Ula of U. country. The People's Pl., pointed out that 
incra•nt in MtiGMl · !..- or in the purchuing power of the people 
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per se did not necessarily imply better economic conditions for the 
. 
people. The Bombay Plan, if executed, would only increase the power of 
the capitalists and concentrate wealth in fewer hands.148 Although the 
planners derived their impetus from the success of Bolshevik plans in 
Russia - and they distinguished between Russia and the Nazi Germany in 
this regard149 - they did not consider it necessary to develop heavy 
industries during the early years of planning. The major thrust of their 
plan was the upliftment of the poor by providing food, health, education 
and housing for them. 
The most interesting feature of the People's Plan was indeed its 
emphasis on agriculture and consumer goods industries. When almost the 
entire world talked of planning only in terms of industrialisation, M.N. 
Roy and his group put forward their alternative in terms of an increased 
production of the basic needs of the masses. The plan reminds one of 
Mao Tse-tung's On New Democracy written in January 1940.150 It is in that 
treatise that Mao first formulated an alternative to the Russian model of 
socialism in a 'semi-feudal, semi-colonial country•. 151 Of course Mao was 
emphatic on the need for' state confiscation of feudal rights in land 
while the People's Plan prescribed only acquiring of the feudal rights by 
the state with compensation paid to the feudal gentry. Still, the People's 
Plan was closer to the concept of 'New Democracy' than to the Russian plan 
strategies. One could argue here that the authors of the People's Plan 
had the instance of Gandhian alternative of village community life in 
India. But, while the Gandhian system was envisaged as a highly de-
centralised economy wjth cottage industries as the major manufacturing 
unita, 152 the People's Plan stressed the need of building up a huge 
organised manufacturing sector of consumer goods industry and prescribed 
the use of cottage industries aa 111erely a provisional end 'transitional' 
MUUre to be 8dapted, if nec .... ry, in view of the poaaibility of dearth 
of capital equtt-nt during the imediate poat-wr perioct. 15> 
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However, in spite of the effort of the authors to provide a 
.. 
'People's Plan' for the maaaea of Indian people and in establishing the 
ideological baaia of the plan within the tradition of Marxism, it is 
obvious from their own argument that the 'left' in India did not consider 
the plan in that light. 154 To the left, it was a case of 'putting the 
cart before the horse'. The various schemes in the plan, they argued, 
'were not worth the papers on which they were printed unless the people 
achieved their power to execute them'. In reply the authors of the 
People's Plan pointed out that, 'power after all was not an end in itself 
but simply a meana to an end', and people's power could be achieved only 
by mobilising the people on the basis of concrete economic and social 
programmes. The People's Plan was, according to them, just such an 
economic programme to enthuse the masses to struggle for a people's 
state. 155 But the communists and the socialists do not appear to have 
been attracted to this plan, nor did the bureaucracy and the nationalists, 
• with their cannon emphasis on 'industrialism', find its objectives 
acceptable. 
The enthusi8811 of all these planners of diFferent hues affected the 
communists also. The All India Trade Union Congress, which was largely 
under communist leadership, adopted a comprehensive resolution on social 
and economic planning at its twenty-first session held in Madras in 
January 1945. The resolution, while reiterating the general stand of tne 
'left' that complete planning could be achieved only under socialism, 
formulated a list of objectives to be pursued during the transitional 
stage. Thia included the establishment of heavy industry, modernisation 
of agriculture, adoption of minimum wags and social security legislation, 
reduction of hours of work, and provision of housing and other social 
services. The AlTUC also declared that even during the transitional 
period public enterprise end public control ""9Uld have to play a large 
part if the abndud of living of the peeple waa to be raised. It there-
173 
fore recOllllllended the nationalisation of key industries, mines and 
. 
quarriea and land as well as transport and communication, banking, 
finance and insurance, and the establishment of a system of profit control 
in respect of both commerce and industry, designed to safeguard the 
fundamental economic rights of the people. 
The prescription of the objectives of planning and the policies to 
be adopted by the state in the 'transitional stage to full-fledged 
socialism' as prescribed by the AITUC echoed the general stand of the 
'lefts' in India, including those in the National Planning Committee. 155 
The 'Gandhian Plan' was the other alternative to the contemporary bias 
in favour of 'industrialism'. S.N. Agarwal, an economist from Wardha and 
a staunch follower of Gandhi, brought out his book, The Gandhian Plan or 
Econan1c Devel~t for IndJa, towards the end of 1944. 157 This book 
hPd the approval of Gandhi himself as an interpretation of his own view 
on the subject. 158 He commended 'the treatise to the careful attention of 
every student of the .•• deplorable condition of the country•. 159 The 
foreword he wrote for it testified to the influence of the idea of planning 
on a person who had opposed it from its very inception within the 
nationalist circles. We may recall that Gandhi had opposed the formation 
of the N.P.C in 1938 and ridiculed Nehru's involvement in the effort. 160 
Agarwal's Gandhian Plan starts by criticising the preceding plan 
programmes as copies of western plans and suggests that an indigenous 
plan with its roots firm in the Indian soil' must be evolved. 161 Up to an 
extent its criticism was made in a similar vein to that in the People's 
Plan. Agarwal asserted that it was 'not enough to say that our aim is "to 
raise the standard of living" or "to create greater prosperity"'· 
Economic values could no longer be divorced from human and cultural values 
of life, for a •111an does not live by bread alone 1 • 162 Aa objects of 
planning, Agarwal cited Sun Yat-een's Three People's Principles of 
'nationali•, dellocracy and livelihood' u the beat principle• on which a 
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Plan should be formulated, 16j and went on to define these in terms of 
the Gandhian concepts of 'simplicity, decentralisation and cottage 
industrialism'. 164 
The first point - nationalism/simplicity - derived from the assumption 
that 'planning should be based on the indigenous culture and civilisa-
tion of the nation and should be in the hature of an organic growth; it 
should also promote the welfare and happiness of the whole nation and not 
merely of a small selected class o~· group'. The second principle -
democracy/decentralisation - was executed with Gandhian principles of non-
violence and 'economic planning, therefore, should necessitate the least 
amount of State control and coercion. That Government is best which 
governs the least•. 165 These principles could be adhered to only if 
'cottage industrialism' was adopted as .a means of livelihood for the non-· 
agricultural population. Only the latter could attain the true dignity 
and sanctity of manual labour. 166 
One can easily discern how very efficiently Agarwal worked out the 
Gandhian concept of village community life. The entire concept of 
bourgeois state formation is challenged by Gandhian philosophy. National-
ism means freedom to follow the indigenous tradition and culture. This 
culture, in the Gandhian view, abhors materialism and relates to a simple 
village-based livelihood based on agricultural and artisan production. 
'The problem of unemployment and therefore livelihood, can be satisfactorily 
solved' only when it is realised that 'the attainment of increased 
productivity with the help of efficient and labour-saving machines is not 
and should not be our [nation's] goal 1 • 167 All the plans, such as those 
in operation in Russia, Nazi Germany or America (New Deal), or those 
published in India, are criticised on the basis of these three Gandhian 
conc.epts of simplicity, decentralisation and cottage industrialism. The 
western notion of progress and development - both capitalist and socialist -
is rejected n being based on materialism. The Gandhian notion of progreaa, 
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on the other hand, is founded on moral and spiritual values. To 
Garidhi, 'industrialism connotes, the ceaseless pursuit of material wealth 
which inevitably undermines character and human values. Hence his 
uJicompromiaing and unbending opposition to its introduction in India•. 168 
As early as 1940 Gandhi had declared categorically his own views on 
planning: 
Hy views on economic planning differ from the prevailing 
ones. I do not want it along industrial lines. I want 
to prevent our villages from catching the infection of 
industrialism. 
Agarwal goes on to elaborate the Three Principles of Sun-Vat-Sen in the 
light of Gandhism. He asserts that 'village communism based on cottage 
industr lism is ••• not a Gandhian fad; it is sound and scientific from 
various angles of vision•. 170 As examples he cites views of Beveridge, 
Dubreuil and othe~s. 171 Above all, thv Chinese experience of industrial 
co-operatives is regarded as evidence of the viability of 'Village 
Communism' • 172 
The chief objective of the Gandhian plan was 'to raise the material 
as well as the cultural level of the Indian masses to a basic standard of 
life within a period of ten years•. 173 This basic standard for every 
individual included, among other things, a balanced diet of 2600 calories 
per day for every individual, 20 yards of cloth annually, and housing, 
recreation facilities, education, etc.~ 74 The total per capita annual 
expenditure to achieve the objectives was calculated to be Rs.72 in terms 
of pre-war pric•s. The average annual income in rural areas was Rs.18. 
The rural population of India was estimated as 90 per cent of the total 
population. So it was the aim of the plan 'to quadruple the per capita 
income of at least 90 per cent of the Indian population•!75 It 
envisaged a total non-recurring expenditure of Rs.J,500 crores over ten 
years. As sources of income it estimated that Rs.2,400 crorer could come 
from internal borrowing, and taxation would yield another Rs.500 crores. 
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The balance of Re.1,000 crorea would have to be in the fort1 of 'created 
. 
1110ney 1 by the state. 
Although the Plan was one of 'Village C011111Uni•', the need for 
basic industries waa not forgotten. The basic or key industries, where 
production would have to be on large-acale of necessity, were to be brought 
under state-ownership in a ~radual 1111n11er. Industries like defence, 
power, mining, •tallurgy, machinery, heavy engineering and heavy chetnicals 
came under thia heading. But the 'large-scale industries were to be 
decentralised to the 111axi11U111 poaaible extent', and state ownership and 
111&nege111ent of the key induatri~a had t~ be 'the corner-atone of the Plan•. 
for the period of transition from private O\lft18rship to state ownership 
the Plan for11Ulated a general policy .tlich included state control over 
the price of goods, profit• and labour conditions in the privately owned 
industries, checking further expansion of private enterpriaa and gradual 
purchase of all foreign business ef•t.orprieea and large-scale indigenous 
private key enterprises, and regulating c011P9tition between cottage and 
large-scale industries. Large-acale conaumers' goods ~ndustriea like 
textile, oil, sugar, paper and rice mills were to be allowed to continue 
but only under •strict discipline and control of the state'. All the 
176 public utilities would also be under state control. The plan viewed 
agriculture dnd induaLry aa completnentary to each other. 'lo regard 
industry and agriculture as ••• water-tight compartments, and then try to 
estat>lish o "balanced economy" by fixing their respective percentages' 
waa a folly. Except for the large-scale key industries, 'the aim of 
economic planning should be to integrate agriculture and industry by 
running theta tOC]dther, aide by aide, ao that there are workshops and 
cottage factories adjoining the fielcta•. 177 Thia 'inteqration of labour' 
would not onb be conducive to the phyaical health of the nation, but 
would elao tatablilh '•really bal81'K'9d and .Ml..-e nation11l econa111y•. 
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The Pl., envieaged total nationalisation of all land and introduction 
of Village Tenure. Both the zmndad mid ryotwr1 eyeteM were to be 
aboliehad, anrt a mouzawar1 eettlement or 'village tenure eyatett', 'in 
.tlich the "'°la village C01111Unity ie collactivoly reaponeible to the 
State for payment of the total revenue' waa to be eatablished. 178 But 
the proceea of nationalisation would have to be gradual. In SOiie cases 
e 'reaaonable cmpenaation' 111ight be paid to the title-holders but the 
lmid acquired through ueury and by taking advantagti of 'defective laws' 
.iould not deserve .,Y compenaation. The 11&jor means of nationalisation 
of land, however, would be levying of heavy inheritance taxes or death 
duties - not leaa than 50 per cent of the capital value of the land in 
question. 'In this ll8f'lner, private property in land ••• [WO\Jld] aut011&ti-
cally be ended in about two generatione•. 179 Regarding rural indebted-
ness the Plan suggested some 'drastic and comprehensive' 111easures. Any 
debt of more than 10 years' standing, on which interest had been paid 
regularly, would be 'deellled to haf\te been fully discharged'. All 'bogus 
and injuat [sic] debts' would be cancelJJd by the state after ~rutiny 
and villagers would be helped by the government to liquidate their debts 
conveniently in 20 instalments. Private moneylending would be prohibited 
and only Village Panchayats, Co-operative Credit ~ocietiee or Land 
Mortgage Banks allowed to engage in this business. To increase productivity 
of land, the Plan recommended the use of natural manures instead of chemical 
fertilizers and the improvement of cattle and other draught animals 
180 instead of mechanisation of agriculture. 
The Plan assumed that most of the consumption goods would be produced 
in the cottage industries. State aid would be in the form of cheap credit 
facilities, technical education and research facilities, assisting 
collP.Ctive purchase and .. rketing, protection from competition with large-
eca.le industries, grant of aubsidiee to cottag• industries by taxing the 
llills, canceeeian in railway or atewr freights for hand-made producta, etc.J81 
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lhe distribution npect wee easily solved. 'With locali .. tion or 
regionali .. tion of production and con9U111Ption, the probl• of distribution 
would be greatly •i111Plified 1 • 182 It would be a self-adjusting, 
auta1111tic and equitable eyst .. of distribution brought about by the aystet11 
of decentralised cottage induatriea, and 'state CMnerahip of all the ba~ic 
industries and public utilitiee'. The rentier claas in such a ayatet11 
would have scarcely any place. The economic ills relating to intereat 
and profit• would also largely disappear, reaulting in a 'leaaer 
diaparity of incOllea'. 183 
It is evident from the diacuuion on the People's Plan and the 
Gandhian Plan that both these auggeated framworka which were directly 
oppoaed to the then established ideaa of planning propagated by both the 
nationaliata, aa well aa the colonialiata. Morenver, there waa a certain 
similarity in their preacriptiona. Both emphasised the upliftmen of the 
agricultural poor. Both atreaaed the development of consumption goods 
industriea and nationalisation of land, and decried the 'industrialiam' 
of all thP other plan progr.,..a. The major difference between the two 
plans lay in their attitude towarda the role of the state. While the 
People's Plan envisaged dir~'Ct participation of the state in the form of 
collectivisation of agricultural farms, the Gandhian Plan was drawn up 
under the dictum that, 'That government is beat which governs least'. 
SECTION 4: Reconstruction Planning, 1943-44 
It is evident from our discussion in the last chapter that there was 
no significant ideological difference in the outlooks of the N.P.C. and 
the leading Indian industrialists who produced the Bombay Plan. Together 
they stood for a set of ideas very different frOll that of the People's Plan 
and the GMCl'tian Plan on the question of wthod of de\felopMmt. While the 
N.P c. ar.ol the 8allbay Plan 8111Pha•iaed 'industrial!•', the People's Plan 
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.-ad the Gancl\ian Plan considered it MDre important to develop consumption 
. 
goods including agricultural goods. However, on the question of the 
role of the state the N.P.C. Ind the Bollbay Plan held different views. 
To be MDre precise, people like Nehru, K.T 9'flh and other non-industrialist 
members of the N.P.C. held opinions different from those of India's big 
induatrialiala. While the former laid stress on the need of nationalising 
all the 'key' industries, the latter were happy simply to have the state 
participating in the progr811118 of' 'induatrialiSll' to develop private enter-
prise. Both advocated a '•ixed econo11Y' with the private and the public 
sectors rurining on parallel line• and compleMnting each other. The 
difference waa ulti .. tely one of' the degree of' state control in the 
economy. The People's Plan and the Gandhian Plan also advocated total 
nationalisation of' all 'key' industries but differed in their view on the 
general role of' the state in other aspects of' the society. While the 
Gandhian Plan approached the question of the role of the state negatively 
in the sense of reducing the eleMnt of state participation to the very 
minimum and upholding self-sufficient clecw11traliaed village systems as 
the principal objective of planning, the People's Plan wanted a strong 
central authority to control all economic activities. 
We can now consider the bureaucratic plan efforts against the ideo-
logical backdrop described above. The Reconstruction Committee of Council 
published two reports in 1944-45 on the progress of reconstruction 
planning. The first of these was published on 1 March 1944 - soon after 
the publication of the Bolllbay Plan. 184 We have already shown how the 
publication of the Bomhay Plan created a sense of •Jrgency in the official 
circle to produce its own plan. 
The First Report deacribed the progress made by the Reconstruction 
Committee of Council at the Centre up to 1 February 1944 and indicated 
the probl .. which the variaue Policy Comitteea wre considering at the 
ti• or would a.veto con9i*r at .-e later atage.185 Ap.art f~ a 
180 
diacunion on the backgt'Olftt and need for planning the Report contained 
eectione dealing with re-settlement and re-9111Ployt119nt of ex-servicemen 
and other personnel, diapoaala, contracts and government purchases, 
transport and con.unication, public works and electric power, trade and 
industrial policy, agricultural, forestry and fisheries and social 
services. for our purpose diecusaion 111ay be confined mainly to the 
sections dealing with Trade and Industrial Policy, and Agriculture. 
The first section, dealing with the background, however, is an 
eaaential part for an understanding of the context of these rene.ed 
bureaucratic efforts. We have referred already to American pressure on 
Britain regarding the need for a political aolution in lndia. 186 It 
appears that the Anglo-American treaties during the early 'forties, e.g. 
the Atlantic Charter - Rooaevelt-Chur.ilill 8-point declaration of August 
1941, the Mutual Aid Agreement of February 1942 and other United Nations 
programmes also had important bearings on the plan efforts by the 
Government of India. 
In 1942, soon after the Mutual Aid Agreement was signed bilaterally 
between U.S.A. and moat of its allies, Theodore Gregory, the economic 
adviser to the Viceroy1 pointed out to the RCC the implications of Article 
7 of this Agreement taken together with the fourth point of the Atlantic 
Charter. 187 He was of the view that if India did not associate herself 
with the Atlantic Charter, it might result in less favourable terms for 
India in the sphere of international trade, 188 He elaborated on the issue 
in a memorandum and suggested that if India did not accept the principles 
underlying Clause 7 of the Lease and Lend Agreement {Mutual Aid Agreement 
between the U.K. and the U.S.A.), 'there was a possibility of India's 
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export trade being severely cut into'. 
The Indian tlellbera in the Policy COIMtittee No. 4 - particularly the 
representatives of rICCl - were worried abput theaa international develop-
11enta. They feared that the citation of the Atlantic Charter and Article 1 
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of the Mutual Aid Agreement by Gregory in his 11et110randum might have been 
to ·illply ttlat India's prevalent fiscal policy needed alteration and the 
current revenue tariffs should be lllOdified. The Indian industrialists 
•re of the opinion that .tlile it was not in the interest of the country 
to r8118in isolated from international ugreements, she should first ensure, 
before undertaking to reduce her own tariffs, that the U.S.A. was prepared 
to reduce her own tariff walls in significant measures. 190 
Soon after the Anglo-American treaty was signed, the FICCI lodged 
ita protest to the Government of India for not informing the Indian people 
about the details of the Agreement and its implications for the Indian 
economy. 191 The 111ajor criticism was that since the Government of India 
was constitutionally reaponaible to the Government of the U.K. as a part 
of the Empire, the incidence of burtlen on the British economy arising 
from the Lene-lend agreement might be shifted to India. rICCI feared 
that the Agreement, taken together with the clauses in the Atlantic 
Charter, could force India to open its economy to the mercy of the 
industrialised nations, viz. the U.S.A. and the U.K.,, and compel it to 
export its raw materials to these nations to repay the war-debts imposed 
upon it. They pointed out that it was 'from no political or military 
consideration of "autarkie' that the demand for national self-sufficiency 
in India ••• [arose] but it ••• [was] from the vital consideration of 
maintenance of a balanced national economy by utilising the enormous 
new materials of the country within itself •••• Industrialisation ••• was 
a vital instrument of India's fiscal and economic policy•,192 and it should 
be made clear by the Government to the U.K. that 'in no case would such 
policy be permitted to·be fettered by c011111itmenta made by H.M.'s 
Government aa qu1d pro quo for Lease-Lend aid obtained by Britain•. 193 
The Marie•~ 'Technical Mission' to India in 1942 also worried the 
Indian induatrialiata. flCCI aaked the 'Indian public mid the ccmiercial 
COllU'lity to be vigilant and to see that the long-tel'll economic intereata 
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of [the] country were in no way adversely affected, as a result of the 
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working of the Mission'. Both Johiulon, personal envoy of the President 
of the U.S.A. and Grady. ChairMn of tM Minion, tried to assure the 
industrialists that their aim was only 'all-out war production for winning 
the war in order that war •ight be ended sooner' and they were in India 
to offer their euggostiona and co-operation for converting its potential 
econo11ic capacity into actual capacity. flCCI emphasised that American 
help would be welcome only 'in the form of plant and equipment for the 
eatabliel'lllmt and expansion, on Indian eoil and under Indian control, of 
industries vital for the defence of lndia•. 195 The fear of 'ulterior 
objects and llOtives of the visit of the Mission' and the fear that 'new 
and powerful American vested interests llight be created in India taking 
advantage of war exigencies and increase American influence in Indian 
economy' lingered for long with the Indian industrialists •196 They 
suspected that America was launching on a new era of 'dollar diplomacy' 
reminiscent of its activities during the first World War. 197 
Although on a number of occasions the Indian industrialists made 
clear to the Government of India their dislike of the clauses of the 
Atlantic Charter and the Mutual Aid Agreement which had bearing on India's 
trade policy, the First Report on the progress of RCC emphasised the 
importance of the international developments during the war and particu-
larly of the Anglo-American treaties vis-a-vis India. It pointed out that 
'indian conditions must t~ a large extent depend on factors governing not 
India alone but the world as a whole•. 198 India would have to review her 
pre-war policies and adopt bro~d lines of policy for the future development 
of the economy against this international bac~ground. But the war had 
also 'created conditions Pf#CUliarly favourable' for economic and aocial 
development. Jhe enormous increase in the volume of economic activity 
., 
al)d 911Plo)'lll80t, stronger financial position of India - in spite of the 
inflationary price aituation caused by war-title expansion of big industries, 
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adoption of new techniques of production, high prices of agricultural 
products resulting in 'greatly increased nioney income of the cultivator' 
and above all 'an effective fl&Chinery of governmental controls' evolved 
during the first four years of the war lfhich was 'capable of being used 
for the permanent good of the country' were the positive aspects of the 
wartime situation in India. All these, in the opinion of the RCC, made 
it possible for the Governir.ent to venture into 'Reconstruction Planning•. 199 
Although the need for planning was recognised by the Government of 
India as early as 1941, the first report of March 1944 clearly confessed 
that no real progress had been made in that direction up to that time. 
The Government was still busy taking preliminary administrative steps in 
organising the machinery for planning. The only concrete decision taken 
was 'to appoint Development Officers responsible to the appropriate 
Department of the Central Government for the preparation of an all-India 
plan as a basis for discussion by the appropriate Con111ittee concerned 1 • 200 
The First Report also bears testimony to the fact that whenever the 
idea of planning was discussed and at whatever level, the absence of 
statistical information was considered to be the foremost obstacle to 
planning. 201 However, unlike on earlier occasions, the Government this 
time took certain immediate steps to meet this contingency. It was now 
'anxious without any further delay to collect the required data in order 
to obtain a correct picture' of the economy and •to determine future 
lines of development•. 202 
On ~he subject of industrial planning, the Industries and Civil 
Supply Department of the Government of India prepared and sent out a 
questionnaire by the end of Novenber 1943 addressed to all industrial 
and commercial associations in India and also to the Provincial and State 
Governnents. It asked for 'factual inforation regarding India's post-
war requir8111eflt of plant and 1M1Chinery, the possibilities of fabricating 
it within India itself, the approximate estimatPs of internal and external 
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demands, dislocation likely to be caused during the transition period 
froin wartime conditions to normal peacetime conditions, etc.'. It also 
sought the views of industrialists and the cOllll8rcial community in India 
on the 'various aepecta of future development and the lines of policy to 
be adoptett•. 203 The Government, while waiting for the replies to the 
questionnaire, appointed a special officer in the Supply Department to 
collect information already available with the various departments of the 
Government of India and •to put it in a form similar to that to be obtained 
from the questionnaire'. It was decided that all this information, when 
available, would be collated by the Industrial Adviser attached to the 
Department of Industries and Civil Supplies and an advisory panel of 
industrialists would be set up to help the Adviser in analysing this 
information. Once this work was cQ111Pleted the Policy Com11ittee No. 4, 
which was concerned with trade and industrial matters, could formulate 
the specific guidelines with regard to industrial development based on 
concrete statiatics. 204 
Yet another iq>ortant decision on industries was that related to the 
acquisition of capital goods from overseas. It was apprehended that 
unless orders were placed early and under a scheme of priorities sponsored 
by the Government, 'it would be almost impossible to secure the required 
capital goods within a reasonable period after the end of the war'. A 
Presa Note was issued asking industries to furnish information about their 
projected requirements of capital goods as soon as possible. The Govern-
ment could then decide what kind of. machinery might be fabricated within 
India and what system of priorities adopted for placing orders abroad. 205 
It was however readily agreed that in view of the crucial importance of 
electric power for any future economic development, priorities should be 
"' given for the capital gc)oda necessary in the electric power industry as 
. 206 
'a key to industrial developnent in India'. 
18S 
On agricultural conditions the Government wee aupplied with adequate 
information by the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research and other 
such bodies which had already been set up. Moreover, William Burns, the 
Agricultural COIMU.ssioner, compiled a review especially intended to 
serve as the basis for reconstruction planning. 207 The Burns Report 
pointed out that the agricultural policy for a country of the size of 
India would have nunerous facets and would concern itself with and react 
on practically all phases of the life of the people. It would need to 
consider pricing, crop planning, •rketing, c011111U1ication, finance, etc. 
Any plan for agricultural development would also have to consider 
'questions bearing on the refol'tl of tenancy laws, organisation of village 
agencies such as Panchayats, Co-operative Societies, etc., problems of 
manpower relation to the needs of general and technical administration 
of the plans•. 208 
In the field of trade policy the report reiterated the importance of 
the international pacts among the allied nations in general and between 
the U.S.A. and the U.K. in particular. It was decided that India could 
not follow an isolationist policy and must accept the pri~les ent>odied 
in the Atlantic Charter, Mutual Aid Agreement and other such pacts, but 
do so 'subject to the reservations that a) she should retain her fiscal 
autonomy; b) she should be free to pursue a protectionist policy to foster 
industrial development if she felt it desirable to do so; and c) the main 
object of her poet-war Commercial policy should be the industrial expansion 
of the country and this should not be hampered by any international 
agreements which India might join•. 20~ Thus the RCC conceded the demand 
of the Indian business interests (who were amply represented in the policy 
cOMitte) that the international agreements between the U.S.A. and the U.K. 
111Ust not be imposed on India without ensuring her freedom to deter•ine her 
own course in the future. On.110netery policy the Colllittee decided to 
wait until the end of the war to deter11ine India's position via-a-via the 
internationally illportant currencies. 
186 
Thue the work of the RCC waa atill at the preparatory stage of 
.. 
formulating the general principles and policies of plaming. Although 
some short-term 11eaaurea regarding re-settlement and re-employment of 
military personnel and regarding dispoaala, contracts, and Government 
purchases and transport and communications, etc. were suggested by the 
RCC in ita First Report, there was no comprehensive assessment or 
preacription aa yet regarding economic planning as such. While the 
Bombay Plan and the People's Plan - both of which were published before 
the First Report of the RCC was out - discussed the aims and targets of 
a plan in terms of food, clothing and housing to increase the 'standard 
of living or the Meses' and fixed the financial esti•tes of a plan, the 
bureaucratic effort was worked out in a different way. The Department of 
the Government were asked to prepare plane for the main issues of their 
concern subject to the assumption that finance would have to be dealt with 
later. The idea was to collatr:. and 'fit together' all the departmental 
plans, once they were ready, on a 'realistic basis•. 210 As a result, the 
RCC did not have any blueprint df aims and targets when the First Report 
was published. The only achievements of the Government of India up to 
that point were an Education Plan by J •. P. Sergent, 211 and the Chief 
Engineer's Repo~t on Road Development. 212 
The publication of the first Report -was t.hus only an attempt to 
convince Indians that the Government was seriously working on planning 
for the economic development of the country. Indeed, Wavell, the Viceroy ,, 
in a letter to Allery, the Secretary of State in the India Office, 
expressed this purpose quite clearly, although Wavell himself found the 
publication to be a 'dull document' which, he thought, would not be 'much 
read outside the departmenta•. 215 Allery agreed with Wavell 'about getting 
the general public in India interested in the Government's reconstruction 
plane, and having those plane presented to the public in a readable form', 
..s uid that he did not see *why Birl• or Roy or anybody else should draw 
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up a llDre entertaining and interesting picture of India's future than 
the. Government itaelf•. 214 
That the RCC did not have much to report on the progress of planning 
up to February 1944 is also evident from the records of the proceedings 
of the Committe itself. For instance, one of the most important c01M1ittee 
on planning - Committee No. 4, instituted initially as the Reconstruction 
Committee on Trade, International Tr&de and Agricultural Policy under 
the Commerce Department,215 met only twice between May 1942 and March 
1943. In its first meeting the Committee discussed its terms of reference 
and the problem of the introduction and future reimbursement of the Excess 
Profit Tax on Indian business, and in the second meet.ing - the implications 
of the international pacts among the Allies on Indian economy. 216 By the 
time the third meeting of C01M1ittee No. 4 was held, in October 
1943, it came to be reconstituted as Policy Committee No. 4 (Trade and 
Industrial Policy) under the Reconstruction Committee of Council. This 
third meeting - the last one before the publication of the First Report 
in March 1944, was devoted to the preparation of the questionnaire 
mentioned above and to a discussion of Indian trade policy of the post-
war period, the result of which was incorporated in the Report. 217 
The bureaucratic effort at planning thus continued to 'progress' in 
its own snail-pace. Wavell, who replaced Lir.lithgow as Viceroy in October 
1943, was, however, anxious to produce some results. Unlike Linlithgow, 
Wavell did not hesitate to consult Indian leaders. He also discussed the 
matter with Birla who reconnended among other things, the appointment of 
a Member for Reconstruction. 218 Wavell accepted the idea and soon sought 
permission from the India Off ice to create a new department for planning 
and development under a special Member to be appointed. 219 Amery agreed 
and suggested the n8llle of Mirza I8118il who was then involved in a bureau-
220 
cratic capacity in.the development activities of the State of Mysore. 
But the Viceroy tmcided an Ardnhir Dalal - a retired 1.c.s. officer, 
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then a director of Tataa, and one of the authors of the Bombay Plan - for 
the"post221 and obtained Tate's consent to release him from the director-
ahip.222 
The choice of Dalal was obviously influenced by the Government's 
attitude towards the Indian indus~rialists. Amery had written to Wavell 
that whoever was appointed would have to 'show India that his conceptions 
[were) as bold and his methods more practical than those of the Birla 
scheme [Bombay Plan)'. He had added that he was not recommending 
'crabbing' the Bombay Plan 'on the contrary, [he was) all for welcoming it 
in general terms and making theae big industrialists feel that the 
Government of India [was) both more capable and more willing to help on 
the industrialisation and development of India than Congress could ever 
be with its fixed obsession about immediate and unqualified political 
power'. 223 
The appointment of a Member for Planning and Development was thus 
not only an administrative necessity to the Government but was also part 
.. 
of the political move on its part to wean away the Indian industrialists 
from the Congress fold. Among all the plans published up to that period 
it was the Bombay Plan which had caught the eye of the administration. 
The importance attached to it was not entirely due to its content. Wavell 
gleefully mentioned to Amery in a paper on the Bombay Plan that Gregory, the 
Economic adviselJ had exposed its hollowness and worked up to the conclusion 
that it was 'not really a plan at all, but only a statewqnt of aims 
supported by & number of arguments none of which would hold water•. 224 
So, for the Government the importance of the Bombay Plan lay primarily 
in the fact that it was the outcome of a concerted effort by India's big 
industrialists. It was the political animosity of the Government towards 
the Congress and its effort to dissociate the powerful group of Indian 
induatrialiata fr. the Cangreea that determined its response to the Bombay 
Plan. The choice of Oelal was a significant tactical triumph for Wavell 
189 
in this respect. ror it ensured that with one of' the authors of the 
Boni:>ay Plan heading the Planning and Development Dep~rtment and with all 
the others included in one or the other of the Policy Committees under 
that Department, the Viceroy could claim to have rallied the entire group 
of' leading industrialists of' the country to the cause of bureaucratic 
planning. The demand stated in the Bombay Plan for a National Government 
as a precondition to successful planning ~ould only sound hollow once 
the authors joined in Goverrnental plan efforts. This is not to say that 
the Indian industrialists stopped their bick'ring over the role of the 
Government in the economic activity of the nation, but the relations between 
them and the Government was 111Uch more cordial than it had been in the 
preceding years. Unlike, say, Willingdon, who had found Birla a 'basically 
non-cooperating fellow, motivated by selfish interests•, 225 Wavell 
regarded him as 'worth talking to', and when Queen Mary wanted to have 
lunch with one of' the visiting industrialists from India, Wavell strongly 
r~commended Birla's name to Amery. 226 
Although Dalal's appointment was finally decided upon by May 1944, 
he did not take over his charge until August that year. 227 Meanwhile the 
Government set up the new Department of Planning and Development in June 
1944. 228 All the policy committees of the Reconstruction Committee of 
Council now came under the charge of this new Department. Apart from 
this administrative reorganisation the Government also took certain steps 
to speed up its activities regarding planning. 
In May 1944 the tentre wrote to the provinces to J .. pare their own 
provincial plans. 229 Assurance was given that finance would not be a 
problem once the plans were approved by the Centre. The CKirnbay Government 
had already prepared a draft plan for the provii'~P. and this was circulated 
230 by the Centre aa a llOdel to be followtsd by all the other provinces. 
Thia was a. five-year plan with an esti•ted expenditure of Rs.60 crorea. 
It 1HWiaaged an expenditure of Ra.l9 crorea (nearly two-thirde of the 
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tolJl) on industrialisation and of Rs.10.36 crores on agriculture over 
th~ five years. The interesting aspect of the plan was its adoption of 
four different types of project: special priority projects for the 
truining of personnel for the administration of develo~nent projects; 
all-province projects which would extend to ~11 the districts and would 
be designed to prepare the way to more intensive developments subsequent-
ly; particlllar area projects, such as irrigation and anti-malaria projects • 
stiitable only for certain regions; and concentrated area projects for a 
concerted drive for nn all-rrn~evelopment of selected areas in various 
parts of the province. 231 
Of these four types of projects, the first, viz., the special 
priority projects, was considered to be very important by the Centre 
also. The Government considered the lack of trained personnel as a second 
major obstRcle to successful planning - second only to the lack of 
statistics. In August 1944 the India Office was attracted to a proposal 
by Bevin to train Indian technical personnel in Britain as a measure to 
232 foster economic development. 
Although the earlier Cripps-Bevin scheme for economic and social 
policy in India was scoffed at and buried silently by the India Office 
and the Viceroy, Bevin had continued to take an interest in the activities 
of the Government of India regarding planning. 233 In August 1944 he 
• 
suggested to the Indian High Commissioner to the U.K. to arrange to send 
trainees from India to Britain to attend a training centre in Britain. 
Inaugurated by him as the Minister for Labour and National Service, it 
was to offer training for mechanisation of coal mines. This, he thought, 
would give an opportunity to the Government of India to augment its 
234 
resources of technical personnel. This initial proposal was developed 
into a more general scheme - popularly known in official circles as the 
'Bevin Boys' Scheme' - of sending groups of Indian technical personnel to 
England for further training. 235 The scheme was soon considered a success 
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by the Government of India and Wavell wanted to have it extended to 
include 'technical personnel of the officer class•. 236 By the end of 
1945 more than seven hundred Indians underwent such training under the 
scheme and Wavell was proud that even after the cessation of war, when 
there was a general situation of retrenchment and unemployment, only 28 
per cent of the Bevin Boys remained unemployed. Even this percentage of 
unemployment would have vanished, in Wavell's opinion, if the Bevin Boys 
were ready to accept wages less' than they would have been offered during 
239 the war. 
The other major steps taken by the Government of India in 1944, apart 
from asking the Provinces to prepare plans and taking up the Bevin Boys 
scheme, were the appointment of an Industrial-Adviser, with a suitable 
staff to direct the planning of industrial development, and the publication 
of a Second Report on the Progress of Reconstruction Planning. 
J. Vesugar, who was appointed as the Industrial Adviser to the 
Government of India, took up the task of preparing a note on the 'problems 
involved in the Industrialisation of India' and submitted his memorandum 
to the newly constituted Department of Planning and Development in August 
1944. 238 Vesugar made it clear that although the production, supply and 
distribution of goods and the development of industries was a provincial 
responsibility under the 1935 Act, the Centre had sufficient power under 
the federal law of this Act to implement a plan of industrialisation 
'which would include those industries the establishment and regulation of 
h f . d . t I 239 w ich were o nation-w1 e impor ance . He enumerated twenty-two 
industries which included all the major industries - both of capital goods 
and consumption goods and which could be legitimately declared expedient 
in the public interest and brought under the responsibility of the Centre. 
To the possible criticism that his list embraced 'the whole range of 
industrial activities' his contention was that political thought regarding 
the functions of the state in national development had undergone a sea-
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change during the war and it was now acknowledged by all the countries 
of the world that the state should act 'not only as an originating 
instrument but also as executor, co-ordinator and distributor' •240 
Regarding the relative place of state and private enterprise in industrial 
development he suggested that in all the national industries he listed; 
the state should undertake to subscribe to 51 per cent or less of the 
total ca~ital in order to keep control over them and let the private 
enterprise run the r.oncerns under state supervision. In general, the 
state should finance entirely or in part those industries in respect of 
which private capital was likely to be shy and ·~he key industries should 
be owned by the state and managed either directly or otherwise. 241 In 
essence, his suggestion did not differ much from that of the Bombay Plan 
in this connection. 
Vesugar's suggestion about the 'machinery for planning' was that the 
Centre should be required to institute at least three permanent organi-
sations, viz., Supreme Council of National Economy, permanent Tariff 
Commission and permanent Indian Technical Missions to the U.K. and U.S.A •• 
The first of these would be necessary to the state for performing its 
role in planning, while the other two were needed to control and supervise 
242 imports and exports for a rapid economic developn.·nt. As an incentive 
to private enterprise, Vesugar suggested a liberal degree of amortisation 
of the capital values of the industries connected with war production to 
11 t t . th t h d h. t t. d t. 
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a ow hem o change w1 ou ar s ip o peace- ime pro uc ion. In 
the interests of industrial expansion he assigned 'super-priority' to the 
capital-goods sector. The export goods production was to be given the 
second priority in order to meet the demand for foreign exchange necessary 
initially to expand the country's industrial production base. Consumer 
goods industries were not to be neglected, but these could be taken up on 
a priority basis only when the first two categories were developed 
sufficiently. But consumption would have to be stimulated from the very 
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beginning to develop certain forms of production. The broad policy 
would be, 'expansionist based on a planned economy of consumption'. The 
problem of employment of the surplus agricultural population could be 
solved by expanding rural and cottage industries through a wide distri-
bution of low-capital and high labour-intensive technology in the 
t 'd 244 coun rys1 e. AnoLher important suggestion of his was to institute 
a number of commissions of enquiry to look into problems connected with 
technical personnel, mineral survey, coal and railway industries. 245 
Vesugar also recommended that instead of depending on the quinquennial 
censuses, the Government should set up a 'scientific department' to 
monitor continuously the economic situation through sample surveys and 
statistical analysis. 246 
The Government of India appeared to have accepted the general ideas 
contained in the memorandum submitted by the Industrial Adviser. However, 
the suggestion of instituting a Supreme Council of National Economy was 
247 
not acceptable to the bureaucr~cy. Vesugar's proposal in this respect 
was somewhat on Soviet lines which would have under its purview all 
matters of public economy whether connected with commerce, agriculture, 
finance, transport or industry. 248 This 'super-organisation', the 
bureaucracy thought, would be incompatible with a parliamentary system. 
Before we conclude our study of the work of the Reconstruction 
Com~ittee of Council, it would be fitting to discuss the Second Rep~rt on 
f R t t . Pl . 249 the progress o econs rue ion ann1ng. This report laid down the 
'g~neral prin=iples' of Reconstruction Planning and summarised the 
dPvelopment policies adopted by the Government 'in respect of certain main 
subjects•. 250 In it the RCC expected a start to be made on developm~nt 
work under a planned programme in early 1946. They proposed a period of 
15 years for the long-term planning, although in some subjects the period 
might be different: the 'Sergent's Plan' for education, for example, was 
a 40-year plan; the plan for roads and road transport had a span of 10 
I ~ 
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years. It was decided to break the period of 15 years in three 
251 
successive short-term 5-year plans. The Government estimated that 
Rs.1,000 crores (10,000 millions) would be available for the first five-
year period taking effet from 1947-48 and ending in 1951-52. Half of 
this amount would come from revenue surpluses while the rest would be 
raised by the Centre and the Provinces through the creation of new money 
in the forms of public borrowing. It was also expected that private 
i·n est t ld · th R 500 th h b · 252 v, men wou raise ano er s. crores roug arrowing. 
After a general statement that 'the ultimate object of all planning 
must be to raise the standard of living of the people as a whole to 
ensure employment for all' and that this could be achieved only by 
increasing the purchasing power of the people by a simultaneous develop-
ment and reorganis3tion of agriculture, industries and services with 
improvement in efficiency and consequently the productivity of labour, 
the Second Report, like the Bombay Plan,emphasised the importance of 
intensive industrialisation to correct the imbalance in the Indian economy 
which they decided was due to its primarily agricultural nature. The 
problem of distribution of wealth, according to this Report, would be 
solved by providing various amenities such as education, medical relief, 
water supply, etc. free or at reduced cost to the poorer classes. 253 The 
role of the state in industrial expansion could take three forms, namely, 
(i) ownership or participation, (ii) control and (iii) management. The 
armament and munition factories should be state owned and managed in the 
nation9l interests. In other cases of 'national industries' the state 
might have to participate directly if private capital was not forthcoming, 
because they would not be sufficiently profitable. The most usual form 
of state relationship with industries, however, should be that of state 
control. Such controls could be exercised through 'nomination of 
Government directors, licensing, limitation of dividends, etc. extending 
up to the stage of almost complete control over production or distribution, 
195 
or both'. But the general principle, as the Report laid down, was that 
except where national interest required it, industries were best left to 
competitive, capitalist enterprise, the state exercising such control as 
to see that they were 'operated for the public benefit after providing 
a reasonable profit 1 ~ 54 
The Report had a very interesting suggestion to make on the import 
of foreign technology and capital. It advised the Government of India 
that in cases where the Government would have to enlist the assistance of 
firms from overseas to 'develop industries of a highly technical kind or 
those which depended on patents', the following principles should be 
o'Jserved: 
In such cases [the Report advised], the participation 
of outside interest may, if possible, be confined to 
the provision of technical assistance and of machinery 
an experts, the firm being rem~nerated for services 
rendered and by royalties on p3tents. In cases where 
participation in capital is required, care should be 
taken to ~ee that the capital is issued in India, that 
the majority of the capital, as well as the director-
ate, is Indian and final control over policy rests 
in Indian hands. In cases where it is necessary to 
entrust the management of such industries to o·Jtside 
firms, provision ··~ould be made for the training of 
Indians in all the technical processes and the 255 
ultimate transfer of control to Indian management. 
The statement quoted above, coming from a colonial government is 
apparently paradoxical. This could be interpreted as a clear recognition 
by the state of the nationalist demand for Indianising all foreign firms. 
We may recall here the nation3list protest against the phenomenon of 'the 
menace of India Limited' during 1937-39. 256 But it should be remembered 
that the British industrial and commercial interests were well protected 
under the non-discrimination clauses of the 1935 Act. We will see soon 
that Dalal's effort to repeal that law in 1945 ca~e to nothing in the face 
of opposition from the British interests. However, since the mid-thirties, 
Am.~rican interests had started penetrating Indian markets and during the 
war the U.S.A. had assumed the role of the big brother to the British in 
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the politico-economic affairs of Government of India. Linlithgow, the 
Viceroy, resented American intervention in the political field and there 
was no reason why the British should have remained indifferent to the 
possibility of losing the Indian market to the United States. One may 
therefore quite legitimately interpret the statement as a nod in the 
direction of the ngtionalist demand of protecting the Indian market for 
Indians as well as gesture of protection for British interests in India 
from other foreign competitors. Be that as it may, this statement formed 
the basis of all the future policies of Indian Governments, both British 
and post-independence, regarding foreig, technology and foreign capita1. 257 
The Report emphasised the need for technological im~rovement to 
insrease the productivity of land. But, agriculture being a provincial 
subject, the Centre's role would be 'to help, guide and advise the provinces, 
so as to secure co-ordinated development and production throughout the 
258 country'. However, it was felt that efforts would have to be made by 
the state to 'secure in an increasing degree of stab~lity of tenure and 
freedom 1 ·om restriction to the actual user of the land and to secure to 
him the benefits of his labour and investment in respect of land improve-
m?nt •. 259 Th3 Imperial Council of Agricultural Research had drawn up a 
plan for the development of agriculture and animal husbandry with the 
object of increasing production by 100 per cent in 9 period of 15 years 
with a, estimated capital expenditure of Rs.l,000 crores. The Report 
mentioned this plan which was still under examination by the provincial 
261) governments. 
We need not go into further detail of this Report here. Suffice it 
to say that on two major aspects of economic planning, that is, industry 
and agriculture, the Reconstruction Committee did not have much to show in 
respect of 'progress' in planning up to mid-1944. After three years since 
its inception, the work was still at the preparatory stage of setting up 
policy cormiittees, panels and other such bodies. Th? ICAR plan for 
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agriculture - known popularly as the Kharegat Report on Agriculture 
wai still under examination, while in industry it had not 'yet been 
possible to formulate even a preliminary plan•. 161 Another interesting 
feature of this Report is the affinity of its views with those of the 
BJmbay Plan. B~th emphasise the importance of industrialisation in 
order to correct the 'imbalance' in the agrarian nature of Indian economy. 
In regard to the actual plannin~ for industrialisation their approaches 
were very similar too. Both considered a total period of 15 years with 
five-year instalments for planning. The total expenditure estimated for 
the first five years in the BJmbay Plan was Rs.l,40J crores, 262 while that 
in the Report was Rs.1,500 crores (Rs.1,000 crores by the Government and 
Rs.500 crores expected in the form of private investment). Both wanted 
state intervention in the form of controlling regionalisation of 
industries, protection from foreign competitors (in the case of the 
Go~ernment planning, with a safeg~ard for the British interests in India) 
and development of basic or key industries. The Second Report also echoed 
the B~mbay Plan in urging that the state should own or manage directly 
only those industries for which private investment was not individually 
interested but which were essential for the purpose of industrialisation. 
State control was not to be allowed to encroach upon the domain of 
private enterprise in India. Ag3in, although both proposed some degree 
of compulsion to enhance productivity in agriculture, neither suggested 
any specific change in the structure of land holding. Both the documents 
revealed an awareness of the incompabilily betwe3n the prevailing structure 
of the land-tenure system and the proposed objectives of planning. But 
both stopped short of prescribing any positive solution to this problem, 
such as that already recommended by that date in the Floud Co~~ission 
Report. Th·~ fact is that, given their understanding of planning, neither 
the British bureaucracy r.or the Indian elites in general, could easily 
countenance such a propose~ for planning, in their view, was merely an 
A'>J 
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instrument of 'economic development' and not of 'social change'. 
The affinity of views between these two documents - and for that matter, 
between all the plan proposals from Visvesvaraya's through to the N.P.C."s, 
excepting the People's Plan and the Gandhian Plan - based on the general 
attitude towards industrialisation as an only economic measure. The 
Bolshevik Plan in Russia had attracted the planners' attention only in 
terms of its economic achievement and was acceptable only to the extent that 
the notion of planning could be applied in the case of India without 
affecting the existing structure of the society. 
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CHAPTER V 
BUREAUCRATIC PLANNING AND ITS INDIANISATION 
SECTION 1: The Frustration of Ardeshir Dalal 
The need for Reconstruction Planning was understood by the Government 
of India as soon as the war had started. But when Dalal took over as the 
Member of the Viceroy's Council for Planning and Development, he found that 
even the provincial plans were not formulated yet, let alone the overall 
plan for the whole of India. By this time the course of events in Europe 
suggested that the war might end before too long. The problems of re-
settlement end re-employment of ex-soldiers and the prospect of a post-war 
slump, due to the stoppage of war-time demand, became imminent. The Second 
Report of the Reconstruction Committee suggested that the Plan programmes 
might be started from 1946-47. But it came to be well understood in the 
official quarters by late 1944 that there was no time to lose for a start on 
the urgently needed programmes of rehabilitation of labour and industry 
involved in war-time production. 
One of the first steps that Dalal ~ook in this regard was to issue 
circulars from the Department asking ell the provinces to expedite their 
formulation of the provincial plans. The provinces were reminded of the 
earlier directives from the Centre in this connection and informed that with 
the creation of the new Department, the CP.ntre was now in a position to take 
'policy decisions on the several subjects of Reconstruction end Development 
Plennning' in real earnest in order to evolve 'a co-ordinated plan for the 
whole of Indie•. 1 
The provinces were asked to prepare both the short-term five-year end 
the long-term fifteen-year plans. The Department elaborated the model of 
I 
1 
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the plan drawn up by the Government of Bombay, which had been circulated 
earlier among the provinces. The first five-year provincial plans were to 
include the 'more urgent schemes such as those which would facilitate the 
re-settlement and re-employment of ex-service personnel and projr:cts which 
were an essential preliminary to post-war development as a whole, e.g. 
schemes for training of technical and other personnel both in India and 
abroad, production of food, etc.•. 2 
The provincial governments, however, did not show the 
enthusiasm that was expected of them in drawing up their plans. Although 
the Finance Member had already assured in the legislature that finance would 
not be an obstacle to any worthwhile plan project, 3 the provinces felt it 
necessary to know for certain the extent to which the Centre would share 
their financial burdens on this account even before drawing up their plans. 
They wanted to have some indication of how the resources available from 
4 
central revenue would be distributed among the provinces in this regard. 
They were also afraid that if they spent their own accumulated financial 
resources on the immediate rehabilitation schemes, they might empty their 
coffer before embarking on projects for 'real development•. 5 Since the 
'special priority' schemes to be adopted by the provinces would involve 
recurring expenditure, they also expected a firm commitment from the Centre, 
in the absence of a guarantee for permanent grants, to share that burden. 6 
The Planning and Development Department and the Finance Department of 
the Government of India had to clear these issues before the provinces would 
draw up their plans. Regarding the Centre's share of financial costs, it was 
pointed out that a budget of Rs.SOO crores of surplus Central revenue was 
estimated for the first five-year plans. It was proposed that approximately 
one-half to two-thirds of this amount, i.e. between Rs.250 crores and Rs.350 
crores would be available for distribution to the provinces on a per capita 
b . 7 as1s. The Centre was unable to provide any assurance regarding long-term 
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planning. However, it pointed out that any future government would remain 
interested in the developmental programmes and both the Centre and the 
provinces should strive to develop their respective resources to embark 
upon a long-term plan progralMle. Neither the Centre nor the provinces 
could afford to allow purely financial considerations to frustrate adequate 
m3asures essential for coping with the ecr,omic situation. Any hesitation 
to take bold action regarding post-war reconstruction end development would 
result in a serious slump which would 'give the worst setback to develop-
ment'. On the other hand the planned reconstruction progrerrmes would increase 
the 'wealth of the whole economy' both directly in terms of production end 
indirectly by creating potentials for increase in future productivity. 8 
The provinces were thus directed to assess their own financial resources 
and raise finance by public borrowing to augment their funds. The assurance 
of Central assistance was also reiterated a number of times to encourage 
the provinces to take positive steps to formulate the short-term plans 
quickly. 
The aims and objectives of the proposed short-term plans were further 
elaborated to the provinces by the Centre in mid-1945. It was estimated 
that Government expenditure would drop by a substantial extent after the 
cessation of the war. Britain was to spend over Rs.450 crores in India in 
her war effort in 1944-45. This accounted for nearly one-third of total 
Government expenditure of Rs.1,200 crores that year. This expenditure by 
Britain would cease within a very short period of time with the end of 
hostilities, while the Government of India's defence exocnditure also would 
decline progressively. The rapid decline of Government expenditure could 
result in the retrenchment of a large part of the labour force attached to 
Government works. However, there were some countervailing influences 
present in the form of excess reserves in private hands and in the banks due 
to the restricted availability of consumer goods during the war. The 
/f',J 
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demobilised soldiers would also have large sums to spend. The Central, 
provincial and local governments would find it necessary, apart from 
pushing on with development schemes, to recondition plant, buildings, 
roads, etc. neglected during the war. But the volume of spontaneously 
generated activity would be insufficient to maintain total expenditure, 
and with it, total employment at an appropriate level. 'The economic, social, 
political and psychological implications of any large-scale development of 
unemployment were sufficiently serious' and were a matter of vital concern 
to both the Centre and the provincial governments. 
Hence it had to be impressed upon the provinces that immediate steps 
were necessary to formulate plans to fight this danger. The choice of 
projects in such plans s~ould be based upon two important criteria. The 
project shoJld be one that was capable of being put into operation at short 
notice. The employment-capital ratio should also be high relative to total 
expenditures involved, in order to generate a quick increase in employment. 
Thus irrigation works, anti-erosion works, road construction and repair 
works and building works w~ich satisfy the above criteria should be given 
priorities. These projects would have the added advantage of absorbing the 
excess industrial materials such as ce~ent and steel which would be freely 
available after the end of the war. 
The first five-year plan was thus envisaged primarily as an anti-
deflationary measure in line with the Keynesian prescription of public 
expenditure. The pragmatism of the bureaucracy superseded the dream of the 
Indian capitalist dream of industrialisation of the economy through a 
planned state effort. By putting it as a long-term goal, the programme of 
industrialisation itself was shelved for the time being by the bureaucracy. 
But the short-term planning also remained merely at the paperwork 
stage until the end of 1945.9 The financial issues discussed above kept 
the Centre and the provinces bogged down in extended correspondence for 
I 
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nearly a year. By that time the war had come to an end and a post-war 
slump had become a reality. 
Dalal, however, took some other steps to revitalise the Plan efforts 
of the Government of !ndia. The long-term goal of planning had already 
been defined as that of industrialising the economy. The most important of 
all the Reconstruction Committees set up since 1941 was Committee No.4. 
Initially it was the ComTiittee for Trade, International Trade and Agri-
cultural Policy under the Commerce Department. This Com~ittee was 
reconstituted under the Reconstruction Com~ittee of Council as the Policy 
CoTimittee on Trade and Industry (No.4). Soon after Dalal took over the 
charge, the Planning and Development Department, under which all the 
previous Reconstruction Committees now worked, separated Industry from the 
purview of the Committee No.4 and set up a separate Policy Committee for 
lndust;ies (Committee No.48) under the Chairmanship of Dalal himself. It 
consisted, in line with the composition of all such comTiittees, of 
Government representatives, non-officials, and representatives of the 
provinces and states. It was also decided to set up seventeen Industrial 
P d 1 t f . d t . . h 1 'f' t• 10 anels to consider the eve opmen o in us r1es in eac c ass1 ica ion. 
All the leading Indian capitalists and other 'experts' were inducted as 
no~-officials on to the new ComTiittee and the Panels attached to it. Birla, 
Matthai, Sarkar, Singhania, Shri Ram, lata and Thakurdas were all among 
the non-official members. In its effort to mobilise popular support for 
its plan efforts, the Government of India also instituted a Standing 
Committee of the Legislature, for the Department of Planning and Development 
under the Chairm3nship of Dalal. 
The latter comTiittee was an ineffective o~e in the sense that although 
the entire legislature could thus serve the purpose 'of satisfying the demand 
of constitutional authority of the legislature in the governmental activities, 
it was incapable of creating any obstacle to the Government's own designs. 
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In a way, the formation of the Policy Committee was merely an empty gesture 
on the part of the Government of India. For instance, the new Policy 
Committee on Industries met only twice in ten months between 14 Dece~ber 
1944 and 5 October 1945, and was not consulted at all either on the 
formulation of the Government's Industrial Policy published in April 1945 
or on th·3 very important talks Dalal had with British officials and 
industrialists during a trip to Britain on the matters relating to British 
induntries and industrial planning in India. 
The first meeting of the Policy Committee discussed problems related 
to import of the capital goods, issue of capital by the Government, 
protection to industries and kindred issues faced by the Indian industrial-
ists at that time. The Government feared that once the war was over all 
the countries intending to develop and reconstruct their economies would 
create an excess demand for machines and plants from the U.K. and the U.S.A. 
and if Indian industries did not place their orders early, they would not 
get capital goods in time. Moreover, the import of capital goods depended 
on the availability of foreign exchange. Although India had accumulated 
immense credit in terms of sterling balance, Britain, after the war, might 
n~t be in a position to recoup her debt quickly. Imports from the U.S.A. 
would need dollar exchange and the Government of India would have to find 
means to acquire that. Hence, the Government insisted that Indian industrial-
ists sho~ld formulate their requirements as early as possible and register 
their orders with the Government. 11 The Government proposed to set up Trade 
Missions both in the U.K. and U.S.A. to assist the Indian industrialists to 
obtain their requirements. Those who failed to register their orders were 
to receive no assistance end would not be eligible for licences for the 
import of such goods into India. 
This policy of the Government worried the industrialists. Their 
opinion was that the prices of capital goods in the U.K. and the U.S.A. were 
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abnormally high during the war and would decline after it was over. If 
Indian firms placed their orders during the war then this would result in 
the undertakings being loaded with over-capitalisation at least for the 
life-time of the capital goods thus obtained. The firms which would buy 
the capital goods in future at a lower price would be able to sell their 
products much cheaper and throw these industries out of the market. It was 
suggested therefore, that in order to induce industries to place their 
orders early, the Government should give a clear undertaking that prot8ctive 
tariffs and other assistance would be provided to those firms to enable 
them to compete with others with cheaper capital goods, and allow a high 
depreciation to these industries from the start. Birla cited the example 
of the U.K. where the Government had allowed a 20 per cent depreciation to 
such industries as were involved in war production. 12 
The problem of capital issue also irked the industrialists. The 
general policy of the Government at that stage was to refuse capital issues 
for immediate schemes. This was meant as an anti-inflationary measure. 
Applications for long-range schemes were granted, but the ~oney had to be 
invested in Government securities. This, Birla and others felt, was an 
attempt to make of the industrialists a 'capital collector' for the Govern-
ment in order to prevent inflation - a policy that was bound to hold up the 
process of industrialisation. The Government, they demanded, must not put 
any curb on schemes which envisaged production immediately after the war. 
However, this argJment put forward by the industrialists did not impress 
the official representatives, for wh3t the Governm~nt wanted during the 
first five years of planning was merely to develop the 'special priority' 
projects. Th~ Indian industrialists also demanded internal protection 
against foreign industries operating with foreign capital. Their attack 
was primarily against the British industries which enjoyed special 
privileges in India under the 'commercial safeguard' clause of the 1935 
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Act. That Act stipulated that British industries in the country would 
have to be treated at par with local ones and no discrimination would be 
allowed under the law. Dalal was obviously sympathetic to this demand, but 
pointed out that the problem waa of 'a very difficult political and 
constitutional character which it was not possible to go into at the meeting'. 
He hoped tdhat a future Government would consider the question of 'enacting 
something like an Unfair Trade Practices Act to discourage any kind of 
unfair practice wh1ch might result in unfair competition•. 13 
Thus the Policy Committee (No.4B} could not change any of the policy 
decisions of the Government. Nor did it arrive at any definite decision 
regarding industrial planning. All that was decided was to control the 
concentration of industries in a few provinces (the economically backward 
provinces were to be favoured in allocation of industries) to develop 
cottage industries in order to provide employment to the rural unemployed, 
and to suggest that the Government should set ~P a permanent Tariff Board 
and a Central Statistical Organisation. 
Nor did the second meeting of the Committee held ten months later 
achieve much. On that occasion Dalal only reported to the Committee the 
publication of the Industrial Policy of the Government of India (1945), his 
futile visit to the U.K. with a view to finding a solution to the problem of 
'commercial safeguard', the intention of the Government to set up an 
Industrial Finance Corporation, a Minerals Board as well as a Coal Board, 
and the possibility of makin~ the Tariff Board a permanent one after three 
14 years. 
The Government's Industrial Policy, 15 as Dalal him>elf admitted in 
his speech in the second meeting of the Committee on Industries, was generally 
in line with that of the Bombay Plan. 16 The Policy was based on the 
Constitution of 1935 under which Industry was a provincial subject. The 
Government of India in its policy statement declared its intention to bring 
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impo~tant industries, 'in which a common policy was desirable' under Central 
control. These included twenty cate~ories of b~sic industries, such as Iron 
and Steel, Machines, Plants and Tools, Electricels, Chemicals, Transport, 
Cement etc. and some consumer goods indt1stries Jike Textiles, Sugar, Auto-
mobiles, etc. In brief, almost the entire large-~~ale industry was to be 
brought under Central control. The Stateinent accepted the suggestions of the 
Industrial Adviser on the role of the stat~ in industrial enterprise. The 
ordnance factories, public utilities and railways were alreadv largely state 
owned. The Government also envisaged the nationalisation of other 'basic 
industries of national importance' in which adequate private capital was not 
forthcoming. Listed among these basic industries were those related to air-
craft, automobiles and tractors, chemicals and dyes, iron and steel, prime 
movers, transport vehicles, electrical machinery, machine tools, electro-
chemical and nonferrous metal. It was contemplated to nationalise certain 
industries in which the 'tax element' predominated even the profit element. 
All other industries were to be left to private enterprise under varying degrees 
of control. In some cases, such as ship-building and menufature of loco-
motives and boilers, industries would be run by the state as well as by private 
capitalists. In some other cases the Government considered management through 
either public corporations or private agencies. 17 
Overall industrial development would be controlled, according to the 
Statement, by introducing licencing of industry. To allow freedom to small 
industrial enterprises, any new industry beyond a certain capital value would 
require licenr.e from the Government to operate. This, the Government observed, 
would enable them to distribute industries all over the country and check 
over-concentration in certain places. The Government expressed the desire to 
introduce new laws to empower the authority in this regard. 18 
rurther state control for a planned development was to be achieved through 
'capital issues' by the Government to 'secure balanced investment in Industry, 
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Agriculture and Social Services'. The Policy also declared the Government's 
intention to introduce legislation for better working conditions and 'a fair 
wage' to the worker. Excess profit made through monopoly was to be 
eliminated. 19 
The Governmeat acknowledged its responsibility for developing certain 
prerequisites of industrial progress. It envisaged augmentation of transport 
facilities and development of irrigation, electrical power, and mineral 
resources. It also promised to assist industries by providing loan 
facilities, guaranteeing a minimum dividend on capital in special cases to 
meet revenue losses for a fixed number of years, enhancing research 
facilities in the universities, etc. end procuring capital goods from ebroed. 20 
The Industrial Policy was generally accepted by most of the provinces. 
However, there were reservations on certain points. The provinces showed 
anxiety regarding two issues: central control over certain industries end 
licensing. Apprehension was expressed that the policy could mean Central 
control over every aspect of industry, that it would amount to a close regi-
mentetion of the entire industry by the Central authority, end that the income 
derived from industries under Central control would go to the Central 
Government end not to the provinces. The Government explained that the 
distribution of revenues between the provinces was a different matter 
altogether from that of centralisation of control end was regulated by the 
Constitution Act. However, on discussing the specific industries on which 
the Centre might exercise its authority, the latter agreed not to centralise 
control over electric power, so that the generation of electricity remained a 
provincial subject. 
On the subject of licensing, the provincial representatives wanted either to 
have a Central Licensing Board with provincial representatives in it, or to 
have the authority to grant licences according to quotes assigned by the 
Centre to the provinces. The Centre accepted both the suggestions, and 
decided that the provinces should have the power of licensing within assigned 
;~~'~; 
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quotas and exercise it through a strong and impartial board with due regard 
to all-India considerations. 21 
Vet another point raised by the industrialists at the second meeting of 
the Policy Committee on Industries concerned the issue of nationalisation. 
They queried the statement that 'basic industries of national importance may 
be nationalised provided adequate private capital is not forthcoming and it 
is regarded as essential in the national interest to promote such industries'. 
It was asked whether this meant that the Government would take over existing 
units already operating under private enterprise. Dalal agreed that the 
sentence in question was loosely worded and that the Government had no intention 
to take over an existing private enterprise. He promised to make this inter-
pretation clear 'in order to set at rest the misunderstanding which had arisen 
in the minds of the public'. 
A second point of criticism was addressed to the Government's declared 
intention to 'take over certain industries in which the tax element [was] 
much more predominating than the profit element'. The industrialists pointed 
out that the Statement had given the impression that the Government proposed 
to take over a wide range of consumer industries such as sugar and matches 
which could fall under this category. The Government representatives 
emphatically denied any such intention. They assured that 'the conditions of each 
industry would be carefully considered if and when it was proposed to take 
it over•. 22 
Although the Policy Committees were not given any power to formulate 
policy decisions, the very fact that the Government considered it necessary 
to institute these committees, and incorporate the 'non-officials' in them, 
undermined at least to some extent its own authority to chart India's path 
of economic development. Indeed this amounted to an acknowledgement, on the 
part of the rulers, of the vital importance of Indian big business in the 
economic affairs of the country. This acknowledgement was possible because 
there was a convergence of the ideological outlooks of these two parties 
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rega~ding the 'economy'. When the first part of the Bombay Plan was published 
in early 1944, the criticisms put forward by the Government officials against 
it were all technical in nature; they were all related to the question of 
wtHther the Plan was technically sound and feasible or not. The ideological 
convergence becomes more apparent when we consider the second part of the 
Bombay Plan which was brought out in December 1944 - a few months prior to 
the publication of the Statement of Government's Industrial Policy. 23 
There was a general criticism against the first part of the Bombay Plan 
that it had left out the vital questions of distribution of national income 
and the role of the state in planning. Part II of the Plan was set out to fill 
in these gaps. 24 In formulating the plan for distribution of national income 
the authors cleared the ground initially by invoking the authority of J.M. 
Keynes in favour of private enterprise. It also acknowledged that a modern 
state must make efforts to bridge the gap of inequality within the economy 
by redistributing the national income. But, private enterprises - with their 
concommitent inequalities - were necessary because 'these were valuable 
human activities', they observed from Keynes, 'which require the motive of 
money-making and the environment of private wealth ownership for th~ir full 
fruition~ Moreover, 'dangerous human proclivities can be canalised into 
comparatively harmless channels by the existence of opportunities for money-
making and private wealth•. 25 Thus, the basic foundation of the economy must 
be on private enterprise. The state, however, must control 'large disparities' 
of income through imposition of diffe~ent taxes and by initiating different 
development programmes. 
The authors also suggested that apart from intervention in the form of 
'co-ordination of general economic activity, management of currency and public 
finance, collection of statistical and other information, adoption of 
legislation to safeguard the interest of economically weak classes', etc., the 
state had a more specific set of functions to perform in a planned economic 
··,· 
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system. These functions were threefold and related to (a) ownership, (b) 
control end (c) management of economic enterprises. These functions were 
'advocated on the ground that unrestricted private enterprise under the 
capitalist system of production' had not served the 'interests of consumers 
end of the community generally as satisfactorily as it should heve•. 26 Of these 
three functions 'state control' appeared to be 'more important then ownership 
end management', and the authors elaborated these further on the same lines 
as they had advocated in their meeting with Srivastava end other officials 
in April 1944. 27 
The similarity between the Bombay Plan end the Government's Industrial 
Policy need not be elaborated further. In so far as the authors were the 
leaders of Indian industry, the convergence of their ideas with those of the 
Government may be understood as an agreement between the entire capitalist 
class of India and the colonial power on some of the most important aspects 
of industrial development. The agreement covered the entire field of socio-
economic planning in India. for instance, it is remarkable that Part II of 
the Bombay Plan acknowledged the retrogressive nature of the zamindari system, 
breaking the silence with regard to the land system, which was so conspicuous 
in Part I. This may have been due to no mean extent to the importance 
attached to the question and the attitude adopted by the f loud Commission. 
The Bombay Plan now declared its preference for a gradual introduction of the 
ryotari system all over India. As a first step, it was suggested that 'the 
State should take over the landlord's functions and pay the landlord a fair 
rent for the land'. Later on, when the state was in a better~position, this 
might be 'commuted into a lump-sum payment and the landlord's claim thus 
finally extinguished•. 28 When the Planning and Development Department 
prepared the Statement of the Government's Agricultural Policy in July 1945, 
it was clear that the 'economic policy' regarding agriculture was based 
precisely on a similar principle. 29 
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The only item in the Government's declared policies that seriously 
bothered the Indian industrialists was the provision of 'commercial safe-
guards' provided to British enterprises in India under the 1935 Act. This is 
where the interest of the colonialists came into direct conflict with that of 
the Indian bourgeoisie. The Industrial Policy of 1945 provided protection 
to Indian industries from all foreign competition operating within and outside 
India. It also envisaged 'industrialisation by Indians'. But British 
industries in India or in the U.K. enjoyed special privileges under some 
clauses of the Act of 1935. Indian industrial and commercial interests had 
been protesting against these clauses ever since the inception of the new 
constitution in 1938. Their arguments were directed specifically against 
Sections 111-121 of Chapter III, Part IV of the Act. 
Under Section 111, a British subject domiciled in the U.K., was exempt 
from the operation of any Federal or Provincial law which would impose any 
restriction on any occupation, trade, business or profession he might choose 
to engage in. Under Section 112, any Federal or Provincial law which 
sought to impose discriminatory taxation against British subjects domiciled 
in the U.K. would be invalid. Section 113 laid down that if any Federal or 
Provincial Law imposed restrictions on companies based either on their place 
of incorporation or the currency in which their capital or loan was expressed 
or the place of birth, domicile, residence, etc. of the members of the 
governing body, a company incorporated in the U.K. should be deemed to have 
complied with the Indian law. Section 114 made the same provision in respect 
of companies incorporated in India by British subjects domiciled in the U.K. 
Under Section 115, ships registered in the U.K. could not be discriminated 
against in favour of ships registered in British India, except in the event, 
which did not arise, that a corresponding discrimination was exercised in 
the U.K. against ships registered in British India. The broad effect of 
Section 116 was that if any company incorporated in British India was made 
-------------!+ 
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elig~ble by Indian Law for any subsidy, then companies incorporated in the 
U.K. and carrying on the same trade or industry in India would)>e eligible 
for the subsidy to the same extent to which the Indian company was eligible. 
Section 117 provided that Sections 111-116 would apply in relation to 
any ordinance,order, bye-law, rule or regulation made after the passing of 
the Government of India Act. Section 118 provided that if, after the 
establishment of the proposed Indian federation, a convention was made between 
the Government of the U.K. and the federal Government of India for similarity 
of treatment in any of the above matters for U.K. subjects and companies in 
British India and British Indian subjects and companies in the U.K., the 
operation of the above sections might to that extent be suspended by Order 
in Council. Sections 119-121 deelt with professional, technical and medical 
qualifications. 
There were also other sections in the Act, e.g. Sections 52(i)d and 
12(I)e, which made the Provincial Governors and the Governor-General responsible 
for the 'securing in the sphere of executive actior. of the purposes' which 
the above mentioned provisions were designed to secure in relation to 
1 . 1 t• 30 eg1s a ion. 
The general effect of the above provisions was that any law which 
purported to give special facilities to Indian nationals as against British 
subjects domiciled in the U.K. would be infructuous. The Sections provided 
full protection to British colonial interest in exploiting the Indian market. 
It was well understood by everybody concerned that no Indian would ever 
accept these provisions voluntarily. As early as 1942 Cripps assured Indian 
nationalists specifically that in giving India dominion status, on the same 
level as the other dominions of the Commonwealth, commercial safeguards would 
not be a condition of the new constitution. In the same year Amery, the 
Secretary of State for India, de~lared in the British House of Commons that 
'a guarantee of special protection for British commercial interests in India 
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would not be a condition for the acceptance of whatever constitution InJians 
might evolve after the war and that any such provisions would more appropriately 
be a matter for negotiations with the future Government of India•. 31 
The provisions of commercial safeguards became crucially important in 
1944-45 when the Government of India tried to define an industrial policy for 
India. Dalal, soon after he became the Member of the Planning and Development 
Department, took up the issue with Wave11. 32 Dalal demanded that the new 
industrial development should be financed and controlled by Indians as far as 
• ~ 
possible. The Government acquiesced in principle, but as the law stood it 
could not discriminate against a British company. Dalal wanted to visit the 
U.K. to discuss this problem with British officials and industrialists there 
to find a solution. 
While the Executive was pondering over the issue, the Indian representatives 
in the Legislature headed by Menu Subedar moved a motion to discuss the issue, 
recommending that 'early action be taken for the removal of Sections 111 to 121 
of the Government of India Act, 1935'. Now that the Government of India was 
forced to declare its stand, the Council directed Dalal to use dilatory 
tactics in the debate in the Assembly. He was asked to try and secure 
withdrawal of the resolution, and if that failed Government could remain 
neutral. He was allowed to express the hope that it might be possible to 
arrive at agreements to prevent any unfair handicaps to Indian industry, 
but he was not to mention the coming negotiations between the Government and 
the British industries scheduled soon to be held during Dalal's visit to the 
U.K. Any statement in regard to negotiations, the Council thought, would 
embarrass both Government and industrialists in Britain. 33 
The Legislative Assembly passed, without a division, a resolution asking 
that the safeguards sections should be repealed. During the debate, Dalal 
did not abide by the Council's decision and made a mention of the forthcoming 
negotiations, assuring the Assembly that the 'results would be reported to 
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the House'. When the Viceroy, in the next meeting of the Council pointed out 
to Dalal that his speech was against the directives of the Council, Dalal 
pleaded that he had 'made a slip'. As a result of this, the Council curtailed 
Dalal's power freely to negotiate in the U.K. by asking him to submit 'as soon 
as possible the substance of what ••• [he] proposed to say in his discussions 
in the United Kingdom•. 34 Accordingly he prepared a Draft White Paper on 
Commercial Safeguards. In brief, it stated that the post-war industrial 
development, and particularly that of 'basic industries vital to Indian 
national development' should legitimately be under Indian control. In 
respect of basic industries, excluding cotton and woollen textiles, cement 
and sugar from the list provided in the Statement of Government's Industrial 
Policy, the Draft proposed that any compari) which desired to expand, if 
expansion exceeded 25 per cent of the existing capital or Rs.10 lakhs, 
whichever was less, should be dealt with in the sam~ way as a new company. 
The further objectives of the Government of India, according to this paper, 
was 'to be free to grant assistance ••• [or] subsidies to Indian companies 
without being called upon to grant similar subsidies to British companies•. 35 
The Draft White Paper proposed that the Sections 111-121 of the Act of 1935 
should be either repealed altogether, or, if that was not possible, at least 
amended to enable the Government of India to carry out the above objectives. 
The only member of the Council to oppose the content of the White Paper 
was Edward Benthal, the Member for the Department of War Transport. He 
proposed that instead of demanding the repeal or amendment of the relevant 
laws, 'a negotiated agreement as a basis of permanent understanding' between 
36 Indian and British industrialists should be attempted. All other members, 
however, generally accepted the Draft prepared by Dalal. Auchinleck, the 
Commander-in-Chief, stated that 'he would prefer a direct approach, i.e. a 
request for the repeal of the sections•. 37 It was understood that, in the 
absence of a constitutional amendment, the only way out would be an agreement 
, -~ 
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on the part of British industry not to claim its rights under the Act. 
Moreover, such an agreement could work only if the Secretary of State indicated 
his approval, at least informally, and agreed that he would not use his 
administrative power to render it negatory. The Council decided that Dalal should 
not be tied down to all details of the Draft White Paper, which he was to 
carry with him to the U.K., but must be free to negotiate 'within the general 
38 framework of the policy proposed. 
The Council thus provided almost unanimous support to Dalal in his 
attempt to find a solution to the problem arising from the sections of the 
1935 Act which offered commercial safeguards to British subjects operating in 
India. The composition of the Council was of course overwhelmingly Indian 
by that time. Out of its seventeen members only five, including the Viceroy, 
were British. The Indian members all supported Dalal's proposal. Even among 
the British members, Benthall was the only one to make a half-hearted effort 
~o oppose it. His long association with the jute industry in Bengal and with 
the Associated Chamber of Commerce representing British commercial and 
industrial interests in India could explain his attitude. Wavell himself was 
not yery optimistic about the outcome of the move but went along with the 
39 
others to support Dalal. 
The Council's deliberations on the issues of Industrial Policy and the 
commercial safeguards actually reflected a change in the British rulers' 
attitude towards India. Since the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, Britain had 
been gradually conceding autonomy to the Government of India. By 1945 the 
British appeared to have accepted the fact that India could no longer be 
ruled as a colony. The war, they reckoned, had changed the situation not only 
in its political aspects but also in the field of economics. 
In January 1945, a group of leading Indian industrialists including 
Birla, Tata, Singhania and Sarkar proposed to visit the U.K. and the U.S.A. 
with a view to exploring the supply situations in these countries for the 
capital goods and finances that Indian industrialists might require in the 
~I ~:,nsd 
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immediate post-war period, and to secure the co-operation of manufacturers 
there for the development and expansion of Indian industry. The India Office, 
together with the Board of Trade and the federation of British Industries, 
circulated a secret memorandum to the members of the federation of British 
Industries to prepare the latter for the ·'orthcoming visit of the Indian 
. d t . l' t 40 in us r1a is s. This memorandum makes interesting reading rega.·ding the 
prevailing British attitude towards India. 
The memorandum advised that it was 'most important that United Kingdom 
manufacturers should recognise the natural and reasonable aspirations of 
Indians to make IndiR a great industrial power and that constructive co-
operation to that and ••• [was] desirable! Otherwise American industry would 
step in and replace British enterprises in India. Moreover, in view of the 
'changed, and changing circumstances' of India, the future prospects of the 
British industry lay in 'meeting, and indeed promoting (1) the steady growth 
in the demand for machinery, equipment, stores, accessories and semi-
manufactured materials needed by an expanding and diversifying Indian 
industrial system, and (2) the rapidly developing sophistication of a growing 
section of Indian consumers consequent upon a marked rise in the standard 
of living of the urban population and the adoption of western comforts and 
luxuries'. The first would help the British capital goods industry, while 
the second would open up the market for the manufacture of 'quality consumer 
goods'. In both respects, the memorandum suggested, a vast market might be 
opened up 'through the economic industrialisation of India'. 
The memorandum further advised the British industries that they should 
try to book as many orders as they could negotiate with the Indian industrial-
ists during their visit to the U.K., 'even though firm delivery dates ~ould 
not be yet quoted'. further, the U.K. firms should also try, 'in vierw of the 
rapidly changing circumstances in India, to manufacture in India those items 
which could economically be made there and which otherwise, would be 
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manu:actured in any event by Indian concerns, probably under American or 
Continental guidance'. The circular ended with the following observation: 
The advantages of retai'ling India's political and 
economic goodwill are delf-evident, and though we should 
hesitate long before lightly transfeL·ring our trained 
ability, salesmanshi~, organisation and technical 
competence which are our greatest assets, it is in our 
own interest as well as to the advantaQe of India that 
we should contribute on the most equitable basis we 
can achieve to her industrial development, with all 
its promise of an increasing market for our specialities 
and fine products. 
Thus, the memorandum shows that the British acknowledged the changing 
circumstances in India where the Indian industrialists had acquired by this 
time a certain degree of independent bargaining power vis-a-vis the British 
counterparts for operating in the Indian market. Britain was rapidly losing 
her long-standing monopoly over that market. Oth·1r industrial powers and 
America in particular, were keen on entering it in a big way. The Government 
of India also had to exercise some independence from the metropolis in certain 
matters of policy and Britain was no longer in a position to dictate terms 
without any adverse political and economic consequences. At the same time, 
this document also makes it clear that Britain was by no means ready to give 
up its favourable position in the Indian market without b fight. Indeed, the 
British industrialists were already trying to take advantage of the provisions 
of commercial safeguards. Dalal cited a number of examples in this respect 
during the discussions in the Council meeting. Thus, the Associated Electrical 
Industries (India) Ltd. which had a plant for the manufacture of small-scale 
electrical equipment, was trying to expand its plant and to manufacture heavy 
motors, transformers, switch gear and welding electrodes. The company, which 
was part of a powerful combine, had no intention of associating itaelf with 
Indian capital. Again, the Aluminium Plant and Vessel Co. Ltd. of London had 
a project for the setting up of an Indian subsidiary company for manufacturing 
in part plants required for the distillation of power alcohol; 75 per cent of 
the share capital was to belong to the parent company. These are only two 
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of many such efforts made by British or Anglo-American combines to expa~d 
their bases in the Indian market. All these companies were entitled to enjoy 
the protection of the Government of India under the Sections 111-121 of the 
Act of 1935. 42 
Dalal, accompanied by Dr H.V.R. Iyengar, his First Secretary, visited 
the U.K. in May 1945. The object of this visit was to discuss and find 
solutions to the problems relating to commercial safeguards, availability and 
price level of capital goods, training of technical personnel, and recruit-
ment of experts from the U.K. for the various departments of Central and 
Provincial Governments to help in planning. The itinerary also included 
visits to the U.S.A. and Canada to discuss with the Governments and 
4:S industrialists of those countries the problems of planning in India. 
Dalal's visit to the U.K. was virtually a failure. Even before he reached 
Britain, the Government of the U.K. had already takeai its decision on the 
issues. Churchill's War Cabinet directed its India Committee to prepare a 
,44 detailed note on 'commercial safeguaros. The Committee narrateJ the arguments 
in favour of and against the demand for repealing or amending Lhe relevant 
sections of the Act of 1935. The arguments which, in their view, went in 
favour of the Government of India were: (1) there would be adverse political 
reaction in India if Britain did not accept the proposal; (2) it would be in line 
with the authority provided to the Government of India and Wave!! in parti-
cular during his assumption of the office of Viceroyalty; (3) statements 
already made by British statesmen lid! Cripps and An.ary in favour of the repeal 
of the 'safeguards' should be respected; and (4) the continuation of the 
clauses might hinder the process of Indian industrialisation. The Committee, 
however, argued that the acceptance of the proposal would (1) adversely 
affect the position of British business interests in India, particularly 
during the difficult post-war period; (2) the Industrial Policy of the 
Government of India was unsound and India should develop her agriculture first 
i 
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before going in for extensive industrialisation; and (3) the proposed 
industrialisation woulrl benefit the powerful Indian industrialists, not the 
Indian people, and it was the former who were pushing the proposai. 45 Apart 
from the arguments against the proposals put forward by the India Committee, 
the British Government had other considP.rations in mind. Churchill's 
Government was facing an election and did not want to go into a controversial 
issue which might alienate industrial and com~ercial interests in Britain.46 
Besides, there w~s also the question of reimbursement of India's sterling 
balances. So the War Cabinet decided that 'there could be no question, in 
present circumstances, of ary repeal of the commercial discrimination 
provisions of the Government of India Act, and this should be made clear to 
Sir A. Oalal 1 • 47 The only concession that the British Government was ready 
to make was that although it 'felt doubts about the soundness of the Industrial 
Policy of the Government of India' it would not reject that Policy QUtright, 
and to state that if any particular economic difficulties arose in special 
cases out of the legislation under Sections 111-121 of the Act, Britain would 
cosnider if 'any agreed variation could be made of the provisions ••• to 
obviate those particular difficulties•. 48 
The attitude of the Government of the U.K. was so unsympathetic on the 
question of 'commercial safeguards' that it annoyed even Wavell himself. He 
was in England when Dalal went there to argue his case. Yet, the Cabinet 
did not even bother to consult Wavell before saying a categorical 'no' to Dalal. 
'One would think', Wavell wrote in his diary, 'that with the Viceroy at home 
and available they would have asked his opinion on an important matter of 
great political significance which had been approved by the Governor-Gener~! 
in Council instead of contemptuously dismissing it without even informing 
him ••• what a crew they are for a perilous voyage!'. Later on Wavell 
intervened on behalf of Dalal when he met the India Committee the day after he 
had come to know about the Cabinet decision from Dalal, and tried to impress 
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upon the Committee the grave political consequences of the latter's action. 
All that his efforts achieved was merely s 'friendly' treatment of Dalal on 
the part of the British officials and the Cabinet members. 49 
Dalal's visit thus, was a failure. It was not only on the question of 
'safeguards' that he failed to elicit any sympathy from Britain. He was no 
more successful in other respects as well. Thus he was told that no priority 
could be given to India for the supply of capital goods from the U.K. end 
that the prices of these goods would not be controlled in India's favour. 
Nor could any new schemes, apart from the Bevin Boys scheme, could be evolved 
for the training of technical personnel in the U.K •• The only pos!tive 
assurance Dalal managed to obtain was that U.K. experts could be made available 
to the Government of India for the development programmes. His visit to the 
U.S.A. and Canada also did not yield any concrete result. However, he 
reported to the Council that, despite the unsympathetic official attitude to 
the safeguards provisions in the U.K., a number of British, U.S. and 
Canadian industrjel end commercial firms end banks had expressed their 
eagerness to operate in India es junior partners to Indian collaborators. 
Imperial Chemical Industries of Britain was already negotiating with Tata for 
the manufacture of dyestuffs without demanding e controlling interest. Brush 
Electrical Co. agreed to co-operate with Kirloskar on e minority basis. John 
Brown and Sons assured Dalal of its full support in developing the ship-
building industry in India 'without any question of capital control' and Avro's 
gave similar assurances for aeroplane manufacturing. In the U.S.A. end Canada 
also there were some firms, e.g. the Standard Oil Company, which were ready to 
operate on the basis of the restrictions proposed in Dslal's Draft White 
Paper. But by and large the Western industrialists -efused to accept to 
collaborate with their Indian counterparts on a }0:7~ basis of control.so 
When Dalal assumed his office in August 1944 he had been optimistic 
about his role as a planner for modern India. The Indian industrialists also 
\ 
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placed their hope8 in Dalal as a representative of their class in such a 
crucial position in the Council. His speeches in the Conrnittee for Industries 
and elsewhere were for several months widely reported in Indian newspapers. 51 
But the initial optimism did not last long. He could form Committees, issue 
policies for the Government and prepare plans, but when it came to putting the 
plan progran111es into effect or changing the existing Government policies of 
control, etc. he achieved little. His failure to obtain negotiated changes 
in the provisions of commercial safeguards was a crucial blow to his already 
waning enthusiasm. The Indian industrialists also started losing their faith 
in him. G.L. Mehta, a noted businessman and one of the leaders of FICCI, 
made a scathing speech in the FICCI in March 1945 criticising Government's 
dilatory attitude towards industrialisation in India. 52 Later on he repeated 
the same criticisms at a meeting of the Policy Committee on Industries. 53 
Since Dalal acted for the Government, he too was subjected to criticism. Birla, 
in a sr>eech in the FICCI, referred to Dalal as having been 'installed in the 
gadi to guide planning' and criticised him for his failure to do anything 
for fostering the growth of Indian industries. 54 
After his return from the trip to the U.K., the U.S.A. and Canada, Dalal 
faced a very awkward situation. His colleagues in the Council criticised him 
for being too optimistic and for preparing a White Paper which they now found 
at fault. Feroz Khan Noon, the Defence Member, 'felt that the policy of 
retaining 70 per cent interest for Indian firms was fundamentally wrong and 
would not succeed 1 • 55 Dalal could only point out that the Paper had been 
discussed and sanctioned by the Council as a whole. 
The criticism from his colleagues in the Council was too much for Dalal 
to put up with. He had never been happy 11bout the procrastinating attitude 
of the bureaucracy. In December 1945 he t~ndered his resignation from the 
Council. Although publicly he said that he was impelled to do so by his 
domestic circU111Btances, he confided to Wavell that it was not possible to lllllke 
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much_ progress under the existing circumstances: co-operation from other 
departments had been lacking and the political atmosphere was such that all 
plans were condemned by the public. 56 Dalal's resignation was reluctantly 
accepted by Wavell, and he was relieved of his responsibility on 28 January 
1946.57 
After Dalal's resignation, the Planning and Development Department was 
looked after by Sir Akbar Hyderi, an I.C.S. officer and an acting member in the 
Council for Information and Broadcasting. But the activities of the Depart-
ment were carried on in a low key. The political situation in both 
India and the U.K. had undergone significant changes, and Wavell had already 
decided that after Dalal for the next few months, until the new Government 
was formed in 1946, the best policy would be to 'keep efficiency primarily 
• • I 58 in view • 
SECTION 2: Work of the Development Board 
The Interim Government headed by Nehru was set up in September 1946. 
One of the earliest steps taken by this Government - before the Muslim league 
decided to participate in it - was to establish an Advisory Planning Board. 
More than nine months had elapsed between the time of Dale.l's resignation and 
the formation of this Board. This was a significant period in the history of 
Indian planning as this was when the colonial bureaucracy actually formulated 
an economic plan end started implementing it, albeit partially. 
One of the major reasons for Dalal's reslgnation as he put it to Wavell, 
was the nonce-operative attitude of the different departments to the measures 
he suggested while serving as e Member of the Planning and Development 
Department. Professor C.N. Vakil, who was attached to Dalal's department as 
an economist, also resigned on similar grounds about the same time. While 
Dalal was pul off particularly by the attitude of other heads of departments, 
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both he and Vakil complained of interference by the I.C.S. officers in the 
work of the Planning and Development Department. 59 
Wavell, as we have seen, was not interested in appointing any new Member 
in the place of Dalal. Following Dalal's and Vakil's complaints about the lack 
of co-ordination among the various departments, he took two steps. Immediate-
ly after Dalal's resignation, a Co-ordination Committee of Council (C.C.C.} was 
formed under the Viceroy's Chairmanship to promote a unity of approach among 
the various central departments regarding planning. Hydari, the acting 
Member for the Planning and Development, became the Vice-Chairman of the 
C.C.C. Wavell's second step was to set up a Development Board consisting of 
the secretaries of Departments including Planning and Development, Finance, 
Labour, Education, Health, Agriculture,and Industries and Supply. This Board, 
set up in February 1946 was to examine the 'integrated plans', 'departmental 
memoranda on matters of general policy on administration affecting develop-
ment as a whole', examine and recommend priorities among development plans, 
progr81111les and schemes, initiate actions on 'any matters affecting planning', 
'keep a watch on development plans generally on behalf of the Council or the 
60 C.C.C.' and to 'report progress to the c.c.c.•. The planning machinery of 
the Government of India was thus further bureaucratised. The Planning and 
Development Department continued to function for some time, but its role was 
now confined to scrutinising the provincial plans from the point of view of 
feasibility. Actual policy decisions regarding the plan programmes were now 
made by the Development Board. Soon the Planning and Development Department 
became virtually defunct and was abolished in July 1946 when W,vell formed 
his 'Caretaker Government 1 • 61 
The Development Board survived the Planning and Development Department 
until 1950 when it was superseded by the Planning Commission of the Govern-
ment of India. One maJor task the Development Board accomplished in 1946 was 
the formulation of Central financial policies regarding planning, and the method 
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of its administrative control. Both these issues involved the question of the 
Centre's jurisdiction in provincial matters. The provinces, under the 
Government of India Act of 1935, enjoyed autonomy in almost all areas concerned 
with economic and social development. Agriculture, Industry, Health, 
Education, Power and Irrigation were all either under provincial responsibility, 
or, in a few cases, were included in the 'concurrent list'. 
As a result, although the Government of India wanted to introduce 
planning at the all-India level, the actual power to adopt and execute a plan 
programme lay with the provincial governments. Such provincial autonomy in 
matters related to planning was an integral feature of the new Indian 
constitution.62 The Government of India's role, to go by their own declaration, 
was now confined to rendering expert assistance and advice in the preparation 
of provincial plans to make them conform to 'all-India' policy and 'sound in 
principle', and in providing financial assistance to the Provinces to help 
thtm implement their plan programmes.63 
The Development Board found itself in a complicated position. It was 
understood by the central bureaucracy that the only way they could exercise 
control over the provincial plans was through the use of financial aids. The 
Government had earlier informed the provinces that between Rs.250 crores and 
Rs.350 crores would be distributed on a per capita basis as grants to the 
provinces for the first five-year plan period. 64 Now the Board had to perform 
the delicate task of finding a balance between the Centre's need to maintain 
control over the use of the money they gave to the provinces and the provinces• 
need to exercise the autonomy granted to them by the Constitution. Caught 
in this dilemma, the Government sometimes looked to other countries for 
alternative models. For example, the Finance Member, in his Budget speech 
of 1946, declared his intention to explore the 'Australian method of distri-
bution' of Federal grant to the States, and proposed to send an officer to 
Australia for that purpose.65 However, the Development Board decided that the 
question of distribution of financial grants could not wait until the Australian 
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method was explored. The population basis of grant distribution would have to 
be adhered to. 66 But on the question of Central control over grants, the 
opinions of the members of the Board was divided. 
In the first meeting of the Development Board, there were four altern-
ative suggestions: the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture and 
Planning and Development proposed that the grants should be in the form of a 
suitable percentage grants towards the actual expenditure on each approved 
scheme, subject to a maximum based on the overall grant to the Province for 
the year. Schemes would be approved in the light of the all-India policy 
laid down and, in exceptional cases, the Centre might withhold financial 
assistance for schemes to which it had serious objections and which the 
provincial governments were not prepared to amend. If the issue were really 
of vital and fundamental importance, the Central Government might withhold 
financial assistance for development altogether pending a satisfactory settle-
ment. In this way, the Centre could ensure that the joint resources of the 
Centre and the provinces were utilised for furthering a policy of development 
found to be desirable and suitable for the country as a whole. The Secretary 
of the Agriculture Department, Pheroze Kharegat pointed out that his depart-
ment was following this principle with success in distributing grants for 
agricultural development and in various other schemes. 
The second method, which was suggested by Education and Health Depart-
ments, was similar to the first one. But they insisted that for each province 
the total amount to be spent on each major subject of development should be 
determined in advance in consultation with the Centre. The programme of the 
provinces would be reviewed with reference to the expenditure desirable and 
possible on each subject of development and the amount of the Central grant 
therefore determined - instead of being a percentage up to a maximum as 
proposed in the first method. 
The Secretary of the Labour Depart111ent, the Reforms Commissioner and 
Secretary, c.c.c., on the other hand, wanted to aake a block grant for each 
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subject of development on the lines proposed under the second method but to 
refrain from sub-dividing the grant for each subject between the various 
schemes under that subject. The advantage claimed for this method was that 
while securing the fundamental objectives, there would be no 'undue inter-
ference' with provincial discretion in the matter of details. 
The fourth method, suggested by Finance and Industries and Supply 
Departments, was even more liberal. The idea here was to make the overall 
grant for a province as one block grant subject to very broad conditions to 
secure that the schemes we~e generally in accord with all-India policy and 
were balanced 'inter-se', that effort was concentrated initially on schemes 
of economic importance and that any major variations in the scheme were put 
into effect only with the approval of the Centre. If a province did not co-
operate and the point of difference was an important one involving a question 
of principle, the whole or part of the grant might be withheld. The Central 
surpluses, in their view, should be treated as 'belonging to the Provinces 
which could legitimately expect them to be within their control for purposes 
of discharging Provincial responsibilities•. 67 
Thus, while the first suggestion was to utilise the grant distribution 
as a tool of maximum control by the Centre over the execution of provincial 
plan programmes, the fourth one pleaded for minimum interference in provincial 
matters. However, the Board was unanimous that some degree of control by the 
Centre over the execution of provincial plans was necessary in the interest of 
achieving a planned development 'on an all-India basis'. 
Subsequently, the members of the Board came to a near-unanimous decision 
that the best method would be to make annual block grants, on a per capita 
basis, to the provinces for the purposes of budgeting and accounting. But 
these grants would be 'deemed to be distributed on a pro-rate basis over the 
different main heads of expenditure'. For example, 'if the expenditure on 
education in an approved provincial plan were 15~ of the total expenditure 
in all subjects, then 15~ of the Central grant would have to be regarded as 
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allotted to the subject•. 68 The grants would be attributable to each main 
head under the broad conditions that, the schemes were generally approved by 
the Government of India, information regarding schemes should be supplied by 
the provincial governments as required by the Centre, Central representatives 
would be kept in touch with the progress of schemes, annual reports would be 
sent to the Government of India, and major variations in schemes would be 
notified in advance to the Government of India. In case of failure of observance 
69 of these conditions, the Centre might withhold a part or whole of the grant. 
Kharegat dissented from this proposal saying that, 'the legislature had 
a responsbility for the proper expenditure of Central revenues' and wanted 
careful scrutiny of individual schemes and to make only a percentage grant 
70 for each scheme. The Council, however, decided to adopt the policy suggested 
by the majority of the Board on the grounds that, politically it was desirable 
to maintain a stand of minimum interference in provincial respo1.=ibilities. 
Moreover, for administrative reasons, it was thought that Kharegat's suggestion 
was not feasible. 71 
For a 'method of administrative procedure' the Development Board decided 
to categorise the 'development' programmes under six categories, viz.: (i) 
multi-purpose waterways, irrigation and power development; (ii) agriculture 
and kindred subjects including minor irrigation and forests; (iii) education; 
(iv) health; (v) roads and (vi) all other subjects. It was decided that, for 
each province, the Planning and Development Department would first provisionally 
assess both capital and recurring expenditures under each main head of 
development prescribed. It would then undertake selection of schemes under 
separate heads within the limit of expenditure determined, and then finalise 
t 'th . 72 both the items in consults ion w1 provinces. The Board fixed November 
1946 as the deadline by which all this work had to be completed so that the 
first five-year plan could be launched in 1947-48. 73 Similar deadlines were 
74 imposed on the Central Departments to finalise their plans. 
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. Two things come out quite clearly from the deliberations of the 
Development Board. Although the Reconstruction Committee of Council and the 
Planning and Development Department were set up, one after the other, with a 
view to organising a planned development of Indian economy on a subcontinental 
busis, the Government of India did not have any comprehensive plan for the 
whole of the country even in 1946. The entire initiative was passed on to the 
provinces. Apart from the 1945 Industrial Policy resolution, Lhe Centre did 
not formulate its policies on any other major economic or social issues. 
To some extent, this was a deliberate decision on the part of the 
Government. For example, the Education, Health and Lands Department prepared 
a statement on Agricultural Policy for the whole of India. 75 But an inter-
departmental meeting of the Secretaries of the Central Departments, pre-
cursor uf the Development Board, decided that no elaborate governmental state-
ment on Agricultural Policy was necessary at that time as there were already 
a number of generalised statements on the issue in the Burns Report, the 
Kharegat Plan and the R.C.C. Reports. Kharegat, as the Secretary of the 
concerned department, dissented from this view and pointed out that unless the 
Government determined its agricultural policy in clear terms no detailed programme 
could be prepared by the Department. But the majority in the Government did 
not accept his view and the Agricultural Policy Statement was never ~;Jblished 
76 by the Government. 
The other important feature of the Board's deliberation is the way the 
question of industrialisation was treated. 'Industry' came under the heading 
'all other subjects'. This was in sharp contrast to the Government's earlier 
stance which seemed to equate planning with industrialisation; after all, the 
only specific public policy ever formulated by the Government was to do with 
regulating industrial growth. Vet when it came to the actual matter of 
drawing up the plan programmes, however, industrialisation received no priority 
at all. We have already mentioned early in this chapter the Government of 
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India's decision to address immediate post-11ar problems through the 'short-
term' first five-year plan. 77 
While industries constituted one of the sectors most affected by the 
war, none of the plans, up to 1946, gave any consideration to industrialisation. 
Yet, in 1946, there were up to thirty-one industrial panels, set up by the 
Industrial Policy Committee, each working on a specific industry. 78 Besides, 
it was in the case of Industry, among all the different aspects of planning, 
that the Constitution allowed the Government of India some freedom to develop 
a centralised plan. 79 On the other hand, the constitutional provision did not 
in any manner preclude provincial initiative in industrial planning. Yet the 
category 'Main heads of development schemes' reveals the indifference displayed 
by the Board at this stage towards the question of industrial planning. When 
the Central and Provincial first five-year plans were finally estimated, 
expenditure under Industries amounted to only Rs.36 crores (Rs.360 million) out 
of a total estimated expenditure of Rs.1,345 crores (Rs.13,450 million). Of 
these thirty-six crores of rupees, 10 crores represented expenditure on the 
Sindri fertiliser factory and.5 crores were for expansion of Hindustan Aircraft 
Factory at Bangalore - both Central schemes. The rest was made up of 
provincial expenditure which was confined to schemes for the provision of 
technical training and the development of cottage and small-scale industries. 
The provincial industrial expenditure estimate was actually less than three 
per cent of the total expenditure on all provincial plans. 80 
In 1946, the Government of India appeared to have completely dropped 
the idea of industrial development in any foreseeable future. It was not only 
that there was virtually no industrial programme included in the 'short-
term1 five-year plan, the Government did not have any industrial plan even in 
the 'long-term'. A statement of estimated total cost of long-term planning, 
produced by the Development Board, also showed Rs.22 crores as the amount to 
be initially allotted for 'Industrial Oevelopmant' during the first five years 
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of a tJtal period of thirty-five years. It was said that no details beyond the 
first five years were available. 81 
It would be wrong to conclude from this that the Government had decided 
to leave the issue of industrial development in the hands of private 
capitalists and organisations. It had in fact full control over any expansion 
of private investment in India through measures introduced during the war. 
The provisions of licensing for new industries or for the expansion of old 
ones, for import-export restrictions, the 'capital issue control', and similar oth1 
measures made India~ private enterprise entirely dependent on Government 
decisions. Birla, in early 1946, bitterly criticised the Government for not 
taking any positive action for industrial development and cited evidence to 
show that it was deliberately trying to thwart all initiatives for industriali-
sation through these controls. 82 G.L. Mehta joined Birla in this criticism. 
Using evidence of the debates in the Legislative Assembly, he showed that 
between January 1945 and June 1946 the Government had released more than thirty-
nine crores of rupees in dollar resources for industrial imports, but out of 
these only Rs.7.29 crores were made available for import of capital goods, 
while more than thirty-two crores were earmarked for consumer goods. 83 
This volte-face by the Government of India, from its early enthusiasm 
about industrialisation to its total passivity after the war, can be related 
to the subordinate character of the colonial Government vis-a-vis the imperial 
metropolis. Any programme of industrialisation after the war required a rapid 
increase in the import of capital goods. The Government of India seemed to 
have been aware of this even during the war; as witness the Centre's initiatives 
in organising the advance booking of orders to purchase capital goods after 
the war from Europe and America. If these initiatives materialised, India 
could conveniently use for this purpose its accumulated sterling balance 
reserves and its favourable balance of trade with the United States during the 
war. Indeed the Indian industrialists had pinned their hopes for a rapid 
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post-war industrial development on the possibility of using these sterling 
balances and dollar earnings to import necessary capital goods. But it was 
precisely on these issues that the interests of the U.K. clashed with that 
of India. 
The Government of the U.K. was far from eager to part with these balances 
for the development of a colonial economy. As far as India's dollar earnings 
were concerned, the Government of India was forced to contribute it to the 
Empire Dollar ?ool created by the U.K. for the purchase of essential war 
mat0rials. As a result although India had a net earning of 300 million 
dollars during the period September 1939 to March 1945 the entire amount was 
contributed to the Poo1. 84 The Reserve Bank of India tried to protect India's 
interest by suggesting to segregate its dollar balances in the Pool so as to 
conserve dollar earnings for post-war reconstruction and development. The 
commercial interests in the U.S.A. also were critical of the fact that the 
surrender of India's surplus dollars to the U.K. 'was detrimental to their 
interests as it shut U.S. exporters out of the Indian market'. But all these 
efforts to separate India's dollar earnings from the Pool was thwarted by the 
British Government on the plea of war exigency. The only concession that India 
could force from Britain, after four years of effort, was a 'contribution' of 
$20 million by the British Government for each of the years 1944 and 1945. 
Ev~n then, the actual allotment for 1944 was made only in July 1945 and that 
for 1945 in 1946. 85 
It was not only that Britain utilised India's dollar earnings during the 
war for her own benefit, she also made every effort to repudiate India's 
sterling balances. Churchill and his supporters used all kinds of arguments 
to disown this debt to India. In 1943 he wanted to charge India the equivalent 
of Britain's debt to her 'for saving her from Japanese invasion'. At that 
time he was dissuaded by Amery and Wavell from adopting such a policy. 86 In 
December 1945 Churchill and John Anderson (Governor of Bengal in the 1930s who 
had earne~ his reputation by crushing nationalist 'terrorism') suggested in 
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the British Parliament that India's sterling credit should be drastically 
reduced on the grounds that it was was a commercial debt. 87 This was in sharp 
contrast to the pledge given by J.M. Keynes on behalf of the British Government 
at the Bretton Wood Conference in 1944 where he said, 'when the end is reached 
••• we shall take it [the sterling balance question] up without delay, to settle 
honourably what was honourably and generously given' 86 The British Press also 
joined hands with the Government of the U.K. in attempting to scale down, if 
not totally repudi3te, Britain's sterling debt to India. 89 The argument put 
forward in favour of this view was that the sterling balances were the result 
of the War financial Settlement which was most generous to India and unfair to 
Britain. The R.B.I. pointed out that out of the total sterling of about £1,515 
million accrued to India by the end of March 1945, the credit received from 
the Secretary of State - under financial Settlement - accounted for £969 
million, the rest being the result of regular commercial transactions between 
th t t . 90 e wo coun r1es. 
The attitude of Britain on this issue did not change much under the 
Labour Government of Attlee. Although the political ramification of repudiation 
or scaling dQwn of Britain's sterling debt to India forced the Govern~ent of 
the U.K. to refrain from such a policy, Attlee gave a specific instruction 
to the Cabinet Mission, leaving for India in 1946, to the effect that 'there 
could be no question of offering ••• concessions on the financial side ir, 
order to secure a political settlement•. 81 Even in 1947, when Britain seemed 
to have agreed to honour her debt and talks were being held between British 
end Indian delegations to settle the issue, Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in Attlee's Government, declared that Britain should refuse to take 
on 'fantastic commitments which are bey0nd her strength and beyond all the 
limits of good sense and fair-play', and th~t the war debts were an 'unreal, 
ur just and unsupportable burden' which 'must be very substantially scaled 
down•. 92 
~~--------------I:. 
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.Any programme of post-war industrialisation, as we mentioned earlier, 
depended entirely on the availability of the sterling balance and dollar 
earnings to India. The unwillingness of the Government of India to promote 
industrialisation in the post-war period thus seems closely related to Britain's 
stand on the issue. Actually the British Government thought of officially 
rejecting the Indian programme of industrialisation in 1945. It was only on 
the advice of the India Committee of Churchill's Cabin'!t which 'did not think 
that it would be wise for His Majesty's Government to reject them entirely', 
that it refrained from doing so. However, the message was duly conveyed by 
the India Office to the Viceroy. 93 It is therefore not surprising that the 
Government of India, after showing so much early enthusiasm over th9 question 
of industrial development, should quietly drop the ide~:in the name of 'short-
term' planning. 
The post-war economic situation in India, no doubt called for some urgent 
and permanent measures to improve agricultural conditions. The food situation 
continued to worsen during and immediately after the war. The resettlement 
of the retrenched servicemen and the labour force connected with the war 
economy needed active government investment in public works. The Centre's 
emphasis on irrigation, power, roads and transport, etc., in the 'short-term 
plan' was not misplaced. But the abandonment of the idea of industrialisation 
naturally made the industrialists unhappy. While FICCI, as we have noticed, 
renewed its tirades against the Government's policies, the Council Members 
in the Assembly had to face bitter criticism from Indian representatives. 
The latter made constant reference to the lack of any Government initiative in 
organising the import of capital goods necessary for Indian industries, while 
the official side tried to counter this change by shifting the responsibility 
on to the Indian industrialists. The official reply was that as early as in 
1944-45 the Govern11Bnt had asked the Indian industrialists to place advance 
orders for foreign capital goods with the Govel'f1118flt, but they failed to 
.~~~----------------:-.... 
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comp~y with the directives, so that the Government was in no position to 
place any orders abroad. However, officialdom had no answer to offer to the 
charge of the Indian representatives that the Gover11ment, if it had any real 
intention for fostering industrial grc 1th, could have always made its own 
assessment of the requirements regarding capital gooda.94 
SECTION 3: Short-term Plans, 1946 
Thus, by 1946, the idea of a planned programme of industrialisation had 
been shelved by the Government of India. However, the financial aspects of the 
five-year plans, both provincial and Central, were finalised by mid-1946. 
The provinces were now asked to prepare detailed schemes of the projects 
they intended to take up during the five years starting from 1947.95 The 
Government divided the schemes into two types. Those which were intended to 
be totally or partially self-financed were designated as 'productive schemes'. 
Power, irrigation, Poat and Telegraphs and Railways were included under this 
heading. In all the other schemes the Government did not expect any immediate 
or direct returns. These were called the 'developmental schemes' which would 
contribute directly or indirectly to national wealth. Agriculture, Roads, 
Education, Health, Industrial Development, etc., were put under this second 
category. In Table l below we give a summary of the total cost of these 
plans. 
Railways accounted for the largest expenditure on a single item in the 
plans. But this figure of Rs.280 crores, reduced to Rs.229 crores by the end 
of the year, 95 was meant not so much for expansion of railways in India but 
mainly for improvement and •replacement' works on office buildings, staff 
quarters, workshops, stations, etc. The total a1110unt to be spent on these 
accounts waa Rs.160 crorea, of which over Ra.70 crores were allotted for 
1 replace11ent works'. or the rest, Ra.120 crorea, 'New lines, 1110atly 
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TABLE 1 
Estimated Total Cost ·of Central and Provincial Five~Year Plarts, ·1946 
{in Rs.10 millions) 
No. Subject Central 
(1) (2) (3) 
Productive Schemes 
(1) Railways. 280 
(2) Electrical Development SO 
and Irrigation. 
(3) Post and Telegraphs. 56 
Total: 386 
Other Schemes 
(4) Roads. 
(5) Agriculture (including 
kindred subjects). 
(6) Education. 
(7) Medical and Public 
Health (including 
Water Supply and 
Drainage). 
39 
22 
21 
12 
(8) Industrial Development. 15 
(9) Civil Aviation. 25 
(10) Others, 49 
(including Meteorology, 
Broadcasting, Labour, 
Mining, resettlement, 
etc.) 
Total: 
Grand Total: 
183 
569 
Provincial 
(4) 
210 
210 
147 
123 
93 
99 
21 
83 
566 
776 
Total 
(5) 
280 
260 
56 
596 
186 
145 
114 
111 
36 
25 
132 
749 
1345 
Source: •Papers supplied to the Advisory Planning Board', G.o.I. Finance. 
Planning BJ'IQ1'ICh I. Fi.Zs no.12(12)-Pl/46. 
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unproductive', accounted for Rs.50 crores. Nearly 20 crores were to be spent 
on electric traction schemes and the proposed expenditure on rolling stock was 
Rs.50 crores. On the other hand the entire expenditure on railways wee to 
be balanced by increased revenue earnings from the users of the railways. 
Power and irrigation wee another scheme where the Centre was to partici-
pate in a big scale. The Centre understood that these two items could not be 
left entirely to provincial initiatives and responsibilities. Any major 
irrigation scheme, which would also include hydro-power projects, would 
require co-ordination and joint action on the part of several provinces. To 
facilitate co-ordination, the Centre had already set up, in 1944, the Central 
Technical Power Board (CTPB) and the Central Waterways, Irrigation and 
Navigation Commission (CWINC). 97 The CTPB was initially set up to give 
technical advice to t~e provinces. The scope of this Board was bro,adened to 
enable it to work together with CWINC in investigating 'regional projects' 
which traversed provincial boundaries. The five-year plans included five 
major projects where inter-provincial co-operation and co-ordination were 
necessary (see Table 2 below). 
TABLE 2 
Inter-Provincial Projects 
No. Name of Pro ect Electric Power 
acres n megawatts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) The Tungabhadra Project 300 120 
(2) The Mahanadi Project 2,500 200 
(3) The Oamodar Valley Project 800 300 
(4) The Kosi River Project 3,000 1,000 
(S) The Rihand Dam Project not estimated 250 
Source: G.O.I. Pinanas. PZanning BNMh I. Fite no.12(18)-Pl/46. 
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_In the first Project, mentioned above, Madras and Hyderabad were involved. 
The second one affected the Central Provinces and Orissa. Bengal and Bihar 
were involved in the third Project. For the Kosi River Project, co-operation 
was necessary between Nepal and Bihar, while the lest project was of interest 
to the U.P., Bihar, the C.P. and also some other Eastern States. Of these 
five projects the first two, the Tungabhadra and the Mahanadi Projects had 
reached a stage where work could be started shortly. The other Projects were 
still under consideration, and the Damodar Valley Project, in official 
opinion, 'presented thorny problems' as it involved the landed interests of 
both t~ngsl and Bihar. The aim of the Power and Irrigation plans, which 
included the provincial plans also, was to double the total Government sources 
of supply in irrigation from nearly 27 million acres to 55 million acres, in 
ten years' time. 98 
Apart from Power and Irrigation, the other fields in which the Centre 
had any departmental plan or prescribed policies were the Roads, Education, 
Health, Industry and Agriculture. The agricultural programme, popularly known 
as the Kharegat Report, was formulated by the Imperial Council of Agricultural 
Research. The Sargent Report on Education and the Bhore Committee's Report 
on Medical an~ Public Health were the bases for the respective subjects. 
Agriculture, Education and Health were all under a single Department at the 
Centre - the Department of Education, H•3lth and Lands. The Central schemes 
in these three fields for the first five-year plan were nominal. In 
Agriculture, Rs.22 crores were to be spent mainly setting up of colleges and 
research institutes in Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Fruit Technology and 
Fisheries - one in each. The other Central scheme was the Agricultural Price 
Stabilisation Scheme under which the Centre 'proposed to take measures to 
stabilise agricultural prices' by intervening in the m9rket 88 a buyer if 
necessary. But no detailed acheM under this heading was prepared 88 yet. 
The Provincial plalYling in Agriculture was under four broad categories: (a) 
········-------~--......... ---------...... 
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schemes for training and staff; (b) research schemes; (c) schemes for 
encouraging the use of improved seeds, manures and fertilisers, improved 
agricultural implements and farming techniques; and (d) minor irrigation 
schemes. Under the third of these categories (i.e. (c)), all provinces were 
to set up a number of demonstration, experimental and seed farms in every 
district. It may be noted that many of the agricultural projec.ts pursued in 
the 1950s and later - e.g. High Yielding Variety Projects, Intensive Area 
Development Projects, etc. - bore much resemblance to these plans. But the 
most striking aspect of the Agricultural Plan was the absence of any measure 
to change the land-tenure system. The Plan was aimed at impr1.~ing production 
and productivity simply by the introduction of improved technology. 99 
The Education and Health plans were characterised by an emphasis on 
higher technological and scientific researches. In Education, among other 
things, the Centre proposed to set up two higher technical institutions on 
the lines of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, U.S.A. This plan was 
later executed in Independent India by setting up the Indian Institute of 
Technology at Kharagpur, Delhi, Kanpur, etc. In Health, the main item of the 
Central proposal was to set up an Indian Medical Institute 'to be attached to 
the Delhi University which would provide for undergraduate and postgraduate 
training and advanced research 1 • 100 
Under Roads, the Centre had a plan prepared by the Road Engineers 
Conference held at Nagpur in 1944. The Central budget of Rs.39 crores was 
to be spent on building 787 miles of new National Highways end improving about 
5,420 miles of existing ones. The largest new National Highways, under the 
Central scheme, were to be undertaken in Biher (260 miles), Punjab (110 miles) 
and Bengal (100 miles). 101 
Railways, Irrigation and Power, Agriculture, Education and Health and 
Roads constituted 110re than 75 per cent of the total estimated Central 
expenditure for the five-year plan. We have already ..ntioned that the 
Oepart.nta concerned with these subjects were the only ones to have well 
,, 
l j 
l 
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chal~ed out programmes. As yet the Government of India could not produce any 
comprehensive All-India Plan assimilating all these departmental programmes. 
As a result there was hardly any plan for the period beyond the next five 
years. The Departmental plans had different time horizons. Railways had 
a seven-year plan with a social budget of Rs.319 crores. The Education Plan 
was for forty years but there was no estimat~ of capital expenditure beyond 
the first five years. The Bhore Committee's Report on Health was a 'long-
term' plan without s fixed time limit. The Roads and Transport Plan was for 
ten years. Only Agriculture and Post and Telegraphs Departments made any 
attempt to prepare their plans for a period of fifteen years - the period 
originally stipulated by the Reconstruction Committee. 102 
Thus the Government of India after more than five years of effort failed 
to produce any 'long-term' plan for the development of the Indian economy. 
Even for the 'short-term' period the Plan did not have any well-formulated 
policy. There was no declared statement on priorities for the plans that 
were sanctioned in 1946. We may recall that the initial idea, in 1941, was 
post-war 'reconstruction' with high emphasis on industrialisation. We have 
noticed how the idea of industrialising India was quietly dropped from plan 
programmes. As our summary of the important items in the Central plan shows, 
the major emphasis in the plan was on technological improvements and on 
researches. While these indicated recognition of certain long-standing needs, 
the plans, it must be said, showed no particular awareness of the problems of 
unemployment and economic slump that might immediately follow the war. The 
allotment of financial resources appears to have been determined mainly by 
the preparedness of the Departments. The Departments which had already 
prepared their own programmes got the lion's share of the resources. In sharp 
contrast to the expenditures on the subjects described above was the budget 
for the Labour Department. A paltry sum of Rs.20 crores, out of the total of 
1,345 crores, wu allotted lmder this heading which included (i) ache•• for 
-.-, 
~; ... . 
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the ~raining, resettlement and employment of ex-service personnel and 
discharged war workers, and (ii) 'other schemes mainly of the nature of Labour 
Welfare Schemes, e.g. Health Insurance, subsidised building of houses for 
labourers•. 103 Yet it was the 'training, resettlement and employment of ex-
service personnel and discharged war workers', which was supposed to be the 
first priority to the Reconstruction Committee when it was formed. When the 
plans were prepared, however, less than 1.5 per cent of the total budget was 
earmarked for this purpose and other labour welfare schemes. 
A great deal of effort was spent in this period by the Development 
Board and the Planning and Development Department in minutely scrutinising 
the financial details of the different governmental plans. In its final 
shape the total plan expenditure was estimated to be more than Rs.1,300 
crores. Yet precious little was thought about resource planning. Actually, 
it was only after all the plans - Central and Provincial - were finalised 
that it occurred to some Members of the Viceroy's Council that it was 
'essential to ascertain whether the necessary material resources for a programme 
of this sort were available'. Eric Coates, the finance Member, first raised 
the issue whereupon Arthur Waugh, the Member for Industries and Supplies warned 
the Council that the whole programme might break down because of the lack of 
supply of only one vital item - coa1. 104 This led the Council to decide to 
make an estimate of resources in two months' time. But the Interim Govern-
ment was formed before this work could be finished and the responsibility 
for implementing the plans now lay with the Indian nationalists. 
This brings us to the end of the history of British planning in India. 
The British had conceived the idea of planning first in 1930. After the first 
effort was aborted, the Government of India renewed its effort to produce a 
planned programme of economic development in 1941. Yet after five years of 
labour what the bureaucracy delivered was not of much consequence. The 
predicBMnt in which the Gover,..,nt found itself in the 1940s is, of course, 
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understandable. While the apparently increasing autonomy and Indianisation 
of the Executive Council and the bureaucracy had raised expectations regarding 
greater governmental involvement in the economic management of the country, 
the Government of India was not in a position to take any important decisions 
regarding economic or political matters independent of imperial intervention 
end, in some cases, dictation. 
This was indeed what led the authors of the Bombay Plan to argue that a 
'National Government' was imperative for successful economic planning. for no 
development of any kind would be feasible, they thought, 'except on the basis 
of a central directing authority which enjoys sufficient popular support and 
possesses the requisite powers end jurisdiction•. 105 Although such conviction 
did not stop the Indian bourgeoisie from urging the colonial Government to 
take up the cause of planning, the events showed the validity of their 
initial stance. It is also evident that the approach of the colonial govern-
ment to planning in India showed more signs of ad hoc thinking than of any 
comprehensive vision of a developed India. The British took up the idea of 
planning initially to find an economic solution to the political problems they 
faced. Even in the 'forties, planning, to them, was only a way of handling 
the impending post-war economic problems. There was no question of the 
colonial officialdom providing a leadership which could enthuse and direct 
the bureaucracy to take up the issue in real earnest. The appointment of 
Dalal was just such en attempt by Wevell to provide this leadership. With 
Dalal's failure, planning was reduced to the position of only one of several 
tasks for the bureaucracy. They performed this task in a routine bureau-
cratic manner where all the departments, both at the Centre and at the 
provincial level, compiled their separate estimates and produced some 
impressive paper work. However, as we have seen, when these plans were 
finalised, they lacked any overall unity or cohesion and did not have any 
comprehensive policy behind them to define a target which the government could 
strive to reach. 
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SECTluN 4: The Revival of the National Planning Sommittee 
While the Development Board in Delhi was finalising the Central enJ 
provincial plans, the political situation in India end in Britain underwent 
some veLy important changes. In July 1945 the Labour Party in the U.K. 
registered a 'land-slide' victory in the general election and Churchill's 
Coalition was replaced by Attlee's Labour Government. Unlike Churchill, 
Attlee and his Cabinet colleagues were eager to find ~ political solution to 
the Indian problem. 106 Soon after the British general election Wavell 
announced elections to be held in India in the coming winter. Both the 
Congress and the Muslim League won massive electoral victo~ies in the election 
held in March 1946 and between them shared 87 out of 102 seats in the Central 
Assembly - the Congress 57 and the League 3o. 107 By September 1946 the 
Congress had formed the first Interim Government. The League joined a month 
later end in another few months' time India appeared to be divided into two 
nations. Indian nationalists and Nehru in particular now revived their 
interest in planning and even the short-lived Interim Government initiated 
certain measures which were to have an impact on the future of planning in 
India. 
Nehru and the other members of the Congress Working Committee, who had 
been arrested during the 1942 Quit India movement, were released by the 
Viceroy's order in June 1945 so that they could attend the proposed Simla 
Conference between the Government of India and Indian political parties. 
Soon after his release, Nehru established contact with K.T. Shah in order to 
revive the National Planning Committee which was in a dormant state since 1940. 
Nehru met Shah in Bombay in June 1945 on his way to the Simla Conference 
end decided to resume the work of the N.P.C. In September an 'informal 
meeting' of the N.P.C. was held in Bombay. 108 The members of the N.P.C. and 
the sub-COllllRitteea who attended these meetings included, apart from Nehru 
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and ~heh, Shuaib Qureshi, Ambalal Sarabhai, Nazir Ahmed and J.K. Mehta. 
J.R.D. Tata and John Matthai - the two main authors of the Bombay Plan - were 
also present in the meetings as special inviteea. 108 The meetings decided to 
ask all the sub-committees which had not yet submitted their reports to do 
so.by March 1946 and generally to resume their work. 
At the end of the second informal meeting of the N.P.C. Nehru issued a 
press statement which clearly reveals the technocratic spirit of his approach 
to planning. 'Ever since we began the work of the Planning Committee', Nehru 
said in his statement, 'our work has been hanfJered by the lack of reliable 
data and statistics and other materials relating to various subjects under 
consideration' [emphasis added]. He suggested that the Government of India 
should furnish the N.P.C. with ell the data and materials collected by the 
various panels appointed by the Reconstruction Committee and the Planning 
and Development Oepertment. 110 
To blame the lack of data and statistics and not the political situation 
as the main hurdle in the way of the N.P.C. was consistent with Nehru's view 
that planning was only a matter of 'quiet' and 'expert' work by scientists, 
economists and leaders of industries. The process of economic planning, 
regarded thus es being neutral to politics, highlighted once again the 
separation between the political and the economic that had always character-
ised Nehru's sociology of planning. .. 
The informal meetings held in September 1945 resulted in the formation 
of a Sub-Committee consisting of C.V. Mehta, A.O. Shroff, Manu Subedar and 
John Matthai with K.T. Shah as the Convenor. The purpose of this Sub-
committee was to prepare, before the next meeting of the N.P.C., a li~t of 
priorities for the latter after taking due account of all the changes and 
developments that had taken place during the period when it was unable to 
f t . t• l 111 unc ion ac ive y. 
The Sub-COllRittee 11eetinga were held in October 1945 and reiterated the 
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N.P.C. stand on the priority of industrialisation in Indian planning. It also 
reaffirmed that 'heavy' and defence industries should be developed only under 
the state aegis and that the state should exercise control over all industries 
through fiscal policy and price fixation of important industrial and 
agricultural products. Emphasis was also placed on industrial and techno-
logical research initiated by the state. It was decided that the state should 
encourage and subsidise research programmes carried out by the industries. 
The state, it was assumed, 'would be a federal democracy in which the 
claims of the several federating units, whether provinces, states or regions 
would be impossible to ignore'. 
Interestingly, while the Sub-Committee deliberated at greet length on 
the need for industrial planning end concomitant technological research 
programmes, it was unwilling to consider Agricultural Policy in any comparable 
detail. The only conclusion arrived at was that priority should be given to 
bring all the cultivable waste land under the plough, and that 'the economic 
organisation best suited for developing such land most effectively, collective, 
co-operative or individualist, must be the province of the appropriate Sub-
Committee dealing with the matter to consider and advise upon•. 112 
The first full and formal session of the revived N.P.C. was held in 
Bont>ay from 8 to 10 November 1945. 113 This formal meeting accepted the 
Report of the Priorities Sub-Committee discussed above and instructed the 
Sub-Committees to incorporate the suggestions made in this Report. The N.P.C. 
decided to hold its next meeting within a few months' time. 114 
However, no further meeting of the N.P.C. was held before December 1946. 
Since the election victory of the Congress in March 1946 Nehru had been too 
busy to spare any time for the N.P.c. 115 By October however he had already 
set up the Advisory Planning Board to review the work done by the Central 
and provincial governments as well as by non-official agencies like the 
N.P.C. and industrialists. In Decelllber 1946 the N.P.C. was finally abolished 
~~~~~--------------.... ~ 
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and K.T. Shah was empowered to publish the Reports of the Sub-Committees, 
with a view to informing Indian public opinion about the work done by the 
N.P.c. 116 A crucial chapter in the history of planning in India was thus 
closed by the end of 1946. After that date nationalist planning in India 
took the form of official planning. 
SECTION 5: The Advisory Planning Board 
When the Congress formed the first Interim Government on 2 September 
1946, the very name of this Goverrvnent suggested that it was of a transitory 
nature leading, hopefully, to complete independence "' the near future. Vet 
the mood in the country was not one of joy. With the recent outburst of ugly 
:iots in Bengal and Bihar, the holocaust of communal strife on a sub-
continental scale was a possibility too real to be overlooked. The problem 
was made more complex by the Muslim League's refusal to join the Cabinet of 
the Interim Government. Congress leaders were now busy travelling across the 
country trying in vain to bring about communal harmony in order to avoid 
further bloodshed. 
Vet, when the Congrese formed the Interim Government it lost no time in 
setting up the Advisory Planning Board. The Government was formed on 2 
September 1946 and by early October the Board had already started furction-
ing.117 The setting up of this Board itself is a testimony to the importance 
that the Congress attached to the idea of planning. 
Not unexpectedly, Nehru played th~~~ing role in instituting the 
Advisory Planning Board. Officially he was in charge of External Affairs and 
Commonwealth Relations in the Interim Government. Although the home ministry 
was under Patel and Industries and Supply was headed by C. Rajagopalachari, 118 
the two members of the Congress-nominated Cabinet who were directly associated 
.. 
with the Board were John Matthai, Finance Minister,, and Nehru himself. The 
~~~~-----------........ 
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'primary object of the preliminary meeting' of the Board 'was to welcome 
Pandit Nehru and Dr Matthai and seek their guirlance as regards action that 
should be taken'. 119 
Planning remained the supreme priority in Nehru's vision of the role of 
a 'national Government'. This is evident also from the records of his 
meeting with Wavell even before the Interim r.overnment was announced. After 
the Congress decided to join the Interim Government, the two had met to 
discuss matters related to governmental institutions. Planning figured most 
prominently in Nehru's first interview with Wavell. Immediately after 
discussing the issue of communal strife which both saw as 'law and order 
problems' to be contained by a 'resolute and decisive Government', Nehru 
asked Wavell 'a number of questions about the working of Council, especially 
as regards planning and talked about the scientific rather than bureau-
cratic approach' to the subject. 120 
Nehru's ideas about planning underwent a change between 1936, when 
he first spoke of planning, and 1946, when he took his first executive step 
towards it. The flamboyant socialistic utterings of the early years were now 
replaced by a pragmatic 'scientific approach'. His choice of John Matthai 
as his associate in initiating the plan process under the Interim Government 
was not fortuitous. As we have mentioned before, Matthai and Tata were 
invited to join the first meeting of the N.P.C. when Nehru tried to revive it 
in 1945. Matthai was included in the Interim Government not only because he 
represented the Christian minority, but also because the Congress wanted an 
.. 
economist to be in charge of Finance •121 It is interesting that while in 
1938 the Congress had sought out academics with nationalist and Congress 
background as experts in the N.P.C., in 1946 a non-Congress bureaucrat was 
chosen in their stead. Matthai, after spending the first three years of his 
career as a teacher in the Madras University in 1922-25, served the Government 
of India in different positions up to 1940 when he retired to join the Tates. 
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It i~ not insignificant that he was also Wavell's choice when, in June 
1946, the Viceroy was planning to instal a nominated Interim Government under 
Cabinet Mission's plan. 122 
The change from idealism to pragmatism in Nehru's approach to planning 
is also evident in the composition of the Advisory Planning Board in 1946. 
His erstwhile colleagues in the N.P.C. were now being gradually replaced by 
a new set of people known more for their 'expertise' than for their political 
c0111nitment to any brand of socialism. The Advisory Planning Board waa 
constituted of fourteen members. Of these, six were Central Government 
officials, all melllbers of the Development Board, and one State Representative 
from Bhopal. Of the rest, I<. T. Shah and Heghnad Saha were the only two who 
were in the original COIMlittee of the N.P.c. 12' Heghnad Saha, however, did 
not attend any Board meeting of the newly formed A.P.B., His association with 
it was confined to meetings of a sub-cOIMlittee on the 'future machinery of 
planning•. 124 
l<.T. Shah and Heghnad Saha were the two members of the N.P.C. who were 
known, not only for their academic standing but also for their socialist 
leanings. However, their association with Nehruvian planning ended in 1946. 
Saha soon fell out of Nehru's favour. S.S. Bhatnagar and Homi Bhabha were 
the new scientists to come close to Nehru. There was no love lost between 
Bhatnagar and Bhabha on the one hand and Saha on the other. Subsequently, he 
was to accuse the former of having influenced Nehru against him and remind 
Nehru that people like Bhatnagar and Bhabha had chosen to serve the British 
when they were invited to join the N.P.c. 125 l<.T. Shah also did not remain 
in Nehru's good book for long. He soon joined the socialist opposition to the 
Congress and later on, in 1952, stood as the opposition candidate against 
Rajendra Prasad in the first election for the Presidentship of Independent 
India. 126 
The inclusion of K.T. Shllh and Meghnad Saha, in the Advisory Planning 
261 
Board, however, cannot be viewed as a 'socialist' bias in Nehru's choice of 
. 
melllbers for the Board. Shah was the General Secretary of the N.P.C. and hence 
almost an aut011Btic choice. Meghnad Saha also could not be left out of the 
Board. A founder-member of the N.P.C., he had played a key role in its 
127 formative stage. On the contrary, the choice of K.C. Neogy as the Chairman 
of the Board and John Matthai as the Finance Member in the Interim Government 
was an index of the new developments. We have already discussed the background 
to Matthai'a selection. Neogy Wl'J an astute politician and a member of the 
Legislative Aaaembly of Bengal. He was known to the British officials as an 
'independent-minded' Congreaaman, 128 who waa 'not at all nappy in the Congress 
fold 1 • 129 He, too, like Matthai, figured prominently in Wavell's list of 
names for the proposed Interim Government in June 1946. 130 
The Advisory Planning Board started its work in November 1946 and 
submitted its report before the end of the year. Its terRtS of reference 
included a review of the planning already done by the Government and a survey 
of the work of the N.P.C. a9 well as of the Bombay Plan and other plans and 
proposals for planning - all to be undertaken with a view to advising the 
Government of India on the subject of planning objectives and priorities and 
the co-ordination, improvement and future machinery required for the purpose. 131 
When the Advisory Planning Board set out to work, sharp divisions of opinion 
surfaced among the members on almost all major issues, and the final Report 
' contained notes of dissent from a8 many aa four med>era: Neogy (the Chairman 
himself), Shah, Mehta and Kharegat. 132 
The Report of the A.P.8. recommended the general objectivda outlined in 
the Second Report of the Reconstruction Committee of Council. Broadly 
speaking these were •to raise the general standard of living of the people 
as a whole and to ensure useful e111Ployment for all'. To attain these, it was 
SUCJgeated that the 'resources of the country should be developed to the 
•xi- extent ponible Md thet the walth produced ehould be distributed in 
---------~-----------------.. 
262 
an equitable manner' both among people and between the regions. 133 The Board 
refrained from suggesting anything quantifying the objectives, because the 
required 'k;lowledge and statistics' were not there, but recommended that the 
targets set by the N.P.C. and the Bombay Plan should be kept in mind by the 
planners. The need ~o increase the supply of trained technical personnel 
was designated by the Board as 'Priority No.l'. It acknowledged that although 
there had to be 'a simultaneous advance in all fields', the emphasis in 
the initial stages must be on 'increased production'. It advised the 
Government to set up a 'Priority Board' for the allocation of scarce resources, 
both material and human, to productive purposes. 134 In this regard it accepted 
the assessment done by the Development Board in the 'Resource Budget' prepared 
under the direction of Council. Coal, steel, timber and cement were identified 
as the major scarce resources, apart from technical personnel. The A.P.B. 
warned that serious bottlenecks could appear in the process of planning unless 
a 'Priority Board' controlled the allocation of these resources. The Board 
also made some general recommendations in relation to finance, agriculture and 
other subjects. Its recommendations for 'action' as distinct from those in 
respect to 'general policy' were confined to Future Machinery of Planning, 
River Development and Electric Power Projects, Industries, Mining and Supply of 
Trained Personnel. 
On the subject of 'finance' it discouraged deficit financing and 
expessed itself in favour of increased taxation and borrowing as the chief means 
for plugging the gap between revenue and expenditure. It was hopeful that the 
Government would be able to use the sterling assets to import the necessary 
capital equipments. On Agriculture, its suggestions followed that of the 
Kharegat Report. It spoke of the need to develop the sense of co-operation 
among the cultivators but refrained from suggesting anything on the land-tenure 
system. 135 
In fact the question of land-syste111 cropped up during the 11188tinga of 
the Board. In the course of dillCU8sion on irrigation projects, Narahari Rao, 
.~~~--------------~ .. 
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Finance Secretary, suggested that the problem of land tenure should be taken up 
by the Board urgently. Even if the general question of land policy could not 
be discussed in a short time, the problem relating to the areas which would be 
brought under cultivation as a result of new irrigation projects shoulr not 
be left unsettled. In such areas it would be necessary, he believed, to evolve 
a land-tenure system so as to ensure that no unearned income accrued to the 
landlords as a result of the new schemes. However, the consensus of the Board 
was in favour of leaving the land question out of its purview. 136 The Board's 
recommendations on the machinery of planning were as followa: 137 
1. Appointment of a Planning Con111isaion of 3 to 5 members under the 
Central Government. 138 
2. Appointment of a Consultative Body of 25 to 30 members consisting 
of scientists, economists, industrialists, etc. 
3. Establishment of a Central Statistical Office. 
4. The Tariff Board set up ~y the Government of India in 1945 to be 
placed on a permanent basis with wider functions. 
5. Establishment in the Provinces organisations similar to 1 and 2 above. 
6. Establishment in each district of an executive machinery for 
plan programmes. 
7. Selection of areas for comprehensive development programmes on 
an experimental basis. 
8. Early appointment of a Priority Board. 
It laid down some of the principles for the composition of the Planning 
Con111ission and suggested that no Minister should be a member of the Con111ission 
so that it remained directly responsible to the entire Cabinet rather than to 
a single Minister. If a five-member Con111ission were to be set up, the 
Chairman should be •a person of standing and general experience of public 
affairs'. Two non-officials with knowledge and experience of industry, 
agriculture and labour, a Governlll80t official 'with knowledge and experience 
of finance and general adlliniatration' and a person '•inent in the field of 
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Science and Technology' should comprise the rest. for a three-member 
Conwnission the Board would recommend apart from the Chairman, one non-official 
for Industry and an official with knowledge and experience of finance. 139 
The Board's emphasis on the need for members with expertise in Industry 
and finance was directly related to its view on the role of the Central 
Government in economic planning. It accepted the stand of the R.C.C., the 
Planning and Development Department and the Development Board that, given 
the Constitution of 1935, the Centre could exercise control over planning 
mainly through financial measures, and that most of the industries had to be 
brought under Central control or responsibility. The Board was also of the 
opinion that Central plannning was P.specially required in the field of 
industries. It was understood that issues like agriculture, education and 
health would have to be left to the provinces in future constitutions, 
because of the diverse characteristics of the different regions of India. 140 
On industries, as we have seen, the major recommendations of the Board 
were to bring certain industries under Central control by legislation and 
to consider the nationalisation of industries. 141 A glance at a list 
prepared by the Board makes it evident that excepting jute, tea, and paper 
almost all large-scale industries were considered by it as proper objects 
of central planning. The Board's view on nationalisation was that, apart 
from Defence Industries and 'any industry where private capital was 
reluctant to invest', the industries which should come under state ownership 
should include coal, mineral oils, iron and steel, motor and air and river 
142 transport. 
In view of the possible shortage of raw materials and capital equip-
ments, it asked the Government to give priority in resource allocations to 
Defence Industries and industries connected with food, clothing and housing 
and to coal and transport. Irrigation and hydro-electric power, iron and 
steel, and chellicala were all to rank second, and the manufacture of 
llBChinery third, in order of preference. One of ita •Jor reconnendations 
on irrigation was to set up a statutory authority to evolve and execute a 
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plan for the Damodar Valley project which was considered most crucial for 
eastern India. 
The Board was in favour of strict restrictions in the matter of foreign 
investment. Foreign firms were to be allowed to operate only when techno-
logically necessary and after sufficient provisions were made to train Indians 
to take over in the not too distant future. The goods which the country 
could not produce at the time but could be in a position to produce later on, 
should not be allowed to be produced by foreign firms in India. It was 
preferable to import the items to keep the field open to the Indian enter-
prise.143 In brief, the recommendation of the Advisory Planning Board 
duplicated the Industrial Policy of the Government of India declared in 1945. 
It was on the issue of nationalisation of industries that the members 
of the Board were sharply divided. The notes of dissent by Neogy and Mehta 
related to this very topic. The former held the view that 'in the interest 
of rapid industrialisation', nationalisation should not be made a condition 
in any sphere of economic activity, and private enterprise should be 
encouraged for speeding up industrial progress leaving it open to Govern-
ment to acquire such industries as may be found appropriate and desirable 
at a later date•. 144 Mehta was opposed to any idea whatsoever of state 
ownership and management of industries and wanted state intervention only 
whe t •t 1 t f th . 
145 
re priva e cap1 a was no or coming. 
The dissent of Shah and Kharegat was of a different nature. Both 
agreed that the existing plans approved by the Go~ernment of India dealt 
with only particular aspects of planning and all these needed to be 
integrated into a broad 'master' plan of development equipped with m!thods 
for its proper execution and a 'sound system of financing of plans and pilot 
programmes•. 146 Beyond this, however, Shah's objection extended to funda-
mentals. He reiterated the need for national 'self-sufficiency' ea the 
primary objectivt and submitted on this point a note lengthier than the Board's 
actual Report. His 11ain contentions wee as 11U11111Briaed below. 
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Shah used the documents of the N.P.C. copiously to criticise all the 
basic premises on which the A.P.B. worked. Apart from emphasising the 
objective of national self-sufficiency which had been ignored by the Board, 
his other important criticism also related to the question of nationalisation 
of industries. The Board was of the view that if the state attempted to 
take the ownership and management of a large range of industries into its own 
hands, the industrial development of the country would be hindered. It was 
on this basis that it restricted its recommendations for nationalisation 
only to the Defence Industries and certain other essential industriea. Shah 
differed radically with the rest of the members of the Board on this issue. 
It was his opinion that the industrialisation of the country could be rapidly 
promoted, rather than retarded, 'by a policy of planned, intensive, universal 
socialisation'. He would not confine the programme of nationalisation to 
'basic industries' or Defence Industries only, but 'extend the regime to 
every item in the field of production•. 147 
The programme of nationalisation according to him, was to include not 
only 'industries' in the narrow sense of the term but also agriculture, 
services and the 'utilities'. He used the terms 'nationalisation' and 
'socialisation' synonymously to 'apply to all enterprises, conducted by any 
public authority, Central Government, Provincial and State Government, 
Municipal or other local government or a Statutory Commission•.
148 
He 
believed that private enterprise 'working on profit motive ••• would try to 
secure for itself the most profitable branches of productive organisation 
leaving to the community collectively those which are non-productive or 
burdensome'. As against that under a 'socialised economy' the deficits in 
some sectors which worked for services or benefit to the community would be 
balanced by other items bringing a net surplus to the community. 
It is to be noted here that Shah's argument did not represent the 
majority view of the N.P.C. either. It was the view of the 'left nation-
alist' ainority in the N.P.C. that he elaborated in his 'note' to the A.P.B. 
Report. tttat he defllanded was a plan model replicating the Soviet system 
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of planning. But he was aware of the problem associated with his concept 
of planning in a democratic set-up of the kind envisaged by Indian 
nationalism. His way of dealing with this problem was to advise that the 
planning machinery should be set up under legislation and not by executive 
order. If all the general issues of basic policy of planning were referred 
to the people in the form of certain categoric propositions at the time of a 
general election, he wrote, 'so as to secure the all-important sanction 
and approval of the real sovereign in a Democracy', then a plan machinery 
could be set up at the Centre with similar organisations at the provincial 
levels under legislative sanctions. Both advisory and executive power could 
be devolved on ~uch a machinery to formulate and oversee a plan process 
with fixed targets and objectives. In short, his observation implied that 
if the political authority wanted to implement the policy of planning with 
the total nationalisation or socialisation of the productive system, the 
federal democratic system envisaged by the nationalists would not impede 
the process. 149 
K.T. Shah's note was essentially in discord with the dominant strand 
of the idea of planning in India. Excepting the People's Plan no other 
plan programme ever considered total nationalisation as an issue. The basic 
premise always had been that private capital would continue to play its 
role in the economy. All the debates on the role of the state were concerned 
with the extent of its influence on private capital. Given the situation, 
Shah's note remained a largely academic exercise. 
The main Report of the Advisory Planning Board, on the other hand, 
reflected the points of view held in common by the overwhelming majority 
of elite nationalists and the Government bureaucracy. The members of the 
Board who signed the Report without any modification were Zekir Hussein, 
Shuaib Qureshi and five of the six Government officials. Pheroze Kharegat, 
the only Government official who dissented, had already shown his difference 
in the meetings of the Oevelopwent Board too. He had consistently been of 
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the view that the Government needed a well worked out and comprehensive Plan 
to initiate any programme. Given the composition of the A.P.B., however, 
the ideological slant of the Report was predictable. It stood for a con-
vergence of ideas held by Indian industrialists and nationalists as well as 
by the British Government regarding the path India should follow in her quest 
for socio-economic development. The choice of the Members for this Board, 
on the other hand, speaks eloquently about Nehru's, as well as the Congress 
leadership's attitude to planning. From the very beginning of its rule, the 
Congress found it helpful to depend on the bureaucracy - the same bureau-
cracy that had served the British so well - to evaluate and formulate 
developmental programmes which were supposed to be a measure of India's 
independence from colonial bondage. Since it regarded planning as 
essentially a technique to be discussed and determined by the experts, the 
ruling party and Nehru, its leader most concerned with planning, had no 
difficulty in finding the 'best' people equipped with the necessary expertise 
among the bureaucrats who had worked on the subject for so many years. The 
composition of the Board proves that contrary to what some historians have 
150 argued, Nehru, when it came to forming the A.P.B., showed a distinct 
preference for the burea!Jcrats and promoted them over the heads of his former 
colleagues in the N.P.C. It was the 'sheer efficiency' of the bureaucrats 
151 
which apparently 'appealed' to Nehru. This, taken together with the 
choice of K.C. Neogy as the Chairman, goes to indicate that Nehruvian 
socialism, whatever it might have been, had rather little to do with what 
is usually understood as socialist planning. 
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CHAPTER YI 
ECONCl4IC POLICY Of" THE CONGRESS ANO fIRST 
STEPS TOWARDS PLANNING, 1946-51 
SECTION 1: Liaquat Ali Khan's Budget 
The date 15 August 1947 officially marked the end of British rule in 
the Indian sub-continent. But it wee during the period of the Interim 
Government that the Congress showed strong indications of the socio-economic 
policies it would pursue es the ruling power in future. The sho~t period 
of the Interim Government of 1946-47 reveals for us two important aspects 
of Nehru's end the Congress's views regarding the role of the state in 
socio-economic change. One of these related to the importance that the 
Congress attached to the notion of planning end this was reflected in the 
formation of the Advisory Planning Board. The Congress stand on the Budget 
of 1946-47 prepared by Liac;·1at Ali Khan, the first Indian in charge of 
finance of the Government of India, indicated its attitude towards the 
Indian capitalist class. This other aspect is discussed in this section. 
The Muslim League joined the government in Novembe~ 1946, nearly two 
months after the Congress had formed the Government. The League's parti-
cipation necessitated a redistribution of Government portfolios. The league 
demanded at least one of the major portfolios like Home, Defence or finance. 
Wavell suggested to the Congress to give up the Home Department which Patel 
strongly refused to part with. As an alternative, it offered the finance 
portfolio to the League hoping that uecause of the technical nature of the 
subject, the letter would either decline the offer or 'soon make a fool of 
themselves in case they accepted it•. 1 In this judgement the Congress 
leaders proved entirely wrong. Muslim League not only accepted the finance '· 
portfolio but Liaquat Ali Khan, its nominee to that post, performed his 
task so well that the Congress waa later to regret its own decision. 
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The relation between the Congress and the League Members in the 
Government was never congenial. It is not only that Liaquat Ali Khan used 
the key position of Finance effectively enough to intervene in the works of 
all those Departments which were headed by the Congress members, but he gave 
the Congress a 'shock' when he presented the Budget for the year 1947-48 to 
the Legislative Assembly. 2 
As we have seen before, removal of economic inequalities and transition 
to a socialist pattern of society were stated as the two major objectives 
of Congress policy since at least 1929. Its election manifesto of 1946 also 
reflected this emphasis. 3 Moreover, during and after the war, the Congress, 
through its leaders like Nehru and Azad, had publicly denounced those 
industrialists and businessmen who had taken advantage of the war situation 
to make money through · ... ,fiteering. It had in fact demanded strong action 
from the Government against these people who had not only earned excess 
profit during the war but also evaded a large amount of income tax by 
avoiding disclosure of their earnings. 4 
Liaquat Ali Khan apparently took the Congress at its words and framed 
a budget ostensibly based on Congress declarations. He introduced proposals 
to impose new taxes on husiness activities and to appoint a Commission to 
enquire into allegations regarding unpaid taxes end devise possible means 
of their recovery from businessmen end industrialists. He openly said that 
his proposals were based on the declarations of responsible Congress leaders, 
and 'admitted that but for the statements that Jawaharlal had made, he might 
never have thought about the matter•. 5 Before discussing Congress response 
to Liequat's Budget we may consider here the broad features of this Budget. 
Liaquat's Budget estimatated a total expenditure of Rs.327.88 crores 
against an estimated total revenue of Rs.279.42 crores at the level of 
exi·.ting taxation. This would leave a prospective gap of Rs.48.46 crores 
as a deficit for the year 1947-48.6 But, in deference to the long-standing 
demand of Indian nationalists, Liaquat proposed the abolition of the Salt 
Tax. This, in his assessment, would entail a loss of Rs.B.25 crores as 
revenue. He also raised the minimum level of income for taxation from 
Rs.2,000 to Rs.2,500 per annum, leading to a further loss of revenue of 
Rs.25 lakhs. Thus the total deficit in his Budget amounted to nearly Rs.47 
crores. 
To meet the hudgetary deficit, he proposed some new taxes direct, as 
well as indirect, eimed at extracting revenue from big business, both 
Indian and foreign-owned. The most important of these was a special income 
tax of 25 per cent of business profits exceeding Rs.100,000 per annum. He 
emphasised that the minimum level of Rs.100,000 corresponded to the 
'standard profit' defined by the Excess Profits Tax Act introduced by the 
Government during the war years. The yield revenue under this heading was 
estimated at Rs.JO crores for the budgetary year. 
The second direct tax proposed was a capital gains tax to yield a 
further revenue of Rs.315 crores. This tax was aimed against those who were 
making quick money by transfer of capital assets which had undergone rapid 
revaluation due to the war situation. To spare ordinary individuals with 
moderate asset holdings, Liaquat proposed a relief from the taxation of 
profits made from capital transfer up to Rs.5,00 a year. The proposal also 
distinguished between gains made from the disposal of capital assets neld 
for two years or less and those held for more than two years. The letter 
were exempted from the 'super-tax'. 
Yet another direct tax devised to yield further revenue was the 
corporation tax. This was increased from one anna to two annas (i.e. from 
~ 
1/16 to 1/8 of a rupee) to yield Rs.4 crores for the year. While raising the 
minimum level from Rs.2,000 to Rs.2,500, Liaquat also intended to change the 
structure of super-tax rates applicable to high individual incomes. The 
t:·Aisting maximum rate of 62 per cent super-tax was applicable beyond 
Rs.350,000 for unearned income and beyond Rs.500,000 for earned income. He 
l 
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proposed to lower this limit to the level of Rs.120,000 for the unearned 
income and Rs.150,000 for the latter. Thia, he estimated could yield an 
additional revenue of Ra.2.5 crores for the year. 7 
Among the indirect taxes, it was proposed to increase the export duty 
on tea from two annas to four annas (from 12.5 per cent to 25 per cent of 
a rupee) per pound. This was estimated to yield additional revenue to the 
extent of Rs.4 crores, but as pointed out by the Finance Minister, the duty 
was of a 'temporary nature' and it might be necessary to reduce the rate if 
there was any danger of curtailment of India's exports of tea due to this 
B duty. 
While the abolition of the Salt Tax and increasing the minimum level of 
income for taxation were intended to bring some relief to the poorer sections 
of the population, Liaquat's new tsxes were directed against big business 
and other excessively wealthy people. In fact he had another arrow pointed 
at big business. Archibald Rowland, the last British Finance Member, had 
imposed in the preceding year a new tax on business dividend aimed not so 
much at raising revenue as at discouraging the dissipation of a company's 
resources through payments of excessive dividends. Under Rowland's scheme, 
62 per cent of the earnings of a company were allowed for dividends. Liaquat 
intended to decrease this rate to 42 per cent through taxation. No yield 
was estimated from this tax on dividend as the measure was a deterrent one, 
and it was expected that the companies would keep their dividend within the 
limit to avoid paying this tax. 
The total amount of extra revenue expected from all these new taxes 
was estimated to be nearly 40 crores of rupees leaving a deficit of Rs.16 
crores in balance. Liaquat's Budget really stirred up the entire business 
community, both Indian and British, who were soon up in arms against him. 
The stock exchanges in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were closed indefinitely 
in protest against the tax proposals. 9 The big business houses, and the 
Press under their control, denounced the Budget RS a 111Urderous one intended 
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to destroy the economy by choking off all business activities in the 
. 10 
country. The Budget was so obviously directed against big business that 
the reaction of the latter was hardly surprising. We do not intend analysing 
the merits or demerits of that Budget here. The Finance Minister in fact 
defended his case very ~.~11 indeed in the Assembly. 11 However, what is more 
relevant for the purpose of our present argument is to study the Congress's 
reaction to the proposals contained in Liaquat's Budget. 
Before framing his Budget, Liaquat had discussed its underlying 
principles with his Cabinet colleagues. He had pointed out that his 
principles were based on the declarations of the Congress leaders against 
profiteering by the big business, and the Congress Members had found no 
difficulty in approving them. After preparing the Budget, Liaquat, on 
Wavell's advice, discussed it with Nehru and Matthai, and both of them 
appeared to be in agreement with the proposals. 12 By convention, the Budget 
was placed before the Cabinet the day before its presentation to the 
Assembly. Apparently the proposals 'went down quite well' at the Cabinet 
meeting. 13 But once the Budget was published and the reaction of big business 
was known, the Congress members in the Cabinet changed their attitude. 
The leaders of the Congress now came out in public to denounce the 
Budget as a 'clever device' for discrediting the Congress by giving a 'most 
unpractical turn to both the Congress demands; that is, those for Governmental 
action against profiteering and tax evasion' 14 Liaquat's taxation measures, 
they argued, 'would have impoverished all rich men and done permanent damage 
to Commerce and lnduetry'. Congress leaders like Patel and Rajagopalachari 
were violently opposed to the Budget and felt that Liaquat was 'more concerned 
to harass industrialists and businessmen than to serve the interests of the 
country'. They even charged that the Budget was based on communal 
considerations motivated to harm the members of the business community, the 
majority of whom were Hindus! 15 Many other Congress leaders who participated 
in the discussions on the Budget in the Assembly spoke in similar terms in 
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defence of business intereets. 16 
The reaction of the right-wing elements in the Congress leadership 
like Patel and Rajagopalachari was not suprising. They were well known for 
their pro-capitalist views. The reactions of the socialists in the Congress 
were also predicatable. They were clearly happy with what a section of the 
Press called 'the poor man's Budget•. 17 But surprising indeed was the 
reaction of Nehru, the champion of Congress socialism, who now joined Peel 
and Bhabha in writing to the Viceroy a few days after the Budget was 
published, dissenting from the record of the Cabinet meeting that had earlier 
endorsed it. This was, of course, a desperate move by the Congress leader-
ship, including Nehru, to deny their responsibility, as Cabinet members, of 
defending the Budget. Liaquat, on t.ha other hand, legitimately claimed that 
the Budget was the responsibility of the entire Cabinet and not of the 
Finance Member alone. 18 
The Budget was of course supported wholeheartedly by all the Muslim 
League members of the Cabinet and the Assembly. Many of the Congress 'back-
benchers' also lent their support to this 'poor man's budget'. But the only 
non-League Cabinet member to defend it in public was John Matthai. In his 
speech in the Assembly he pointed out that in spite of the new proposed 
taxes the burden of direct taxation upon industry and trade was actually 
Rs.40 crores less than the burden in the previous year. He challenged the 
contention of its critics that the tax rates would discourage new investment 
by lowering the expected rate of return to capital. He also warned the 
business community that if private enterprise put their money into business 
at much higher rates than the Govern~ent could allow, the~ 'the country 
would have to face seriously the question whether it [was] in its interest 
to continue .private enterprise; whether it [was] in its interest that 
capitalism Rhould have a longer lease of life•. 19 
Liaquat did not succeed in getting his tax proposals approved by the 
Assembly without modification. In the face of stiff opposition from the 
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supporters of big business, he himself suggested that the Tax Bills be sent 
up to a Select Committee of the Legislature for further examination. 20 
The business-related interest-groups tried to manipulate the Select Committee 
but failed. 21 The Committee approved the Bills with minor modifications 
to the proposals for the tax on business profits. Even this did not solve 
the problem for Liaquat. Many of the supporters of big business within 
the Congress Party in the Assembly appeared to be determined to oppose 
the Bill. After its defeat in the Select Committee, the Congress was anxious 
to avoid any further loss of face and a possible split within its ranks 
on this issue. It now demanded a new discussion in the Cabinet on 
Liaquat's proposals. The latter objected to reopening the discussion in 
the Cabinet but had to agree to the Viceroy's advice to the effect that he 
should have informal talks with his Cabinet colleagues. 22 
Big business continued to mount pressure on Liaquat through the 
Congress. 23 Ultimately, he was compelled to accept drastic modifications 
which reduced the anticipated yield of the new taxes by over SO per cent. 
The chief modification made was in his tax proposal on business profits. 
The tax abatement of Rs.l lakh, as proposed initially, was replaced by 
an abatement of 6 per cent on capital, and the tax rate was reduced from 
25 per ~ent of the profit to 16.75 per cent on residue profit after abate-
ment. The exemption limit for capital gains tax was also raised from Rs.S,000 
24 to Rs.lS,000. 
The controversy over Liequat Ali Khan's Budget proposals exposed very 
clearly the stand of the dominant leadership of the Congress on the question 
of socio-econoic reforms. Whatever might have been Liaquat's 'reel' 
intention in proposing such an anti-capitalist budget - Maulana Azad thought 
it was to discredit the Congress - his public declarations were aimed at 
moral and social objectives of a progressive nature. He opened his Budget 
speech by saying that unlike his predecessors - the British Finance 
Members - he did not take his task rnerely as that of balancing revenue and 
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expenditure, but to even out the glaring disparities between the income 
lev~ls of the few who were wealthy class and the poverty-stricken mas~es~ 25 
By contrast the Congress as a Party and Nehru in particular, stand dis-
credited by their attempt to subvert the Budget. The disparity between 
their oft-repeated profession of egalitarianism and social justice and the 
actual nature of the policies they adopted needs no further exposition. 
While arguments may be found to justify Nehru's role, the fact remains that 
in the name of the unity of the Congress Party, he was ready to sacrifice 
not only his socialist ideals but even abdicate his sense of responsibility. 
Within the Cabinet of the Interim Government the majority were in support of 
the Budget. Even Rajendra Prasad, a 'rightist', who was the Food Minister, 
did so. 26 Had liaquat undertaken to force a vote on the issue in the 
Assembly, he would perhaps have carried the day. Yet Nehru found it fit to 
side with Patel and Rajagopalacheri in denouncing Liaquat's proposals. 
But it was not only on the question of this Budget that the Congress 
leadership revealLd its sympathy for the Indian business community. 
liaquat's proposal to set up a Taxation Enquiry Committee was also not 
pursued by the composite Interim Government. The 'black marketeers' of the 
war period thus enjoyed complete reprieve from any punitive action from the 
state. After Indeµendence nothing more wss heard about that proposal. 
Another illustration of the Congress's keenness to defend the bour-
geosie during the period of the Interim Government is the history of th~ 
Commodity Prices Bosrd. Liaquat, in his crusade against price manipulation 
by big business, set up this Board in February 1947 to advise the Central 
Government in regard to price fixation of controlled commodities and also 
to suggest what new commodities should be brought under Governmental price 
control. He justified the appointment of the Board on the ground that 'there 
was no co-relation between the prices of commodities of various 
kinds' and that it was necessary to have a 'scientific method of stabilisation 
of prices'. 27 
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The Commodity Prices Board consisted of two members: Mr A.O. Gorwala, 
I.C.S. as its President, and Professor D.R. Gadgil of Gokhale Institute of 
Politics and Economics as a Member. 28 The Board was abolished in September 
1947 when they both resigned as a protest against the way in which its 
recommendations were treated by the Congress Government of what had become 
by then the Indian republic. N.V. Sovani, who was a close associate of Dr 
Gsdgil in the Gokhale Institute, wrote on the issue that 'the programme of 
action visualised by this Board through the various reports it submitted, was 
a middle of the line programme which refused to allow the capitalists to reap 
undue profits but did not necessarily lead in the direction of the extinct-
ion of private enterprise, or even any large step in the socialisation of 
industry•. 29 Yet the work of the Boar.d, in Sovani's words, 'got support 
only from the Muslim League members end the Departments controlled by them. 
The Congress Party felt it necessary to nullify the work of the Board and 
succeeded in reducing it to impotencP'. To substantiate his observation, 
Sovani went on to cite examples of different decontrolling measures adopted 
by the Congress Government immediately after coming to power in total dis-
regard to all recommendations of the Board. 30 
The Interim Government was the first reel test of Nehru's, and the 
Congress's, attitude t~wards the social and economic inequalities which they 
had decried so much in the past. They had always declared that economic 
prosperity and its equitable cl~stribution were the key to solving the 
country's different social problems. Even during the regime of the Interim 
Government, when the entire sub-continent was embroiled in communal strife, 
Nehru considered that 'of all India's problems the economic one was the most 
serious•. 31 That he attached the highest importance to the economic is 
evident from his initiation to set up the Advisory Planning Board. Planning 
was the talismanic concept to him to solve all economic and social problems. 
He was often angry with the Muslim League on the ground that his efforts for 
'forward planning' which entailed planning for a unified India were being 
thwarted by the separatist policies of the latter. 32 
.~~~-... 
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Nehru's stand on the question of curtailment of rampant profiteering 
by the business community showed his lack of con111ilment to fight from his 
professional ideals. The support he gave to big business in its attempt to 
subvert liaquat's budgeting and other proposals, shows how easily he wilted 
under pressure. 
This critic!sm againFt Nehru may sound too harsh. like M.R. Masani, 
one could argue that liaquat's taxes would have hindered the growth of 
industries while the Government was not in a position to participate in 
industrial production on a large scale. While this observation may have 
scime force it does nothing to take away from Matthai's argU1T1ent about the 
relative lightness of the burden of tax on big business compared to that of 
the previous year. Moreover, as Liaquat pointed out, the Congress itself 
had been worried about unscrupulous profiteering by the business community 
during and after the war. Many members in the Assembly, speaking in support 
of liaquat, citP.d information relating to the share markets as examples of 
wartime profits. Most of the shares of established companies had gone up by 
300 to 600 per cent over the years since the end of the war. One example 
given was that of the Tates whose shares with a face value of Rs.100 were 
being quoted at about Rs.2,000 - a 400 per cent increase over 1938-39. 33 
liaquat's measures were so appropriate that even Pethick-Lawrence, the 
British Secretary of State for India and Burma, had to admit it. 'There can 
surely be no doubt', he wrote, 'that any Government in India which looks for 
popular support must use its fiscal machine to correct in some measure the 
enormous disparities in wealth and the a.·companying concentration of economic 
power in a relatively few hands'. This observation gains in significance 
when we remember that Liaquat's Budget also affected British interests very 
adversely. Not only that the British companies in India would have to bear 
their share of the tax burden, the doubling of the export duty on telJ. was 
directly going to hit the United Kingdom, the largest importer of Indian tea, 
the industry itself being overwhelmingly owned by the British capitalists.34 
287 
Episodes surrounding Liaquat Ali Khan's Budget, especially the failure 
of the Congres to support it, thus afford us interesting insights into the 
contradictions of the Congress and particularly those of its leadership. 
Nehru's commitment to socialism surely looks rather anaemic in the light of 
these events. 
SECTION 2: First Years of Freedom 
The final transfer of power on 15 August 1947 enabled the Congress to 
establish itself firmly at t~e helm of affairs of a truncated India. The 
socio-political aftermath of the Fartition, however, delayed the realisation 
of Nehru's dream of a planned economy. The National I · lanning Commission was 
appointed only in 1950. The interim period, 1947-49, witnessed the pattern 
of economic policies to be pursued by the state in India. These policies 
very much followed the trends set at the time of the Int~rim Govrenment when 
the Congress as we have noticed quite openly sided with the Indian bour-
geoisie against the economic and fiscal policies µreposed by the Muslim 
League leader in the Cabinet. By July 1947 the two Parties had actually 
parted company and set up de facto separate governments. The Interim 
Government was reconstituted by re-allocating portfolios between the two 
Parties so that the Congress wing of the Cabinet could take charge rf affairs 
pertaining to the 'Dominion of India' while the League representatives took 
charge of the corresponding portfolios in so far as Pakistan was concerned. 
The personnel of the Departments were rpr;'1tributed to create two nations 
out cf the Indian sub-continent. On • Just, the Congress Cabinet of the 
Interim Government was sworn in by the Governor-General to form the first 
Government of Independent India. 35 
The demand for planning by \:ir J :1dian bourgeoisie emanated from their 
inability to build up a capital goods ba&e by themselves. The state was 
called upon to intervene in the sphere of 'basic' or 'key' industries 
L 
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leaving the consumers' goods market free for exploitation by the bourgeoisie. 
The Congress leadership, while immediately unable to gear the state activity 
to fulfil its first task - of industrialising the economy - more then compen-
sated the capitalist class by opening up the consumers' goods market in an 
unrestricted manner. 
One of the first acts of the Cong~ess Government after independence was 
to withdraw all controls over the consumers' goods market. Many of the war-
time controls had been retained afterwards by the British Government to 
facilitate stabilisation of the economy. Cotton, jute, major cereals, oil 
and oilseeds, and sugar were the main items the prices of which were fixed 
by the Government. The distribution of essential commodities like cloth 
and food were also controlled by the state. The Congress approach to the 
issue of control of essential items was the opposite of whet the British 
administration thought suitable for tiding over the post-war economic crisis. 
Even in September 1946, within days after the first Interim Government was 
set up by the Congress, Rajagopalacheri, the Member in charge of Indust ·ies 
and Supplies indicated, at the Oilseeds Conference held by the Centre, his 
bias in favour of general decontro1. 36 
Soon after Independence, in August 1947, the Government appointed a 
Foodgrains Policy Committee under the chairmanship of P. Thakurdas. This 
Committee actually superseded to a large extent the Commodity Prices Board 
set up by Liaquat Ali Khan a few months earlier. This was the reason for 
the resignation of the members of that Board. 37 The appointment of the 
Foodgrains Policy Committee was the first step by the Congress to start the 
process of decontrolling the foodgrain market. The All-India Congress 
Committee in its Delhi session in November 1947 endorsed the steps taken by 
the Government by recording its alarm •gt the disturbance of normal life by 
various controls, specially in regard to foodstuffs and clothing'. The 
controls, in the opinion of the AICC, promoted black-marketing, hoarding, 
etc. and 'interfered with the process of self-reliance and arrested the 
.. 
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incentive to production, specially in matters of growing more foodstuffs 
. 
and the manufacture of handspun and handwoven Khadi in thousands of villages 
of India•. 38 The attitude of the Government was thus clear. As a result, 
even before the Foodgrains Policy Committee submitted its Interim Report, 
on 22 December 1947, the Government of India announced its decision to 
decontrol sugar from l December 1947 and foodgrains from l January 1948. 
Decontrol of textiles followed a month later. The prevailing attitude of 
the Government was indicated further by the very libe.ral increases in the 
controlled prices of iron and steel in January 1948. 39 
All these happened in the backdrop of a severe food crisis due to 
drought since 1945. The Government justified its action with the argument 
that official control created artificial scarcity of food by encouraging 
hoarding and black-marketing of foodgrains and that decontrolling would force 
the hoarded grains into the open market. It was envisaged that the possi-
bility of a price rise would be nullified by increased supply in the market. 
Moreover on the recommendation of the roodgrains Policy Committee the 
Government also decided to stop the import of food after 1948. 40 
The result of decontrol was immediately felt in the market. The Index 
Numbers of Wholesale Prices of rood Articles shot up from 297.8 in August 
1947 (year ended August 1939 = 100) to 396.6 in September 1948, and the 
General Index showed an increase of 81 points from 301.4 to 382.2 during the 
same period. 41 This rise was all the more striking because the decontrol 
policy was launched under the most favourable circumstances. Internal food 
production was higher than in previous years. Import position had also been 
more favourable than in any year during or after the war. 42 
The assumption that decontrol would lead to dishoarding on a large 
scale thus mitigating food scarcity and price inflation was proved entirely 
wrong. The situation worsened to such an extent that by September 1948 the 
Government waa forced to reintroduce measures of control of f oodgraina 
distribution and to increaee .illport of food on a scale higher than ever 
before.43 
-------• 
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The reversal did not atop at fiscal measures only. Although it took 
. 
Nehru quite a few years to set up the Planning Commission, a number of major 
steps were taken meanwhile to formulate the economic policy of the new state 
In November 1947 the All-India Congress Committee appointed an Economic 
Progra11111e Committee to go into the matter. The Committee was composed of 
Nehru, Azad, Jaye Prakash Narayan, N.C. Range, G.L. Nanda, J._C. Kumarappa, 
Achyut Patwardhan and Shankarrao Deo. AE; can be discerned from the names of the 
members the Committee was well represented by the different pressure groups 
within the Party. While Kumarappa and Shankarrao were Gandhians, Jays Prakash 
and Achyut Patwardhan were staunch socialists. Range and Nanda represented 
the Kisans and the Trade Unions. Nehru and Azad were the top most leaders of 
the Party. In a way the only group left out was that of the 'right-
. ' 46 wingers • 
The absence of the 'right-wingers' may be also noticed in the 
declaration by the AICC relating to the appointment of the Economic Programme 
Conrnittee. The AICC observed that the main task ahead, after achieving 
political independence, was 'the establishme11t of real democracy in the 
country and a society based on social justice and equality'. This democracy 
could be realised only when it was extended 'from the political to the social 
and the economic spheres'. Democracy in the modern age would necessitate 
'planned central direction as well as decentralisation of political and 
economic power', in so far as this was compatible with the security of the 
state, and 'with efficient production and the cultural progress of the 
conrnunity as a whole'. The aims of this democracy would be, in so far as it 
was possible, achieving 'national and regional economic self-sufficiency in 
the essentials of life'. 
Regarding large-scale and centralised industries the AICC was of the 
opinion that they should belong to the community and be organised in such a 
way that the workers would share not only in the profits but also managerial 
and adlliniatrative reaponaibilitiea. 'Land, with its mineral resources, and 
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all other means of production as well as distribution and exchange must 
. 
belong to and be regulated by the community in its own interest'. 
The aim of the Party, declared in that session of the AICC, was 'to 
evolve a political system which [would] combine efficiency of administration 
with individual liberty, and an economic structure which would yield maximum 
production without the creation of private monopolies and the concentration 
of wealth and which [would] create proper balance between urban and rural 
economies'. Such a society could, according to the Congress 'provide an 
alternative to the acquisitive economy of private capitalism and the 
regimentation of a Totalitarian State•. 47 The rhetoric here was broadly 
that of the left, but it should be noted that although the declaration did 
mention that Industry, Land and other means of production should belong to 
the community, the AICC refrained from elaborating on the issue. 
The Economic Programme Committee submitted its recommendations to the 
AICC in April 1948. 48 Full employment and a 'quick and progressive rise in 
the standard of living'were taken as the basic objectives of the economic 
programme formulated by the Committee. To achieve these objectives and 'a 
just social order' the Committee recommended, among other things, 'equitable 
distribution of existing income and weelth' and prevention of future growth 
of disparities. The Committee prescribed a ceiling for incomes not exceed-
ing '40 times the national minimum needed for the primary needs of food, 
clothing etc.' and gradually to bring the upper limit down to 20 times the 
t . l . . 49 na iona minimum. 
On agriculture, the major recommendations WP.re, firstly, to eliminate 
all intermediaries between the tiller and the state and to replace the 
middlemen by co-operative agencies; secondly, to fix the maximum size of 
landholing, and thirdly, to vest all cultivable land held by non-cultivating 
landholders in the village co-operative community. The Committee also 
proposed organisation of 'statutory village Panchayats' for self-governing 
purposes with well-defined powers and adequate financial resources and with 
supervisory jurisdiction over all other institutions in the locality. 
- ...... -------------------------------- -
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Regarding productivity of land it recommended techological improvements, 
technical education and, as a priority, state planning for the early 
development of river-valley projects and also for the production and distri-
bution of cheap electricity for rural industries and agricultural purposes. 
Another important reconmendation on agriculture was related to land revenue. 
The Committee proposed that 'the present land revenue system should be 
replaced by progressive taxation of agricultural income'. It also suggested 
that the Provincial Governments should take steps for the relief of indebt-
edness of agricultural labour. 50 Thus on agriculture the recommendations of 
the Economic Programme Committee followed the general line of the Congress 
as it had evolved over the past two decades. But it was regarding industry 
that the Committee revealed a distinct shift from the Congress view of the 
earlier times, particularly in respect of the role of the state. 
Regarding consumers' goods industries the Committee recommended de-
centralisation and co-operative systems of production as far as possible. 
On large-scale industries it proposed that these should not come into 
competition with small-scale and cottage industries and that, 'measures 
should be taken to co-ordinate the various types of industries and link them 
up in a supplementary-complementary relationship•. 51 The Committee also 
suggested regional distribution of all types of industries to attain regional 
self-sufficiency. 
But let us consider the major recommendations of the Committee regard-
ing large-scale industries. 
1. Control of investment and licensing of new undertakings should be 
resorted to for the purpose of effective co-ordination and harmonious 
development of different types of industry. 
2. New undertakings in defence, key and public utility industries 
should be started under public ownership. New undertakings which 
are in the nature of monopolies or in view of their scales of 
operations serve the country as a whole or cover more than one 
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Province should be run on the basis of public ownership. This 
is subject to the limit of the State's resources and capacity 
at the time and the need of the nation to enlarge production and 
speed up development. 
3. In respect of existing undertakings the process of transfer from 
private to public ownership should commence after a period of 
five years The first five years should be treated as a 
period of preparation, during which arrangements should be made to 
take over and run these undertakings efficiently. 
4. The progress of transition of public ownership should be controlled 
so as to avoid the dislocation of the economic life in the country, 
fall in production, uneconomic acquisition of inflated assets, and 
the diversion of valuable resources from more urgent to less urgent 
uses. 
5. All resources avdilable for investment should be subject to the 
control and direction of the State. The State should set up Finance 
Corporations for financing industries. Banking and Insurance should 
be nationalised. 52 
Thus while the Congress resolution of 1931 and the majority of the 
members of the N.P.C. in 1938, han prescribed state ownership or strict 
control of all defence, key and public utilities industries, the Economic 
. .Programme Committee of the Congress came out with r~commendations strikingly 
close to those made by the industrialist members of the N.P.C. who wanted 
only the defence industries to be under state ownership and state partici-
pation restricted to areas where the private capitalists were unwilling to 
invest. Moreover, the recommended gap of five years before the existing 
undertaking could be transferred from 'private to public ownership', was 
obviously a new concession to private enterprise. Even the Bombay Plan or 
the Industrial Policy of the British Government in 1945 had envisaged a 
stricter control of private enterprise and greater participation by the 
I 
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state in the process of industrialisation. 
Even the changes in terminology are worth noting. While all previous 
plan documents since 1938 used the terms 'nationalisation' or 'socialisation' 
to define state ownership of industries, the Committee's report used the 
term 'nationalisation' only in respect Qf banking and insurance and took 
resort to an ill-defined nomenclature, 'public ownership' in all other 
relevant cases. 
But the Report of the Economic Programme Committee met with adverse 
reaction among the traders and industriali~ts. The business ~ommunity 
picked up the clauses in the Report which advised imposition of controls 
over the distribution of profits and public ownership of important under-
takings after a gap of five years. 
On profits the Report suggested that tiie computation of the return on 
~apital should be adapted on the basis of 'employed capital, i.e. capital 
plus reserves' and that distributed profits should be taxed at a higher rate 
than undistributed profits to promote reinvestment. It also recommended a 
maximum limit of 5 per cent of employed capital as dividend for distribution 
of profits, and further, that the employee should have a share in the profits 
of the companies. 
The business community found the Report to be of an 'extremely radical 
character' and forecast disastrous reactions on the industrial structure of 
53 the country. 
The Indian bourgeoisie had won their first decisive battle in 1946 
against any 'radicalism' on the part of the state when they were successful 
in mobilising the Congress leadership against Liaquat's efforts. Now, after 
Independence, they wanted more incentives and further commitments from the 
state for fostering private enterprise. 
What helped the bourgeoisie in pressuring the Government to liberalise 
terms and conditions in favour of private enterprise was the economic state 
of the country immediately after Independence. The post-war economic 
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situation in India was characterised by a high rate of inflation together 
with a gradual retardation in production. In agriculture the failure of 
rains for two consecutive years since 1945-46 led to a sharp decrease in 
internal food supply. In the industrial sector almost all the major 
industries showed a continuous decrease in output since the end of the war. 
The following table gives us the relevant figures for certain important 
industries. 
TABLE I 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN INDIA DURING 1944-48 
Commodity 
Cotton Piece G 
Jute Manufactu 
Cement 
Sulphuric Acid 
Ammonium Sulph 
Paper 
Pig Iron 
Steel Ingots 
Finished Steel 
Coal 
Sugar 
oods 
re 
ate 
Unit 
Million Yards 
(000) Tons 
(000) Tons 
(000) Cwts. 
(000) Tons 
(000) Cwts. 
(000) Tons 
(000) Tons 
(000) Tons 
(000) Tons 
(000) Cwts. 
1944-45 1945-46 
4, 726 4,651 
975 973 
2,044 2,146 
456 481 
22.4 21.1 
1,472 1,681 
1,400 1,406 
1,254 1,300 
1,268 1,338 
24, 154 26,543 
21,127 17,639 
1946-47 947-48 
3,86~ 3,735 
1,042 1,028 
2,027 1,634 
597 588 
21. 3 21. 5 
2,319 1,415 
1,328 1,523 
1,212 1,210 
1,200 1,138 
26,218 26,769 
16,799 ll,7ll(a 
Sourae: N.V. Sovani, Post-War Inftation in India -A Survey, (Poona, 1949), 
Table 14, p.33. A similar table with minor variations given in 
'Economic Survey for 1947-48 by the Economic Adviser', G.O.I., Ministry 
of Finanae, PZanning Branah, FiZe No.F.13(18)P/48. Table C, p.34. 
(a) Total for 7 months ending October 1947 only. 
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While all the industrial commodities showed a continuous decrease in 
production, the wholesale price index showed a steady increase. Between 
September 1945 and August 1947 rhe General Index increased by 57 points -
m r than 24 t . . t 54 o e per cen increase in wo years. By September 1948, this 
Index jumped up by another 82 points due to the Government's policy of 
decontro1. 55 
The Government identified the 'want of industrial equipment and re-
placements, lack of technical skills, transport bottlenecks and inadequate 
transport services' as the general causes for the economic crisis. 56 The 
situation was aggravated by the Partition of India in 1947. It not only 
created unforeseen socio-economic problems by turning millions of people 
into destitute refugees dependent on Government help for rehabilitation, but 
also cut off the Indian economy from a major source of its supply of food 
grains and important raw materials such as cotton and jute. 57 The policy of 
decontrol added fuel to the fire. It not only destablished the economy by 
the rise in food prices that it had caused, but also affected industriBl 
production through the impact it had on the railways, the major system of 
transport of industrial raw materials. As the Railway Minister explained in 
1949, with the introduction of decontrol, the 'priority system' for booking 
of railway wagons was brought to a state of total chaos by the traders of food-
grains, leading to a shortage of wagons for transporting important 
industrial raw materials such as coa1. 58 
The decrease in production and the high rate of inflation affected 
the labouring people directly. The average real wage continued to be lower 
59 than in the early war years. Unemployment increased rapidly as military 
orders stopped after the war and the level of industrial activity decreased. 
The inflow of millions of refugees added to the vast number of the unemployed. 
The restiveness of the working class was reflected in the rising number of 
industrial disputes which increased by more than 125 per cent between 1945 
and 1947 while the number of 'man-days' lost due to strikes during this 
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period shot up from 4,054,000 in 1945 to a staggering 16,563,000 in 1947. 60 
All the speeches that the Congress leaders, and Nehru in particular, made on 
the economic situation curing that period pointed to the urgent need for 
t . d t. 61 augmen ing pro uc ion. 
Given the situation the bourgeoisie lost no time in impressing upon 
the Government the need for a liberal industrial policy. Even before 
Independence, in March 1947, G.D. Birla had voiced the concern of his class 
when he demanded that the Government should come out with a definite policy 
regarding the future of private enterprise in India. 62 Under this pressure 
and the pressure of circumstances, the Government reduced almost all the 
direct taxes incident upon business. It also called a tripartite Industrial 
Conference in Delhi in December 1947 to discuss the problems of Indian 
industries. The Conference was attended by the representatives of industries, 
labour and the Government. 63 
Nehru, in his speech at the Conference emphasised the need for increasing 
production on all economic fronts and tried to allay the fear of the 
bourgeoisie about the prospect of nationalisation of India. The following 
quotation captures the spirit of his speech: 
I am not for the moment talking about the final resolution, 
as to the future economic policy and the merits or othewise 
of nationalization ••• Speaking as a person who is a believer 
in the socialization of industry, I should like to say this, 
that far too much attention is often paid to acquiring 
existing industries than to the building of new industries 
by the State or under State control ••• It seems to me a far 
better approach to the problem for t.he State to concentrate 
more and more on new industries of the latest type and to 
control them in a large measure ••• instead of merely trying 
to get hold of something which exists.64 
This was an important declaration by the Prime Minister of the new 
Government. Particularly so as the Economic Programme Committee of the 
Congress had just been formed and Nehru himself was the Chairman of the 
C011111ittee. 
-------------------
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The Conference identified six reasons for the inability of the 
industrial sector to produce to its installed capacity and to expand as 
planned. These were a) inadequacy of transport, b) shqrtage of raw 
materials, c) lack of capital goods, d) supply and exchange limitations in 
the import of the full requirements of industry, e) paucity of technical 
personnel and f) unsatisfactory relations between management and labour. 65 
On the last mentioned point, the Conference resolved to call for a truce 
between capital and labour for the next three years to 'maintain peace and 
to avert lock-outs, strikes or slowing down of production'. It also 
recommended to the Government that 'while enumerating their internRl policy 
of industrial development, the following aspects among others, should be 
kept in view': 
1) The need for an equitable distribution of the country's wealth 
and production leading to rapid improvement of the standard 
of living ••• based on social justice. 
2) The need for full employment of resources without concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a few people. 
3) The division of industries into three broad categories according 
to the need for State ownership or management, joint participation 
by the State and the private sector, and private ownership. 
4) Th d f t 1 1 . 66 e nee or cen ra p anning. 
On the face of it the resolutions adopted by the Conference did not 
have any difference with the recommendations of the Economic ProgrRmme ~ 
Committee of the Congress. Yet in reality the bourgeoisie was looking for 
far greater commitment from the state in assuring the private enterprise of an 
unhindered growth. Regarding the taxation system the demands of the 
Conference partially reflected the attitude of the bourgeoisie. It 
recommended the abolition of Sales Tax on industrial raw materials and a 
t . 1 d. . d t. 
67 further lowering of other axes inc u ing excise u ies. 
The Government continued its efforts to satisfy the demands of the 
capitalists. Soon after the Conference, in April 1948, the Government 
published its Industrial Policy Resolution, 68 which said that only the 
-....., 
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manufacture of arms and ammunition, the production and control of atomic 
energy, and the ownership and management of railway transport would remain 
'the exclusive monopoly of the Central Government'. Among other industries, 
the Resolution singled out some in the case of which the state - meaning 
Central, Provincial and State Governments and other public authorities like 
Municipal Corporations - would be 'exclusively responsible for the establish-
ment of new undertakings, except when, in the national interest, the State 
itself finds it necessary to secure the co-operation of private enterprise' 
subject to such control and regulation as the Central Government might 
prescribe. These were coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, ship-
building, mineral oils and manufacture of telephone, telegraph and wireless 
apparatus, excluding radio receiving sets. 69 
The Resolution selected some other industries 'whose locations must be 
governed by economic factors of all-India import, or which require considerable 
investment or a high degree of techniLnl skill', as subject to Central 
regulation and control: salt; automobiles and tractors; prime movers; electric 
engineering and other heavy machinery; machine tools; heavy chemicals, ferti-
lizers and pharmaceuticals and drugs; electro-chemical industries; non-
ferrous metals; rubber manufacturers; power and industrial alcohol; cotton 
and woollen textiles; cement; sugar; paper and newsprint; air and sea transport; 
minerals; industries related to defence, and generation and distribution of 
70 
electric power. 
The rest of the industrial field was left open to private enterprise, 
'individual as well as co-operative', with provisions of state participation 
or intervention 'whenever the progress of an industry under private enter-
prise was unsatisfactory•. 71 
If we compare this Resolution of 1948 with the Industrial Policy 
Statement of 1945, an interesting difference emerges. The British Policy of 
1945 had identified certain 'basic industries', including aircraft, auto-
mobiles and tractors, chemicals and dyes, iron and steel, prime movers, 
j 
I 
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transport vehicles, electrical machinery, machine tools, electro-chemical and 
. 
non-ferrous metal industries, in the cases of which the Government might 
consider nationalisation in the absence of sufficient private investment in 
the field. 72 It had also contemplated nationalisation of the entire defence, 
railways and public utilities industries. The Resolution of 1948, on the 
other hand, chose, as we have noticed above, only six industries including 
coal, iron and steel, aircraft, shipbuilding, mineral oils and telephone, 
telegraph, etc. industries, apart from defence, railways and public utilities, 
where the 'new undertakings' might be kept under the exclusive responsibility 
of the ~tate. The Resolution also declared that the Government had 'decided 
to let existing undertakings in these fields develop for a period of ten 
years', during which they would be allowed 'all facilities for efficient 
working and reasonable expansion'. At the end of this period, the 'whole 
matter' would be 'reviewed and a decision taken, in the light of circum-
stances obtaining at the time'. If it was decided that the state should 
acquire any unit, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution would 
be observed and compensation would be awarded on 'fair and equitable basis•. 73 
It is not only that the Resolution of 1948 was more liberal in its 
attitude towards the private enterprise than envisaged by the Plan programmes 
of the mid-forties, even the Advisory Planning Board set up by the Nehru 
Government itself in 1946 recommended, by majority vote, stricter controls 
of the private sector. We may recall here that on the question of national-
isation the Board directly specified that apart from defence industries and 
the railways, 'any industry where private capital was reluctant to invest' -
e.g. coal, mineral oils, iron and steel, motor and air and river transport -
should be nationalised. 74 
In 1948 on the other hand only the 'new undertakings' in these fields 
were earmarked for 'public ownership'. If we compare the recommendations of 
the Economic Programme Committee with the Industrial Policy of 1948 we again 
find a similar retracing of steps. While the former contemplated a five-
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year time gap before the Government could decide about nationalising the 
prescribed industries, the latter increased the time limit to ten years before 
the Government would consider the question of nationalisation. 
The scrupulous avoidance of the word 'nationalisation' in the entire 
body of the 1948 Resolution also seems significant. Actually the word became 
almost a taboo in the official circle and the leaders of the Congress went 
out of their way to assure businessmen that nationalisation was not on the 
cards, as witness Sardar Patel's statement in December 1949. 'Take it from 
me', he said, 'if ~nyone talks of nationalisation, it is only for the sake of 
leadership'. This was not a slant on Nehru, the arch-rival of Patel in the 
jockeying for Party leadership, for Nehru's views were not all that different. 
A few months before Patel made this statement, Nehru had explained to the 
FICCI that the Government's earlier declaration that it 'would not touch' the 
basic and key industries for at least ten years, 'did not mean that [it] would 
necessarily touch them immediately after th~ ten-year period 1 • 75 
The idea of nationalisation of any industry, basic or otherwise, was 
actually foreclosed by Congress action in 1946 against Liaquat's efforts to 
subdue the bourgeoisie. In the face of politi~al and economic crisis after 
Independence the Congress set primarily to woo the industrialists to run their 
businesses. It may be argued that in the given situation where more than 
nine-tenths of total output and employment and more than seven-tenths of 
output in modern industry were within the private sector, the Government was 
in no position to antagonise the private sector. 76 On the other hand, apart 
from the public statements against the idea of nationalisation by many 
businessmen, there is hardly any evidence to show that the fear of national-
isation was a major factor for de~reased production. The resolutions of the 
Industrial Conference, although they enumerated six major hurdles for 
increased industrial production, did not mention anywhere the bogey of 
'nationalisation' as a reason for the lack of private investment. Moreover, 
the big industrialists like J.R.O. Tata were confident that the Government 
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would not go for any programme of nationeliaation of the existing industries. 
They were also aware of the fact that if they had expanded their production 
capacity, they would benefit frOll the unlikely eventuality of nationalisation, 
simply because the increased market value of the assets of the company would 
increase the compensation owing to them. 77 
looking closely at the six causes enumerated by the Industrial Conference 
as factors impeding industrial growth, we find that three were directly 
related to the failure of the industries to utilise the installed capacity, 
whereas the other three related to the failure to expand aa planned. 
Inadequacy of tranaport facilities, management-labour relationa, and shortage 
and maldiatribution of raw materials were in the first category. lack of 
capial gooda and construction materials, limitations of import of require-
ments of industry and paucity of technical personnel 11ay be viewed as related 
to plaming or the lack of it. 
If we consider the first three, we find that while the Conference tried 
to find a 'truce' between management and labour, the governmental measure 
of decontrol waA itself responsible for the crisis of railway transport -
which was the major means of transport of industrial raw materials and 
finished products. Also, while the Government had pursued a liberal import 
policy in 1946, restrictions were imposed on imports in 1947 to such an 
extent that even the available sterling releases could not be utilised. 
In 1948 the import policy was again liberalised, and to such an extent that 
India far transgressed the limits of sterling balances. 
It may be added here that by negotiation with the Government of the 
United Kingdom, India was allowed to spend annually an BllOUnt of £35 million 
as 'straight release' and a further £30 million as 'working balances', to be 
replenished by the flow of trade, from the 'No.l account' of ita total 
sterling balance assets. The reMinder of India's sterling balencea were 
kept in a blacked ltCCOUftt (No.2 8CCOUnt) .unt for •once-for-all paymnta• 
ror the period of 15 Auguat 1M7 to the end of the year the negotiation 
JOJ 
allowed India to uae only £9 million as 'straight release' and the Government 
. 
failed to uae even that amount in the period due to the prevailing import 
Policy. The liberaliaation of import policy in 1948 led India to a deficit 
of £81 Million in the No.l account, and the British Government allowed the 
same amocnt to be transferred from No.2 account to help India maintain the 
agred £30 Million 'working balance' in the former account. 78 
The sterling balance account having been overdrawn, India went back to 
a restrictive import policy again in 1949. K.C. Neogy, the then Commerce 
Minister, admitted that the Governnent had failed to evolve any import policy 
for more than a few months at a ti111e and added further that •as circumatanc~a 
change rapidly, I [the Minister] cannot pra11ise that no change will be made 
in the future•. 79 
Going back to the 'causes' of recession, it is easily seen that all the 
six causes 111entioned earlier were of a technical nature. While 80lle of 
these causes could be rellledied by illllllediate governmental actions regarding 
the transport and distribution of necessary goods, the others, e.g. lack of 
capital goods, technical personnel, etc. could be tackled only through 
concerted effort by the Government to augment the resources. However, both 
the categories would have required a well formulated plan programme for the 
economy. Even in the short-run, no piecemeal and disjointed 111easurea could 
aolve the crisis. This was understood by both the Government and the 
industrialists and it made the idea of planning acceptable to both the 
parties. 
From 1930 onwards all the proponents of planning had harped on the need 
to set up a central planning authority in India as the first and moat 
essential step towards economic develop111ent. The Advisory Planning Board 
had acknowledged this neceaaity and had even specified the nature of the 
11achinery needed in this regard. Yet, the new GovertWent faltered and failed 
to take q etep in that direction for a nullber of year• after Independence. 
It ia of'ten ugued thllt thlt aocio--politicel crieea of poet-independent yean 
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kept Nehru preoccupied with other things.80 But it is not recognised that 
the very crisis demanded a stronger politJcal will on the part of the new 
rulers to take positive steps. 
When the Congress was installed as the ruling party in new India, the 
concept of planning was no longer a novel idea. Nor was it the case that the 
bureaucracy was ignorant of and inexperienced in the mechanism of planning. 
The Congress Government inherited a governmental machinery which had already 
spent a number of years in the basic paper-work producing a good many plans 
for economic improvement. The Development Board had been continuing to 
function. The finance Department had an active planning division included in 
it. It would not have required any overhauling of the existing bureaucratic 
machinery just to evolve a centralised plan authority. Planning as envisaged 
by the Indian elites and Nehru during the 'thirties and the 'forties did not 
involve any process of popular mobilisation. Thus there were no political 
risks involved in taking any immediate steps towards planning. It was not 
even as if there were no shared views about which areas or sectors the plans 
could cover. There was in fact a large degree of consensus among the 
bourgeoisie and the political elites in this regard. 
The closeness of views reported in the documents of the N.P.C., the 
Bombay Plan and the Reconstruction Committees - and if we are to consider 
the individual efforts we may include those of Visvesvaraya, Birla and 
others - amply support our contention. What was missing was the political 
will and determination necessary to achieve the goal. 
The lack of will and initiative is evident in the Centre's role vis-a-vis 
developmental programmes in the period concerned. We may recall that the 
British Government, in 1944, had estimated an amount of Hs.500 crores in 
revenue surplus for distribution as planning grants to the Provinces for a 
period of five years once the plan progrannes were initiated. Due to inadequate 
revenue earnings the Centre had infortled the Provinces in 1945 that a total 
of Ra.250 croree t110Uld be available to the latter for aupple1111nting their own 
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resources in the implementation of their plans. 81 Although initially the 
provincial plans were to start from 1947, many provinces were forced to take 
up 'short-term plan' measures from 1945-46. Yet by the time political power 
was transferred to the Congress hardly any Central grant had been remitted 
to the Provinces for developmental programmes. Up to March 1948 the total 
amount released by the Centre to the Provinces on this account amounted to 
only Rs.25 crores.82 This was out of a total estimated expenditure of 
Rs.205 crores earmarked for the Indian part of the sub-continent.BJ 
Thus in two years, 1946-47 and 1947-48, including the period of Interim 
Government - the Government of India spent less than Rs.25 crores for its 
plans. In 1948 the Government allotted a sum of Rs.JO crores for the year 
1948-49 to the Provincial plan programmes, and added the condition that the 
Provinces must spend an equivalent amount in the proj~cts taken up. Actually 
the bureaucracy assured the Government that 'in view of the inevitable slowing 
down of work on most schemes due to the shortage of manpower and materials' 
the Government would not have to spend the stipulated total amount of grant 
in the next four years and this would 'give the Centre some relief•. 84 
This statement reveals the Government's attitude towards plan programmes. 
The main concern of the Government during 1947-49 appears to have been only 
to check inflation. We have already seen how the 1948-49 budget had been 
worked out to produce a surplus. The theoretical assumption behind the 
budget was that relief in direct taxation on private investment would boost 
up the industrial sector and a surplus budget based on higher indirect taxes 
would restrict excess demand for goods. Bu~ we have also seen ~hat by all 
accounts the major obstacle to increasing production was not the lack of 
investment funds but technical deficiencies. 
Thus the Government in post-independent years failed to direct its 
activities towards long-awaited developmental programmes. Instead of aug-
menting its financial resources to carry out the existing plans, formulating 
co-ordinated plans for development, and taking 11easures to realise the lllUCh 
, 
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avowed ideals of equitable distribution of wealth, etc. it chose the easier 
option of depending entirely on the initiatives of private enterprise. Taxes 
on business profits were reduced and the burden of taxes was shifted on to 
the consumers, while traders in consumers' essentials were given a free hand 
by lifting controls over prices and distribution for a period. Even people 
found guilty of tax evasion were let off lightly. The Income Tax Investigation 
Commission set up by Liaquat Ali Khan had concluded that most of the 
cases involved big industrialists, traders and speculators. Nehru, instead 
of bringing the tax evaders to the book, appealed to those whose cases were 
being investigated that they should quickly compound their taxes -and assured 
that they would be spared any blame or punishment.85 
Some other developments of this period also point to the Government's 
unwillingness to launch any constructive programme. In 1948 the Government 
appointed three consulting firms to advise on the establishment of iron and 
stdeel works capable of an output of one million tons. In 1949 the Govern-
ment decided 'in principle' to set up two plants in Madhya Pradesh and 
Orissa, 'as soon as finances permit'. Yet the first contract to instal a 
steel plant under public sector did not materialise until 1953.86 While the 
Government procrastinated over finding ways of raising finance for the new 
plant, individual capitalists in the industry refrained from expanding their 
production base out of a fear of future over-production in the field. As a 
result the supply of iron and steel continued to remain a most scarce raw 
material for any developmental programmes for years to come.87 
But it was not only in the industrial sector that the Government exposed 
its inability to assert itself. On land reform, an issue on which the 
Congress had made many pronouncements, the new Government in Delhi displayed 
hardly any initiative. 
The demand for land reforms and abolition of zamindari system was so 
widespread anong the rank and file of the Congress that the Central leadership 
was forced to take a atand on the isaue. We have discussed in earlier 
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chapters how, in the 'thirties, the leadership had tried to restrain lower 
level members from pursuing any movement effecting the rural rich. However, 
by the mid-forties, particularly after the publication of the floud Commission's 
Report, all political parties including the Congress and excepting a very 
small minority of pro-zaminder politicians, had come to agree on the abolition 
of intermediaries in agriculture as an important item in their socio-economic 
programmes.BB Most of the Provincial Governments set up after the 1946 
election took up the issue in earnest. The U.P. and Bihar Governments under 
the Congress and the Bengal Government under the Muslim League and their 
supporters took the lead. 89 
By 1948 most of the Provincial Governments had introduced bills 
regarding land reform in their respective Legislative Assemblies. All these 
bills included provisions for adequate compensations to the Zamindars and 
other landowners whose lands held in excess of the prescribed ceilings, would 
be vested with the state. But the Congress Government in Delhi appeared to 
be hesitant to help the Provinces carry out the measures contemplated under 
the bills. Thls was sought to be justified in the name of the financial 
stringency faced by the Government at the Centre. In October 1948 the Centre 
directed the provinces to delay the actions proposed under the Land Reform 
Bills and even threatened them with complete nonco-operation from the Centre 
if the provinces acted in any haste. Witness the following portion of a circular 
from the Centre to the provinces: 
They [the Government of India] ••• wish to make it clear 
that in case any Provincial Government feels that the 
implementation of the schemes for prohibition [of the 
consumption of alcohol] and/or for the abolition of 
Zamindari cannot possibly be postponed they should not 
expect any financial assistance from the Centre by way 
of loans or otherwiee.90 
This pairing of the two demands, for prohibition end zamindari abolition 
is worth a few comments. Prohibition was related to the Gandhian fed against 
drinking of alcohol. The Z•indari system on the other hand was identified 
by all and sundry as the most important cause of 11iaery of the rural poor. 
I 
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The enactment of prohibition would lead to loss of revenue to the provincial 
exchequers, in the form of excise duties and sales taxes. Abolition of the 
Zamindari system would entail a possible drainage of provincial governmental 
resources, although almost all the provinces had included clauses for 
deferred payment of compensation in their bills. To the Government of India, 
however, as the above circular clearly shows, prohibition and the abolition 
of Zamindari were issues of equal status and both could be postponed until 
the financial situation improved. 
The years 1947-49 were difficult years for the new regime. The Partition 
and its aftermath, the mutual animosity of the two new nations, the problems 
of annexation of the princely states and the inflation-recession on the 
economic front - all these factors contributed to the crisis of government 
for the new rulers. The Congress Government did not hesitate to assert itself 
in political matters. Yet on the economic front it showed a complete lack of 
leadership and signs of panic whenever its policies met with strong 
opposition from landlords and capitalists. 
SECTION 3: Nehru and the Socialists, 1947-49 
The socio-economic crises of the immediate post-independent years found 
Nehru completely lacking any initiative to realise his ideals of a 
planned industrialised modern India. His role in the crises since the days 
of the Interim Government seriously damaged his image as a proponent of 
'socialistic' democracy. Within the Congress the socialists were disillusioned 
first by his betrayal to Liaquat's efforts to contain big business and then 
by his joining hands with Patel in support of the Mountbatten Plan of 
Partition. The economic policies of the new Go~ernment during 1947-48 further 
accentuated this disillusionment of the 'leftists' within the Congress. The 
Congress Socialist Party dropped the word 'Congress' frOlll its name in 1947. 91 
In March 1948, soon after the death of the Mahatlla the Socialist Party 
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92 dissociated from the Congress and became a separate party. 
Nehru's relation with the Congress Socialists had been dubious since the 
inception of the CSP in the mid-thirties. He never joined the organisation 
formally but almost always enjoyed the support of this group. On the other 
hand on crucial issues when this group confronted the right-wing leadership 
of the Congress, Nehru sided with the latter. In 1939, when Subhas Bose was 
ousted from the Congress, Nehru was with Gandhi and Patel. In 1946 when 
Gandhi opposed the Partition and was supported by the socialists Nehru joined 
Patel. In 1946 Jaye Prakash Narayan, tr.e socialist leader, joined the 
Working Committee of the Congress on Nehru's request, yet the latter betrayed 
his leftist comrades on the issue of the Budget. 93 
After Independence, the dominant leadership of the Congress took steps 
to get rid of the leftists in their efforts to bring about a monolithic 
party structure. In 1948 the Congress adopted a new constitution which 
prohibited its members from remaining loyal to any other political organi-
sation. 94 This clause was obviously aimed against the Socialists who within 
the Congres had a group entity under the banner, first, of the Congress 
Socialist Party and then of the Socialist Party only. The new constitution 
left only two options open to the Socialists: either to disband their 
organisations or to resign from the Congress. The first option was really 
unacceptable to them because as mere individuals the Socialists would be at 
the total mercy of the right-wing leadership of the Congress. The Socialists 
therefore adopted the only option open to them; that is, to form a separate 
organisation. 
The Socialists charged the Government and the Congress of pursuing an 
anti-labour and pro-capitalist policy under the garb of its emphasis on 
increased production. The resolution adopted by the Socialist Party in its 
Nesik session in March 1948 declared the following: 
••• it is naively stated that the panacea for this critical 
economic situation facing the country lies in "increased 
production", that a larger quantum of goods will square up 
; 
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the inflated purchasing power; that the way to increase 
the quantity of goods is by providing a suffici~nt profit 
incentive to the manufacturer and reduce his taxation 
so as to promote his investments; that once there are 
sufficient goods in the country and prices are more or 
less stabilized the economic evils will be automatically 
adjusted.95 
The resolution further claimed that the Government of India in its 
economic policy had 'acted as an agent of capitalist interests', and that its 
policy announcements and all other actions on the economic front was 'calculated 
merely to fatten the capitalist class into persuasion of the need of increasing 
production of goods and services'. The party charged that the Government 
appeared to have abandoned all the ideas of a planned economic development 
and urged it 'inmediately to appoint a planning Commission with the set task 
of implementing a programme of economic regeneration of the country', and 
to implement the economic programme adopted by the All-India Congress Committee 
in 1947. 96 
With the ousting of the Socialists from the Congress Nehru lost a major 
base of support within his own party, He had indeed tried to dissuade the 
Socialists from forming an independent party but in vain. Even after the 
Nasik Conference of the Socialist Party, he tried to convince his erstwhile 
comrades that his personal sympathies were all with them and that he was 'keen 
as ever to go in a particular direction and carry the country' with him with 
the help of the Socialists. 97 But his gradualist approach and his attitude 
of appeasement towards the capitalists could not convice the Socialists of 
the sincerity of his intentions. Jaye Prakash, who had earlier looked upon 
Nehru as an elder brother now wrote to him: 'You want to go towards socialism, 
but you want the capitalists to help in that. Yo~ want to build socialism 
with the help of capitalism•. 98 
We may add here that Nehru's effort to reunite the Socialists with the 
Congress could very well appear to be dubious to the former because of the 
role he played prior to the formation of the Socialist Party. In 1947 when 
Kripalani, a staunch Gandhian, was forced to resign from the Presidentship, 
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Gandhi recommended Acharya Narandra Dev, a Congress Socialist, es Kripaleni's 
successor. Gandhi's choice was obviously aimed at heeding off the threat of 
a Socialist exodus from the Congress. But Patel with his anti-socialist 
bias rejected the proposal. Nehru, while agreeing with Gandhi's choice 'felt 
compelled to co-operate with Patel•. 99 
Nehru's politics from 1946 until Patel's death in 1950 was characterised 
by a close alliance with the latter on several major ideological issues. 
While both vied with each other for the highest p~Jsition of power within the 
ruling party and the Government, their mutual interest of retaining the power 
between themselves seemed to have made them allies against the leftists 
within the Congress in that period. Nehru's decision to side with Patel on 
Liequet's Budget, the Mountbatten Plan and against the Socialist candidate 
for the Presidentship of the Congress in 1947 all point to this conclusion. 
When, however, it came to confronting Patel in defence of his own interest, 
Nehru did not fear to oppose him. Soon after the ousting of the Congress 
Socialists, Nehru successfully opposed the election of Purushottemdes Tendon, 
a rightist candidate backed by Patel end Birle, and got P. Siteremeyye elected 
to the office of the Presidentship of the Congress. 100 
In the previous section we discussed the economic policies of the 
Congress Government during the first two years of its regime in independent 
India. This discussion is essential to understanding the process of ~l~nning 
es it evolved in the 'fifties. It is also essential in this regard to 
consider Nehru's attitude on issues related to planning, for he was the chief 
spokesman through whom the Congress expressed its views on planning and he 
in turn was the most important influence shaping these views. It was he who 
since the inception of the N.P.C. had consistently pursued the idea of planning 
as a part of the nationalist movement. After Indep£ndence, as the Prime 
Minister of the new Government, it was Nehru again who was mainly responsible 
for the direction of planning in India. His id1"as on planning may thus be 
studied as the dominant strand in official thinking in India on the subject. 
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From the very inception of the new government, Nehru kept harping on 
the heed for planning. Between August 1947 and March 1949 he gave at least 
five public speeches on matters related to economic policies of the new 
101 government. The necessity of planning and his regret at the fact that his 
Government, because of'other pressing problems: could not take up the task 
immediately, featured in all these speeches which were very similar to one 
another in their structure and implication. For the sake of brevity we shall 
review here two speeches he delivered in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) 
in February and April 1948, and published under the titles 'Our Economic 
Policy' and 'The Only Right Approach'. The second of these was his contri-
bution to the debate on the Industrial Policy Resolution, while the occasion 
for the first one was provided by a resolution moved by Kazi Syed Karimuddin, 
an opposition member of the Assembly. Karimuddin's resolution, which read 
as follows, was opposed by Nehru: 
The Assembly is of the opinion that the economic pattern 
of this country shall be socialist economy based on the 
principle of nationalisation of key industries and co-
operative and collective farming and socialisation of 
the material resources of the country and that the 
Government of India shall adopt the said principle 
immediately. 102 
Both these speeches by Nehru spelt out quite clearly his and his party's 
stand on major issues such as the question of nationalisation, socialisation 
etc. The argument put forward in the first of these speeches was based 
primarily on the idea that increasing industrial production was the 'first 
essential' for the economic development of the country. If nationalisation could 
help production then his Government would forthwith carry it out. But a 
hasty step in that direction could lead to a disaster and should be avoided 
till a system to replace the existing one was available or feasible. To talk 
of immediate nationalisation was, in his view, irresponsible and counter-
productive. 
His second argument was that to spend funds on the nationalisation of 
existing industries would be squandering away the Government's resources, 
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although he conceded that to acquire industries by the Government 'may be 
for the nation's good'. Such a step would leave the Government with very 
little funds for alternative investments and it 'would have spoiled the field 
for private enterprise too•. 103 Moreover, the existing industries used old 
technology. Nehru predicted the advent of world-wide technological revolution 
that would soon make these industries obsolete. The state should, there-
fore, preserve its resources to use them when they were to be most needed. 
Finally, it was all very good 'for non-official organisations to look far 
ahead into the future, but for a Government to commit itself to the long 
distance [was] not safe•. 104 
Production being most essential, a great deal of co-operation was 
required between the different interest groups involved in producing goods 
and services and hence the Government could not afford to lose the goodwill 
of the industrialists. 105 The course that Nehru envisaged for the new state 
was one that would cause no breakdown or major upsets in the existing 
system. The Government would gradually make efforts to bring about changes 
first in those sectors of the economy which were 'most capable of bearing it 
106 to the national advantage, and lhen making other changes'. 
Nehru's opposition to Karimuddin's resolution then came from his anxiety 
to preserve the existing system of production. It was not that he dropped 
the rhetoric of socialism from his vocabulary. In the same speech he 
asserted that the Report of the Economic Sub-Committee of the Congress 
indicated a 'strong tendency towards socialism'. But this socialism would be 
brought about only through a gradual dose of state intervention without 
causing any disruption to productivity. 107 In his other speech, mentioned 
above, he even claimed that India was a 'socialist state•. 10~ 
Nehru repeated these arguments in his speech on the Industrial Policy 
Resolution. This speech was notable for the technocratic outlook it reflected. 
He maintained that the Socialists and the Conmunists had a 'static' view of 
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109 the world. They were blind to the technological changes that science was 
bringing about. He agreed in principle with the leftist demand for changes 
in the land system and for state ownership of key industries, but these 
demands would be made redundant soon by the 'vast changes in productive 
methods' in industry and agriculture that he thought were taking place in the 
more developed parts of the world. 110 He and his party would conserve the 
energy and resources of the state in order to take advantage of these 
scientific achievements, as they became available, in order to develop Indian 
economic and social life, 111 rather than being carried away by the leftist 
'issues•. 112 The\scientism'of this argument was in keeping with Nehru's 
earlier fascination for western modernity and the 'scientific spirit•. 113 It 
also tied in with his other argument that improving production was the 'first 
essential' in the economic development of the country. 
In his address. to the fICCI members, Nehru declared that he considered 
the profit motive 'not only wrong from the economic point of view but a vulgar 
thing from any sensitive point of view' and added that changes in the socio-
economic structure were necessary. But how would such change come about? 
I would [Nehru continued] much rather bring them about 
without deliberate destruction and obstruction ••• [which] 
must undoubtedly lead to a stoppage of growth at present. 
They stop production. They stop the production of wealth. 
One has the satisfaction of being able to do something 
afterwards more rapidly, no doubt, but it is not certain 
that afterwards you will be able to do it so rapidly. 
One has, therefore, to compromise. 114 
This ideology of transition to the new society through 'compromise' 
allowed the new Government to make all kinds of concessions to private enter-
prise. The Central directive to the provinces to go slow on land reforms 
was also explained by referring to the need for conserving the resources of 
the state. 
All this is actually not surprising. Nehru had been consistent in 
his ideas ever since the N.P.C. was formed. His strategy for bringing about 
socialism was to deal with it simply as a techno-economic exercise involving 
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no political mobilisation of the masses. This precisely was the politics 
of his strategy. This, as we have noticed, was revealed in the work of the 
N.P.C. in the assumption that socialism could be brought about the 
'quiet', 'expert' and 'scientific' work of the planners. The political 
question of class-struggle or the alignment of class-forces was irrelevant 
because socialism was a matter of adopting the correct scientific tech-
niques in the economic field. Now in 1948, science and technology alone were 
expected to bring about a revolution in productivity making the political 
aspect of nationalisation of industries and changes in the lend system, etc. 
redundant. The only political requirement of this economic solution - an 
independent national government - had been fulfilled by the success of the 
freedom struggle. Now that the state was in the hands of national leaders 
who had a 'scientific' approach to society, a scientific revolution in 
production would follow end that would gradually lead to changes in the 
existing socio-economic structure. 
Nehru and his party were also consistent in the view they had adopted, 
since the days of the N.P.C. of the specific role of the state. We may 
recall here his letter to K.T. Shah when he elaborated how socialism might 
be brought about through planning without engendering any conflict with the 
basic structure as it existP.d. On the issue of nationalisation also Nehru 
was explicit that 'it would be impracticable to insist on state management 
of the existing industries in which vested interest have already taken root', 
and that the state should P.ndeavour to develop new industries under its 
aegis rather than acquire the existing ones. 115 
But Nehru's justifications of the governmental actions during 1947-49 
still left him with the task of proving the worth of his G~vernment in aug-
menting the country's wealth. Here he was on a more comfortable ground. 
Alth~ugh in the industrial sector the Government could not show any achieve-
ment (the proposed steel ind•_·stry was still under consideration), yet the 
irrigation and hydro power schemes initiated by Wavell's Development Board 
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in early 1946 were there to point to. 
We may recall that the 'plans' prepared or aanctioned by the Development 
Board in 1946 gave p~imary i11POrtance to irrigation and power schemes during 
the first five years of planning. The bureaucratic efforts started in 1946 
gathered momentum over the years and lll08t of the Provincial Governments, 
despite the lack of any central plan or direction, continued to support them 
with enthusiasm. As a result, by the end of 1948 the Central Water Power 
Irrigation and Navigation Con111ission could claim that there were as many aa 
160 irrigation and hydro-dlectricity projects at that time under execution, 
investigation or contemplation. Of these, 46 were under actual execution 
while there were 53 in an advanced stage of investigation. Alllong the 46 
projects under execution were included Danioctar Valley Schelle (the Centre, 
following the suggestion of the Adviaory Planning Board, had aet up in 1948 
e otatutory body - the Damodar Valley Corporation - for this purpose), Hirakud, 
. 116 Bhakra, Nangal and other projects. All these projects had been taken up 
on the basis of the plans sanctioned in 1946. 
Nehru, on behalf of his Government, took full credit for these projects 
and cited them as achievements of the new regime. 117 Even until 1946 he had 
been a proponent of rapid large-scale industrialisation. In 1948, however, 
he considered these river-valley projects to be of primary importance for 
the welfare of the economy. 
The Congress thus seems to have followed the footsteps of the colonial 
government. The latter had moved from talking about rapid industrialisation 
to planning for everything else but industries. Nehru and his Government now 
seemed to be repeating the same performance. 
SECTION 4: Emergence of the riret rive-Year Plan 
Although the Govertwent of India failed to ineti tute any llaehinery for 
planning until 195C, the i.. of planned dltvelas-nt remined central to all 
... 
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nationalist thinking on econmaic well-being of the country. In November 1947, 
soon after the Trenafer of Power, the All-India Congress Connittee, while 
appointing the Econmaic Progr...- COINltittee, resolved that 'Democracy in 
modern age neceeaitated pl8"VM9d central direction as well as decentralisation 
of political and economic power, in ao far as this was compatible with the 
safety of the state, with efficient production and the cultural progress of 
the connunity aa a whole•. 118 The Economic Programme Connittee of the AICC, 
as we have noticed earlier in this chapter, strongly supported the recommend-
ation of the Advisory Planning Board for the early formation of a Planning 
Conniaaion. 
Amongst both the 'right' and the 'left' in the CongreBB the idea of 
planning had its followers. Thia was evident in December 1948 when Pattabhi 
Sitaramayya, in his Presidential address to the fifty-fifth session of the 
Congress, referred to the Japanese plan of rural reconstruction after the 
war. Although his emphasis was on the Gandhian objectives of socio-economic 
reforms, he was explicit about the urgent need for socio-economic planning 
by the Government. 119 
Sitaramayya'a statement reflected the mood of the Gandhians in 1948. 
Gandhi's death at the hands of an assassin had only strengthened their 
resolve to carry on with 'constructive work' in the villages and to influence 
the Congress to adopt a plan baaed on the Mahatma's ideal of village society. 
In 1949, they called a meeting of Gandhian 'constructive workers' at 
Wardah. This Sarvodaya Economic Conference adopted a Plan submitted by the 
group's Sarvodaya Planning Connittee which included Kake Kelelkar, J.C. 
Kumarappa, Shankarrao Oeo, P.C. Ghosh, R.K. Patel and Gulzarilal Nanda. 120 
The Sarvodaya Plan called for the abolition of private property and 
strongly recommended co-operative and collective farming in agriculture. 
Regarding industries it atatifd that large-scale industries should be 
aocialiaed on p.pent of (;Gllpenaatian not exceeding the ceiling of highest 
wage or inr:GM, calculated by the CGdittee u Re.2000 per 11anth at the 
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existing price levels. Thia caapensation would be given only as a rehabili-
tatibn c~tion. On taxation, the ai11 of the Plan was 'to evolve a 
finance ayst• under which 50 per cent of the public revenue collected may 
be spent by the village panchayats. from the r.aining 50 per cent the 
administration of the higher bodies should be financed'. With regard to 
foreign concerns and foreign trade the Plan advocated public ownership and 
corporation. 121 Although the Sarvodaya Plan went beyond Gandhi's own ideal 
of 'trusteeship' with regard to private proprietary rights, on the ideal of 
non-violence it reached the logical extent of Gancllian utopia: it urged the 
gradual disbandment of all armed forces to achieve a non-violent defence 
syst•.122 
Despite its utopian vision of a totally non-violent society, the 
Sarvodaya Plan succeeded in bringing forth the importance of village society 
in Indian economic life. It was upheld by many Socialists including Jaye 
Prakash Narayan123 and led people like Vinoba Bhave to launch the Bhoodan 
Yajna in the early 'fifties. 124 The entire Sarvodaye movement was based on 
the strategy of class collaboration in order to usher in a society rid of the 
inequalities of class and caste. It caused considerable embarrassment to the 
Government in so far as it highlighted, in the name of Gandhism, the urgent 
need of ctlanging the socio-economic structure of India. 
It also brought into focus the ideological contradictions between 
staunch Gandhians and the rest of the Congress leadership. Although the 
former were not in a position to alter the course of the Congress policies 
to any significant extent, they were not to be dismissed lightly. At least 
two of the members of the Sarvodaya Planning Committee - Shankarrao Deo and 
P.C. Ghosh - were in the Congress Working Committee. 125 They also had a 
large following in .the Congress Party at the level of the provinces. More-
over the Plan was evidently in line with Gandhi's vision of constructive 
reform of the aociety. Solle of the Ganclliana within the Congress, who were ~ 
in official poeiti- in the Provincial Gove~ts, alao took an active 
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interest in the Plan. Morarji Desai, Home and Revenue Minister of Bombay at 
-
the time,organiaed efforts to draw up a detailed Sarvodaya Plan in Bombay 
State. Tne proceaa was inaugurated by hi• in 1949. Thia effort was organised 
on a district basis with experienced Gandhian constructive workers in charge 
of an extensive progra1111e of development, and a budget of 10 million rupees 
for a four-year period. The programme was later incorporated into Bombay's 
first Five-Vear Plan. 126 
The Sarvodaya movement initiated in 1949 by the Sarvodaya Plan programme 
gathered its momentum in the 'fifties through the participation of non-
Congreas Gandhian workers such as Vinobha Bhave and his followers. Jeya 
Prakash Narayan from the socialist camp and Shankarrao Dea, who resigned from 
the Congress, made the movement stronger by their leadership. But by then, 
however, the Congress had already got over its initial hesitation with regard 
to planning and the Government of India had launched its own First Five-
Vear Plan. All these enabled the Government to make political use of the 
Sarvodaya movement by lending official support to its Bhoodan aspect. 127 
In 1949-50, however, thanks to the Sarvodaya efforts, the Congress was 
forced to take its own steps towards planning. At the Delhi session of 
the Congress Working Committee in January 1950, Shenkarrao Dea presented a 
Gandhian 'Economic Policy' together with the Sarvodaya Plan. 128 He suggested 
that even if the Congress was unable to accept the suggestion that Gandhi 
had made immediately before his death, that is, to dissolve the Congress as 
a political party, it was still in a position to realise the Gandhian ideals 
by 'rejuvenating the old Congress by giving it a new creed, a new programme 
and a new constitution' in line with Sarvodaya ideals. He envisaged a 
Congress working towards a 'co-operative COlllllOl'lwealth' ideal which would 
present to the world 'an Indian brand of Socialism baaed on [the] heritage 
of non-violent CQllPasaionate culture - a Sociali .. not merely scientific 
and technological, but also htnmW and tulanitarian•. 129 
The Congreea Working C..-tttee felt obliged to reepond to this fervent 
i~ 
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plea from a Gandhian. At ita Delhi meeting the C011111ittee adopted a resolution 
on the 'economic policy' which specifically directed the Government to set 
up a planning machinery without further delay: 'In order that the declara-
tions of the Congress and the directive principles of the Constitution are 
made effect:! v., in as short a ti"'8 as possible, it is desirable that a 
Statutory Planning COlllllission be set up by the Government of India'. In 
emphasising the need for planning the C011111ittee recognised the centrality 
of the idea of planning in Indian nationalist thought. 'The tasks of a 
planning body for India', the resolution emphasised, had 'already been set 
up in the course of the country's struggle for freedoln•. 130 It was this 
'recognition of the vital role of planning' in realising 'the people's 
aspirations for social justice and progress' that led to the appointment of 
the N.P.C. in the year 1938. 131 
The resolution laid down the principal objectives of planning as: 
a) The establishment of a just order of a society, providing for: 
(i) the operation of the principles of decentralisation, 
co-operation and individual freedom to the utmost feasible 
extent · 
(ii) equal opportunity for all 
(iii) adequate means of living for all 
(iv) just and humane conditions of work 
(v) full and suitable employment 
(vi) the growth of human personality in all its aspects. 
b) Adequate and expanding vrJlume of production to secure a progressive 
rise in the standard of living ••• within a rea£onable period 
c) The best utilisation of the material and human resources ••• and 
the improvement of the skill and the productive capacity of its 
manpower by suitable technical production and training 
d) As near an approach to national and regional self-sufficiency as 
would be compatible with the requirements of an adequate standard 
of living and the country's internal and external security. 
On the basis of these principles the duties of the proposed Planning 
Commission were fixed as (a) to make a full aasesament of the resources end 
the requir8111enta of the nation, (b) to deter111ine priorities and to work out 
a proper allocation and diatribution of the resources, (c) to lay down the 
varioue at.egee, Heh covering a definite period, for the develap.-nt of the 
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country's economy and to undertake the necessary preparatory work in connection 
with each stage, and {d) to secure full and all-round co-ordination in the 
process of planning and the execution of the plan. 132 
The resolution also laid down the immediate priorities for the Planning 
Commission. These were to bring about a speedy elimination of the import of 
luxury goods, and other dispensable articles, to secure the necessary capital 
goods for essential industries, to maximise the production of the essential 
primary goods including food-stuffs, and to speed up the irrigation and 
power projects. 133 
One interesting aspect of this resolution was that, unlike all the 
previous Congress documents on economic progr8111118& and policies it did hot 
attempt to categorise the future planned society in terms of 'socialiam', 
'capitalism' or any other familiar label. Nor did it spell out the roles the 
state and private enterprise would play in the process of implementaUon of 
the plan. Instead, the resolution simply noted that 'the economic content 
of the people's freedom' had already been 'indicated in general terms in the 
resolutions and manifestos of the Indian National Congress, in the pronounce-
ments of Mahatma Gandhi and other Congress leaders and in the Congress 
Economic Programme'. As in fact these pronouncements were often mutually 
contradictory, it is obvious that the resolution was very carefully drafted 
so as to avoid controversies within the Party. 
Whatever might be the ideological content of this resolution, its 
acceptance by the Congress Working Committee soon led to the setting up of 
a Planning Commission by the Government of India. 134 The Planning Commission, 
formed in March 1950 by a resolution of the Government of India, consisted 
initially of six members. 135 Nehru himself became the Chairman of the 
Commission while Gulzarilal Nanda, Labour Minister of Bonmay Government, was 
made the Vice-Chairman. The other four members in the Connission were Y.T. 
l<rishn..achari, C.O. Deahmukh, G.L. Mehta and R.I<. Patel. l<rishnelnachari waa 
.-. adllinietrator .r1d h•dltd the fiacal Comisaian of 1949. o.t.Jkh wea a 
.. 
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former Governor of the Reserve Bani< of India and was working at that time as 
Adviser to the Govern111ent of India on External Finance. G.L. Mehta was a 
leading member of the FICCI. R.K. Patel was an ex-ICS officer who at that 
time held the position of the rood Commissioner to the Government of India. He 
was also a leading and active Congress figure in Bombay. 136 Thus, out of the 
six members three were political leaders (Nehru, Nanda and Patel) and two 
administrators, while G.L. Mehta represented an important political pressure 
group. 
The composition of this body hardly reflected the emphasis that Nehru 
used to place in 1938 on technical 'expertise' and on the desirability of 
keeping 'politics' out of the National Planning Committee. 137 The recommend-
ation of the Advisory Planning Board had also suggested an expert body and 
was specific in its recommendation to keep Central ministers out of this body 
so that it would remain responsible to the entire Cabinet rather than to 
individual ministers. 138 It is interesting to see that Nehru's initial 
proposal regarding the composition of the Commission included the names of 
N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar139 and P.C. Mahalanobis in lieu of himself and R.K. 
Pate1. 140 Before considering Ayyangar Nehru had requested Rajendra Prasad 
to be the chairman, but the latter declined the offer. 141 The Congress 
Working Committee and other people had apparently pressurised Nehru to take 
up the Chairmanship. 142 
Some authors suggest that Nehru's choice of the members of the Commission 
was determined by their expertise and not by their political status. They 
argue that while Gulzarilal Nanda and R.K. Patel were political leaders at 
provincial levels, their inclusion in the Commission could have been due to 
their respective experience in labour problems and public administration. 143 
The point is debatable. But that certain 'experts' were excluded on political 
grounds seems to be beyond all doubt. 
The exclusion of J.C. K~rappa and K.T. Shah actually gave rise to 
80M8 strong critici• in the Parli811Bnt. Kt.118rappa was a ataooch Gancl1ian 
323 
who, it may be recalled, had resigned from the N.P.C. on ideological grounds. 
Although Nanda and Patel were also known for their Gandhian beliefs and as 
signatories to the Sarvodaya Plan, 'they were not considered as staunch 
"Gandhites" like Kumarappa•. 144 K.T. Shah, on the other hand, was known for 
his socialist leanings. Shah's exclusion was even more conspicuous than 
Kumarappa's, because of his long service as the General Secretary of the 
N.P.C. and because of his close association with Nehru in these matters. 
His exclusion could only be a political decision and perhaps had to do with 
Shah's nomination by the Socialists as a candidate for the office of the 
first President of India in opposition to Rajendra Prasad. 145 
The setting up of the Planning Commission, which Nehru had always 
viewed as the first step towards economic development under the leadership 
of the state, did not prove to be a smooth process for him. Not ell of his 
Cabinet colleagues were enthusiastic about forming a separate body. John 
Matthai, the Finance Minister, was particularly opposed to the proposal. He 
had been so at least since 1949. 146 He was of the opinion that instead of 
setting up new bodies for planning, the Government should have directed its 
energy in implementing the plans and projects already in hand (prepared by 
the Development Board in 1946). 147 When Nehru ultimately succeeded in setting 
up the Commission, on the basis of the directives of the Congress Working 
Committee, Matthai saw in Nehru's action a party caucus determining the steps 
of the Government. To Matthai, this meant the end of parliamentary 
democracy. 148 The differences between Nehru and Matthai grew sharper after 
the formation of the Planning Commission and led eventually to the latter's 
resignation from the Cabinet. In a bitterly worded statement to the press, 
Matthai explained the reasons for his resignation. Among all the charges he 
made against the Commission, e.g. that it was becoming a 'parallel Cabinet', 
weakening the authority of the Finance Ministry and gradually reducing 'the 
Cabinet to practically a registering authority', etc., there was one which 
described the Planning COMiaaion aa 'hardly qualified for its work' and 
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'not competent to handle the complicated task of drawing up "an order of 
pri~rities" for the existing plans•. 149 Thus even in their arguments over 
the Planning Commission, Matthai and Nehru had one basic agreement in common. 
Planners, they both insisted, must primarily be people with adequate 
technical qualification and expertise. 
Although Matthai was the only one in the Cabinet to resign from the 
Cabinet on the issue of the Planning Commission, 'some even of the ministers 
who remained had no liking for the Planning Commission and failed to co-
operate with it and facilita~e its working•. 150 As a result, the setting up 
of the Planning Commission did not give any innediate fillip to the cause of 
planning. More than a year after the formation of the Commission, Nehru 
expressed his disappointment thus: 'We seem to have lost all capacity to 
consider anything from the point of view of a new approach. We go round and 
round in circles and cannot get out of our grooves•. 151 
The formation of the Commission was, however, only a step towards 
actualising the idea of planning. The Commission would require a policy 
framework to formulate e plan progranne. This could only be provided by the 
political organisation in power. The Congress took up the task in earnest 
soon after the formation of the Planning Commission. In April 1950, P. 
Siteramayya, the Congress President, called a meeting of the chief Ministers 
of the States and the Presidents of Provincial Congress Committees 'to 
formulate an economic programme for the country and to devise the best 
methods to implement the programme•. 152 
This conference reiterated the Congress stand on the need for planning. 
The emphasis was again put on socio-eco~omic reforms rather than on rapid 
industrialisation, exactly as it had been done in the C.W.C. meeting of 
January that year. As objectives of planning the Conference enumerated the 
following: (a) promotion of a balanced economy in agriculture, large-scale 
and basic industries, village industries and social services; (b) rational-
isation of production in agriculture and industry and to take steps for the 
325 
establistvnent and administration of a just and decentralised co-operative 
economy; {c) to bring 8 definite rise in thP Standard Of living Of the people 
es a result of planned economy which guarantees a fair remuneration to those 
who participate in the creation of wealth. 153 
The question of agrarian reforms, which had been taken up by then as 
an urgent task on principle by most of the provinces, featured prominently 
in the conference. It was resolved that specific 'planned' measures would 
be taken for the development of irrigation, rapid multiplication of better 
seed, increased production of organic fertilizers, reclamation and preser-
vation of soil, etc. It also decided to int~oduce 'effective and widespread 
agricultural extension service' which woul,. 'act as a two-way link between 
the cultivator and the scientific departments' of the state. 154 
We have seen before that the Centre, faced with financial stringency, 
had tried to dissuade the provinces from implementing the land-reform measures 
in haste, and had warned them that they could not expect the Centre to share 
their burdens if they decided to go on their own. The Conference of the 
Chief Ministers and the Provincial Congress leaders trie~ to find a solution 
to this problem. It concluded that agriculture would 'remain in a state of 
flux so long as the structure and pattern of rural economy [did] not become 
clear and definite'. In view of this, it was resolved that it was 'necessary 
to shorten the period of transition by expediting the abolition of Zamindari 
and Melguzari by paying compensation, if necessary in bonds'. It went on 
further to suggest that 'provision should be made for fixity of tenure to 
the tiller', and sub-letting should be discouraged and not allowed for a 
. d th f' 155 per10 more en ive years. 
Whilst deliberating on the subject of 'Industry' the Conference 
emphasised the importance of cottage and small industry and recommended the 
imposition of a cess on large-scale industry - the earnings from which would 
be utilised in subsidising cottage and small-scale industry so as 'to reduce 
the disparity in the cost of production between them [i.e. large end small-
------------------------------------- --- -----
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scale industries]•. 156 
The other important features of the resolutions adopted by this 
Conference were related to the question of 'planned investment of capital' 
and the 'machinery for rural development'. Regarding the former the resolution 
suggested, among other things, that there should be a programme under which 
the richer section of the population would have to 'regularly put a certain 
percentage of their income into the shares of co-operative societies'. The 
co-operatives being the basic units of production in the programme, this 
measure, in the opinion of the Conference, would lead to regular augmentation 
of investable capital of these units and hence increase national investment. 
To regulate and channel investment in a planned manner, the Conference felt 
that it would be necessary for the Government to have some control over 
capital issues. 
Regarding rural development, the suggestion was to evolve a three-tier 
system at the basic level: the village panchayat, the multi-purpose co-
operative and the industrial co-operative. This system, in the opinion of the 
Conference, would help the villagers to participate in the process of 
planning. The villagers' plans for local development - social and economic -
through the co-ordination at the district and the provincial level, would 
provide the basic information on the basis of which the national plan was 
to be drawn up. 157 
This was the first time that the role of the people in the process of 
planning was specifically considered by any Congress programme. The 
Conference had included this factor in its resolution on the 'objectives' 
of planning: 
For the implementation of ••• [a plan] programme, emphasis 
should be laid on the rousing of mass enthusiasm and 
consciousness which alone can make it a people's programme. 
It will also be necessary to create such institutions as 
co-operatives in agriculture and industries and Panchayats, 
and to arrange for the training of local leadership to man 
this industries ••• In the background of our limited 
resources, economic planning presupposes a period of austerity 
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on the part of the people. In order to secure voluntary 
self-denial on a nation-wide scale for the purpose of a 
programme of planned regional development, efforts should 
be made to create a sense of equality of sacrifice among 
all sections of the community. f58 
This recognition of the role of the people appears to be a distinct 
departure from all the earlier Nehruvien discourses on planning in the 
Congress. We can recall here the emphasis on expertise end scientific 
approach in Nehru's vision of planning during the rtays of the N.P.C. 
Planning to Nehru, end to the capitalists es well es the British bureaucracy, 
was en affair of the state. Whenever they considered 'people' it was always 
in relation to their poverty and amelioration of it. The question of people's 
participation in planning was never considered by any of them. People came 
in their construct only es beneficiaries and not as participants either of 
the Nehruvian or of the British colonial variety. The only two pressure 
groups in the Congress who had considered the question of popular partici-
pation with any seri~usness were the Gandhians and the Socialists. By 1950 
the majority of the latter had been ousted from the party. But the Gandhians 
ccdd not be treated in a similar fashion for obvious reasons. The revival 
of Gandhian idealism in the form of the Sarvodaya movement could not be 
discussed so lightly by the Congress without risking its own credibility. 
Incorporation of Gandhian populism into the Congress programmes was et least 
a token recognitjon of the pressure that the Gandhiens were capable of 
mounting. 
It is noteworthy that although the village panchayat had been an age-
old organisation in Indian society, it was left out of the Draft Constitution 
prepared by the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly under the 
chairmanship of Dr B.R. Ambedker. It needed Gandhian intervention to 
incorporate the concept of village panchayats in the Directive Principles 
of the Constitution of lndia. 160 
But there was another aspect to it. As long as planning meant essentially 
industrial planning, the question of the popular participation could be kept 
.~~~-------------------
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in abeyance. Industrie.lisation could be an affair only of the state. But 
when circumstances pushed to the forefront of Congress planning, such basic 
questions as land reform, provision of employment to the rural masses, raising 
the standard of living, etc., the new regime had to think in terms of an 
administrative machinery appropriate to the task. The process had been 
started by the colonial bureaucracy itself when in 1945 they craated the post 
of development officers at the district and provincial levels. The Congress 
in 1950 seized on this end decided to extend the machinery to the village 
level. Penchayets, conmunity extension service, and co-operative societies 
could serve the duel purpose of extending the control of the state to the basic 
level and et the same time give the new regime a populist image. It could 
help them to appropriate Gandhian populism as well es satisfy the idealist 
followers of the Mahatma. By calling on the people to participate in these 
village-level bodies meant to administer rural development, the government 
was seeking to put a nationalist gloss on a structure that in its essentials 
had been evolved by the colonial state. The slogan of 'popular participation 
in planning' was obviously of some political use to leaders who otherwise had 
no serious commitment to that idea. 
The idea of people's participatioon in planning became a constant feature 
in ell the subsequent resolutions of the Congress in the early 'fifties. In 
Nasik, in September 1950, the Party reiterated the importance of 'public co-
operation' and public enthusiasm in the process of planning. It acknowledged 
that efforts should be made •to utilise the experience, energy, free time and 
other resources of the people on a voluntary basis and on a national scale' 
to harness people's enthusiasm in the right direction, and recommended that, 
'In any such scheme Congressmen should give their full and active support'. 
(Apparently this had reference to the Sarvodeya movement launched by the 
Gandhians.)161 The Nasik Congress also elaborated on the urgent tasks of 
planning which had been specified by the Delhi Conference in January that 
year. It called upon the Goverrwent to take i!Mlediate steps in the following 
1111tters: 
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1. Basic and essential lines of development such as power and 
. irrigation, and prior allocation of available resources 
for this purpose. 
2. Early realisation of self-sufficiency in food. 
J. An adequate supply of raw materials for indust~y. 
4. An orderly and progressive reduction in the general price level. 
5. Full and efficient utilisation of installed capacity in industries; 
reducing cost of production to a reasonable level and, at the 
same time, providing conditions in which the workers can put forth 
their best efforts. 
6, Expansion of opportunities for gainful employment by planned 
development of villages and small-scale industries on co-operative 
lines as far as possible, and on the basis of the highest attainable 
technical efficiency. Priority should be given in this respect 
to Khadi and the handloom industry. 
7. Abolition of Zamindari, Jagirdari and other forms of landlordism. 162 
The themes of people's p3rticipation and development of rural India 
recurred again in the Delhi session of the Congress in September 1951 when it 
declared that 'the first steps in the reorganisation of rural economy [was] 
to strengthen the village as a socjal and economic entity as against the 
separate interests of individuals, and for the purpose of effective admini-
stration for development'. This resolution also specified the organisational 
form required to fulfil this task. 'Village production councils; it added, 
'should be charged with the ·~sponsibility ~f developing and increasing 
procuction and should serve as the link between the people and the agencies 
of the State. They should mobilise voluntary labour for community ~1orks. 
Management of all land not cultivated by occupants should vest in village 
production councils'. The Congress's recognition of the need for extending 
the state machinery led the Government to take certain new steps in the early 
'fifties. Creation of the post of Block Development officers, formulation 
of community development programmes, setting up of the National Extension 
Servi~~163 and, most importantly, making Panchayati Raj statutory through 
provincial iegislation164 were all part of this process of extending the 
state's control to the basic unit of the society, and 'harnessing' people's 
I 
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enthuaiaa• in pl..,ing.1~5 
After the objectivea, prioritiea and 118Chinery of planning, etc. had been 
apecified,there remined bra other things to be done, that ia, to draw up a 
plan to e>cecute, end to define the objectivea of planning. While tl!le 
Planning C0111Riaaion recently set up was to look after the first task, it was 
for the political organisation in power to categorise the objective. 
The Gandhian& in formulating their Sarvodaya Plan had coined a new 
term, 'Co-operative Co111011wealth', to define their goal. 166 In doing this 
they acknowledged the difference of thia goal fra1t the MahlltMa'a vision of 
a Ram Rajya. The Congreaa in ita Naaik aeaaion in Septellber 19SO defined ita 
objective anew. It waa 'the eatabliatwent of a Welfare State wherein there 
is economic democracy, a national mini-.n standard in respect of the e88811tials 
of physical and social well-being, a rising standard of living, full e11Ploy-
ment, elimination of e>cPloitation and progressive narrowing down of disparities 
.in income and wealth, so that there may be equality of opportunity to all 
for self-develop11ent and growth of peraonality~ 167 
The concept of the Welfare State had its reference to the Britiah system 
of social security adopted in July 1948. In England the term denoted the 
measures taken up by the atate to fight against Beveridge'a 'five giants•. 
There was no precise theoretical connotation of this term. Vet it wea seen 
as the Keynesian answer to the socialist and conaunist critique of the 
capitalist syatem. 168 
The choice of this term by the Congress in 1950 signified its inability 
to accept even the jargons of socialism at that period. It took Nehru a few 
more years and the aucceaa·of the First Hve;.Vear Plan to revive his own 
no11enclature of socialist pattern, etc. for defining Indian 'planned' 
society. Meanwhile• until the 'Avadi Congress of 1955, the ConQren continued 
.to uaet .. Welfare State' to define ita objective of planning. 169 
:! lndt..'• perticipetion. in the dewelap.ent of the ColOllbo Plan <• diecuaa 
the .. .-r9ence or thi• Plen •1•) llight heft b6 Jn a fector in the Choice of 
.. 
the ter11.,, Britain'• internt, and alao that of ita ally, the U.S.A., in the 
ll1 
ColOllbo Plan wee to retain its zone of influence in South and South-Eaat 
Asia and to keep it free fro11t c~ist influence emanating frOll the success 
of the latter in China and North Korea. India was to submit its own plan to 
the Comllonwealth Consultative C0111ittee in September 1950 and it 11ight not 
have been a 111ere coinci~ that the Congress hit upon the term 'Welfare 
State' to define India'• objective& at planning precisely at that ti•. Surely 
any no1119nclature associated with socialism would not be welCOlle to the 
lletllbers of the eo-a.awealth who were already haunted by the fear of a ccmnunist 
takeover of South-Eaet Asia. On the issue of the Korean War, India was 
trying hard to maintain the stance of a non-aligned nation. 170 The country's 
interest in the ColOlllbo Plan waa to seek foreign aid for its own develop-
..ent. Under the circ'88tancea, it 111ight have been thought prudent to settle 
on 'Welhra State' aa the lll08t convenient concept to define India's ailt8 at 
planning. 
The new atate that waa .. rging in India after the Transfer of Power took 
nearly three years to shape itself. In 1950 the basic postulates of this 
state were finalised. India adopted the new Constitution, set up a Planning 
C011111ission to chart the course of its future progress, forna.ilated its 
objectivea and gave a naM to ita envisaged goal. The onus on the Govenwent 
now was to execute the tasks. The new Planning Commission did not waste much 
ti• to produce a blueprint for planning. Immediately after ita institution 
it was faced with the task of preparing s six-year plan to be submitted in 
September that year to the Cc:mionwealth Coi.sultative Committee as part of the 
proposed Colombo Plan. 
The idea of the Colombo Plan .. rged in the course of diacuaaiona held 
a.:>ng the Ccmionwealth countriea which had begun in January 1950 in ColOllbo. 171 
The foreign •iniatera of the Cu•oowealth countries 111et in a Conference there 
to diacuaa the econo11ic and the political situation in South and South-East 
Asia. The Ca.nf•r•• NCOgnieed 'the vital illlPOl'tance' of the aconallic 
da¥el•••nt of U. 1'119ion fOI' the ..tntenence of the political stability of 
)}2 
the countries concerned, and for 'the growth of an expanding world economy 
basect upon 11Ultilateral trade'. It was also understood that the resources 
required for the effective development of the countries in this region were 
beyond the •ans of the economies and it would be •necessary to seek the 
co-operation of other countries'. 
A Commonwealth Consultative Committee was set up at this Conference to 
go into the matter. This Committee suggested that the Governments of the 
Commonwealth countries in the area should draw up their plans for economic 
development for a six-year period starting from 1951, so that the COlllftittee 
could use them to draw up a Report on •practical and realistic' planning for 
the development of the region. Such a report would not only epecifiy the 
needs of these countries to those interested in supplying aide and grants for 
the development of the region, it would also help the countries to colla-
borate amongst one another for their 1MJtual development. 
The outline that India submitted to the Commonwealth Consultative 
Committee derived its importance from the fact that it formed the basis of 
the draft of the First Five-Year Plan prepared by the Commission soon after. 
It was in conformity with the basis and objectives set by the Congress in its 
resolutions in the early 'fifties. The aim, as it stated, was to achieve 
the target of an improved standard of living, provision of a minimum social 
services and supply of suficient capital and consumer goods to restrain 
inflation. 172 
To achieve these objectives it proposed (i) to increase agricultural 
production by developing irrigation, rural electrifications and by increasing 
the supply of fertilizers, implements and building materials; (ii) to develop 
and improve transport facilities; (iii) to promote capacity utilisation of 
existing industries; and (iv) encourage cottage industries as a source of 
e111Ployi.nt. 
The six-year plan eati•ted a coat of Ra.18,400 million distributed 
according to the Tllble 2 9ben below. 
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TABLE 2. Allocation under Colombo Plan 
(1) 
(1) Agriculture 
(2) Transport 6 C01111MJnication 
(3) fuel and Power 
(4) Industry & Mining 
(excluding coal) 
(5) Social Capital 
(2) 
Rs. 
million 
6,080 
7,027 
576 
1,800 
2,913 
18,396 
(3) 
Percentage 
of Total 
:n 
38 
3 
10 
16 
100 
Source: The ColartJo Plan (Report of the Commonwealth Consultative 
COlllll'littee (London, ~9SO), p.13. 
In physical terms the basic aim of this plan was to make available to 
the people 15 yards of cloth per person and, in the rationed urban areas, 
cereal consumption of 16 ounces a day. This was not an ambitious aim. The 
programme envisaged a 50 per cent increase in clothes and a 25 per cent 
increase in cereal consumption on the existing level of consumption over the 
next six years. It also envisaged to do away with import of food grains, which 
was the major cause of the country's current balance of payments deficit, arvl 
expected that at the end of the six-year period an equilibrium would be 
achieved at a higher level of international trade helped by substantial 
increases in exports of raw materials such as oil seeds and short-staple 
cottons, and of manufacturers like jute products, cotton textiles and other 
consumer gooda. 173 
The prime limitation on the execution of the programme, as identified 
by the Planning Commission~ was the availability of internal and external 
finance. The C01111ission aimed at raising Rs.10,300 million from internal 
financial resources, leaving a gap of Rs.8,100 million to be 111et frOll 
external aourcea. It looked forward to uee Ra.2,800 •illion worth of sterling 
balances during the period 1951-57. Thia would leave the country with a 
deficit of Rs.5,300 million. The import materials on which the external 
finance was to be used were capital goods needed for the development plan, 
raw materials such as cotton, non-ferrous metals, timber and oil, and food 
and consumer goods. The Government pleaded that if external finance on the 
scale envisaged in the progr&llllle was not forthcoming, the rate of increase of 
production would cle~rly be smaller than was desirable in the prevailing 
circumstances. 174 
Since the planned investment by the state was oriented towards the 
development of agriculture and other infrastructural necessities, the issue 
of industrial development was left to private enterprise. To induce private 
investment from abroad, the Government pledged to make conditions of 
investment more attractive to foreign investors. The plan pointed out that 
excepting the manufacture of munitions which was reserved to the Government, 
the only power that the Government exercised with respect to the admission of 
new foreign enterprises was for the purpose of preventing 'over-investment' · 
in certain crowded sectors of the economy. Under the existing exchange 
control regulations, all foreign enterprises were allowed to freely remit 
abroad their entire current earnings. The Government now proposed that 
investment from hard currency areas would be given the same treatment as 
that from the sterling areas and investors from all these areas would be 
allowed to repatriate not only the original capital :nvested in approved 
projects after January 1950, but also any profits which might be ploughed 
back into the business. In a nutshell, the Government was ready to make all 
concessions necessary to stimulate both domestic and foreign private 
investment. 175 
The six-year plan that India submitted to the Commonwealth Conaultative 
C011111tittee was the first draft outline for a planned economic development of t'. 
ft'. 
India prepared after the transfer of power. Soon afterwards, in July 1951, ;;¥~~, 
the Gove~t of India ptJ>llehed the draft outline of the first five-Year Plan. 17'f~~~ 
~,;Ts 
The Gov6rrment bid already dlei.-ci to conaider 1951 lia the starting point of ~ 
.... ·---·~~---...-.-.. ............... -......_I 
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planning and had directed the Planning Commission to draw up a five-year plan 
in two stages, the first covering 1951-53 and the second the subsequent three 
years. 
The basic ideas which guided the work of the Planning Commission were 
the same as those put forward by the Congress in the preceding two years. 
There was the emphasis on 'a large measure of agreement in the connunity as 
to the ends of the policy' and on t:he conception of planning as a democratic 
process where the people would p&rticipate actively both in the formulation 
of the plans and in their implementation. The first was necessary because 
'a major task for a Goverl'llll8nt which embarks upon planning ••• is to create 
in the cmnulity an earnestness of purpose [as observed during an emergency 
such as war] on the basis of which resources can be lllobilised to the full 
extent. It js this earnestneaa of purpose which enables a COlllllUflity to make 
whate•1er sacrifices are necessary for the attainment of defined goals' •177 
To maintain the democratic proceaa in planning, 'not only the Government of f 
States but also local self-governing bodies, such as municipality, district 
and taluka boards and panchayata, and various functional organisatioona have 
to play a role', because democratic planning presupposes an 'overall unity 
of policy combined with proper diffusion of power and reeponsibility•. 178 
The Draft outline accepted the 'Directive Principles of State Policy' 
given in the Constitution as the goals to achieve. Actually three of these 
principles had been written into the Planning Commission's terms of reference 
viz. (a} that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an 
adequate means of livelihood; (b) that the ownership and control of the 
material resources of the cOlllllUflity are so distributed as best to subserve 
the cOllllllOll good; and (c) that the operation of the economic system does not 
result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common 
detriment. 179 But the outline also considered other clauaes of the Directive 
Principles • relevent to the Pl...,ing eo-iseion'• task. These included, 
8MOfl9·· other things. the ol'QIJl'liaation of village .,.,a.yata, the promtion of 
}'· 
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cottage industries 'on an individual or co-operative basis in the rural 
-
areas and the provision of free and compulsory education up to the age of 
14 within ten years•. 180 
The outline proposed, as perspectives of planning, 'firstly to rectify 
the disequilibrium in the country caused by the War and Partition, and 
secondly, to initiate the development of certain basic resources so as to lay 
the foundation of more rapid and economic growth in the future•. 181 The 
total expenditure of Rs.1,493 crores estimated for the five years was allocated 
in a manner similar to that given in the Colombo Plan. The main difference 
in the f irat five-Year Plan outline with the Colombo Plan was in its greater 
allocation to agriculture and leas to transport and communication. The 
Outline increased the share of agriculture, irrigation and power and that of 
social services by decreasing allocation for transport and c011111Unication and 
for industries (see Table 3 below). Thus the objectives and priorities that 
the Congress specified for the Planning Commission were scrupulously followed 
by the latter in formulating the first plan in India. The Draft of the Plan 
was thoroughly debated in and outside the Parliament. The revised final 
version of the plan was published in Decmber 1952. 182 
By that time the plan which it purported to formulate finally was in 
operation for nearly twenty months. There were some changes in the final 
planning document from its draft outline. The major change occurred in the 
item, 'Agriculture and C011111Unity Development•, allocation on which went up 
from 12.8 per cent of the total (Rs.191.69 crores) to 17.4 per cent (Rs. 
J45.84 crores). This increment accounted for the expenditure on community 
development· programme initiated in 1952 (Rs.90 crores), provision for 
additional minor irrigation projects (Rs.JO crores) and provision for the 
establishment of a national extension organisation. 183 The other major change '· I 
ID8de was in the allocation of resources for industries under public sector. 
Thia wu increaed frm h.100.99 crores (6.7 per cent of the total outlay), 
in the draft outline• to Ra.172,87 crone (&.•per cent). I 
-----=---~-----
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The overall financial outlay in the first plan was increased from 
Rs.i,492.92 crorea to Rs.2,068.78 crores in its final version. The pattern 
of allocation, however, remained the same with primary emphasis on the 
development of agriculture, irrigation, power and transport and communication 
(see Table J below). 
The Plan envisaged an increase of investment from a level of 5 per cent 
to about 7 per cent of national income, the target for aggregate investment 
over the five years being Rs.3,500 - 3600 crores, of which about Rs.1,500 
crores were expected to be invested by the private sector. 184 
On resources for financing the Plan the Commission relied mainly on 
(a) the ability of generating surplus revenue by the Centre and the provinces 
by widening the coverage of existing taxes and in a very few cases by 
imposing certain new taxes at the provincial level, (b) internal long-term 
borrowing by the state and (c) small-scale savings. The Draft outline 
estimated a total yield of Rs.1,121 crores from their internal sources. The 
final Plan raised this estimate to Rs.1,414 cores but the Commission added 
that 'any radical changes in the machinery of taxation or in the techniques 
of borrowing were not to be looked for. A gap of Rs.655 crores, in the 
final estimate, was to be filled partially by taking recourse to deficit , 
' ' financing - to the extent of Rs.290 crores. The rest, it was hoped, could f 
be met from external resources or, in its absence, by additional measures of 
internal taxation and borrowing or by further deficit financing•. 185 
Thus by the early 1950s, planned economic and social development 
ceased to remain confined to the level of ideas only. The First Five-Year 
Plan, the only Indian plan that actually succeeded in terms of fulfilling 
its physical targets, ushered in a new era - the era of planned economy. 
Yet this Plan and all the economic policies that the Congress adopted prior 
to launching it did not differ at all in content from what the colonial 
Government of India had proposed to do in the late 1940&. . The actualisation 
i;·.,~~' 
of the idea of planning under a 'National Government' did not operate by any ;,;;~, M:!; 
·<''.:"""· 
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strategy of socio-economic development that had not been borrowed from its 
colonial predecessor. 
TABLE 3. Pattern of Allocation of Resources in the Colombo Plan end 
the Draft and the Final First Five-Year Plan 
First Five-Year Plan 
Items Colombo Plan Draft Outline Final Plan 
Rs (crores) '8 of Rs(crores) '8 of Rs (crores) 
total total 
(1) (2) (J) (4) (5) (6) 
Agriculture, 
Irrigation 
and Power 665.6 36 642.05 43 921.84 
Transport and 
Communication 702.7 38 388.12 26.l 457.10 
Industry 180 10 100.99 6.7 173.04 
Social Services 
and Others 291.3 16 361. 76 24.2 516.80 
Total 1839.6 100 1492.92 100 2068.78 
Source: For Colombo Plan - Table 2 
For Col.4-7, G.O.I. Planning Commission, The Flrst Flve-Year 
Plan (Delhi, 1952), p.3. 
'8 of 
total 
(7) 
44.6 
24.0 
8.4 
23.0 
100 
'~J 
f 
\ 
,, 
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EPILOGlE 
Our narration of the developnent of the idea of plBMing in India ended 
with the advent of the first five-year plan. From that time onwards it would 
be more a history of planning itself than the history of its idea. In 1951 
the 'prehistory' ended. It was thought that a knowledge of this 'prehistory' 
would help us better understand the failure of India's subsequent 'social-
istic' plans. The First Five-Year Plan, which even Nehru described as 'no 
plan at all', remained the only successful plan in tel'llB of fulfilling its 
target and more. An analysis of the execution of the first plan shows that 
its success, especially in food production, was due more to natural cauaea 
than to the endeavour of the planners. 1 But the importance of this plan lay 
in its emphasis on the agrarian question and, as Nehru would often say, in 
making the country plan-conscious. A study of the history of the beginning 
of the planned era shows ua that the first plan also marked the failure of 
the leaders of the nation to conceptualise Indian reality in objective terms 
and to make any real progress towards emancipating the masses from the semi-
feudal socio-economic structure evolved by the British colonial state. This, 
in the main has been the burden of our argument in the last six chapters. 
The modernist economic thought that had evolved with the early Indian 
champions of industrialisation had the question of amelioration of poverty 
as its starting point. People like Telang, Ranade, Naoroji and Dutt correctly 
identified the root of this poverty in British colonial rule. The solution 
of this problem, to them, lay in modernisation of the Indian economy by 
industrialising its production system. They were conscious of the weakness 
of indigenous industrial efforts in the face of a discriminatory 'laissez-
fajre• policy adopted by the colonial govern111ent on behalf of its own 
predatory c11Pitaliata. With the advent of railways in India, the praponenta 
of Indi., capitali• very well wv»rataod the role that the atate could play 
in developint ~ .. J.ea. 'hlW .. ·hid. the inaUncea of Meizi Jlipar\ clnd 
• ; ,' ~· < • 
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8i8118rckian Germany to convince thelll of the importance of positive state 
intervention to fulfil their dream. The idea of state intervention which 
they and their succeeaors in the early decades of this century had in their 
11inda created the foundation for the emergence of the idea of planning. 
rrom 1930, the colonial authorities themselves started thinking about 
planning. The imniediate impetus came from two directions: the success of 
planning in Soviet Russia and the change in the att.itude towards the role of 
the state in the U.K. itself. Although the Economic Advisory Council in 
England was far fra11 being a plan-machinery, in India the British bureau-
crats looked upon it as a lllOdel to use in their effort at organising a planned 
progr8111118 of economic development. Planning to people like Schuster, Rainy 
and others, was an economic solution to the political crisis of the Raj. The 
colonial administration appeared to have convinced itself that an organised 
developmental programme would help it to isolate the nationalist elites from 
the masses. The people, in this view, were leas concerned with power than 
with better economic conditions, the lack of which was turning them to the 
Congress fold. British interest in Indian planning thus 81118nated from a 
political exigency. Initially the British took up the idea of planning as a 
method of industrialiaation under the aegis of the state. Indian and British -~ 
thinking converged on this point. To both industrialisation was the panacea 
for the economic ills of the country. 
The interesting point in British thinking on planning was in the 
realisation, which was forced on it, about the importance of agriculture in 
Indian economy. They might have started in 1930 with the idea of industrial 
planning but in 1934 ended up by discussing the problems of agrarian poverty. 
The Indian planners also faced similar problems. Visvesvaraya had a well-
worked out blueprint for a progrmmie of industrialising the agriculture, and 
people like Birla, n were mre concerned with the !mediate reality, aaked 
the atate to take up at ance the task of tackling the agrari8n queation. 
Birla'a inYacetion or punheaing tMMJI' theory, in hie llP••ch in 19Jt\, in 
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support of his view that agricultu~e was the first problem to be solved even 
in the interest of industry, is a pointer to hie mature understanding of the 
situation. The iaaue of agriculture C81118 up whenever the planners wanted to 
discuss a progr&11111e. The National Planning Committee also could not escape 
this question even though the organisation was set up with the specific purpose 
of planning for industrialisation. 
The governmental position, in the nineteen-forties, did not show any 
new development in the idea of planning. The official mind was working 
within the 88118 ideological framework. Planning was still synonymous with 
induatrialiaation. As a result, the major thrust waa in evolving policies 
with regard to the role of the state in the field of industries. In a aenae, 
all the official deliberations in the 'forties both within and outside the 
Reconstruction Committee and the Planning and Development Department can be 
viewed pri1111rily as a dialogue between private enterprise and state bureau-
cracy on the role of the state in the industrial sector. Indeed, the moat 
important document that the Government published in that period waa on its 
Industrial Policy. On the other hand, although the Department of Agriculture 
formulated an 'agricultural policy', the Government did not feel it necessary 
to publicise it. It is interesting that the only official to object to the .~ 
ad hoc nature of the plan programmes sanctioned by the Development Board 
and plead for a •master' plan, was Kharegat, the Secretary of the Agricultural 
Department. But while industrialisation was the first priority at the level 
of idea, objectively the colonial Government was forced to adopt measures for 
the development of agriculture (including irrigation, power and other related 
matters) aa the firat priority in its 'short-term' five-year plan. 
When the Congress C81118 into power and instituted its Economic Progr8111118 
C01111ittee in 1947 the latter spent a lot of time in discussing issues 
related to industries and the role of the state in the •tter. Yet, when the 
Congre• 8ove1M1nt •ttled down to fonulate • plan all that it could wrk 
aut wu to Wa1Q9 upon tM lhort-telll pl.n fo1'9Uleted by the Oevelap•1nt 
Board in 1946 - • plan with overwhelming priority given to matters related 
to agriculture. 
In thic connection it may be of aome interest to consider the first 
official effort on planning in the early nineteen-thirties. As we have seen 
in the second chapter, Schuster and his colleaguea were attracted to the idea 
of planning more due to political reasons than from a benevolent disposition 
to the Indian econo11tic situation. They started with the idea of induatrial 
planning for various reasons. First, the bourgeois notion of develapment, 
by definition, considered industrialisation as the dJfferentla spec1f1ca of 
a 'developed' economy. Secondly, it was in industries that the state could 
participate without disturbing the existing system of production and display 
physically the resultant improvements. The two most organised and vociferous 
sections of the Indian population were the capitalists including merchants 
and industrialists, and the urban poor made up of workers and middle-cl888 
youth. A programme of industrialisation would satisfy the former, and 
dissuade the latter, so the British thought, from pursuing Bolshevik ideas. 
Finally, the Soviet experiment in planning which made the officials 'plan' 
conscious' put an overwhelming emphasis on rapid industrialisation. (It is 
interesting that none of the proponents of planning ever mentioned the 
changes in the agrarian structure brought about in Soviet Russia during the 
period between the 1917 revolution and 1928, the year the first Soviet plan 
was launched.) 
So, in 1930, ideologically, politically and empirically, the Br~tish 
Government of India had invoked the idea of planning only as an industrial 
one. The years 1930-34, however, forced it to acknowledge Indian reality. 
The impact of the Depreeaion was so devastating on agriculture that it called 
for ilmllediate r81118dy. On the political front, the Ganc:ttian Civil Disobedience 
•vMente brought forth the potential threat that the agrar.ian ••aes could 
paee to both the colonie.l rev.we end its clOH8t ally, the 1.ncted gentry. 
Thue, in 1934, ·awn • the Goverwnt 8bMdaned ita initial effort et 
c , - ,~· 1 • -
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planning, it tock acme policy decisions on issues related to agriculture • 
. . 
The renewed planning initiative adopted by the Government of India 
during the 'forties were related to its apprehension about a post-war 
recession. As a result, the bureaucracy was forced to think primarily in 
terms of rehabilitating the labour-force employed in the war-machinery. The 
name of the Reconstruction Connittee itself was suggestive in that respect. 
But, aa we have seen, the officialdom tried to organise this Committee to 
take up not only the task of inaediate reconstruction programmes but long-
term planning also. Here again planning meant industrial planning. The 
effort however was hamstrung by the non-availability of resources and the 
attitude of the imperial metropolis towards the question of industrialising 
the colony. forced by such circU11Stances as f .. ine and recurrent food 
crises, the lndianised bureaucracy showed a sign of recognition of the need 
fol: tackling the problem of agriculture as an immediate issue in its plan 
progra1111es. Agriculture thus figured prominently in the plan produced by the 
Government in the mid-forties. The Congress Government during the first 
plan period carried on the legacy it inherited from the colonialists. 
When the colonial Government planned for agricultural development, its 
chief concern was about the low production level of Indian agriculture. All ~ 
its efforts were oriented towards increasing agricultural productivity by 
augmenting inputs, mainly water and power. It was a technical solution to 
a social problem. It was not that the rulers did not understand the inhibiting 
role of the land-tenure system. But they could not risk upsetting the 
existing relations of social forces by taking any drastic measure to change 
the socio-economic structure. Thus even as they deliberated upon the 
questions of poverty,indebtedneaa, under-employment, etc. of the rural 11&saea, 
they would try in effect only to evolve minor adllinistrative steps for debt 
redellption M'ICI increasing the level of production. What is i11POrtent to 
note lwre ia that although the adlliniatration waa aware of the politinl 
Mture or tlw prableM or lndi•'• llQl'•riM eociety, it• effort• at • aolution 
took the fOl'll of ecanaMic preecriptiana. 
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If the colonial mind aeparlted the 'political' from the 'economic', the 
. 
!'ldian planners, on their part, did not break any new ground in that respect. 
The leaders of India's struggle for independence, however, had an added 
problem partly of their own creation. As far as the colonial state was 
concerned, it easily identified its allies among the landlords and other 
rural elites. But the Congress's efforts to become the spokesman for the 
entire nation forced it to acknowledge the role of the masses in the struggle. 
To avoid class-struggle they took resort to Gandhie11 strategies to unite the 
masses in a movement directed only against the foreign rulers. Yet even the 
Gandhian intervention, despite its class-collaborative tactics, ignited a 
spirit of freedom among the masses which often crossed the limit set by the 
Central leadership of the Congress. Hence the transformation of the :: r1ti-
British movements into anti-landlord struggles witnessed so often in rural 
India. The emergence of peasant organisations since the late •twenties was 
also seen aa a threat by the Congress leadership. The latter often made anti-
feudal pronouncements in order to steal the thunder from the left-wing 
opposition within and outside the party, but always took care to avoid the 
adoption of any policy which might alienate the land-owning interests strongly 
entrenched in the organisation. 
Given the organisational nature of the Congress, the idea of any drastic 
change in the social structure was foreclosed to it. It was easier, there-
fore, for people like Nehru and other 'progressive' leaders to cherish the 
vision of an industrial India than to work out any political strategy towards 
a fundamental sn~io-economic change. An 'industrial' plan programme with 
all its 'scientific' and technological paraphernalia thus became a very 
attractive proposition. It was easier also to pose industrialisation, rather 
than the agrarian question, aa an economic problem resolvable by administrative 
actions of the atate. It wee thus that all the 11&jor ideas of Indian 
planning during the nineteen-thirtiea and the 'forties whether they originated 
with the BriUeh or the CanQre98 or the Indian C1Pitaliata c .. to converge 
~ . .:..,. . 
·a·' 
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on principles marked by a considerable degree of similarity in thinking. 
This convergence or affinity in the realm of ideas is evident in 
agricultural planning also. Both the British and the Indian planners {with 
the exception of the authors of the Gandhian Plan and the Peaple's Plan) 
adapted similar stances when forced to consider agrarian problems. The 
production aspect, which was primary in their view, was to be solved by 
increasing inputs, and the social problem by legal and administrative steps. 
The British avoided the second step and launched a plan programme oriented 
towards the first solution. It was incumbent upon the Congress to take up 
the question of land ayate11. The Government at the Centre allowed the 
provinces to l~gialate Acts legally abolishing Zamindari and the other inter-
mediary systema of land tenure. But that the Congress did not consider 
implementation of these Acta as of primary importance was evident in the 
Central directives to the provincial govern111ents to go slow about it. The 
Central Government argued that it would not be in a position to bear the huge 
burden of compensations payable to the landlords on forfeiture of their 
rights and titles. We have not gone into the details of the controversies 
related to the different provincial land reforms Acts. But a browse through 
the constitutional provisions on rights to private praperty and the powers 
of the state would show that it was not difficult to adapt legally permissible 
measures to delay cash compensation to the zamindars and other intermediaries. 
What was evident in the Centre's attitude of giving precedence to financial 
considerations over the ideological standpoint was its reluctance to upset 
the balance of power in the countryside by adopting drastic measures against 
the rural elite. By delaying the process of land reform the Centre itself 
allowed the landlords sufficient time to make a mockery of the 'reforms' by 
benan1 transfer of their holdings. 
If on agrarian questions the British and the Indian elites both showed 
the .- reluctance to disturb the established power relation& in rural 
eociety, the affinity between their ideas on induatrialiution n the role 
of the state in it, was alao evident in our study. The British colonial 
~..........__ _____ ...... 
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state was cORlllitted to the idea of the sanctity of the rights to private 
property and of private enterprise. The role of the state in such an 
ideology was subservient to the need of the bourgeoisie as s class. The 
existence of a strong state, another concept imbedded in the bourgeois view 
of a nation state, presupposed the direct control of the state over certain 
economic activities. Major means of communication and defence industries 
were required to be under the aegis of the state because private ownership 
in these areas could undermine the power of the state as the ultimate arbiter 
within the nation. There were other industries where state investment was 
necessary, in the interest of the overall industrialisation programme 
demanded by the indigenous bourgeoisie, because the latter was not in a 
position yet to ensure a quick return to its investment in such enterprises. 
The Industrial Policy resolution of 1945 was baaed on these premises. 
The opposition of the Indian bourgeoisie to this policy emanated not from 
what it proposed to do but from the inability of the colonial state to 
assure total protection to the indigenous industries against the invasion of 
imperial capital in India. The opposition was to the constitutional 
'commercial safeguards' provided to British enterprises in India and not to 
the industrial policy resolution as such. The 'policy' of 1945 reflected 
precisely what the Indian capitalists demanded in their 'Bombay Plan'. 
The socialism of the Congress was based on similar ideological commit-
ment to the sanctity of priv~t~ property ownership. Both Gandhian and 
Nehruvian 'socialism' tried to tackle this issue in their own ways. Gandhi 
brought in the concept of 'trusteeship'. Nehru, on the other hand, wished 
sway the problem by resorting to the stand that planning as such would bring 
about a change of heart among the majority of the people by showing what 
socialism could do to develop the economy. It would not require any political 
struggle to bring about the abolition of private property. Planning with 
its new science Md technology lllOUld ..ace capitaliam redundant. Thua it was 
possible in hie ideology to evolve • constitution which borrowed heavily in 
~--------------~ 
its content and for11 from western bourgeois democracy and guaranteed all 
rights to private property. 
Sceptics might argue that the first five-Year Plan was not Nehru's own 
Plan and we must look into the Second Plan as exemplifying Nehruvian socialism. 
In fact, Nehru himself said that the first Plan was 'limited planning, not 
planning in the real sense of the word•. 2 The second plan (1956-61) is 
viewed by many of his followers as ushering in a 'new epoch 1 • 3 This was the 
plan which was to implement programmes for &6~Ublishing a 'socialist pattern 
of society' where the principal means of production would be under 'aoeial 
control', production sped up progressively, and an 'equitable distribution 
of the national wealth' would be achieved. 4 Long before thft first plan was 
to come to an end, in July 1954, the All India Congress Committee qualified 
the objectives of establishing a 'cooperative commonwealth and a welfare 
state' (as propounded during the first two years of the 'fifties) by resolving 
that to achieve that objective the existing social structure 'which still 
[continued] to be partly baaed on an acquisitive economy ••• [was] to be 
progressively changed into a socialised economy•. 5 The Avadi session of the 
Indian National Congress in January 1955 ratified this gradualist resolution 
which was said to herald a 'new epoch'. 
The Second Five-Year Plan diti'ered from the first in many respects. 
The overall financial allocation was more tnan doubled, from Rs.2,000 crores 
on public account in the first Plan to Rs.4,800 crores i.n loft second. 6 
Instead of formulating the plan on the basis of available financial resources, 
eff orta were made to take resort to physical planning. The AICC gave a lead 
in this direction in 1954 when it suggested that to bring abotJt the change 
to a 'socialised economy', 'the physical content' of planning should be 
.. 
emphasised.' The idea of deficit financing did not scare the plamera any 
longer.'If you are producing wealth', eaid Nehru, 'it does not •tter very 
lllUCh if you have .- deficit financing beceuae you are actually putting 
llOney back through goode Md eervtcee•.8 To top it all, the second plan was 
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based on the fSlllOUa Mahalanabis Model ostensibly emulated from Soviet plan 
frameworks. Investment in capital-goods industry was given the first priority 
in this plan. The ratio of the public expenditure on industrial development 
to the total was increased from 7.6 per cent in the first plan to 18.S per 
cent in the second. Agriculture and Irrigation which constituted JS per 
cent of the total in the first plan was scaled down to only about 22 per cent 
in the second one. 9 
So the Second Five-Year Plan enlarged the volume of planned expenditure 
by the state and emphasised the industrialisation of the economy. It showed 
that although the newly independent Congress regime had been forced by 
circumstances to give priority to agriculture and related matters in the 
First Five-year Plan, the dream of industrialisation was not given up by the 
new rulers. The emphasis on industrialisation was the Nehruvian attempt to 
realise that dream. To Nehru, as we have seen before, planned industrial-
isation was synonymous with socialism. But any comparison between the 
Second Five-Year Plan and the ·Bon~ay Plan' shows that the former did not 
formulate anything that had not already been anticipated by the latter. 10 
Even without going into detailed analysis it can be pointed out that the 
second plan did not require any drastic change in policy matters. For 
instance, the 1956 Industrial Policy resolution of the Government of India 
almost verbatim replicated the first industrial policy formulated by the 
Government of India in 19~5. The 1956 resolution classified industries in 
three categories. 11 The first, shown in Schedule A, consisted of industries 
for the future development of which the state would accept exclusive 
'responsibility'. Railways and air transport, arms and ammunition and atomic 
energy were to be developed as Central monopolies. But, for other industries 
under the first category, the resolution qualified the exclusiveness of the 
state by adding that the state's acceptance of exclusive responsibility did 
not preclude the expansion of the existing privately-owned units or 'the 
possibility of the state securing the co-operation of private enterprise in 
~~~-------------... 
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the eatabU.ahllent of new unite• when the 'national intereata• would eo 
require. Under thia cleuee the elate control, in the caaee tllhere co-operation 
of the private enterpriee would be eought, would be exercieed 'either 
through •Jority participation in this capital or otherwise'. Under Schedule B 
were liated those induatriea tllhere both the etate and the private enter-
prise would operate aide by aide, the foner eatabliahing new undertakings 
'with a view to accelerating their future develop11ent•. All the reMining 
industries would fall in the third category. The develop119nt of these 
induatriee waa to be 'undertaken ordinarily through the initiative and 
enterprise of the private eector, though it [would] be open to the State to 
start any industry in th~a category•. However, the reeolution declared 
that 'it [would] be the policy of the State to facilitate and encourage the 
development of these induatriea [under the third category] in the private 
sector, in accordance with the progr811111f..s fol'tllllated in auccessive Five-
Vear Plana'. Thua the position of the private sector in the planned 
development of a 'socialistic pattern of society• was ensured by this 
resolution. The state would protbct the interests of private enterprise as 
it envisaged interdependence of the public and private sectors for the fore-
seeable future. This interdependence was highlighted in the Second Five- of' 
Vear Plan Heport: 'The Plan as a whole can go through only on the basis of 
simultaneous and balanced development in both sectors. In fact, it is 
appropriate to think more and more in terms of an interpenetration of the 
12 public and private sectors rather than of two separate sectors'. 
Nehruvian socialism in the second plan period thus cannot be dis-
tinguished from either what the Indian industrialists envisaged in the llid-
nineteen-fortiea, or even what the British had accepted as the right policy 
f.-' 
for Indian econaatic developmnt. Thia leaves ua with another cl•i• Mde for ·· 1 
( '] 
th:• brand of aociali•. Socialistic pattern, in the view of Nehru and hie ~ki 
i},;'1 
Party, would be echieved through a •re equitlble distribution of natiOMl '}i} 
$':~1d 
-1th. M • ~~ of - in thi• _..i, w cen anly cite the ~
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of R.K. Hazari, the reports of the Monopolies Inquiry Commiaaion or the 
Industrial licencing Policy Inquiry Committee set up by the Government in 
the late 'aixtiea, expoaing the great concentration of wealth in relatively 
fewer hands. 
The euphoria about plPmed econamic development and eociali• in India 
did not laat long. Within one and a half years after the launching of the 
Second Five-Vear Plan, India paid the price of its dependence on nature's 
benevolence regarding agriculture and on the wiadoll of private enterprise 
in judicious uae of foreign exchange reserves. By the end of 19S8 the Indian 
brand of aociali819 bec8118 heavily dependent on food grants from the U.S.A. 
and other ~rnJntriea, and continued to do so for years to COiie. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to go into the economic and political conaequ19nCea 
of such dependence, which has been the subject of discussion in a large body 
of scholarly literature. 
... 
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SCHEDULE A 
1. Arma and ammunition and allied items of defence equipment. 
2. Atomic energy. 
). Iron and steel. 
4. Heavy castings and forging of iron and steel. 
5. Heavy plant and machinery required for iron and steel production, 
f9r mining, for machine tool manufacture and for such other basic 
industries aa may be specified by the Central Government. 
6. Heavy electrical plant including large hydraulic and steam 
turbines. 
7. Coal and lignite. 
8. Mineral oils. 
9. Mining and iron ore, manganese ore, chl'Olll8 ore, gypaunt, sulphur, 
gold and di-.-.nd. 
10. Mining 8l1d proceeeing of copper, lead, zinc, tin, •lybderul 8l1d 
.olfHM. 
11. Mineral• 1P9Cifled in the Schedule to the Ata11ic Energy (Control 
of Productian 8l1d U.) Order, 19S). 
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Aircraft. 
Air trenaport. 
Railway transport. 
Ship.building. 
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12. 
n. 
14. 
15. 
16. Telephones and telephone cables, telegraph and wireless 
apparatus (excluding radio receiving sets). 
17. Generation and distribution of electricity. 
SCHEDULE B 
1. All other minerals except 'minor minerals' as defined in section 
3 of the Minerals Concession Rules, 1949. 
2. Aluminium and other non-ferrous metals not included in 
Schedule 'A• • 
3. Machine tools. 
4. ferro-alloys and tool steels. 
5. Basic and intermediate products required by chemical industries 
such as the manufacture of drugs, dye~tuffs and plastics. 
6. Antibiotics and other essential drugs. 
7. Fertilizers. 
8. Synthetic rubber. 
9. Carbonisation of coal. 
10. CheMical pulp. 
11. Road transport. 
12. Sea transport. 
12. All the quotations in this paragraph are taken from the text in lb1d. 
lJ. R.K. Mazar!, The Structure of the Corporato·Prlvate Soctor (Bombay, 
1966); G.0.1. Report of the Monopolies Inqu1ry Conml.sslon (New Delhi, 
1965); G.D.I., Report of Industr1al L1conclng Polley Inquiry Conml.ttee 
(New Delhi, 1969). See for a recent work on the subject, N.K. Chandra, 
'Monopoly Capital, Private Corporate Sector and the Indian ~conomy: A 
Study in Relative Growth, 1931-1976' in Amiya Kumar Bagchi and Nirmala 
Banerjee (eds.), Change. and Cho1ce in Indian Industry (Calcutta, 1981), 
pp.329-81. 
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Srinilcetan 
P.O. Surul 
Dist. 81R8HlJ4 (Bengal) 
Menbers: 
Shri Vaikunth L. Mehta 
Sirdar Building 
Apollo Street 
BHAY 1. 
Dr B.V.N. Naidu, M.A.,8.COll.Ph.D., Bar-at-Law 
University Professor of Economics 
Annamalai University 
ANNAMALAINAGAA 
Shri R.G. Saralya 
Vasant Vihar 
85 Nepean Sea Road 
BCl4BAY 6. 
Prof. Bhupati Bhushan Mukerjee 
Prof eeaor of Economics 
Patna College 
PATNA 
Shri S.C. Maj\llldar 
Hinduethan Co-operative Insurance Society ltd 
C011aissariat Building 
Hornby Road 
BoeAY 
Shri P.S. Nayak, B.A., B.L. 
General Manager 
Canara Banlc Ltd 
IWGAUllE 
Shri a.ttttlal KilllChend DevchMd 
JJ-.JS Kol• Mahalla 
Pydhanie, BINJAY • 
•,$;' 
~ .. 
Shri Kiehan Prasad 
Meeara. Kiahan Prasad & Co. Ltd 
· • Kalbadevi Road 
IDtBAV 2. 
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Dr Anwar Iqbal Quereshi, M.A.,M.Sc.,Ph.O. 
OalDania University 
P.O. LALAGOOA (Deccan) 
Dr M.O. Patel 
Marketing Officer 
Baroda State 
BAROOA 
1/2: River Training and Irrigation 
ChaJ.rman: 
Sir M. Yiaveavaraya, K.C.I.E. 
Uplands 
High Ground 
BANGALORE 
(Sir M. Yieveavaraya, K.C.I.E. 
46 f, Warden Road 
BC14BAY.) 
Secretary: 
Dr N.K. Bose 
Irrigation Research Institute 
82 E, Model Town · 
LAHORE 
Menbers: 
Dr M.N. Saha, O.Sc., f .R.S. 
University College of Science 
92 Upper Circular Road 
CALCUTTA 
Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung 
Jubilee Hilla 
HYDERABAD (Deccan) 
Mr Abdul Wahid, I.S.G. 
Chief Engineer, P.W.D. 
BHOPAL 
l/J: Soil ~onaervation and Afforestation 
Prof. J.N. Mukherjee 
..Uveraity Collecp of Science 
92 Upper Circular Road 
CM.CUTTA 
Secretary: 
Prof. S.P. Agharl<ar, M.A., Ph.D. 
University College of Science 
JS Ballygunj Circular Road 
CALCUTTA 
Hent1ers: 
Dr Amar Nath Puri, Ph.D., D.Sc. 
Irrigation Research Institute, P.W.D. 
LAHORE 
1/4: land Policy, Agricultural labour and Insurance 
Chairman: 
Prof. K.T. Shah, B.A., B.Sc. 
Barrister-at-law 
8 laburntMI Road, Gamdevi 
8048AY 7. 
secretary: 
Dr Radha K81t8l Mukherjee 
Lucknow University 
LUCKNOW 
Menbers: 
Dr C.A. Mehta 
Director of Industries 
Baroda State 
BARODA 
Prof. V.G. Kale 
'Ourgadhivaaa' 
POONA, 4. 
The Hon'ble Rafi Ahmed Kidwai 
Minister, Government of U.P. 
LUCKNOW 
The Hon'ble Mr T. Prakaaam 
Minister, Government of Madras 
fort St George 
MADRAS 
Dr S.K. Datta, Principal 
f ortllln Christian College 
LAHORE 
Dr Z.A. Atnad 
Socialist Book Club 
S Elgin Road 
M.l.W.AIW> 
Sir Chinubhai Mllcllowial Ranchadlal, Bart. 
=~· _1Mhibau9 
"I 
i 
Prof. N.G. Range, M.L.A. 
SIM..A 
1/5: Animal Husbandry and Dairying 
Chairmen: 
Sir Chunilal V. Mehta, K.C.S.I. 
Queen's Mansions, Prescott Road 
ID1BAV 1. 
secretary: 
Dr B.K. Badami, Director 
Veterinary Department 
H.E.H. The Nizam's Govt. 
HYDERABAD (Deccan) 
HerlDers: 
Rao Bahadur M.R. Ramasw&IR)' Sivan 
47 Sullivan Garden Road 
Mylapore, MADRAS 
Mr Shah 
l6S 
Director of Veterinary Services 
Govt. of Punjab 
LAHORE 
Mr E. J. Bruen 
live Stock Expert 
Government of Bo:nbay 
POONA. 
1/6: Crop Planning and Production 
Cha1m11n: 
Sir T. Vijayaraghavacharya 
SIM..A, E. 
Sir T. Vijayaraghavacharya, Chairman 
COlllftittee on Co-operation 
Chepauk, MADRAS 
secretary: 
Dr Bholanath Singh 
Benares Hindu University 
BE NARES 
fit!lrbers: 
Shri B.N. Sarkar, L.Ag. 
Senior Marketing Officer 
8ihar and Ori ... 
PATNA 
Rai BahMlu;.- k.C. Mehta, M.Sc. ,Ph.D., Professor 
Agra College 
Mi8A 
Moulvi fateh-ud-Oin, M.H.E., I.A.S. 
fodder Adviser to the Govt. of Punjab 
· • HISSAR 
Dr 8.N. Uppal 
Plwit Pathologist to Govt. of Bombay 
College of Agriculture 
POONA 
Dr Higginboth• 
Allahabad Agricultural Institute 
ALLAHABAD 
Shri Boshi Sen 
Vivekananda laboratory 
ALMORA, U.P. 
Shri s.v. R8111811Urthi, 1.c.s. 
Venkata Vilas 
Cathedral Post Off ice 
MADRAS 
Shri K.R. Narayana Iyer, 8.A., M.Sc.,r.c.s. 
Director of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Trivandrum, TRAVANCORE 
Dr R.D. Rege, 8.A., M.Sc., Ph.D. 
Crop Physiologist 
Sugarcane Research Scheme 
Padegaon, P.O. Hire R.S. 
Dist. POONA 
Shri T.S. Venkatara11tan 
Government Plant Breeding Station 
COLteATORE 
1.7: Horticulture 
Chairman: 
Dr G.S. Cheema 
College of Agriculture 
POONA 
Secretary: 
Mr Jabir Ali 
Devnar Farm 
P.O. Chetltbur 
B(Jo8AV 
MetrtJers: 
Shri Ratenchand Hirachand, M.A. 
Construction House 
Wittet Road. Ballard Estate 
IDIMY 
• # • 
Shri N.V. Kaahalkar 
Madhu Canning Co. 
• I048AV, 12. 
Dr J.N. Rakahit, r.1.c., f .c.s. 
Rakhit Gardens 
GHAZIPUR, U.P. 
Mr A.M. Mustafa 
Chief Agricultural Officer 
QUETTA 
Dr P.K. Sen, M.Sc., Ph.O.,D.I.C. 
fruit Research 5tatir 
Sabour (E.I.Rly.) BIHAR 
Shri K.C. Naik 
Horticulturist 
Government of Baroda 
BAROOA 
Shri R.S. Dubaahi 
Supt. Modibag 
Agricultural College 
POONA 
1/8: fisheries (Marine and Inland) 
Chairman: 
Dr B. Sundar Raj 
Department of fisheries 
Govt. of M:tdras 
MADRAS 
secretary: 
Dr S.B. Setna, M.Sc., Ph.D. 
fisheries Officer 
Old Custom House 
BateAY, 1 
Menbers: 
Shri C.S. Kriahnaswami Naidu 
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Propr. Melber fisheries Cannery 
CHALIYAM (South Malabar) 
Shri Hemanta K. Sarkar 
II/l: Rural and Cottage Industries 
Chairman: 
Shri s.c. Dae Gupta 
5odlpur 
. ,.....,.. 
~ 
Secretary: 
Or C.A. Mehta 
Director of Industries 
Baroda State, BAROOA 
NentJers: 
Shri M.S. R8118Chandra Rao, B.A. 
Director of Industries 
Govt. of Mysore 
BANGALORE 
Dr V.K.R.V. Rao, Ph.D., Principal 
S.I.D. Arts College 
AtK:OABAD 
Shri Maurice rrydllan 
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Caneulting Engineer to the Govt. of Aundh 
AUN>H STATE 
Shri Shankerlal Banker 
Mizzapur 
AtKOABAD 
Shri S.C. Mitter, B.Sc., A.M.I.E. 
Department of Industries 
7 Council House Street 
CALCUTTA 
Shri Laxminarayan 
All India Spin~r's Association 
Madhubani 
OARBHANGA 
Mr A. Mohiuddin 
Director of Industries, Hyderabad State 
HYDERABAD (Deccon) 
Shri Ambalal Sarabhai 
P.O. No. 28 
AtKDABAO 
Shri Oharamai Mulraj Khatau 
Laxmi Building 
28 Ballard Road 
BCM3AY 
Shri Miari Lal Gupta, M.A., L.T. 
Education Secretary 
OAYALBAGH (Agra) 
II/21 Power and fuel 
ChaJ.mei: 
Or M.N. s.ha, D.Sc., r.R.S • 
...,ivereity College of Science 
92 Upper Circular Road 
CALCUTTA 
: 
a 
---- ----~-~-~~---...·-__... ____ If .... -_....., ______ _. .... -.. ?-----------
Secretary: 
Prof. A.K. Shaha 
66 Harrison Road 
CALCUTTA 
Nenbers: 
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Mr F.N. Mowdawalla, M.A., B.Sc., M.I.E.E.F.N.I. 
Deputy Secretary to Govt. of N.W.F.P. 
PESHAWAR 
Dr N.G. Chatterji, D.Sc., D.I.C., A.M.I.Chem.E., LL.B. 
H.B. Technological Institute 
CAWNPORE, U.P. 
Dr S.K. Roy, B.Sc., Ph.D. 
Indian School of Mines 
OHANBAD 
Dr V.S. Dubey, M.Sc., Ph.D. 
Benares Hindu University 
BE NARES 
Shri N.N. Iengar, A.M.I.E. 
The Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd. 
Bombay House 
Bruce Street 
BCJeAY 
Mr B.P. Sethna 
The Tata Hydro Electric Power Su~ply Co. Ltd 
Bombay House 
Bruce Street 
BCJeAY 1. 
Dr Ram Prasad 
Office of the Chief Electrical Engineer 
Govt. of Mysore 
BANGALAORE 
11/J: Chemicals 
Chairman: 
Dr J.C. Ghosh, D.Sc. 
Indian Institute of Science 
P.O. Hebbal 
BANGALORE 
Secretary: 
Prof. R.C. Shah, M.Sc., Ph.D. 
Royal Institute of Science 
BCJeAY, l. 
)70 
Merlbers: 
Shri B.D. Amin, 8.A., M.S.C.I. 
The Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd 
BAROOA 
Or K. Venkatar8'"8n 
Dept. of Ct • .imical Technology 
University of Bombay 
BCleAY 
Or S.S. BhP.tnagar, 0.8.E., O.Sc. 
Univ~raity Chemical Laboratories 
LAHORE 
Or N.N. Godbole, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D. 
Benares Hindu University 
BE NARES 
Shri M.L. Dey 
Jl Beadon Street 
CALCUTTA 
Shri S.G. Shastry, B.A., B.Sc. 
Sandalwood Oil f ~ctory 
MYSORE 
Shri Rajshekhar Bose 
Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Co. Ltd 
CALCUTTA 
Shri Kapilram H. Vakil 
Bombay House 
Bruce Street 
BOteAY, 1. 
Or N.R. Oamle, M.Sc., Ph.D. 
Industrial Chemist 
Old Custom House 
BCHSAY 
Dr Quadrat-i-Khuda, D.Sc. 
Professor of Chemistry 
Presidency College 
CALCUTTA 
Prof. D.Y. Athavle, M.Sc., A.I.I.Sc. 
Department of Old Technology 
H.B. Technological Institute 
CAWNPORE 
Hr S.K. Detar, B.Sc. 
Head lnduatriea, India Ltd. 
CONNAGAR, near Calcutta 
Dr B.K. Nni, Ph.D. 
Hattkine lnatiwte 
Perel, 8'18AY, 12. 
Dr Mata Prasad, O.Sc. 
Royal Institute of Science 
. • B(M)AY, 1 
Or K.G. Naik, D.Sc., F.I.O., F.N.I. 
Baroda College 
BARODA 
Mr Kanga 
Supt. Coke Ovens 
Tata Iron and Steel Co. ltd. 
JAMSl£DPUR 
Dr P.C. Guha, D.Sc. 
Indian Institute of Science 
P.O. Hebbal 
BANGALORE. 
II/4: Mining and Metallurgy 
Chairman: 
371 
Mr D.N. Wadis~ B.Sc., r.c.s., r.R.A.S.B. 
Department of Mineralogy 
Torrington Square 
COLCM30 
Secretary: 
Dr V.S. Dubey, M.Sc., Ph.D. 
Benares Hindu University 
BENARES 
Menbers: 
Shri Amrit Lal Ojha 
8 Clive Street 
CALCUTTA 
Mr P.N. Mathur 
Delma Villa 
JAMSHEOPUR, (B.N.Rly.) 
Mr J.J. Ghandy 
The Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. 
JAMSHEOPUR (B.N.Rly.) 
Dr O. Swarup, Ph.D. 
Benares Hindu University 
BE NARES 
Prof. N.P. Ghandi 
Benarea Hindu University 
BE NARES 
Shri M.L. Joshi 
ro1111an Christian College 
LAHORE 
372 
Shri B. Sen 
Supt. of Proepecting 
• The Tete Iron & Steel Co. Ltd 
JAMSHEDPUR (B.N.Rly.) 
II/~: Engineering Industries {including Transport Industries) 
ChaJman: 
Mr P.N. Mllthur 
Dal• Villa 
JAMSHEDPUR (8.N.Rly.) 
Secretary: 
The Hon. Mr M.N. Dalal 
41 Cuffe Parade, Colaba 
eoteAY 
Ment>ers: 
Shri Maurice frydlllan 
Conaulting Engineer to the Govt. of Aundh 
Al.Nlt1 STATE 
Shri A.K. Shaha 
66 llarriaon Road 
CALCUTTA 
Rco Bahadur G. Nagaratna~ Ayyar 
Governing Director 
The Industrial Engineers & Merchants Ltd 
BEZWAOA 
Shri B. Viswanath, B.E. 
General Manager 
The Mysore Iron & Steel Works 
BHADRAVATI 
Dr A. Pandya, O.Sc. 
1}2 Hanilton Road 
LONXJN, N.W.11 
Shri S.L. Kirloskar 
KIRLOSKA~ WADI 
Dist. Satara 
Shri B.N. Mukerjee 
Martin & Co. 
12 Mission Road 
CALCUTTA 
II/6: Manufacturing Industries 
Chai,,,.,: 
Shri Mbalal Sarllbhai 
Poet lox· No". 28 
MIOMIAD 
sacretary: 
Or Nazir MtMd 
Technological Laboratory 
Mmt\19, BCl4BAV 
Nlld>ers: 
Prof. K.T. Shah, 8.A., B.Sc. 
Macllav Nivaa 
8 Lllburrua Road 
BCl4BAV 7. 
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Shri D.L. NarMillha Raju, 8.A., B.Sc. 
The Ancttra Engineering Co. ltd. 
VIZAGAPATAM 
Shri a. Viewanath, B.E. 
General Manager 
The Myaore Iron 6 Steel Works 
BHMlRAVATI 
Shri Shanti Prasad Jain 
P.O. Oalaaanagar 
SHAHABAD 
Sarder Indra Singh 
Indian Strel 6 Wire Products ltd 
Managing ~gent's Office 
TATANAGAR 
Shri Kasturbhai Lalbhai 
Shahibaug 
Att£DA8AO 
Shri Manu Subedar 
Kodak House 
Hornby Road 
B()eAY 
The Hon'ble Mr Shuaib Qureshi 
Minister in Attendance 
Bhopal State 
BHOPAL 
Shri M.C. Ghia, M.L.A. 
Raja Bahadur Motilal Mansions 
28 Apollo Street 
B()eAY 
Shri N.N. Rakshit 
TATANAGAR (B.N.Rly.) 
11/71 lndustriee Connected with Scientific lnstrllllll!flts 
ChaJ.l'll*tt 
Or P.N. Q,oeh, M.A., Ph.D., D.Sc. 
l.kliveraity College of Science 
92 Upper Circular Road 
C.-.LCUHA 
Secretary: 
Principal G.R. Par.,jpe, I.E.S. 
Royal lnatitute of S:ience 
BClllAV, 1 
Netrbers: 
Shri G.I. Patel 
305 Hornby Road 
BCMJAY, l 
Shri A.K. Cm1gu!i 
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The Scientific Instrument Co. Ltd. 
11 Esplanade East 
CALCUTTA 
Shri N.M. Athavale 
Laboratory Apparatus Works 
Karve Road 
~.1 
Dr M. Venkat Rao J.P. 
c/- Powells Ltd. 
Lamington Road 
BCJeAY, 4. 
Shri K.B. Rao 
c/- Bombay Surgical Co. 
New Charni Road 
80-eAY, 4. 
Mr M.A. razalbhoy 
c/- razalbhoy Ltd. 
16 New Queen's Road 
SHAY, 4. 
Shri N.G. Motwane 
c/- Chicago Radio & Telephone Co. Ltd 
129 Esplanade Road 
BCJeAY 
111/1: Labour 
Chairman: 
Shri N.M. Joshi, B.A., M.L.A. 
Servants of India Society 
411 21 Sandhurst Road 
B(lotBAV, 4. 
secretary: 
Shri V.R. Kal&P?H, M.L.A. 
44 Kingaway 
NAGPUR 
NllllCers: 
Shd Gulzari Lai Nanda 
Par lit1Mntary ~1t:cretary 
lllbour Department 
POONA 
Shri B. Shiva Rao 
Hyde Vale Cottage 
SIM.A, S.W. 
Dr Sureah Chandra Banerjee, M.L.A. 
170 Harrison Road 
CALCUTTA 
Shri H.B. Chandra, M.LA. 
Bihar 
PATNA 
Prof. S.R. Boae, M.A., B.Sc. 
Patna College 
PATNA 
Dr B.R. Seth 
D.A.Y. College 
OEHRA D:.JN 
Dewan Chaman Lal 
2 Zaf far Ali Mansions 
LAHORE 
Shri S.R. Deshpande, M.B.E. 
J7S 
Assistant Commissioner of Labour 
labour Office, Secretariat 
BOMBAY 
Shri Padampat Singhania 
Kamala Tower 
CAWNPORE 
Mrs Kapda Khandwalla 
Vanita Vishram 
Sandhurst Road 
BOMBAY, 1 
Mr S.A. Saklatwalla 
Bombay House 
Bruce Street 
BOMBAY 
Shri N.Y. Phadke 
Servants of India Society 
Prarthana Samaj 
BCM!AY, 1. 
Mias Godavari Gokhale 
Serv .. ta or India Stciety 
41J-2 SwtchJrst Road 
Bollbay, 1 
111/21 Population 
ChliJllBl: 
Dr Raftlc-1 Mukerji 
Lucknow University 
LUCKNOW 
Secretary: 
Dr e.c. Guha 
University College of Science 
92 Upper Circular Road 
CALCUTTA 
Menbers: 
Prof. O.G. Karve, M.A. 
Willingdon College P.O. 
SANGL! (Oiat. Satara) 
Or A.C. MukerJi 
Director of Statistics 
Department of Statistics 
Baroda State 
BAROOA 
Shri B.T. Ranadive 
'National r ront' 
62 E. Girgaon Road 
BCJ48AY, 4. 
IV/l: .!!.!!:!!. 
Cha1rman: 
Shri Lala Sri Ram 
22 Curzon Road 
NEW DELHI 
Secretary: 
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Prof. O.N. Ghosh 
School of Economics and Sociology 
University of Bombay 
BeteAY 
Mertbers: 
Prof. C.N. Vakil, M.A. 
School of Economics and Sociology 
University of Bcnbay 
BC143AY 
Shri G.1. Mehta 
Central Bank Building 
100 Clive Street 
CALCUTTA 
Prof. 8.N. Ganguly, M.A. Ph.D. 
Hindu College 
• DELHI 
Shri Kaeturbhai lalbhai 
Shahibaug 
Atl1EDABAD 
• Shri Haridaa Madhavdaa Amersey 
Madhavdaa Amersey & Co. 
65 E:aplanade Road 
Bolllbay 
Mr Hooeeinbhoy A. lalljee 
Flower Mead, Warden Road 
8<14BAY 
IV/2: Induatrial finance 
ChaJ.rnan: 
Mr A.O. Shroff, 8.A., B.Sc. 
Dalal Street 
Savoy Chambers 
BC14BAY 
Secretary: 
J77 
Shri J.K. Mehta, M.A. 
Indian M!rchants Chamber Building 
Churchgate $treet 
Back Bay Reclamation, BOMBAY 
Henbers: 
Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Kt.C.I.E.M.B.E. 
Navaari Chambers 
Outram Road 
Fort, BCM3AY 
Shri B.T. Thakur 
cl- Central Bank of India Ltd 
KARACHI 
Shri S.C. Majumdar 
Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd 
Conmissariat Building 
Hornby Road, BOMBAY 
Mr R.P. Masani, M.A.L.J.P. 
Vice-thancellor 
University of Bombay 
8()48AY 
Prof. Cyan Chand 
P.O.Bankepore 
Patna College 
PATNA 
Dr P.S. Lolcenethan 
Univeraity of Madras 
· • Oepert.ent of Economics 
lriplicane P.O. 
Hadraa 
Shri Lala Sri R• 
22 Curzon Road 
NEW DELHI 
Shri C.S. Rangaaw•i, Editor 
'Indian finance• 
20 British Indian Street 
CALCUTTA 
Mr A. Mohiuddin 
Director of Industries 
Hyderabad State 
HYDERABAD (Deccan) 
Dr N.N. Law 
96 Amherst Street 
CALCUTTA 
Mr J.R.D. Tata 
Bombay House 
Bruce Street 
IDBAY 
IV/J: Public Finance 
Chalrman: 
Prof. K.T. Shah, B.A., B.Sc. 
Madhav Nives 
8 Laburnum Road 
BC»4BAY, 7. 
Secretary: 
Prof. Gyan Chand 
P.O. Bankepore 
Patna College 
PATNA 
Meimers: 
Dr D.R. Gadgil 
Gokhale Institute 
POONA 
:J78 
Prof. C.N. Vakil 
School of Economics and Sociology 
University of Bombay 
8'14BAY 
. Dr P.J. ThoM& 
Medrae University 
Triplic- P.O. 
MADRAS 
Mr A.O. Shroff, 8.A., B.Sc. 
Dalal Street 
· • Savoy Chambers 
B<l4BAV 
Shri M. Venkaterangaiya, M.A. 
Andhra University 
Meharanipeta P.O. 
VIZACAPATAM 
Or J.P. Niyogi 
Prof eaaor of Econoiaica 
Calcutta University 
CALCUTTA 
Hon'ble Mr Shuaib Qureshi 
Minister in Attendance 
Bhopal State 
BHOPAL 
IV/4: Currency and Banking 
Chairman: 
Shri Menu Subedar 
Kodak House 
Hornby Road 
BOM8AY 
Secretary: 
Prof. C.N. Vakil, M.A. 
'79 
School of Economics and Sociology 
University of Bombay 
BOMBAY 
MentJers: 
Prof. K.T. Shah, 8.A., B.Sc. 
Madhav Nivas 
8 Laburnum Road 
BOMBAY, 7. 
Shri Maurice Frydman 
Consulting Engineer to the Govt. of Aundh 
AUNDH STATE 
Dr H.L. Dey, M.A., D.Sc. 
Dacca University 
P.O. Ramna 
DACCA 
Shri P.R. Srinivaa, Editor 
'Indian Finance' 
20 British Indian Street 
CALCUTTA 
' 
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Sir Purahotllldae Thakurdas, Kt. C.1.E., M.B.E. 
Navsari Challlbera 
· • Outram Road 
rort, ID4BAY 
Shri Mohanlal Tanian, M.Com. J.P. 
c/- Punjab National Bank Ltd. 
LAHORE 
Shri Debi Prasad Khaitan 
8 Royal Exchange Place 
CALCUTTA 
1V/5: Insurance 
Chairman: 
Sir Chunilal V. Methe, K.C.S.1. 
Queen's Mansions 
Prescott Road 
BC14BAY, 1 
secretary: 
Shri K.S. Ramachan Ira Iyer 
Ewart HOuae, Tamarind Lane 
BOteAY, 1 
Mertt:Jers: 
Pandit K. Santanam 
7 Race Course Road 
LAHORE 
Shri J.C. Setalved, B.A. 
Jehangir Wadta Building 
Esplanade Road 
BOMBAY 
Hon'ble Mr Shuaib Qureshi 
Minister in Attendance 
Bhopal State 
BHOPAL 
Shri S. Vaidyanathan, M.A., r.A.I. 
Oriental Govt. Security Lifr Assurance Co. 
Oriental Buildings 
Fort, BOt-eAY 
Shri B.K. Shah, B.Com. F. I.A. 
The New India Aesurance Co. Ltd 
Central Bank Building 
Esplanade Road 
eoteAY 
Mr Abdul Retaan Siddique 
217 Lower Circular Road 
CALCUTTA 
Ltd 
V/l: Transport Services 
Cha.trman: 
Or D.R. Gadgil 
Gokhale Institute 
POONA 
Secretary: 
Dr r. P. Antia 
Associated CeMnt Co. Ltd 
Esplanade House, Waudby Road 
SHAY 
Me:it>ers: 
Shri M.A. Master 
Scindia House 
Dougall Road, Ballard Estate 
SHAY 
Shri G.D. Naidu 
United Motors (Coimbatore) Ltd 
United Motors Building 
COIMBATORE, (S. India) 
Shri R. Nanden Saran 
ZA Metcalfe Road 
DELHI 
Prof. M.K. Ghosh, M.A., B.Com. 
Allahabad University 
ALLAHABAD 
Or N. Sanyai, M.A., Ph.D. 
23 Hindustan Road, Ballgunje 
CALCUTTA 
Mr Nur Mahomed Chinoy 
Meher Buildings 
Chowpatty, BOMBAY, 7 
Shri P.M. Kahali 
Brabourne Stadium 
Churchgate Street 
fort, 80t+3AY 
V/2: Conmunication Services 
Chalman: 
Sir Rahimtulla Chinoy, Kt. 
fCadio House 
Apollo tuider 
EOBAY, 1 
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Secretary: 
Dr S.K. Mitra 
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APPENDIX II 
RECONSTROCTII* C04MITTEE IF COtKIL 
List of Members of the Various Policy Committees 
Note: 1. Representatives of the Government of India will be nominated 
with reference to the agenda for the meeting. 
2. Representatives of Provincial Governments will be nominated by 
these Governments for each meeting. 
J. The names of representatives of Indian States and non-
officials on each Policy Committee are given in the attached lists. 
RECONSTRUCTION COtf.tITTEE or COUNCIL 
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5. The Hon'ble Sir K. Ramunni Menon, Member, Council of State 
6. Rao Bahadur N. Siva Raj, M.L.A. 
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Policy Committee No. 4 - Trade and Industry 
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(b) Non-officials: 
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3. Dr A. Krishnaswami 
4. B. Ramachandra Reddi 
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6. Sardar Bahadur Sir Datar Singh 
7. Mr F.I. Rehimtoola 
8. Prof. J.N. Mukherji 
9. Dr L.C. Jain 
10. Khan Bahadur M.A. Momin 
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12. Khan Bahadur Risaldar Moghal Bez Khan 
13. Cheudhri Mukhtar Singh 
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15. Mr P.N. Singh Roy 
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Source: P.T. Papers, File No.260 in N.M.M.L. 
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APPENDIX 111 
STATDENT CF IIOJSTRIAL PO.ICY (1945) 
The Government of India have issued the following statement on 
Industrial Policy: 
1. The Government of India have reached a stage in their planning 
of industrial development when they consider it would be in the 
public interest to make an announcement of the conclusions 
reached by them on various aspects of policy. There has not 
been time to consult either provincial Governments which are 
at present constitutionally responsible for industrial develop-
ment in Provinces or States between whom and British India a 
high degree of collaboration will be necessary if the maximum 
results are to be achieved from a vigorous industrial policy. 
Some of the proposals will eventually have to be placed before 
the Legislature for approval. Although, for these and other 
reasons, the conclusions reached are, to sonie extent, provisional, 
the Government of India consider that en announcement of their 
views may help to clear up the uncertainty which appears at 
present to be impeding plans of development by private industry. 
2. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the development of 
industries is a provincial subject, but is open to the Centre 
to declare it law that the development of certain industries 
under Central control is expedient in the public interest and 
thereupon, the development of such industries becomes a Central 
subject. No such Act has in fact been passed by the Central 
Legislature with the consequence that the development of 
industries is at the "'°"'9flt wholly a provincial subject. In 
view of this, llOll8 explanation is necessary as to why the 
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Government of India feel themselves called upon to issue a 
·statement of their industrial policy. The reasons are two-fold. 
In the first place, the general economic policy pursued by the 
Government of India under their own constitutional powers 
exercises a profound influence over industrial development. 
It is a matter of history, for example, that the cotton textile, 
the iron and steel and the sugar industries have made rapid 
strides in India largely es a result of the fiscal policy 
pursued by the Central Government. In the second plece,the 
progress of planning has made it abundantly clear that 
certain industries lll.lst be taken over under Central control 
in the interests of co-ordinated development. It was indeed 
contemplated by Parliament, when the Government of India Act 
was passed, that industries in which a common policy was 
desirable would be brought under Central control. Government 
consider that for achieving the foregoing object the following 
industries should be centralised, but before coming to a final 
decision they will consult the Provinces and the leading Indian 
States: 
(i) 
(ii} 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
{viii) 
(ix) 
{x) 
{xi) 
{xii) 
(xiii) 
{xiv) 
(xv) 
(xvi) 
(xvii) 
(xviii) 
(xix) 
(xx) 
Iron and Steel 
Manufacture of Prime Movers 
Automobiles and Tractors and Transport vehicles 
Aircraft 
Ship-building and Marine Engineering 
Electrical Machinery 
Heavy Machinery, such as Textiles, Sugar, Paper, 
Mining, Cement and Chemical 
Machine Tools 
Heavy Chemicals and fine chemicals, chemical dyes, 
Fertilisers and Pharmaceutical Drugs 
Electro-chemical Industry 
Cotton and Woollen Textiles 
Cement 
Power Alcohol 
Sugar 
Motor and Aviation Fuel 
Rubber manufacture 
Non-ferrous metals Industry 
Electric Power 
Coal 
Radio Engineering. 
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When the necessary legislation is passed by tl.J Centre, the 
- Governaent of India will have direct constitutional authority 
for shaping the progress of a number of industries of vital 
importance to the country's development. It may be pointed 
out, although the point is clear enough, that this arrange-
ment has no long range constitutional implications. It is 
intended to be in operation for so long as the present 
Constitution lasts; and to what extent it will survive beyond 
that period is a matter to be decided by the future. 
J. The policy to be pursued by Government must be governed by 
what they consider to be the proper objectives of industrial 
development and the steps that will be necessary, in the 
conditions in which India will find herself after the war, 
to enable these objectives to be achieved. Government 
consider that the fundamental objects of industrialisation 
are three-fold: 
(i) To increase the national wealth by the maximum 
exploitation of the country's resources. It is well-
known that there ere considerable unused resources 
of manpower and material, and clearly Government 
policy must be directed towards stimulating their 
fullest and most effective utilisation. 
(ii) To make the country better prepared for defence. 
The experience of two wars has demonstrated the 
dangers, both to India and to the rest of the 
Commonwealth, inherent in India's dependence on 
overseas supplies for vital commodities required for 
defence. (iii) To provide a high end stable level of employment. 
At present the volume of industrial employment is 
comparatively speaking small, but if the country's 
industrial resources are developed to their maximum 
possible extent, industrial employment, including 
employment in ancillary trades and professions, will 
considerably affect the volume of total employment 
in the country. Government consider that their 
industrial policy should be directed towards maintaining 
employmentd at the highest possible degree of stability 
end vol\1118. 
It ia mciOll8tic in Gover'11118flt's policy that the additional 
"811lth created by industrial developlllfflt should be distributed 
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in a manner that may be regarded as socially equitable. 
·· Powers must be taken and consciously used to secure this 
purpose. 
4. The attitude of Government towards industry in the past was 
for many years one of laissez-faire. Till the war of 1914-18 
this policy was maintained in the belief, which was in 
accordance with current economic doctrine, that industrial 
progress was best achieved by unregulated private enterprise. 
This attitude underwent some modification after the last war 
through the adoption of the policy of discriminating protection. 
The Secretary of State, Mr Edwin Montagu, in a despatch to the 
Government of India in 1919 on the Fiscal Commission report, 
announced a new policy. "If", he said, "the active 
participation by Government in industrial development is to 
be accepted as one of its legitimate functions a new policy 
is required. With the quickening of political life that will 
follow the grant of constitutional reforms the demand for 
progress in administration and social reform may be expected 
to become insistent, and if progress is not to be hampered by 
want of funds the taxable capacity of the people will have to 
be increased. To this end the natural resources of India must 
be effectively utilised, as new opportunities for the invest-
ment of capital present themselves, in order that the standard 
of comfort of the people may be raised, and the economic 
strength of the country may increase. Further, as the experience 
of the past few years has shown that in timP of war, India 
cannot rely on outside sources for her needs, the matte is one 
in which political 9xpediency, economic advantage and military 
aecurity are coincident and accord with the interests of the 
Eapire as a \IWtole. 
~-------,.J 
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I accept the two fundamental principles underlying the 
- recommendations of the Commission; first, that in future 
Government should play an active pert in the industrial 
development of the country; secondly, that Government cannot 
undertake this work unless provided with adequate administrative 
equipment and forearmed with reliable scientific and technical 
advice". 
This despatch was soon followed by the Government of India 
Act, 1919, under which industries become a provincial subject. 
The Government of India therefore lost direct interest in 
industrial development and the Provinces had neither the financial 
nor the technical resources to stimulate development on any 
significant scale. 
The Government of India consider that the continuance of their 
existitl\j policy, in the conditions in which India will find 
herself after this war, will not mee~ th~ objectives of sound 
. 
post-war development. Though industrially stronger than in 
1939, India will find herself in a position of relative 
inferiority. In other countries technological advances have 
been immense and, as a re~ult of the nature of modern warfare, 
there has been a striking increase in the total volume of 
skilled industrial labour. If India is to make rapid headway 
and if the standard of living of the masses is to be effectively 
raised a vigQrous and sustained effort is necessary in which 
the State no less than privRte industry must take a part. 
5. Government have decided to take positive steps to encourage and 
promote the rapid industrialisation of the country to the fullest 
extent possible. They attach particular importance to the 
develoPIMmt of thoae industries which constitute the foundation 
of llOdern industrial life, such aa the iron and steel industry 
I 
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the heavy engineering industries, the machine tool industry, 
· the heavy chemical industry and so on. But while the development 
of these industries must take high priority, it must form part 
of a balanced plan in which due place is given to consumption 
goods industries. It is clear that if progress is to be 
achieved, the development of industry must be planned by 
Government in co-operation with industry and every effort made 
to make the plan effective. 
6. The formulation of a tariff policy appropriate to the post-war 
needs and conditions of the country is under active consider-
ation. The subject, however, is one of great complexity, and 
will require a little further time for the Government of India 
to determin! its policy and devise the machinery for imple-
menting it. In the meantime, the position of industries which 
have been established or developed in wartime requires 
consideration. Soit'le of these are covered by the announcement 
made in 1940 in regard to the grant of an assurance of post-
war protection to essential wartime industries. Outside the 
scope of this announcement, however, lie a large number of 
industries which have helped to sustain the national economy 
during an exceptionally difficult period. The provision of 
assistance to or protection of such of these industries as have 
been established on sound lines is likely to assume a measure 
of urgency during the period of transition. Government pro~ose 
to set up machinery without delay for the ir.vestigation of the 
claims of such industries for assistance or protection. This 
is a short-term 111eaaure pending the formulation of long-term 
tariff policy and the est~blishment of a permanent machinery 
for the purpose. 
7. (i) A pri .. ry point in industrial policy is the extent to which 
·~· 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
the State will take part in industrial enterprise. In India, 
··ordnance factories, PUblic utilities and railways together 
forming a considerable proportion of the total industrial 
enterprise are already very largely State-owned and State-
operatad. Thia arrangement will naturally continue. Further, 
Government have recently decided that the bulk generation of 
elertric power ahould, as far as possible, be a State concern. 
Thia decision falls within the existing pattern of State and 
private enterprise. Apart fr011 ordnance factories, public 
,. 
utilities and railways, baaic induatriea of national i111POrtance 
may be nationalised provided adequate private capital is N>t 
forthcOlling and it is rPgarded as essential in the national 
interests, to promte auch industries. ror the purpose of 
Government policy, baaic industries can be defined aa including 
aircraft, autOllObilea and tractors, chemicals and dyes, iron 
and ateel, pri .. movers, transport vehicles, electrical 
11achinery, 118Chine toola, electro-chemical and non-ferrous 
111etal industries. It is contemplated also that Government lltBy 
take over certain industries in which the tax element is -..ch 
more predominating than the profit elemnt aiid it ia necessary 
and convenient for the State to take over the industry. An 
exB111Ple of auch action in the past is "Salt Manufacture". 
All other industries will be left to private enterprise under 
varying degrees of control. There may be no control except 
such as is required to ensure fair conditions for labour, in 
the case of such industries as those catering for ordinary 
~rs' deMnda and subject to free cCJ11petition, while in 
the cese of induatriea of a ... i-llOOOPOliatic nature or .t\ich 
control acarce natural resources there •Y be a stricter 
control vuyift9 w.lth the circ.-tancea of HCh cue. 
The viftll expreeeed in this paragraph regarding the scope of 
· nationalisation will be diacueaed with Provinces and also with 
the mre illportant Indian StatH and a further atate111ent issued 
aa to whether the scope should be enlarged at all, and if so 
to at extent. 
Within the field considered open for State enterprise, the 
question whether the exiating unite which are private owned 
should be taken over by the State will be examined on the merits 
of each type of each case. The Reconstruction Cmnittee of 
Council Nia chcided in regard to Electri~ity undertakings that, 
aa licences fall due, they will aa far as possible be taken over 
by the State or quasi-State organisation. 
The case of coal will be exallined and dealt with separately. 
(ii) Certain industries of national i111pOrtance such aa Ship-
building and the 111BnUf.cture of locOllOtivea and boilers will 
be run by the State as well as by private capitalists. 
(ii~) Normally State enterprises will be 118f18CJ"d by the State. 
In apecial caaea the possibility of manageiient through private 
agency for a li•ited period may have to be explored. (iv) In 
80ll8 caaes, State enterprises may be operated through public 
corporations. In order to gain experience of management through 
public corporations, further experlments will be tried. 
Government asslstance to lndustry 
8. Governnent have 8:. pr~mary responsibility, which they propose 
to diachawge without,delav aa soon as war conditions allow, for 
developing certain pre-requisites of industrial progress. One 
of thellt ia the development of transport facilities. Thia ia a 
•tter in .t1ich both Central and Provincial GovernMents as 
well n the lndi• States are vitally interested and atepa to 
eneun a co-ordJ.nated policy have already been initiated and 
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Mcie considerable headway. Another pre-requisite is the 
• 
· development of power. The Govenwent of India have made good 
progreaa in ensuring co-ordinated development in this field. 
In naany cases, power echemea - particularly where they are 
cOllbined with irrigation - are ~he primary responsibility of 
Provinces, but where regional projects, which overrun 
Provincial and State boundaries, are considered necessary, the 
Goverrwent of India are taking action for the development of 
resources on a regional basis. The survey of mineral resources 
is another field where the responsibility falls squarely on 
the Central Govem.nt. Steps are being taken to extend the 
Geological eurvey ._., to put it on a footing where it can be 
of the .. xi-... service to the country. Another prerequisite 
of industrial progreaa is scientific and industrial research; 
the Government of India have already devoted considerable 
attention to it and they propose to take all steps which their 
resources will allow for seeing that it is maintained at a 
high level. Technical education, particularly through high 
grade technological institutes, and technical training of 
personnel required for skilled employment are also matters 
in which the Government of India have initiated action which 
will directly assist industrial progress. 
9. In addition to discharging their responsibility for thus laying 
the foundation of industrial progress, the Government of India 
are prepared to assist industry in one or more of the following 
wayas 
(i) Govel'f'lll8nt will take part either by making loans or by 
aubecribing a ahare of the capital, in industrial under-
t.kingll Mhich are considered to be of ill!pOrtance to the 
country•• ctevelopmnt, but for -"ich adequate private 
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capital •Y not be forthcoming. Within this category might 
fall such industries as those 11&nufacturing aircraft, suto-
llObilea and tractors, chemicals and dyes, iron and steel, 
prime movers, transport vehicles, electrical machinery, 
machine tools, electro-chemical and non-ferrous metal 
industries. This list will be modified from time to time as 
circllft8tances warrant. Industries receiving this type of 
assistance will be subject to a greater degree of Government 
control than others. For example, Government might require 
representation on the Board of management and that their 
sanction should be obtained for incurring certain types of 
expenditure and for certain appointments. Government might 
provide in suitable cases capital equipment like buildings, 
services and/or machinery on terms to be settled on the merits 
of each case. This might in certain cases take the form of 
bulk Governnent orders for capital goods which might then be 
allocated to industrialists on suitable terms. 
(ii) In special cases, industrial enterprise will be encouraged 
by guaranteeing a minimum dividend on capital or undertaking 
to meet revenue losses, for a fixed number of years, subject 
to the condition that Government would have a voice in the 
management and that a ceiling will be fixed for the return 
on capital. Where this procedure is followed, profits on 
subsequent years over and above the ceiling will be appropriated 
towards returning the funds paid by Government and after this 
has been done, such excess prcfits as continue to accrue will 
be divided by the Government and the Company in agreed 
proportions. 
(iii) Government will be prepared to give adequate financial support 
to neeerch orp1i•tione .. t up by Industrial Aeaociatiane 
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representing organised industries and to provide for grants 
to Universities for approved schemes of research. Such 
assistance would be in addition to direct Government 
organisation of research as for instance through the Council 
of Scientific and Industrial Research. 
(iv) Subject to reasonable safeguards as to quality and price, 
Governlleflt will continue to encourage Indian industry 
by buying its products in preference to others. 
(v) The Government of India are ~xamining the question of 
the promotion of an Industrial Investment Corporation or 
a similar institution. 
(vi) Government will undertake to examine from time to time, 
the t'ax system with a view to ensuring that, while 
securing the ends of social justice and national 
budgetary interests, the taxation does not tend to act 
adversely on development. 
(vii) Government will assist in the procurement of capital 
goods required by industrialists. They propose to set 
up an organisation in the U.K. and in the U.S.A. for 
this purpose. 
(viii) In certain branches of industry, the advice of experts 
is particularly essential. Government will help in making 
the services of such experts available to industry • 
. 
Ucensino of industry 
10. Government have come to the conclusion that they must take power 
to license industrial undertakings. They have at present no 
power except for emergency war-time controls, to regulate the 
growth of industry; normally a person may put up a factory 
tllherever he likes and .. y 118flUfacture in it .tlatever coanodity 
he c:hCJcMle•· There are, of course, local laws Mhich regulate 
40S 
the size of the buildings, the proportion of open space, public 
· health needs and ao forth and it is possible under these 
regulations to refuse permission to put up a factory building, 
but such refusal cannot be based on considerations of 
in::tustrial development. One eff•.:ct of this unregulated freedom 
to promote industrial enterprise has been the concentration 
of industry in certain areas for instance, the manufacture of 
cotton textiles has been concentrated in Bombay and Ahmedabad; 
sugar in the United Provinces and Biher; paper in Bengal. In 
some cases there are good grounds for the concentration of 
particular industries in particular areas, but in many cases, it 
has been thtt result of fortuitous and haphazard growth. There 
are vast areas in this country which, thoug~ suitable for 
industrial development, have not been developed because industry 
has tended to flow in particular channels. 
11. The effects of such concentration are economic, social as well 
as strategic. It seems unsound from the strategic point of view 
that so large a proportion of industry should be concentrated 
in a few cities which might well be vulnerable to attack. On 
the social side it is clear that concentration creates housing 
problems of a most acute type. Perhaps, an even more important 
consideration is that concentration deprives other areas of the 
country of the beneficent effects of diversified economy. 
Lastly, it is not clear that concentration is necessarily 
economically sound. The markets for textiles, for instance, 
are situated all over India, and cotton, the main raw material, 
is also grown in various parts of India. from the point of 
view of the consumer, it would obviously be right to cut0 out 
ooneceeaary transportation costs and to locate ll80Uf acture 
"'8re both ttw nw •terial and the •ftc•t are situated. Even 
1 
l 
l 
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where concentration appears relatively cheap on the basis of 
· financial coats of production and distribution, it would, in 
many cases be found, in the long run, both socially and 
economically cheaper to disperse industry, if regard is paid 
to the benefits of a widely spread industrial structure and its 
integration with agriculture. 
12. Control over development would be necessary from another point 
of view. In an unregulated industrial economy there is likely 
to be a tendency for capitalists to go in for schemes which promise 
quick returns. This will lead to lopsided development - a 
scramble for some industries, with the danger of overproduction 
and excessive competition and inadequate attention to other 
industries which are equally necessary in the national interest. 
To overcome this difficulty it would be necessary to fix 
targets, to allocate them on a regional b~sis and to see that 
these targets are achieved. 
lJ. As Government has no authority at present to do this, they will 
have to take powers by legislation. Government propose that 
they should take power to licence the starting of new factories 
and the expansion of existing factories, for, without this 
power, planned industrial developm9nt will be quite impossible. 
At the same time in order to avoid unnecessary delays it is 
proposed to set a monetary limit to th~ plants or projects 
requiring licence so that very small plants, moderate extension 
of existing plants or replacements which do not add to output 
should not be subject to licensing. Details of this legislation 
are under consideration. Even on a preliminary examination, it 
is 1111nifest that the power proposed to be taken by Government 
-t be uaed in a Mnl"Mtr that will coamand general public 
confidence. It ia 8qU811y clear that the adlliniatratian of 
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the licensing system must be such as to assure Indian States 
that their legitillate desire for industrial development is 
not overlooked. It is accordingly proposed that a Board 
should be constituted at a high level to advise the Central 
Government in the matter of granting licences for industries 
specified in paragraph 2 above. Details of the personnel of 
the Board, its function, and other connected matters will 
be decided later. 
Other ContJ'ols 
14. In a planned economy it is imposs'ible to do without controls. 
Government consider that such controls should be the very 
minimum required. They propose that apart from licensing, control 
should be undertaken to achieve the following objects: 
(i) To secure balanced investment in Industry, agriculture and 
the social services. It will be necessary, after the war, 
to ensure that the available capital resources ere utilised 
on a balanced plan of agricultural, industrial end other 
development and that inside the field of industrial develop-
ment, a lalance is kept between the manufacture of capital 
and consumer goods. Agriculural development will be under-
taken almost wholly under the auspices of the State. This 
is because the bulk of the holders of land are poor and 
cannot themselveb finance, at any rate, initially, 
improvements such as contour bunding and irrigation by lift 
pumps. In many cases it will be possible to recover the 
coat ultimately, but the capital expenditure #ill have to 
be advanced by the State. The State will ~lso require to 
.. 
borrow heavy 8Ull8 either directly for itself or on behalf 
of locel euthoritiea for financing road develop11ent, 
irrigation, e
0
lectricel power, public health and other 
r 
I 
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aocial services. On any reasonable estimate, the capital 
resources required for these purposes will be heavy, and 
it will be necessary to ensure that the State is in a 
position to mobilise them from the cou~try's savings. 
This will make it necessary to maintain control over 
capital issues; for, otherwise, capital may flow 
excessively in one direction and lead to lopsided develop-
ment. 
(ii) To secure for industrial workers a fair wage, decent 
conditions of work and living and a reasonable security 
of tenure. It is a fundamental objective of industrial 
development that it should enable the general standard 
of living to be raised. It would be a f .t.·ustration of 
this objective if industrial workers do not get fair 
wages and decent working conditi~ns. In the past, these 
matters were left largely to be settled between the 
employers and the workers but it m•1y be necessary for the 
State to intervene with statutory powers. This question 
is engaging the earnest attention of Government and the 
necessary legislation will be undertaken from time to time. 
(iii) To prevent excessive profits to private capital. In the 
case of private undertakings, subject to free competition, 
it would be a mistake to discourage enterprise by undue 
restriction of profits. The risks of such enterprise 
are considerable and if industrialists are to bear the 
losses, they must also be permitted to reap the profits. 
In the normal course the tax svstem may be expected to 
prevent any excessive accU111Ulation of profits. Where, 
however, conditions of free c0111P9tition donot exist and 
n a eo1•quenctt, exceaaive profits accrue, special steps 
l 
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would be necessary. These can only be considered on the 
facts of each case as it arises. 
{iv) To ensure the quality of industrial products in the 
interests of both internal and external markeh. It is 
of the utmost importance to ensure good quality for the 
internal as well a_ the external markets. This involves 
standardisation of products and administrative machinery 
to enforce standardisation. 
(v) To ensure that unhealthy concentration of assets in the 
hands of a few persona or of a special c01111MJnity would 
be avoided. This may be secured by a judicious exercise 
of controls, such as capital issues control and the licensing 
machinery for the regionalisation of industry. 
(vi) To require necessary technical training of personnel and 
to extend the benefit of such trainin~ to minorities and 
backward coanunities. 
15. The Government of India propose without delay to enter into 
discussions with Provinces and with the Indian States in the 
light of the policy stated above and are confident that it will 
be possible to evolve a machinery which will enable an agreed 
policy to be implemented in practice in a spirit of friendly 
co-operation on the part of all parties concerned. 
Planning and Development Department 
New Delhi, April 21st, 1945 
5p&DD-500-26.4.45-PSVPO 
Source: ~.a.I. P & D Dept. File No.8(5)-P/45. 
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